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Presumption and Despair: The figure of Bernard in Middle English imaginative literature 
Adam Tyler Horn 
 
   This dissertation pursues two distinct but parallel projects in relation to the work of 
Bernard of Clairvaux and Middle English imaginative literature. First, I argue for a Bernardine 
anagogical lens as a way to better understand the deepest theological commitments and most 
distinctive formal innovations of certain key Middle English literary texts, especially Piers 
Plowman and The Canterbury Tales. Second, I outline a more genealogical project, tracing the 
figure of Bernard as it is explicitly invoked in widely circulated Middle English works 
including Piers, The Parson’s Tale, and the Prick of Conscience. These two threads connect to 
suggest that the work of Bernard of Clairvaux can offer a new way to understand the relationship 
between theological and literary texts in the late Middle Ages. Because Bernard’s influence in 
the vernacular is as much as matter of style as of content, it requires a more capacious way of 
theorizing the theological implications and even motivations of literary form. The “figure of 
Bernard” acts as a cipher for later works to explore their deepest intellectual preoccupations, and 
makes it possible to trace the way they imagine the anagogical interval between the presence and 
absence of Christ, the over- and under-estimation of the presence of eternity in time. The 
Bernardine themes of “presumption” and “despair” serve as a useful shorthand for signaling this 
theorization, and help me to extend its application beyond texts in which Bernard is explicitly 
invoked—including to writers, like Chaucer and Thomas Malory, whose work is often assumed 




Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... ii 
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iii 
Introduction: A Double Glow: Bernardine style and anagogical exegesis ..................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Noonday Ambivalence: Re-examining Langland’s Nede in the light of Bernardine 
theology ......................................................................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 2: The Two Bernards: Tensions in Bernardine theology and its literary heirs ............... 75 
Chapter 3: “Bernard the monk ne saugh nat all”: Chaucerian theology and the Bernardine 
tradition ....................................................................................................................................... 128 
Chapter 4: “In good tyme”: After despair in Malory’s “Book of Sir Launcelot and Queen 
Guinevere” .................................................................................................................................. 183 
Chapter 5: Memorare .................................................................................................................. 237 
Conclusion...................................................................................................................................257 









 First I should thank my dissertation committee, and especially my sponsor Eleanor 
Johnson. Eleanor offered more of her time and energy to this project than I had any right to 
expect, and made me an incomparably clearer thinker and writer over the course of almost six 
years of encouragement and supervision. Christopher Baswell has consistently challenged my 
least thorough impulses, and helped make possible a research trip that fundamentally shaped this 
dissertation. Patricia Dailey has suggested crucial sources for this project that I would never have 
got to myself, and challenged me at the start to find deeper scholarly resources for my interests. 
My fellow student Jeremy Stevens gave me the strength to carry on over lunch at Panda Express. 
I should also thank Nicolette Zeeman for helping me to begin to understand Thomas 
Malory, and to read and write about literature much more carefully than I was at first inclined to 
do. Without her supervision of the MPhil paper that became this dissertation’s fourth chapter, I 
would have had no idea where I was going, and even less of an idea of how to get there. I would 
also like to thank Robin Kirkpatrick, who taught me how to read Dante in the most generously 
personal learning environment I have ever encountered. Dante does not appear much in this 
dissertation, but the spirit of Robin’s teaching does. 
 Lastly, I have to offer a special thanks to Nicholas Watson, my undergraduate advisor, 
without whom I would have never thought of attempting such a thing. Nicholas introduced me to 
Chaucer, Langland, and Julian of Norwich, and sent me to Bernard’s On Loving God to 
understand them. It is no exaggeration to say that I have spent ten years of my life pursuing these 
themes. Tempting as it is to conclude with a monastic “perdite vixi,” I do not feel that the time 
has been wasted, and I am very grateful to have been sent off in the direction of Cîteaux, by way 







for Steve Roberts, who took me to Gethsemani and bought me some books, 






















Not to make sense, inside the keel of sweating ribs, 
not to make sense but room. 
—Rowan Williams, “Thomas Merton: summer 1966”  
 
But what he knew by nature from eternity he learned by experience in time. 
(“sed quod natura sciebat ab aeterno, temporali didicit experimento”) 












A Double Glow 
Bernardine style and anagogical exegesis 
 
It is no less important to recall that a doctrine does not exist only where it is laid out in didactic 
and scholarly fashion: it is also present in actu where it inspires thought; it can be there in a 
much more organic and much more powerful way than in some formula whose verbal balance 
and clarity leave nothing to be desired.  
 
—Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis  
 
 The outstanding examples of the “Cistercian school,” Étienne Gilson observed, were all 
“stylists”: “Brought up in the school of Cicero and St. Augustine, they have renounced 
everything save the art of good writing.” This applies most of all to their most famous 
representative. Gilson recalls that the “profound hesitation” of St. Bernard of Clairvaux’s early 
years was the question “whether to become a man of letters or to become a saint” (7). Ultimately, 
Bernard chose both. From the very beginning, when he entered the fledgling Cistercian order at 
Citeaux with some thirty friends and family members in tow, Bernard was already preaching and 
converting, learning how best to use language in the service of his new vocation. As his friend 
William of St. Thierry wrote in the saint’s Vita Prima, at that time Bernard “began to rejoice in 
the Spirit, for he was now the spiritual father of all those reborn in Christ, his own brothers, and 
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he saw clearly that the hand of the Lord was working with him. From this moment he set himself 
to assemble whomever he could by the force of words and began to put on the new man” (17). 
From the pen of William, who enlisted Bernard’s rhetorical skill in multiple theological 
controversies,1 the germ of this observation shines through in all its sincerity: for William, 
himself a gifted writer, Bernard is one who works “by the force of words,” and whose capacity to 
use them is second to none. “From now on,” William says, “when Bernard spoke either publicly 
or privately, mothers hid their sons from him, wives kept their husbands away from him, and 
friends fended off their friends from contact with him, because the Holy Spirit put so much 
power into his speech that hardly any other love could withstand its force” (19). The passion for 
“good writing” never left Bernard—he was composing his Sermons on the Song of Songs on his 
deathbed—and it left its mark on all who came into contact with him. 
Testaments to the power of Bernard’s rhetorical gifts echo down through the Middle 
Ages. Steven Botterill’s study of Bernard’s impact on Dante’s Divine Comedy, where Bernard 
appears to complete Dante’s journey through the heavenly spheres, provides a good introduction 
to the saint’s legacy in the years following his death in 1153: “if there was one factor that linked 
the disparate perceptions of Bernard in late medieval culture – contemplative, Mariologist, 
ecclesiastical reformer, theologian of grace – it was the recognition of his uniquely efficacious 
use of language, especially in his preaching” (41). Thomas Aquinas celebrated Bernard “for the 
humility of his preaching,” even if he was “reluctant to accept whole-heartedly his authority as a 
thinker” (30); likewise, for the Franciscan Spiritual Ubertino of Casale, “it is above all the word 
 
1 Bernard’s disputes with Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers were both instigated at William’s urging. G.R. Evans 
cites Otto of Freising’s remark that “Bernard was so zealous for Christian truth that he was sometimes remarkably 
simple and credulous.” According to Evans, William “captured [Bernard] for the cause by appealing to the crusader 
in him. . . .he could be relied upon, once he had taken up a cause, to give it all his considerable energies” (The Mind 
of St. Bernard 149). 
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that is Bernard’s gift to posterity” (40). More probably influential in England is the view of 
Robert of Basevorn, the English author of the Forma praedicandi, an early fourteenth-century 
manual on the rhetoric of preaching. In the Forma, Robert lists Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard 
as the greatest preachers since Christ and St. Paul, and recommends these three as the definitive 
models for all aspiring preachers. In what is perhaps the “earliest technical analysis of 
[Bernard’s] style” (Botterill 40), Robert speaks to the innovativeness of Bernard’s rhetorical 
procedure:  
Now it should be realized that his method is without measure, exceeding the style and 
capability of almost all men of genius. He more than the rest stresses Scripture in all his 
sayings, so that scarcely one statement does not depend on the authority of the Bible or 
on a multitude of authorities. His procedure is always devout, always artful. He takes a 
certain theme or something in the place of it—i.e., some matter that he intends to 
handle—and begins it artfully, divides it now into two, now into three, now into many 
members, confirms it, and ends it, making use of every rhetorical color so that the whole 
work shines with a double glow, earthly and heavenly; and this, as it seems to me, invites 
to devotion those who understand more feelingly.  
(“Sciendum quod modus ejus est sine modo, modum excedens et capacitatem fere 
omnium ingeniorum, qui prae omnibus in omnibus dictis Scripturam inculcat, ut vix sit 
una sententia quae ex auctoritate Bibliae vel multis auctoritatibus non dependeat. Hic 
semper devote, semper artificialiter procedit. Aliquod thema certum, vel aliquid loco 
thematis, i[d est] materiam aliquam quam intendit tractare, accipit, quod artificaliter 
introducit, dividit nunc in duo membra, nunc in tria, nunc in plura, confirmat, concludit, 
omni utens colore rhetorico, ut totum opus utraque redolentia refulgeat, saeculari scilicet 
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et divina, quae, ut mihi videtur, magis motive intelligentes ad devotionem invitat . . . .”) 
(247)2 
“semper devote, semper artificialiter”: borrowing from Bernard’s own language to define his 
style—Bernard’s popular treatise De diligendo deo (“On Loving God”) famously argues that the 
“modus” (“measure”) in which we are to love God is “sine modo” (“without measure”) (I.1; 
III:119).3—Robert underlines the mix of feeling devotion and artful construction that 
characterizes Bernard’s writing, especially the sermons on the Song of Songs and on the 
liturgical year that will be the touchstones of this study.  
The twentieth-century theologian Henri de Lubac helps to draw out the theological 
implications of the liberty that Bernard takes with his scriptural and patristic sources: 
Furthermore, it is not merely by such or such an unprecedented interpretation, it is by his 
whole manner that Bernard treats Scripture with a new liberty; with an ‘audacious 
liberty’. . . .‘With the spirit of freedom going on before,’ says Bernard himself. He uses it 
so freely, remarks [Bernard’s friend and secretary] Geoffrey of Auxerre, ‘that he seems 
rather to precede it than to follow it, to lead it where he wanted, himself following the 
Spirit who is its author.’ Of him more than any other it therefore seems true to say that he 
does not properly speaking explicate the Scripture: he applies it; he does not clarify it: he 
clarifies everything by means of it, and the human heart to start with. . . .As Saint 
 
2 I have used Thomas Marie Charland’s edition of the Latin text, cited in my Works Cited below. I have begun here 
with James J. Murphy’s translation, which suggests “double glow” for “utraque redolentia.” I have adopted 
Murphy's usage because more literal translations all seemed to lose something of the original sense. “Double 
fragrance” is maybe the closest. 
3 All references to Bernard are given with reference to the relevant sections of the work itself first, followed by the 
volume number and page number at which the text appears in Jean Leclercq’s edition of Bernard’s Opera. Both are 
given in parentheses, and the section references are separated from the references to Leclercq’s edition by a 
semicolon. In general, I have begun with the translations provided by the Cistercian Fathers series, then adapted the 
translations when they seemed to me to need it. Each translation I have used is cited in my Works Cited below. 
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Augustine had done in a few pages of lyric exaltation, but more habitually, he composes 
centos. He pulls the texts from their context. He appropriates them. (152) 
Bernard’s Augustinian “centos” model a beguiling mix of unprecedented citationality and 
unprecedented flexibility: he says almost nothing but scripture, but does almost anything he 
wants with it. It is as if in Bernard’s sermons scripture simply becomes experience, it is so 
deeply digested into the author’s way of seeing the whole world and of understanding himself.4 
This revolutionary new style leads de Lubac to call Bernard not only “the last of the Fathers”—a 
traditional title still used by the Trappist Thomas Merton in his twentieth-century celebration of 
the saint—but also “the first of the great moderns,” marked by his “interiorizing contemplation,” 
“preoccupied above all with the spiritual conversion and interior life” yet nonetheless “never . . . 
individualistic.” De Lubac terms this way of making scripture a site of “experience” “mystical 
tropology”: “At such a degree of interiority, allegory is no longer distinct from tropology; 
mystery and morality are united in a single mystic vision full of sweetness” (175). In Bernard’s 
writings, a thread that had been lost since Augustine’s Confessions is picked back up, precisely 
because it is a matter not just of theological content but of literary style: Bernard’s exegetical 
“spirit of freedom” extends into a renewed interiorization of scripture, and a daring willingness 
to expand its application beyond any previously circumscribed exegetical sphere.  
This dissertation examines the influence of Bernard’s stylistic and theological 
innovations in Middle English imaginative literature. Evaluating Bernard’s impact on later 
literary works, I will not be applying the ideas of a speculative theologian or literary theorist to 
more putatively complex literary texts. I will be doing something more like describing a dialogue 
 
4 Jean Leclercq remarks that Bernard “is convinced of what he calls ‘the unity of the Scriptures’; that everything in 
them is meaningful and can be discovered by an ingenuous love. . . .Bernard reaches a sort of Biblical ‘experience’, 
a ‘lived’ comprehension of the truths that it teaches” (“The School of Cîteaux” 193). 
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between artists, comparing one work of what Nicolette Zeeman has called “imaginative theory” 
with another.5 This approach itself has roots in Bernard’s rhetorical style. Robert of Basevorn 
summarized Bernardine style with the word “inculcatio” (“inculcation”). “Inculcatio” happens, 
Robert says, when “allusio” (“allusion”)—“when Scripture is touched upon without being quoted 
as such” (“quando Scriptura tangitur, non allegatur”)—occurs “on many occasions or 
continuously” (“multum in pluribus vel continue”). According to Robert, “It is the blessed 
Bernard in particular who has made use of these rhetorical colors” (“Quibus coloribus praecipue 
usus est beatus Bernardus”). Bernardine “inculcation” requires an interpretive flexibility from its 
reader, and in particular a willingness to follow “allusion” even when it occurs “not in the same 
way in which it was written down, but while changing the subject or the grammatical case” 
(“non eodem modo quo scripta est, sed mutatur vel persona vel casus”) (320). As we will see, 
many later writers changed the “subject” of Bernard’s writings, but a substrate of Bernardine 
thinking and style is nonetheless identifiable in, and important for understanding, their work. 
“Inculcatio” models the possibility of absorbing a source in such a way that the seams between 
original and copy, allusion and source, seem almost to disappear. This does not mean that what is 
being done with the source is not original, even revolutionary. Close attention will be required to 
discern the shared theoretical underpinnings, and the sharp departures, that mark the complex 
interplay between Bernard and his literary heirs. 
 
 
5 Zeeman describes “the possibility of literary theory expressed in ‘literary’ form,” drawing particular attention to 
the way “the literary text—especially in the vernacular—was in a disciplinary sense ‘different’, a site from which to 
enter into dialogue with, or even counter, the teachings of the schools. . . .Later fourteenth-century English writers 
such as Chaucer and Langland signal in a variety of ways their distance and disengagement from the traditional 
intellectual formulations and teaching methods endorsed by the schools” (“Imaginative Theory” 225-6). Bernard, in 
the controversies mentioned above, also often signaled his distance from the schools. Bernardine literary theory, and 
Bernardine theology itself, is always distinctly embedded in a literary form, and clearly demonstrates Zeeman’s 
claim that “theory can be expressed in figural terms” (240). 
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Bernardine anagogy  
The cornerstone of the Bernardine “theory,” in my reading, is what Robert of Basevorn 
calls the “double glow, earthly and heavenly.” If this designates, in technical terms, Bernard’s 
artful combination of rhetorical “colors” and bursts of apparently artless “measure”-lessness, it 
also indicates that with Bernard we remain firmly anchored in what Jean Leclercq calls the 
“dialectics of presence and absence, possession and non-possession, certainty and uncertainty, 
light and darkness, faith and eternal life” that characterize the pre-eschatological saeculum (Love 
of Learning 25). De Lubac describes the way this aspect of Bernard’s work generates a dramatic 
play of approach and retreat, departure and return: “This is what he calls the ‘alternations,’ the 
‘vicissitudes of the Word going and coming back’ . . . the ‘drama of vicissitude,’ a drama which 
is the necessary expression of temporal and pilgrim existence, and consequently, ‘the authentic 
criterion of a real experience of God’” (160). Bernard is the unparalleled master of producing 
this effect. Although de Lubac discusses the distinctiveness of the Bernardine style most of all in 
terms of “mystical tropology,” I will refer to Bernard’s distinctive “double glow” here in terms 
of de Lubac’s fourth and final sense of scripture: “anagogy.” This is the sense that “completes 
the movement of mystical tropology” (188), and that was already for Origen and Jerome “one of 
the names of the spiritual sense in general” (180). For all the importance of the Cistercian 
tropological “interiorization,” the dialogue with Bernard in later literary writers was even more 
marked by an attraction to the sense in which, in Bernard’s writing, even in the flow and flux of 
time, the “earthly and the heavenly” sometimes appear to shimmeringly coincide. G.R. Evans 
describes “that duality, that lively tension between this world and the next, which [Bernard] 
found so stimulating in everything he did” (The Mind of St. Bernard 114). “More concretely,” de 
Lubac says, the anagogical is “the sense that lets one see in the realities of the earthly Jerusalem 
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those of the heavenly Jerusalem: ‘for a certain part of the earthly city has been made an image of 
the heavenly city’” (180).6 This does not mean that the earthly image is to be arithmetically 
equated with the heavenly reality it points to; for, although Bernard “was quite able to refer to 
Clairvaux as the true Jerusalem,” it is a “mark of the mediocre” to move from looking for 
“authoritative examples” and “divine indications” to affirming “a historical bond grounding 
some sort of exclusivity” (150).7 Genuine anagogy must maintain its tension forward, while 
remaining firmly grounded in the present intimations of eternal truth: “For Christianity is a 
fulfillment, but in this very fulfillment it is a promised hope. Mystical or doctrinal, taught or 
lived, true anagogy is therefore always eschatological. It stirs up the desire for eternity in us” 
(197). What de Lubac calls the futura (“future things”) are always mysteriously present in the 
invisibilia (“invisible things”) on earth, but never fully fulfilled there; the two aspects of anagogy 
are interdependent and intertwined.8 Bernard’s anagogical double glow maintains this tension 
between future fulfillment and present desire. 
 
6 In Bernard’s fourth Missus est homily In Praise of the Blessed Virgin Mary, he explains that Christ is said to reign 
over Jerusalem, even though he never did in the literal, historical sense, “because, as we have already said, the 
throne on which [David] sat in time bore the image of the eternal throne” (“idcirco, ut iam dictum est, memoratur 
fuisse David, quia haec, in qua temporaliter sedit, aeternae illius gerebat imaginem”). This is extrapolated into a 
general interpretive principle: “However, as we know, there is another Jerusalem meant, one different from that 
which now is, where David reigned, one far more noble and far richer. I think that this is the one meant here, in the 
manner of speaking frequently found in Scripture, where the signifying thing is put for the thing signified” (“Sed 
novimus quamdam aliam Ierusalem ab ea, quae nunc est, in qua regnavit David, designatam, multo ista nobiliorem, 
multo ditiorem. Hanc igitur puto hic fuisse significatam, illo videlicet usu loquendi, quo saepe reperis in Scripturis, 
significans poni pro significato”) (4.1; IV:46-7). 
7 Leclercq notes, however, that Bernard sometimes stressed “the conviction that the life lived in the Cistercian Order 
and especially at Clairvaux bears importantly on the glory of God and the good of all mankind, almost as though 
outside Clairvaux there was no salvation” (A Second Look 90). I will deal with this “exclusive” mentality somewhat 
in Chapter Two. Constance Berman’s study The Cistercian Evolution suggests that this mentality led to internal 
divisions within the Cistercian Order, where Bernard’s influence and the influence of Clairvaux could be perceived 
as overwhelming. 
8 M.B. Pranger contrasts Bernardine anagogy with Erich Auerbach’s influential idea of the medieval “figura” with 
respect to this tension: “What breaks down [in Bernard's writing] is Auerbach’s construct of figura of an event that 
‘is enacted according to an ideal model which is the prototype situated in the future and thus far only promised.’ As 
a result, the sequel of this promise also breaks down: the fact, that is, that the same event is ‘already fulfilled in God’ 
turning figura into ‘the tentative form of something eternal and timeless.’ Bernard’s version is much more radical 
than that. There is just no bi-polarity. By blending coming and going he establishes a figura that comprises past and 
future because it is based on a present that is not a prototype or a model but a reality” (“Bernard the Writer” 235). In 
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Although Bernard’s writing was to prove widely influential and his Order destined to 
become a mainstay of western monasticism, it is important to remember that the newness of the 
Cistercian style was felt at least by some at the time as a decisive break with the past: “For 
whether it be a matter of admiration or of scandal, the same word is upon all lips in the first half 
of the twelfth century just as at the time of the first Christians: novelty. ‘What is this new law? 
This new doctrine? Whence does it arise? Whence comes this new and unheard of 
presumption?’” (de Lubac 151). This at least was not just a matter of style: for all its 
commitment to a renewed sense of simplicity and re-dedication to the Benedictine rule, the 
Cistercian Order was marked by a striking number of cultural and procedural innovations—from 
its emphasis on personal choice as exemplified in its “break with the oblate system,” to its 
eschewing “peasant feudal labor” in favor of “bearded lay monks” known as the conversi, 
defining the “social catholicity of its appeal” (Lawrence 167), to its “partly representative 
legislature,” consisting of general chapters that were in their time “the only international 
assemblies known to Europe” (174).9 C.H. Lawrence judges that the Order’s “advocates 
conveyed all the exhilarating sense of taking part in a great movement of reform, which was also 
a revival of a heroic past” (169). Early Cistercian converts like Bernard were marked by a 
“determination to renew the concept of the monastic vocation as a spiritual adventure freely 
chosen by the individual in response to a divine call” (165). The corollary of de Lubac’s 
 
this respect, perhaps more than de Lubac admits, Bernard himself occasionally asserts even on the exegetical level 
“a historical bond grounding some sort of exclusivity” (de Lubac 150). But another way of looking at this would be 
to say that, more than Pranger realizes, Bernard maintains the “bi-polarity” between figure and fulfillment while 
straining it toward its vanishing point in the Incarnation. Present reality is not a “prototype”; neither is it quite ever 
beatitude.  
9 Louis J. Lekai notes that the Cistercian “lay-brotherhood” was not “an altogether revolutionary innovation,” but 
“no other order employed lay-brothers on such a large scale and with such great efficiency.” He points out that the 
conversi were not to be “exploited merely as laborers; they were treated as religious, members of a monastic 
community” (334). C.H. Lawrence, however, notes that in the later years of the twelfth-century, “most Cistercian 
abbeys became large-scaled landed proprietors, differing from the older monasteries only in that they exploited their 
estates largely with their own labour-force instead of leasing them to tenants” (176). 
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interiorized “mystical tropology” on the level of practice lay in the Order’s innovative insistence 
on the importance of individual freedom and communal self-rule. 
Perhaps in part because he was conscious of the way these innovations provoked 
accusations of novelty and presumption, the originally Augustinian theme of “presumption” and 
its opposite “despair” is ubiquitous in Bernard’s writings, including in some of his most 
influential works. Tracing this phrase will be one important way I trace the influence of 
Bernardine anagogical thinking and style.10 Although the formula’s appearance in a literary text 
is by no means a guarantee of Bernard’s direct influence, “presumption and despair” acts as a 
kind of informal signature that tends to show up where Bernard is being directly or indirectly 
invoked, and that at the very least signals an interest in the category of issues that were raised by 
the Cistercian innovations—a deep dive into interiority that also necessitated serious thinking on 
the way the eternal relates to its manifestations in time, the way spirit relates to flesh, and so on. 
The pairing of presumption and despair therefore also tends to bring with it the fundamental 
problem of anagogy, which itself traces a middle way, on the exegetical level, between 
despairing of the eternal significance in things and presuming to comprehensively grasp it. To 
“presume” is typically, for Bernard, to pretend to understand something you ultimately cannot; to 
despair is to give up on trying. 
In short, Bernard stands at the hinge of Christian intellectual history, not just stylistically 
but theologically and culturally, in terms of his participation in an influential reform movement 
that stressed individual freedom and personal experience as its keynotes, even as it paradoxically 
insisted that freely chosen humility and communal obedience were the highest virtues. If Bernard 
 
10 Susan Snyder traces the pairing to Augustine’s Sermo CXLV. She comments: “The law gives us fear, which is a 
check on presumption; then grace gives us hope, lest we despair. But the transition may be perilous. Fear is the gift 




was the “last of the Fathers,” spoken of in the same breath with Augustine and Gregory the 
Great, he is also one of the only medieval theologians besides Augustine to be consistently 
invoked with respect and even fondness in the work of the magisterial reformers Martin Luther 
and John Calvin.11 As a writer and as a thinker, Bernard is just as prescient as he is traditional, 
and almost as influential after the Reformation as he was before. The greatest of the Cistercian 
“stylists,” “exceeding the style and capability of almost all men of genius,” Bernard of Clairvaux 
is also truly the “first of the great moderns,” as de Lubac suggests but does not pursue. Pursuing 




 Because William Langland’s fourteenth-century poem Piers Plowman deals explicitly 
with both genuinely Bernardine and popular Pseudo-Bernardine texts, it is a good starting place 
for an examination of Bernard’s legacy in Middle English imaginative literature. In Chapter One, 
“Noonday Ambivalence: Re-examining Langland’s Nede in the light of Bernardine theology,” I 
bracket the question of Bernard’s explicit presence in the poem in favor of pursuing a deeper 
parallel that resonates with a neglected but essential dimension of Piers Plowman: the poem’s 
distinctly anagogical sensibility, and its consequently fine attunement to the sense of Christ’s 
alternating presence and absence in time. By applying an anagogical lens to the figure of Nede, 
generated from a close reading of Bernard’s thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs, I argue 
that the critical impasse around Nede is a deliberate effect artfully induced by Langland, 
 
11 See Bernard McGinn’s Introduction to Bernard’s On Grace and Free Choice for comments on the importance of 
Bernard’s influence on the magisterial reformers (45-50). M.B. Pranger more directly parallels Luther and Bernard, 
and argues that the former fundamentally misunderstood the latter, in his article “‘Perdite vixi’: Bernard de 
Clairvaux et Luther devant l’échec existentiel.” 
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signaling an attempt to crystallize the poem’s eschatologically inflected vision centered on 
neediness and the soul’s necessarily fragmented experience of time. Although this reading 
overlaps with the readings of some other critics—Jill Mann’s in particular—I push beyond them 
to suggest that there are in fact deep reasons for the critical uneasiness around the figure of Nede, 
and that these must be framed in terms of an attempt to represent an obscure “noonday” 
temptation that consists precisely in the inability to recognize a present good. This reading serves 
to illustrate the potential productivity of reading Bernard alongside the literary texts under his 
influence, and of re-reading works of theological “imaginative theory” alongside literary texts 
more generally. 
 In Chapter Two, “The Two Bernards: Tensions in Bernardine theology and its literary 
heirs,” I move from the inductive method employed in Chapter One to making a more deductive 
set of connections grounded in specific historical contexts. I begin where I left off with Piers, 
drawing out the implications of Chapter One to offer a new reading of Langland’s relationship 
with the figure of Conscience and with important tensions in fourteenth-century theology. 
Building on the work of Richard Firth Green and William J. Courtenay in particular, I argue that 
Langland uses the figure of Bernard as a stand-in for an at the time already traditional and even 
somewhat outmoded, “covenantal” form of Christian thinking, while at the same time pushing 
beyond Bernard to apply an apocalyptic lens to the institutional configurations of the Christian 
Church itself. Mid-chapter I switch critical modes to show that there was another influential 
strand in Bernard’s thinking that had an equally strong, almost opposite influence on prominent 
literary texts in the saint’s lifetime and after: a dualistic drift, exemplified in his crusade 
preaching and in the popular Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae 
conditionis (“Pious Meditations on the Understanding of the Human Condition”), that led him to 
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stress the divides between spirit and flesh, soul and body, the cloister and the world. I show how 
Bernard’s crusade preaching may have shaped the songs of the troubadour Jaufre Rudel, master 
of the “amor du lonh” (“love from afar”) lyric, and explore the literary and real-world 
consequences of the un-anagogical dualism it modeled. Jaufre provides me with a direct literary 
parallel with Bernard’s preaching, and a point of likely direct contact from which to begin my 
examination of Bernard’s influence in the vernacular. I also introduce the Meditationes piisimae 
as a crucial text for understanding the “figure of Bernard” in medieval England. As Steven 
Botterill argues, “it is less important to decide how ‘correct’ [an author’s] view of Bernard was, 
in terms of its conformity to the historical record, than it is to consider its particular orientation 
and its consequences for [the author’s] own thought and poetry”; “The point is not what is true, 
but what is believed” (21). The pervasive appeal of the Meditationes illustrates this well. 
 My interest in the Meditationes piissimae, a bleakly fascinating and under-studied text, 
leads me on to a fuller exposition of the treatise and of its influence in the Middle English 
vernacular—both as a foundation and inspiration for the widely circulated poem called the Prick 
of Conscience, and as an adversarial foil for the neglected theological underpinnings of 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. In Chapter Three, “‘Bernard the monk ne saugh nat all’: 
Chaucerian theology and the Bernardine tradition,” I argue for a new understanding of Chaucer 
as a committed counter-theologian, whose garrulous figure of the Host embodies an anagogical 
theology precisely calibrated to counteract the effects of the Prick’s and Meditationes’ futura-
obsessed gloom. In Harry Bailey, Chaucer constructs an anagogical figure so firmly anchored in 
time and in the body that his eternal significance is almost too embedded to be seen. In my view, 
the figure of the Host is in fact in line with some of the most distinctive tendencies in Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s own exegetical method: in particular, with his attention to what Bernard calls, in the 
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De diligendo deo (“On Loving God”) treatise, the “tongue” (“loquela”) of the flesh, which 
speaks to the spirit even if it must be ultimately subordinated to it. An examination of Bernard’s 
direct and indirect presence in Chaucer’s work makes it possible to see how Chaucer, in an 
importantly different way from Langland, responds with force and originality to some of the key 
theological currents of his time. The Host more than anyone embodies Robert of Basevorn’s 
assessment of Bernardine style: “saeculari scilicet et divina” (“earthly and also divine”), the 
apparently secular Host in fact shines with a divine “double glow” that requires a re-assessment 
of Chaucer’s poetry in terms of its deep theological commitments. 
I end with my least likely theological interlocutor, and so with an attempt to extend the 
interpretive agenda of my dissertation to an even more thoroughly secular figure: Sir Thomas 
Malory. In Chapter Four, “‘In good tyme’: After despair in Malory’s ‘Book of Sir Launcelot and 
Queen Guinevere,’” I re-trace the tight formal structuring of the Morte Darthur’s penultimate 
book, arguing that Malory’s most original additions serve an authorial agenda centered on some 
of the key terms of Bernardine thought: his concern with “presumption” in particular, and the 
worry of despair that is its theological shadow. In the figure of Lancelot, Malory concentrates his 
thinking on distinctly theological questions about sin, self-knowledge, and the soul’s relationship 
with its origin in God, culminating in the enigmatic miracle that marks the end of his original 
“Sir Urry” sequence. Returning to Chapter One’s procedure of reading Bernardine theology 
alongside rather than into literary texts, I suggest that a Bernardine lens on Lancelot’s experience 
can help us to see what Malory is attempting with the elaborate rearrangement of his sources that 
marks the “Book of Sir Launcelot and Queen Guinevere.” Even here, I remain grounded in lines 
of real intellectual filiation: the Old French Queste del Saint Graal, which is still thought to be a 
possibly Cistercian production, provides Malory with a theological backdrop against which to 
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push and from which to draw some of the deepest sources of his own theoretical interventions. 
Much like Langland, Malory proves to be thinking with and against Bernardine ideas, even if in 
this case Bernard’s direct influence is perhaps unlikely. Taking Malory seriously as an 
“imaginative theologian” in Barbara Newman’s terms, I explore the implications of her claim 
that “when Malory is forced to choose between sacred and secular values, he chooses both” 
(109). 
To conclude, I turn back to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales to ask what Bernard’s particular 
reputation for Marian devotion, decisive in the late Middle Ages but unexamined in the body of 
my dissertation, has to say to my dominant themes of anagogical presence and the influence of 
Bernardine writings in Middle English imaginative literature. A compressed close reading of one 
of Bernard’s Missus est homilies pairs with a brief reading of Chaucer’s Second Nun’s Tale to 
model the way vernacular texts could draw inspiration from, and radically widen out the 
meaning of, Bernard’s “figure.” The Second Nun, unlike many of the authors I explore in this 
study, explicitly cites her source in Bernard, but his influence is much more deeply inculcated 
than even this direct citation suggests. The story of Bernard’s reception in the Middle English 
vernacular is marked by these kinds of conscious and unconscious repossessions; this is why it 
requires a close and careful reading to assess its significance. Bernard is referenced, as Robert of 
Basevorn described the rhetorical device of “inculcation,” “on many occasions or continuously,” 
but “not in the same way in which it was written down.” The Second Nun’s self-consciously 
“feithful” practice of “translacioun,” designed to “ydelnesse withstonde,” models a form of 
“leveful bisynesse” that resists both presumption and despair, respecting the gap between 
original and translation without giving up on the “werche” it takes to faithfully bridge it: “Wel 








Re-examining Langland’s Nede in the light of Bernardine theology  
 
And so I think that with your maul you will hew out for yourself from these cliffs something that 
you would not have gotten by the keenness of your talented mind from the bookshelves of the 
schoolmasters, and at times you will in the heat of midday, in the shade of the trees, have sensed 
something you would never have learned in the schools. 
 
(“Unde arbitror, quod malleo illo tuo aliquid tibi de rupibus illis excuderis, quod sagacitate 
ingenii, de magistrorum scriniis non tulisses; et nonnunquam tale aliquid in meridiano fervore, 
sub umbris arborum senseris, quale nunquam didicisses in scholis.”) 
 
—Bernard of Clairvaux, letter to Aelred of Rievaulx, Preface to the Mirror of Charity
 
 Bernard of Clairvaux is a paradoxical figure. He famously described himself, in a letter 
written in the wake of the Second Crusade’s failure, as the “chimaera of his age,” referring to the 
bizarre mixture of mystical contemplation and active, ever-mobile praxis he recognized in 
himself and in his uniquely gyrovantic career as the politically and ecclesiastically active abbot 
of Clairvaux (Ep. 250.4; 402).1 This paradoxical quality is also characteristic of his thought, 
 
1 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I have not had access to the seventh and eighth volumes of Leclercq and 
Rochais’s Sancti Bernardi Opera, which contain the edited Latin texts of Bernard’s Epistolae. They are not held at 
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which made it possible for the great mystic of the love of God to sponsor the first military order 
of warrior monks, and to enthusiastically advocate for not only the failed Second Crusade but 
also a later, follow-up crusade that never took place.2 One way to address the apparent 
contradictions in Bernard’s life and thought would be to speak, as David Aers does, of something 
like “Constantinian Christianity”: Bernard inherits a somewhat debased, or at least compromised, 
Christendom, the covetousness of which has completely obscured the purity of the primitive 
church of holy fools.3 Rowan Williams takes a softer version of this line when he suggests that 
there is a tendency in Bernard’s thought, and in the thought characteristic of his time, to obscure 
“the eschatological tension between Church and society”: for some in the twelfth century, at 
least, Christendom simply is Christianity, and the literal defense of kingdoms gets confused with 
the anagogical quest for the Kingdom of God (“Three Styles” 28).4  
 
the library of the University of Kentucky, where I finished this dissertation. I have therefore provided the letter 
number and section number from Leclercq’s edition, followed by the page number of the corresponding passage in 
the translation by Bruno Scott James, separated by a semicolon.  
2 Jean Leclercq observes: “In 1149 and 1150, after the failure of the military expedition into the Holy Land, 
[Bernard] accepted a project which had already been germinating in certain minds, an attack on Constantinople by 
the Western forces (the idea was eventually thwarted by divisions among the princes). However, it was a matter of 
conquering them, not as schismatics, but as the political adversaries of the Crusaders. Bernard recognized that their 
political separation from Rome constituted a violent situation, an absence of peace—iuncti fide, pace divisi. He 
reminded Eugenius III of his responsibility as universal pastor. Bernard desired reconciliation” (“Saint Bernard’s 
Attitude toward War” 34-5). 
3 I refer to Aers’s study Beyond Reformation?: An Essay on William Langland’s Piers Plowman and the End of 
Constantinian Christianity. I will engage with Aers more directly later in this chapter. 
4 Nevertheless, as Leclercq notes, Bernard’s fellow Cistercian Isaac of Stella, otherwise awestruck in his veneration 
of the saint, dubbed the rise of military-monastic orders like the Templars’ “new militias” (“novae militiae”) a “new 
monstrosity” (“monstrum novum”), scoffing, “Those who died in this depopulation were called martyrs. . . .How 
would such behavior compare with the patience of Christ, his gentleness, and manner of preaching?” (“siqui autem 
de eo in depopulatione talium ceciderint, Christi martyres nuncupent. . . .Quomodo objicietur ei Christi mansuetudo, 
patientia, ac forma praedicandi?”). Isaac does qualify himself—“not that what they do is altogether evil, but because 
it can become the occasion of evil. For (miserable fact) nearly all evils have sprung from good things” (“nec quia 
fortasse omnino sunt mala, quae agunt: sed quia fore malorum occasiones queunt. Nam (quod miserabile est) omnia 
fere mala de rebus bonis inoleverunt”)—but not before making it clear that Bernard’s attitude toward the Templars, 
and toward the relationship between the church and violence in general, was not universally held or uncontroversial 
(PL Vol. 194, cols. 1854b-1854c). I will cite the Patrologia Latina by volume and column number in parentheses, 
using the abbreviation PL. 
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 These difficulties, of course, are not limited to Bernard’s twelfth century. The saint’s 
striking lament, in the letter cited above, that he is “neither cleric nor layman,” and that, having 
“kept the habit of monk,” he nonetheless “long ago abandoned the life” (Ep. 250.4; 402), is in 
fact reminiscent of the fundamental dilemma faced by William Langland’s protagonist Will in 
the long fourteenth-century allegorical poem Piers Plowman. Piers also incorporates a nuanced 
array of responses to the thought of St. Bernard, including citations of both genuinely Bernardine 
and Pseudo-Bernardine materials, and embodies in its own way the central tension that 
characterizes Bernard’s own thought—a tension between what I will call “pilgrim” and 
“crusading” theologies, a mysticism of love and an incipiently violent dualism. It therefore 
demonstrates how the figure of Bernard can serve as a surprisingly malleable touchstone for later 
literary authors in addressing their own most fundamental concerns, and serves as an appropriate 
introduction to the subject of Bernard’s influence in Middle English imaginative literature.  
Will’s own crisis of purpose is adumbrated in Piers Plowman’s opening lines: 
In a somur sesoun whan softe was the sonne 
Y shope me into shroudes as Y a shep were; 
In abite as an heremite vnholy of werkes 
Wente forth in the world wondres to here, 
And say many selles and selkouthe thynges. (C.Prol.1-5)5 
At once an “heremite” and “vnholy,” habited only “as” a sheep, Langland’s Will is never quite 
comfortable with his position in the world—and, like Bernard, he expends immense rhetorical 
energy worrying over it. This acute sense of unsettledness, and Langland’s complex response to 
it, indicates a significant parallel between the poet’s and the monk’s most fundamental 
 
5 All references to Piers Plowman are to are to Derek Pearsall’s edition of the C-Text, cited in my Works Cited 
below. References will be given by passus and line numbers, in parentheses. 
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intellectual concerns: Will’s search for a “kynde knowyng” (C.I.137) of the truth and of true 
love amid the “wondres” of the world, which he requests of Holy Church in Passus I of the 
poem, runs parallel to and draws directly on Bernard’s lifelong attempt to articulate a theology 
of “experience,” which Emero Stiegman has called the “preeminent distinguishing mark of his 
thought.” As Stiegman points out, Bernard refers to the Song of Songs, the subject of his 
decades-spanning, unfinished masterwork Sermones super cantica canticorum (“Sermons on the 
Song of Songs”), as the “book of experience,” which he sets alongside Scripture and creation as, 
for the first time, a “third revelatory book” (“Bernard of Clairvaux” 138). Along similar lines, 
Eleanor Johnson stresses that “in Piers, the literary rendering of participatory contemplation is 
an experience, a zone of sensory complexities to be wandered through, as a means for grasping 
abstract truths about God that remain, always, slightly beyond discursive, rational access” 
(Staging Contemplation 76).6 Across the space of two centuries, the poet and the monk pursue 
parallel projects: the opening up of a space for a theology of experiential participation, where 
something like “kynde knowyng,” or experience itself—Bernard writes, in the first of his 
sermons on the Songs, that “Only the anointing [of the Holy Spirit] can teach the song, and it is 
learned by experience alone” (“Istiusmodi canticum sola unctio docet, sola addiscit 
experientia”) (1.11; I:7)—is placed firmly at the center of Christian thinking.  
 Langland in fact draws on both genuinely Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine materials to 
determine what it means to know something “kyndly.” These citations occur in their most 
 
6 Likewise, James Simpson has suggested that, “In seeking discussions of the forma tractandi of scriptural writing 
which might be relevant to Piers Plowman, we should turn specifically to theologians for whom theology was 
regarded as an affective rather than a speculative mode of knowledge, concerned with the good rather than with the 
true, and experienced through the will rather than conceived through the intellect” (“From Reason to Affective 
Knowledge” 5). Bernard, whose “accounts of the contemplative experience tends to fall overwhelmingly on the 
affective side of the mystical experience” (Cvetkovic 101), and whose “emphasis on voluntas, at the level of which 
he locates the image of God,” comes “at the expense of memory and intellect” (51-2), fits this description to a T. 
Traugott Lawler describes Langland’s Imaginatif—who is, in the C-Text’s Passus XIII, the figure in the poem who 
explicitly defines the role of Nede in the humbled ascent to God—as “the capacity to profit from experience” (113). 
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concentrated form in Will’s conversation with Liberum Arbitrium in Passus XVI of the C-Text, 
where Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine texts are mashed together to recommend suspicion of 
over-intellectualized forms of knowledge: “‘Beatus,’ saith seynt Bernard, ‘qui scripturas legit / 
Et verba vertit in opera emforth his power’ / Coueytyse to conne and to knowe sciences / Potte 
out of Paradys Adam and Eue: / Sciencie appetitus hominem immortalitatis gloriam spoliauit” 
(C.XVI.222-6). The first Latin citation here, a Pseudo-Bernardine passage that parallels several 
genuinely Bernardine texts,7 crystallizes one of the most essential anxieties that drives Piers 
Plowman: the need to escape the realm of infinite “verba” and know with certainty what one 
really ought to do. This passage’s final line, a genuine citation of Bernard’s Sermo IV in 
Ascensione Domini, prompts Liberum Arbitrium to reflect on the need for thoughtful moderation 
in one’s pursuit of knowledge: “‘Non plus sapere,’ saide the wyse, ‘quam oportet sapere, / Laste 
synne of pruyde wexe’” (C.XVI.229-30). This scriptural citation of Romans 12:3, which 
Traugott Lawler in The Penn Commentary on Piers Plowman links to the influence of Bernard as 
well (159),8 fairly summarizes the role the figure of St. Bernard explicitly plays in the poem: the 
 
7 Pearsall cites the Tractatus de Ordine Vitae (PL Vol. 184, col. 566c), but this work seems to draw on an earlier 
source for the phrase (Alford 396). 
8 Lawler points out that this scriptural citation occurs in conjunction with the proverb that just precedes this passage 
in the poem (Proverbs 25.27)—“Sicut qui mel comedit multum, non est ei bonum; sic qui scrutator est magestatis, 
opprimetur a gloria” (C.XVI.217)—also in Bernard’s fifteenth sermon De diversis, which, he says, along with 
Bernard’s Sermo IV in Ascensione Domini, “reads almost like a commentary on Piers Plowman.” Lawler observes 
that “it is hard not to think that L[angland] has Bernard in mind all through this passage” (159). There are in fact 
multiple moments in this latter sermon that suggest Langland may have had direct knowledge of it. For my purposes 
it is particularly interesting that Bernard says, in the section just preceding the passage that Langland cites, that even 
“the experience of harsh need to which we have been handed over by our senseless appetite for knowledge” (“durae 
experientia necessitatis, cui sumus addicti per insipientem scientiae appetitum”) will not necessarily dissuade us 
from ascending the mountain of prideful, unnecessary knowledge (4; V:140). Christ, on the other hand, “ascended in 
the very act of descending” (“in hoc ipso quod descenderit, ascendisse”) (3; V:139). It is also interesting that this 
sermon explains this descent by humility with a creative use of the word “passus,” which is so evidently crucial for 
Piers Plowman: Christ “was going step by step, as it were, so that from strength to strength the God of gods might 
be seen on Zion (“velut quisbusdam passibus ibat, ut de virtute in virtutem videretur Deus deorum in Sion”) (6; 
V:143). Near the beginning of the sermon, Bernard compares God’s actions in the world to a writer’s skillful 
arrangement of his materials: “For just as a writer arranges everything for specific reasons, so the things that are 
from God are appointed; and especially those performed by [his] majesty present in the flesh” (“Sicut enim qui 
scribit, certis rationibus collocat universa, ita quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt, maximeque ea quae praesens in carne 
est operata maiestas”) (2; V:139). 
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voice of the Cistercian saint consistently recalls the Dreamer to the pursuit of “kynde knowyng,” 
of “quam oportet sapere” (“what it is necessary to know”), to the exclusion of any immoderate 
“sciencie appetitus.” Another Pseudo-Bernardine citation at another crucial moment in the poem 
focalizes this question of what one needs to know around the problem of self-knowledge in 
particular: “Multi multa sciunt et seipsos nessiunt” (“Many know many things and do not know 
themselves”) (C.XI.163), Scripture says, in the B-Text in response to Will’s changing the subject 
away from helping the needy to criticize the clergy (B.X.359-60).9 “lakkede… in Latyn” and 
weeping with wrath, Will falls asleep at once and is “rauysched . . . into the lond of longyng and 
loue” (C.XI.162-7), where he has to confront his own sins and limitations. 
As in the opening sequence of the poem, where Will implores Holy Church to “Teche me 
to no tresor but telle me this ilke, / How Y may saue my soule” (C.I.79-80), the Bernardine call 
to moderation and self-awareness in the pursuit of knowledge raises the inevitable question of 
just how it is that one is to distinguish between the unnecessary “tresor” of intellectual vainglory 
and the necessary knowledge of salvation. It is in facing this question that the deepest thematic 
concerns of the poet and the monk most overlap. Langland does not make explicit use of the 
Bernardine language of “experience,” but he does invent his own vocabulary for filling in an 
analogous gap in Will’s understanding: an experience of “nede” that alone makes possible an 
appropriately moderated “kynde knowing,” capable of distinguishing between those kinds of 
knowledge that are necessary and those that are not.10 This is a controversial claim, because 
 
9 This is the incipit of the treatise Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis (“Pious Meditations on 
the Understanding of the Human Condition”), a work that most often went under Bernard’s name. I will analyze it in 
detail in Chapters Two and Three.  
10 There are Bernardine analogues for this emphasis on need, as when in the first sermon on Advent he says that 
Christ came “not at the beginning of time or at its midpoint, but at its end. This is done not inappropriately; on the 
contrary, Wisdom wisely arranged that help should first be brought when the need was great” (“non in initio, non in 
medio temporis, sed in fine. Nec incongrue factum est, sed vere sapienter disposuit Sapientia, ut cum magis esset 
necessarium, tunc primo ferret auxilium”), emphasizing that “We were the ones in need” (“Nostra enim necessitas 
erat”) (1.8-9; IV:167), or when, in his third sermon on Palm Sunday, he exclaims, “Great is his need, the need for 
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Langland’s Nede is a controversial figure. Nede speaks only in the final passus of the B- and C-
Texts of Piers Plowman, appearing just before the arrival of Antichrist and the apparent 
unraveling of the Church’s “Unite.” Its appearance has consistently baffled critics. Jill Mann and 
Robert Adams are the crucial voices in what constitute, respectively, the “pro-Nede” and “anti-
Nede” critical camps, into which most readings of the poem fall.11 Following Mann, the former 
group tends to emphasize the importance of physical and spiritual neediness for the whole poem, 
and so the positive priority of Nede’s appearance in the final passus for our interpretations of 
Piers as a whole; the latter, on the other hand, emphasizes the apparent un-orthodoxy of several 
of Nede’s statements, including a radical inversion of the hierarchy of the virtues—Nede places 
temperance, traditionally last, at the top of the list—and, in a twist unique to Adams, the at least 
plausible identification of Nede with the “egestas” (“need”) that is said, in Job Chapter 41 in the 
Vulgate, to precede Leviathan, and that was generally understood, following Gregory the Great, 
as a kind of allegory of Antichrist. These latter critics therefore dismiss Nede as a figure for a 
malign and even diabolical temptation. Positing an ambivalent middle way, James Simpson has 
described Nede as a “matter of great intellectual tension” for Langland (Piers Plowman 205-6)—
a place where the poet’s inability to resolve the problems of the active life versus the 
contemplative, evangelical poverty and the lifestyle of the wandering writer-hermit versus the 
more stable life of the cloister, is concentrated into a final, self-lacerating reproach. Nede 
“afrounted me foule and faytour me calde” (C.XXII.5), Will reports at the beginning of Nede’s 
appearance in the poem’s final passus, and he is given no opportunity to answer Nede’s charges 
against him; he simply swoons and falls asleep again.  
 
their salvation” (“Magnum opus, opus salutis”) with regard to Christ’s need for mankind’s salvation (3.3; V:53). But 
Langland’s use of the term is strikingly original. 
11 Jill Mann’s “The Nature of Need Revisited” provides a helpful roster of the impressively evenly matched literary 
critical teams in question (5). 
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In contrast both with Simpson’s proposed irresolution and with those critics who sort 
themselves into one or the other critical camp, I will argue that Langland does indeed attempt to 
resolve the tension represented by Nede—but only in the sense that he attempts to inhabit it, 
straining to represent and affirm the “eschatological tension” that Rowan Williams sees as 
peculiarly elided in the crusading work of St. Bernard. Nede’s functioning, as Richard Firth 
Green puts it, as both “apocalyptic sign” and “redemptive principle” at the same time (“Nede ne 
hath” 26), is the only answer the poem gives to its own most fundamental questions, a “sign of 
contradiction” that, rather than offering “discursive, rational access” to some kind of once-and-
for-all answer to its protagonist’s and poet’s personal and intellectual concerns, obscurely relays 
to its reader an experience of tempered hopefulness through an awareness and experience of 
one’s own fundamental neediness. For Piers Plowman, it is only in terms of this experience, and 
not by way of any intellectual scheme—“Sciencie appetitus hominem immortalitatis gloriam 
spoliauit”—that the question of “quam oportet sapere” can finally be answered. 
It has perhaps not been sufficiently noted by recent critics that Bernard himself—
however much he may have traveled “In abite as an heremite vnholy of werkes”—was also a 
master of personal and ecclesiastical self-critique. The twelfth-century movement toward greater 
strictness in the observance of the Benedictine rule, of which he was the most famous advocate, 
arose at least in part from the conviction that he was himself living in an age of shocking 
hypocrisy and rampant covetousness at the highest levels of the church, threatening to render the 
Christian community of his day a diabolic parody of its Gospel commitments.12 Bernard was 
 
12 This is most dramatically, and hyperbolically, illustrated in Bernard’s Apologia ad Guillelmum, written against 
what he saw as the decadent practices of the monks at Cluny. Conrad Rudolph’s The “Things of Greater 
Importance” provides a lengthy analysis of the treatise, which he describes as “the most important source we have 
today for an understanding of the actual medieval attitude toward art as it functioned in society” (3-4). The theme is 
also developed at length in the sermon I will describe and analyze below, where Bernard locates the Church of his 
day firmly in the age of hypocrisy at its highest pitch. It is worth noting, however, that—as in the Apologia—
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also, as a close reading of his thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs will make clear, himself 
an unparalleled master of what Williams calls “eschatological tension.” He is himself torn 
between the requirements of a Christendom at times lacking in something like eschatological 
perspective—a Christendom to which he nonetheless owed his full obedience, having had to be 
persuaded at great length both of the Templars’ foundation and of the Second Crusade’s 
initiation that it was his duty to support them, and having apparently never questioned these 
pursuits once he was persuaded that this was so—and his own evident attunement to the fact of 
the church’s, and the soul’s, necessarily existing for now in an anagogical interval in which they 
are both mysteriously present in the world, and yet in some sense not to be fully realized until the 
arrival of the eschatological Kingdom.13  
To this extent I agree with Williams, if I would not go so far as Aers: Bernard will 
discard “eschatological tension” when it suits him, or rather when he feels bound to as a matter 
of obedience. And yet at the same time it must be remembered that he is his generation’s great 
advocate for a whole dimension of thought that was, as he greatly feared and as was perhaps 
responsible for his occasionally hysterical tone in the affairs of Peter Abelard and Gilbert of 
Poitiers, rapidly disappearing.14 This is the dimension of thought that I have described in my 
 
Bernard often seems to suggest that the Cistercian Order (and perhaps the Cistercian Order alone) is exempt from 
this specific critique (Lawrence 168). 
13 It is hard to restrict the location of this latter sensibility to any one particular passage, as it permeates the whole of 
the Sermones super cantica canticorum and much else of Bernard’s work. M.B. Pranger describes Bernard’s view of 
“life as ritual failure” (Bernard of Clairvaux 26). Along similar lines, Julia Kristeva writes of love in Bernardine 
theology: “Indeed, governed by the higher inclination toward the good and toward God, our fallen nature yet 
remains rebellious. Without that resistance we would not have needed the holy violence that constitutes love in order 
to reach the ideal. Without it Christianity would be a philosophy of the good, eventually a rationalism, not this 
passion of the body wrenching itself—which is called love” (166). My reading of the thirty-third sermon will, I 
hope, bring out this dimension of Bernard’s thought more clearly. 
14 Emero Stiegman describes Bernard’s reputation as a “reactionary obscurantist” in these confrontations as “a 
partisan construct,” and yet perhaps “history’s revenge for the undeserved image of his opponents that he himself 
projected, in the acrimonious style that was Christendom’s traditional dialogue with ‘heretics’: they were rationalists 
devoid of faith.” Bernard’s “deepest concerns” in these debates, Stiegman believes, must be sought in terms of 
“what disturbed him as a contemplative monk”—the concern, for instance, that if faith is held “as the best available 
hypothesis, an opinion – an aestimatio (or existimatio, as Abelard said),” then “reason becomes the final arbiter, and 
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Introduction in terms of anagogy, and that I have discussed so far in this chapter with respect to 
Bernard’s category of “experience” and Langland’s figure of “Nede.” A closer look at Bernard’s 
anagogical imagination in action will make it easier to make sense of Langland’s own eventual 
recourse, at the end of both B- and C-Texts of Piers Plowman, to the language of neediness. 
Identified in the Middle English Dictionary not just with necessity (2), but also and more 
frequently with desire (1a), lack (1b), poverty (1c), and with sexual desire (1f) and the relief of 
bodily needs such as urination and defecation in particular (1g), “nede” is a word marked by a 
generative ambiguity that, in its capacity to encompass both the bare needs of the body and the 
strict necessities of metaphysical speculation, promises to bridge some of the distance between 
here and the hereafter, the “now” and the “not yet” of anagogical time. Bernard of Clairvaux, to 
whom Langland’s Liberum Arbitrium refers in his reflections on the dangers of superfluous 
knowledge and the consequent need to establish what it is that one really needs to know now, 
provides both an obviously influential analogue, and a direct, eliciting influence, on Langland’s 
decision to have recourse to this prolifically ambiguous figure.  
 
The Chimaera of Time: Noon in Bernard’s Thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs 
 Bernard’s eschatological genius is made abundantly clear in his thirty-third sermon on the 
Song of Songs, a masterwork of anagogical perspective both personal and ecclesiastical and one 
of the great commentaries on the symbolism of noontide in the Song and in the Psalms. The 
sermon begins with a fugue of prayerful voices: 
 
the monk’s mystical ascent loses its grounding” (“Bernard of Clairvaux” 132). Constant J. Mews describes 
Leclercq’s analysis of these confrontations in terms of “two distinct systems of schooling in the medieval world, one 
clerical . . . the other monastic,” but ultimately disagrees with Leclercq’s neat dichotomy, emphasizing instead the 
extent to which Bernard “was simply not interested in the critique of theological language” and “had no particular 
expertise in such a discussion of words” (166). Stiegman’s “mystical ascent” hypothesis resonates more with my 
reading: even if Bernard did not understand what was being gained in the schools, he understood what was in danger 
of being lost. 
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“Tell me, you whom my soul loves, where you pasture your flock, where you make it to 
lie down at noon.” But another voice, that of Job, says: “Tell me why you judge me like 
this?” This man does not complain of the judgement, he merely queries its cause, seeking 
to gain knowledge from his afflictions rather than be destroyed by them. Still another 
man made a similar request: “Make your ways known to me, O Lord, teach me your 
paths.” What he means by paths he reveals in another text: “He leads me in the path of 
righteousness.” Therefore the man who longs for God does not cease to seek these three 
things, righteousness, judgment, and the place where the Bridegroom dwells in glory: the 
path in which he walks, the wariness with which he walks, and the home to which he 
walks.  
(“Indica mihi, quem diligit anima mea, ubi pascas, ubi cubes in meridie. Et alius quidem: 
Indica, inquit, mihi cur me ita iudices. Ubi non sane sententiam causatur, sed scrutatur 
causam, erudiri flagellis petens, non erui. Item alius precatur, dicens: Vias tuas, Domine, 
demonstra mihi, et semitas tuas edoce me. Quas dixerit semitas, manifestat alibi: Deduxit 
me, inquiens, super semitas iustitiae. Ergo tria ista anima curiosa Dei non cessat 
inquirere, iustitiam, ed iudicium, et locum habitationis gloriae sponsi, tamquam viam in 
qua ambulet, cautelam qua ambulet, et ad quam ambulet mansionem.”) (33.1; I:233-4) 
The first voice is, of course, the voice of the bride in the Song of Songs; this is Bernard’s third 
consecutive sermon discussing this single verse: “Tell me, you whom my soul loves, where you 
pasture your flock, where you make it to lie down at noon” (Song of Songs 1.6).15 The second is 
the voice of Job, asking God to explain the reasons for his suffering; and the third is the voice of 
 
15 All references to the Bible are to the Vulgate. As in this case, where I am citing Bernard citing scripture, I have 
used my translation of Bernard’s citation, following the Cistercian Fathers series. In other cases, I have provided my 
own literal translations of the Vulgate text. 
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the Psalmist, asking to be taught the ways of righteousness. Bernard’s first rhetorical move is to 
knit these three voices together, depicting them as three harmonizing registers in which the 
desire of the “man who longs for God” is expressed; Bernard strikes them all at once, together, 
as a kind of chord. He goes on to characterize the three things sought from God in terms of three 
corresponding virtues that are given to the bride who seeks them: “loveliness from the habit of 
righteousness, prudence from her knowledge of judgments, and chastity from her desire for the 
presence or glory of her Bridegroom” (“de forma iustitiae sit Formosa, de iudiciorum notitia 
cauta, de desiderio praesentiae seu gloriae sponsi casta”) (33.1; I:234). These are the gifts 
requested by a spiritual love, Bernard says, as opposed to a carnal. This is why the bride says 
“not simply, ‘whom I love,’ but ‘O you whom my soul loves,’ thereby indicating that her love is 
spiritual” (“non simpliciter: quem diligo, sed: O, inquit, quem diligit anima mea, spiritualem 
designans dilectionem”) (33.2; I:234). 
  The bride in this passage—who is, first and foremost, the soul, although she will turn out 
also to be a figure for the Church—is characterized fundamentally by her desire; structurally, she 
is a kind of beggar. Even her virtues, Bernard stresses, are properly not her own; they are “gifts” 
received. We are a long way from the exposition of the noonday demon and of the fourfold 
scheme of the temptations of the soul and of the church at the end of the sermon, but we are 
nonetheless already offered a kind of doubly threefold interpretative schema, which might be 
fruitfully compared both with the scheme of the four cardinal virtues and also with Henri de 
Lubac’s fourfold sense of scripture. Bernard is in effect here describing a threefold interpretation 
of the bride’s desire, which acts as a kind of literal sense subject to rigorous allegorical 
interpretation: “the man who longs for God,” whose desire this sermon is meant to make legible 
for us. Interpreting this fundamental datum, Bernard first describes a righteousness that asks, 
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“Make your ways known to me, O Lord,” which might be fairly compared with the allegorical or 
Christological sense of the received teachings of the faith and of the life of Christ, and which is 
said to issue in the virtue of prudence. He next describes a faculty of judgment that asks to “gain 
knowledge from his afflictions,” issuing in a kind of moral “loveliness” that might be fairly 
compared with the tropological sense’s emphasis on how exactly one is to act on what one has 
understood, and with the virtue of fortitude. Lastly, and most enigmatically, Bernard arrives at 
“the place where the Bridegroom dwells in glory,” which is known on earth only in terms of the 
“desire” for itself that it generates, and that issues in the distinctively Bernardine and Cistercian 
virtue of “chastity.” It is this final comparison that has the greatest bearing on my argument 
about Piers Plowman, and that is of the most importance for the sermon itself: the implicit 
connection between “the place where the Bridegroom dwells in glory,” apprehended here only 
by “desire”; the fourth of de Lubac’s fourfold senses of scripture, the anagogical sense; and a 
“chastity” that looks very much like the virtue of temperance as it is described by Langland’s 
Nede.16  
 
16 This is of course more than Bernard says. The description of the virtues he offers to the Cistercian Pope Eugenius 
III in his treatise De Consideratione (“On Consideration”), however, also significantly prioritizes temperance, 
without explicitly inverting the hierarchy Aquinas would later describe in more detail. In a passage that would serve 
as a good gloss on Nede’s speech, Bernard blurs the boundary between prudence and temperance: “Prudence is the 
mean of desire and necessity. . . .In this way it forms a third virtue called temperance. Consideration judges 
intemperate both the man who obstinately denies himself necessities and the man who indulges in excess. Thus, 
temperance is not only the rejection of what is excessive, but also the acceptance of what is necessary” (“Haec 
(prudentia) item est, quae inter voluptates et necessitates media . . . et sic . . . tertiam formans virtutem, quam dicunt 
temperantiam. Nempe intemperantem ipsa consideratio censet, tam eum, qui necessariis pertinaciter demit, quam qui 
indulget superfluis. Non est ergo temperantia in solis resecandis superfluis: est et in admittendis necessariis”) 
(VIII.9; III:404). G.R. Evans writes of this passage, and of virtue in the De Consideratione more generally: “The 
connection of justice with temperance is through the will. Unless the will is under control (by consideration), it will 
not refrain from excess and then it will not be able to give the other person his just desserts. Unless the will is thus 
‘tempered’, it may go too far in justice, for it is possible to be excessively just by being excessively severe 
(Ecclesiastes 7.17). . . .[Bernard] argues for a ‘mean’ which is both proper to each virtue and uniformly and fully 
shared by all.” Although it is ultimately prudence that is identified as the “virtue which is the discoverer of this 
mean” (Bernard of Clairvaux 134)—in Bernard’s terms, “the mean of desire and necessity”—this emphasis on the 
centrality of moderation and the mean for all the cardinal virtues is nonetheless clearly reminiscent of what Nede 
says about the priority of temperance with respect to real need. Piers itself, in the persons of the “vicory,” lord, and 
king, already suggests the fragility and manipulability of the three cardinal virtues other than temperance that Nede 
himself criticizes. One should not mistake the obvious point that Langland’s lord abuses fortitude, for the more 
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 Robert Adams identifies this sermon as a direct or indirect source for Piers,17 and aligns 
the “lewed vicory,” the lord, and the King who appear in the poem’s penultimate passus both 
with perversions of the first three cardinal virtues, and with a fourfold scheme of church history 
adduced by Bernard at the end of the sermon (“Some Versions of Apocalypse” 206).18 In any 
case, long before Bernard enters into any speculations on the stages of church history, he first 
takes care to provoke the desire of his listeners for the three virtues he has described as 
characterizing “the man who longs for God.” He recommends, “Nor must you overlook the 
reference to the hour of noon, nor above all that she looks for a place where he who feeds the 
flock also lies down, a sign of great security. . . .Happy the place in which the sheep move in and 
out at will, and there is no one to frighten them!” (“Sed nec illud praetereat te de hora meridiana, 
et quod is potissimum exploratur locus, in quo qui pascit, cubat simul, quod est magnae 
securitatis indicium. . . .Felix regio, in qua pro libitu oves ingrediuntur et egrediuntur, et non est 
qui exterreat!”) (33.2; I:234). Langland’s Dreamer, of course, sets out dressed in “shroudes as Y 
a shep were” (C.Prol.2), and Piers Plowman itself seems to exist emphatically in that interval of 
unfulfilled, expectant desire that Bernard describes as that place where noon has not yet come, 
the flock may not yet lie down, and “no matter how great the effusion of the Spirit that enriches 
these, the husk of the sacrament is not received with the same pleasure as the fat of the wheat, 
nor is faith the equivalent of vision, nor memory of presence, nor time of eternity, nor a face of 
its reflection, nor the image of God of a slave’s condition” (“quantalibet sane abundantia Spiritus 
 
controversial suggestion that Nede abuses fortitude by ranking it lower than temperance. The former precisely 
motivates the latter. Likewise, it is the lewed vicory himself who declares, “For Spirtus prudencie among the peple 
is gyle / And al tho fayre vertues as vises thei semeth” (C.XXI.455-6). The critique of prudence that begins this 
fourfold satirical scheme in the poem has a spokesperson who is acutely aware of the failure he perhaps also 
embodies. 
17 Margaret Goldsmith also makes this connection in her article “Piers’ Apples” (320-1). 
18 As Adams implies, this is not the same as claiming Bernard as a direct source. It is, however, only “among the 
exegeses of St. Bernard’s disciples” that the Augustinian four-stage model of church history was brought into 
explicit conversation with the otherwise separate schema of the four cardinal virtues (“The Nature of Need” 300).  
30 
 
pinguescant ista, non pari omnino iucunditate sumitur cortex sacramenti et adeps frumenti, fides 
et species, memoria et praesentia, aeternitas et tempus, vultus et speculum, imago Dei et forma 
servi”) (33.3; I:235). It would be hard to imagine a more dramatic description and even 
enactment of “eschatological tension” than this passage’s litany of dichotomies between the 
“now” and the “not yet” of anagogical temporality. Bombarding his listener with accounts of the 
“safe dwelling-place” of “Paradise,” the “sweet nourishment” of the “Word,” and the “wealth 
beyond calculation” of “eternity” (“Tuta habitatio paradisus, dulce pabulum Verbum, opulentia 
multa nimis aeternitas”) (33.2; I:235)—and subsequently insisting that these things only exist for 
us now in terms of their being longed for—Bernard opens up a kind of interval of expectation 
and even abjection in the sermon, a gap between the now and the hereafter, time and eternity, 
memory and presence, that must be left indefinitely open for now, suffered with the aid of 
Bernardine “chastity” on the way to the “home to which he walks.” 
 This point is emphatically restated with reference to the person of Stephen, the first 
martyr of the church, “one of your little sheep,” upon whose death Christ was said to stand up 
from his throne in heaven (Acts 7.55). Even Stephen was not spared the experience of abjection: 
“You feed your flock therefore, and at the same time make them rest, but not here below” (“Ergo 
et pascis, et cubas pariter, sed non hic”) (33.4; I:236). In a characteristically Bernardine twist, 
this somewhat grim observation immediately opens up more space for prayerful desire: “And so 
I beseech you,” he repeats, “‘show me where you pasture your flock, where you make it lie down 
at noon,’ that is, the whole day long: for that noon is a day that knows no evening” (“Et 
propterea, quaeso, Indica mihi ubi pascas, ubi cubes in meridie, hoc est tota die: etenim illa 
meridies tota est dies, et ipsa nesciens vesperam”) (33.4; I:236). Just as noon transforms abruptly 
here into a figure for all of eternity, tantalizingly conceived in terms both of the anagogical 
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now—the invisibilia of de Lubac, where eternity already interpenetrates time—and of the 
eschatological not yet—de Lubac’s futura, the future things at the end of time—Bernard shifts 
gears again, throwing us back into the past, where the life and death and resurrection of Christ 
laid the allegorical foundation on which his whole interpretive schema is built. The noonday’s 
sun “never sets” (“nescit occasum”), Bernard says; “But perhaps it had a sunrise, when that 
sanctified day first dawned upon us through the tender mercy of our God, in which the Rising 
Sun visited us from heaven” (“At matutinum forsitan habuit, cum primum videlicet dies 
sanctificatus illuxit nobis, per viscera utique misericordiae Dei nostri, in quibus visitavit nos 
Oriens ex alto”). “How many prophets and kings desired to see this, and did not see it!” (“Quanti 
reges et prophetae voluerunt videre, et non viderunt!”) (33.4; I:236), he exclaims—thus closing 
the interval of desire, if only for a moment, with the sunrise appearance of Christ. And yet this 
interval is immediately once again re-opened, and with greater force, “because it was still only 
the dawn, and the beginning, or rather a token of the coming day, for the Sun concealed its rays 
rather than shed them over all the earth” (“eo quod aurora esset et initium, vel potius indicium 
diei, dum Sol adhuc absconderet radios suos, et minime eos spargeret super terram”) (33.5; 
I:236). “The dawn, then,” Bernard observes, “and a quite clouded one at that, was the whole life 
of Christ upon earth, which remained obscure until he died and rose again” (“Erat ergo aurora, et 
ipsa subobscura satis, tota illa videlicet Christi conversatio super terram, usque dum occumbens 
et rursum exoriens”) (33.6; I:237). With the resurrection of Christ we finally reach sunrise—both 
literally and figuratively since, as Bernard reminds us, the women who found him are said to 
have come to the tomb just after dawn (Matt. 28.1, Luke 24.1)—and with it “a new beauty, with 
a more serene light than usual” (“novum . . . decorem, et sereniorem solito lucem”) (33.6; I:237). 
This light has only grown, it seems, in the time since: “Since then the Sun has risen indeed, and 
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has gradually poured down its rays over the earth; its light has begun to appear increasingly 
clearer, its warmth to be more perceptible” (“Sane ex tunc elevatus est sol, et sensim demum 
infundens suos radios super terram, coepit paulatim clarior apparere fervidiorque sentiri”) (33.6; 
I:237). The resurrection, ascension, and sending of the Holy Spirit, it seems, have made possible 
this gradual and irresistible brightening. 
 This metaphorical treatment of Christ’s coming in terms of the sunrise in itself represents 
a whole panoramic vision of history, and one that seems at least to complicate the fourfold 
Augustinian scheme to which Bernard will later commit himself. This first schema’s insistence 
on the only partial light of Christ’s first coming implies a more or less straightforwardly 
progressive understanding of the way Christian history works: Jesus’s resurrection represented a 
sunrise of which we are still only, at least in Bernard’s twelfth century, beginning to see the late 
morning consequences. Of course, by now we perhaps recognize the pattern: Bernard is about to 
undercut this concretely optimistic suggestion, and from multiple directions. First, he returns his 
listener to the eschatological interval of hope: “However, even though it increases in warmth and 
strength, though it multiplies and extends its rays over the whole course of our mortal lives—for 
it will be with us even to the end of the world—it will not attain to its noontide splendor, nor be 
seen here below in that fullness that it will exhibit hereafter, for those who are deemed worthy of 
this vision” (“Verum, quantumlibet incalescat, invalescat, multiplicet et dilatet radios suos per 
omni huius nostrae mortalitatis curriculum, —erit enim nobiscum usque ad consummationem 
saeculi—, non tamen ad meridianum perveniet lumen, nec in illa sui plenitudine videbitur modo, 
in qua videndus est postea, ab his dumtaxat quos hac visione ipse dignabitur”) (33.6; I:237). 
Next, addressing Christ directly, Bernard firmly re-situates his listener in the space of prayer, and 
so of unfulfilled desire:  
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O true noontide, fullness of warmth and light, trysting-place of the sun. . . .Show me this 
place, [the bride] said, where there is so much brightness and peace and fullness, so that, 
just as Jacob while still in this life saw the Lord face to face and his soul was saved, or as 
Moses saw him, not by means of images and obscure saying or through dreams . . . so 
may I too merit the ecstatic grace of contemplating you in your light and beauty, as you 
generously feed your flock and make them rest securely.  
(“O vere meridies, plenitudo fervoris et lucis, solis statio. . . .Hunc locum, inquit, tantae 
claritatis, et pacis, et plenitudinis, indica mihi, ut quemadmodum Iacob adhuc in corpore 
manens vidit Dominum facie ad faciem et salva facta est anima eius, vel certe sicut 
Moyses vidit eum, non per figuras et aenigmata seu per somnia . . . ita ego quoque te in 
lumine tuo et in decore tuo per mentis excessum merear contemplari pascentem uberius, 
quiescentem securius.”) (33.6; I:237-8) 
In the wake of this prayer, Bernard begins now to explicitly thematize the frustrating cycle of 
approach and rebuff, advance and retreat, presence and absence it characterizes, lamenting again: 
“Here on earth too, you feed your sheep but not to their full satisfaction. . . .You call me blessed 
when I hunger and thirst for righteousness. But what is this in comparison with the happiness of 
those who are filled with the good things of your house, who feast and rejoice in the sight of the 
Lord, who delight with joy?” (“Nam et hic pascis, sed non in saturitate. . . .Beatam me dicis, cum 
esurio et sitio iustitiam. Quid hoc ad illorum felicitatem, qui repleti sunt in bonis domus tuae, qui 
epulantur et exsultant in conspectu Domini, et delectantur in laetitia?”) (33.7; I:238). Here 
Bernard modulates himself into a humbler, “needier” vein: “To eat is pleasurable, but one does 
not eat in security if fear is present. To suffer and feast simultaneously is surely a bitter pleasure? 
All things here below fall short of perfection, many are beyond the reach of my desires, and 
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nothing is safe” (“Et pasci certe, ubi timeas pati, iucunditatem habet, sed non securitatem. Porro 
autem pati et pasci simul, nonne molesta iucunditas est? Omnia mihi hic cedunt citra perfectum, 
plura praeter votum, et tutum nihil”). With this seemingly bewildered reflection, the saint arrives 
again at once at another tantalizing node of hope: “When will you fill me with the joy of your 
presence? Lord I do seek your face. Your face is the noontide” (“Quando adimplebis me laetitia 
cum vultu tuo? Vultum tuum, Domine, requiram. Vultus tuus meridies est”) (33.7; I:238). 
 The disarmingly simple identification of the “noontide” with the face of Christ represents 
the anagogical axis of the sermon, around which the whole rest of it turns. With the invocation of 
the bridegroom’s “face,” Bernard arrives at a kind of prefiguring fulfillment of desire, an image 
that arrests—if only for an instant—the anxious quest for the noontide pasture. As if to 
underscore this point and lengthen this pause, Bernard returns immediately to his scriptural 
refrain: “‘Tell me where you pasture your flock, where you make it lie down at noon” (“Indica 
mihi ubi pascas, ubi cubes in meridie”) (33.7; I:238). In the wake of this crystallization of the 
bride’s desire, a new register begins to open up in Bernard’s discourse—a more nearly 
confessional vein, which testifies to the speaker’s own experience more specifically than the 
sharply rhetorical laments that have preceded it:  
I do wish to know where that pasturage is at noon. For during my time in this life, in this 
my place of pilgrimage, I am accustomed to feed and be fed under your protection, in the 
Law and the Prophets and the Psalms, in the meadows of the Gospels . . . and often I have 
done my utmost to beg food for myself and those belonging to me from the doings of the 
saints, from their words and writings. More often, however, because this was the closer at 
hand, I have eaten the bread of pain and drunk the wine of sorrow, ‘my tears have been 
my food day and night, while men say to me continually: “Where is your God?”’ My one 
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hope is your table . . . from which I receive by favor of your mercy all that I need for 
refreshment when I feel sad and inwardly disturbed. This is the pasture that I have known 
. . . but tell me also about those secret places that I do not know. 
(“scire velim ubi in meridie pascas. Nam in tempore quidem mortalitatis meae et in loco 
peregrinationis meae, consuevi sane sub tua custodia pasci et pascere, in Lege et 
Prophetis et Psalmis, necnon et evangelicis pascuis . . . frequenter etiam de gestis 
sanctorum, et verbis et scriptis eorum, victum mihi atque attinentibus mihi mendicavi ut 
potui; frequentius autum, quoniam is magis ad manum fuit, manducavi panem doloris et 
vinum compunctionis bibi, et Factae sunt mihi lacrimae meae panes die ac nocte, dum 
dicitur mihi quotidie: Ubi est Deus tuus? Nisi quod de mensa tua . . . de ipsa, inquam, 
tuae quidem beneficio miserationis accipio, in quo utcumque respiro, quotiens tristis est 
anima mea et quotiens conturbat me. Haec pascua novi . . . sed indica mihi, quaeso, etiam 
quae non novi.”) (33.7; I:238-9) 
Threaded throughout the sermon, the prayerful voice of the Psalmist returns with force in this 
passage, stitched together as it is from four different references to the Psalms. It is a paradigmatic 
example of what Robert of Basevorn called Bernardine “inculcation,” threading citations 
together to make something entirely new. Bernard uses this method to settle for a time into a 
Psalmic register of longing and loving address, and his request now tacitly admits that he has 
everything he really needs; only he wishes it were not so intermixed with sorrow. This 
comparatively stable stance of humbled prayer seems to open up the way now for the speaker to 
address the world around him, snapping him out of his long reverie of frustrated desire and only 
ever momentarily glimpsed attainment. Now—in the second half of the sermon, which roughly 
follows the elliptical vision of the “face” of Christ, the true “noontide”—Bernard begins to make 
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something like practical requests and even exhortations, warning his listeners of the false 
prophets who capture the imaginations of the “wanderers” (“vagi”) at dusk, and who are “always 
learning,” yet never attaining to “knowledge of the truth” (“semper discentes, et numquam ad 
scientiam Veritatis pervenientes”) (33.8; I:239).19 And yet the humbling lesson of the first half of 
the sermon remains here, practically applied: “I say emphatically, we must also yearn for that 
noontide, so that in its clear light we may detect the tricks of the devil. . . .For we cannot defend 
ourselves against the noontide devil except with the aid of noontide light” (“inquam, et maxime, 
videtur mihi illa meridies optanda etiam nobis, ut clara luce deprehendamus astutias diaboli. . . 
.Non enim aliter nos custodire sufficimus ab incursu et daemonio meridiano, nisi in meridiano 
aeque lumine”) (33.9; I:239-40). The tense longing deliberately generated by the first half of the 
sermon is, it seems, the only sure way to guard oneself against the temptations described in the 
sermon’s second half. 
 The doggedly paradoxical quality of Bernard’s thought returns here again. He has just 
spent half of a long, rhetorically overstuffed sermon celebrating and longing for the noontide 
light of eternity, of presence, of the face of Christ. And yet now, just when we have entered into 
the plane of practical day to day existence, we are abruptly warned of the noontide devil at dusk, 
 
19 Here, and for perhaps the first time in the sermon, Bernard recognizably inhabits something like the stern, self-
critical pragmatism by which he was to become, for the late Middle Ages in Middle English, the paradigmatic 
spokesperson for a certain kind of moral perfectionism. The peculiar amalgam of authentic and inauthentically 
Bernardine texts that made up this figure, evidently important for Piers Plowman—especially the C-Text’s Passus 
XVI, discussed above—and for other popular works of Middle English literature, such as the Prick of Conscience, 
has been thoroughly discussed with reference to Piers by Joseph Wittig in his study, ‘“Piers Plowman’ B, Passus 
IX-XII: Elements in the Design of the Inward Journey.” I will discuss this tradition at much greater length in 
Chapters Two and Three. The Cistercian treatise De spiritu et anima, which often circulated with this material and 
which in itself combines authentically Bernardine material (including citations of the Sermones super cantica 
canticorum) with Pseudo-Bernardine citations, comforts its reader near its conclusion: “Do not wonder that many 
seem in need, for this is a place of need. As the Prophet says in the Psalm, ‘My soul thirsts for you, my flesh longs 
after you’” (287). This treatise is cited in my Works Cited in McGinn’s edition. The question of how and why (and 
to what end) this anagogical register was sifted out of the Bernardine corpus on its way into the vernacular will be 
one of the major questions of Chapter Three. Piers, of course, resists this sifting; Langland reconstructs the language 
of anagogical fulfillment in his own idiom, the language of “nede.” 
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and of the grim possibility that “wicked spirits . . . for the purpose of deceiving man, can become 
bright as day, even as noon” (“aliqui de numero malignorum . . . se ad fallendum simulare 
noverunt, nec modo diem, sed meridiem”) (33.9; I:240). That inaccessible noontide pasture that 
seemed, even its inaccessibility, to act as a kind of North Star to the desires of all those who long 
for God, suddenly becomes here at least potentially only a false north. Launching ourselves out 
now into something like Langland’s “fair field full of folk,” we are at once confronted with the 
possibility that all we have desired so far will only deceive us in the end, for “when this kind of 
noontide devil sets out to tempt a man, there is no chance whatever of parrying him; he will 
tempt and overthrow his victim by suggesting what appears to be good, by persuading him, 
unsuspecting and unprepared as he is, to commit evil under the guise of good” (“forte aliquod 
istiusmodi daemonium meridianum tentandum acceperit . . . non poterit omnino caveri, sed 
tentabit et supplantabit sine dubio sub specie boni, pro bono scilicet malum incauto et 
improvideo persuadens”)—“unless,” that is, “the Sun from heaven shines into his heart with 
noontide brightness” (“nisi cordi illius . . . Oriens ex alto illuxerit velut meridies”) (33.9; I:240).  
 Once again, and now on the plane of personal spiritual struggle and temptation, we are 
saved only by a kind of hypothetical “unless”—an interval of desire, or “eschatological tension,” 
that renders salvation possible only in the abandonment of ourselves to something like our own 
un-savability,20 our willingness to inhabit the suspended longing for a noonday vision of Christ 
that will arrive in its entirety only in the hereafter and “not here below.” Otherwise, as Bernard is 
 
20 Giorgio Agamben writes, in a somewhat polemically hope-prioritizing reading of St. Paul’s phrase “In hope we 
are saved,” “What does [love] hope for? Does it hope to be satisfied? Not really, since hope and the imagination are 
essentially linked with something unsatisfiable. This is the case not because they do not desire to obtain their object, 
but because, insofar as it is imagined and hoped for, their desire is always already satisfied. Saint Paul’s claim that 
‘in hope we are saved ’ (Romans 8.24) is therefore both correct and incorrect. If the object of hope is that which 
cannot be satisfied, it is only as unsavable—that is, as already saved—that we have hoped for salvation” (The 
Adventure 90-1). Bernard would probably have found this to be a bridge too far, but its hyperbole effectively 




quick to warn us, we will be tempted to pin our salvation on our own efforts. More specifically, 
and perhaps more specially pertaining to Bernard’s monastic audience, we will be tempted to 
identify our own particular moralistic or otherwise ascetical program with the eschatological aim 
of our existence—like the monk who gets up before his brothers only to find himself sleeping 
through communal prayer, or the similarly misguided monk who prolongs his fast only to 
become “so weak that he is useless for the service of God” (“ut divinis obsequiis eo inutilem 
redderet, quo imbecillem”), or, perhaps more relevant to Langland’s Will, the isolationist monk 
who “lives as a hermit in order to achieve perfection, until the unhappy man finally discovers 
how true that saying is that he had read to no purpose: ‘Woe to him who is alone, for when he 
falls he has none to lift him up!’” (“quasi obtentu maioris puritatis eremum petere persuasit, et 
cognoverunt miseri tandem quam verus sit sermo quem frustra legerant: Vae soli, quoniam si 
cecedierit, non habet sublevantem”) (33.10; I:240). Somewhat like Langland’s Nede, who is so 
greatly exasperated by Will’s resistance to the idea of simply taking “no more than nede the 
tauhte” (C.XXII.9), Bernard laments in particular the habits of over-zealous monks who, having 
“once stubbornly refused what was necessary,” “now insistently demand what is superfluous” 
(“importune superflua quaeritare qui prius necessaria obstinatissime recusabant”)—thus forging 
“a degrading alliance . . . with those bodies on which they had previously waged a cruel warfare” 
(“turpe iniere foedus cum corporibus suis, quibus crudele ante indixerant bellum”) (33.10; 
I:240). This oscillating intemperance, Bernard warns, makes it impossible for these monks to 
“dwell in one custom together” (“habitare . . . unius moris”) with their brother monks (33.10; 
I:241), ultimately impacting negatively on what Langland might have called their “Unite.” 
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 In line with this implicit theme of temperance,21 and with his more explicit theme of 
“chastity,” Bernard pauses to reassure his listener that he does not mean, at the expense of the 
fastidious, “to encourage the gluttonous” (“frena laxare gulosis”) (33.10; I:241). To demonstrate 
that this is so, he provides a fourfold schema of all temptation whatsoever, a kind of catch-all 
guide to all the hurdles faced by all monks, whether gluttonous or otherwise. Drawing, as 
Augustine did before him,22 on Psalm 91.6—“His truth will surround you with a shield: you will 
not fear the terror of the night, nor the arrow that flies by day, nor the pestilence that stalks in 
darkness, nor the invasion of the noontide devil” (“Circumdabit te veritas eius: non timebis a 
timore nocturno, a sagitta volante in die, a negotio perambulante in tenebris, ab incursu et 
daemonio meridiano”)—Bernard succinctly identifies the terror of the night with “adversity” 
(“adversa”), especially where “the reward for which we are prepared to suffer adversity is not yet 
revealed to us” (“propter quod adversa pati aggredimur, id nondum revelatum est”) because our 
failure to perceive those rewards precludes, in our present darkness, the “desire” (“desiderio”) 
that would otherwise “render all fear as nothing” (“timor omnino quorumvis nullus esset”) 
(33.11; I:241); the arrow that flies by day with a debasing desire for the praise of others, “which 
is vainglory” (“quae est inanis gloria”); the pestilence of the darkness with “hypocrisy” 
(“hypocrisis”) which “has its source in ambition, its dwelling in darkness: for it conceals what it 
really is. . . .Active at all times, it retains the appearance of piety as a mask to hide behind” (“de 
ambitione descendit, et in tenebris habitatio eius: quippe abscondit quod est. . . .Negotiatur autem 
omni tempore, formam retinens pietatis ad sese occultandum”) (33.12; I:242); and the noontide 
 
21 This passage of the sermon is broadly resonant with Bernard’s discussion of temperance in his De Consideratione, 
in a passage cited at Footnote 16 above. 
22 In his Enarrationes in psalmos, Augustine in fact interprets “noon-day” as “the heat of a furious persecution.” He 
simply inaugurates the tradition of tying the passage specifically to the history of the church, which he outlines only 
in terms of a two-stage persecution—one by day and one, more difficult to resist, by night (91.8). Bernard’s 
elaboration is extensive and original, and demonstrably closer to what Piers Plowman appears to be doing. 
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devil himself with a more mysterious, last-ditch demonic endeavor to “seduce . . . by means of a 
counterfeit good” (“falso bono supplantare”) the otherwise saintly, “laying ambushes for the 
perfect” (“insidiari perfectis”) (33.13; I:242). And yet, perhaps surprisingly, this last temptation’s 
capacity for deception is illustrated not with recourse to famous examples of counterfeit goods 
and devilish ambushes laid for the holy, but instead with reference to the passing, ultimately 
mistaken anxieties of the patriarchs, saints, and apostles: Mary is perturbed by the angel 
Gabriel’s greeting because she fears some deception, an incredulous Joshua has to verify for 
himself that the angel who greets him is in fact an angel, and the apostles cry out in fear when 
they see Christ walking on the water toward their boat. “Was not this cry of fear,” Bernard asks 
of the apostles’ exclamation, “a sign that they clearly thought him to be the noontide devil?” 
(“clamarent prae timore, nonne apertam meridiani suspicionem daemonii praetenderunt?”) 
(33.13; I:243).  
 These are all, of course, great examples of righteousness, biblical figures who 
approximate as much as anyone else the desire of Bernard’s bride who “longs for God.” They are 
also, therefore, people whose purported anxiety over the noontide devil ultimately proves to be 
entirely unwarranted. This implies a somewhat portentous question for Bernard’s listener: does 
fearing the noontide devil with the fear he deserves necessarily mean risking the tragic mis-
recognition of the angel Gabriel, or of Joshua’s “commander of the army of the Lord,” (Joshua 
5.14), or even of Jesus Christ himself, as a demon? “He who was the true noontide,” Bernard is 
quick to assure us, “made himself known to the disciples with the words: ‘It is I, have no fear,’ 
and their mistrust of this strange phenomenon was dispelled” (“discipulis verus se manifestavit 
Meridies in eo quod audierunt: Ego sum, nolite timere, et falsi suspicio ab eis depulsa est”) 
(33.13; I:243); if it is Jesus, it seems, he will tell us so. But how exactly is this kind of spell-
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breaking utterance to be recognized? Bernard answers, again, only by way of a kind of prayer, 
which turns the figure of noontide once more on its head: “may the true Noontide, shining from 
the heavens, send forth his light and his truth even to us” (“Utinam et nobis . . . emittat lucem 
suam et veritatem suam . . . oriens ex alto verus Meridies”) (33.13; I:243). It is perhaps not 
especially reassuring that Bernard does not say what the consequences of being taken in by the 
noonday demon would be, or give his listener any concrete examples of what that experience of 
being fatally deceived might look like; prayer, it seems, and the subsequent intervention of God’s 
noontide grace, is our only hope.23 
 Bernard has only one abrupt twist left to give to his sermon, but it is a significant one. “If 
you are not worn out by the length of this sermon,” he says, “I shall try to apply these four 
temptations in due order to the Church, and Body of Christ” (“nisi taedio fuerit longitudo 
sermonis, has quatuor tentationes tentabo suo ordine assignare ipsi corpori Christi, quod est 
Ecclesia”) (33.14; I:243). Why? Perhaps to offer his listeners the reassurance of understanding at 
least where they are situated in the history of the church, since his discourse on the noontide 
devil has raised the specter of helplessness before demonic forces—or perhaps simply because 
this is what Augustine himself does. In broad outline, Bernard’s fourfold schema of church 
history runs like this: the first age of the church is characterized in terms of the outright 
persecution and martyrdom of the saints, “the terror of the night” (“timore nocturno”). The 
second is distinguished by the influx of “vain and ambitious men” (“homines vani, cupidi 
gloriae”) who “for long afflicted their mother [the church] with diverse and perverse doctrines” 
 
23 The effect is not dissimilar to that achieved by Adams’s reading of Nede as the noonday demon with respect to the 
final passus of Piers Plowman. With Bernard’s noonday devil, in this reading, one is set adrift in a world of 
hermeneutical deception, where the only way to be saved would be to have been already, by something like divine 
intervention, undeceived. But it is, in my view, the “interval” of humility and of humble prayer that, both in 
Bernard’s thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs and in Langland’s Piers Plowman, unravels the Augustinian 
riddle: “But who calls on you when he does not know you? For an ignorant person might call upon someone else 
instead of the right one. But surely you may be called upon in prayer that you may be known” (Confessions I, 1.1). 
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(“diu eamdem matrem suam afflixerunt in diversis et perversis dogmatibus”)—the heretics, the 
“arrow that flies by day” (“sagittam volantem in die”) (33.14; I:243). The third age, which 
Bernard believes himself to be living in, is described in terms of a “hypocrisy that is so prevalent 
that it cannot be hidden, and so impudent that it does not want to be. . . .Everyone is a friend, 
everyone an enemy . . . all are neighbors to each other, but all insist on their own way” 
(“hypocrisis . . . quae iam latere prae abundantia non valet, et prae impudentia non quaerit. . . 
.Omnes amici, et omnes inimici . . . omnes proximi, et omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt”) (33.15; 
I:244). In much the same way that fastidiousness earned special attention in Bernard’s 
application of this fourfold scheme to the temptations faced by the monk, here something like 
gluttony, the “bogus splendor” (“meretricius nitor”) of the medieval church of his time, comes in 
for special censure (33, 15; I, 244). This period is particularly characterized by “a peace that is 
not peace” (“pax est, et non est pax”) because the church “has peace from the pagans, peace from 
the heretics, but not peace from her own sons” (“Pax a paganis, pax ab haereticis, sed non 
profecto a filiis”); “most bitter of all is the corrupt morals of the members of the household” 
(“amarissima nunc in moribus domesticorum”) (33.16; I:244). “Nothing remains,” Bernard 
concludes, “but for the noontide devil to appear in our midst, to seduce those who still abide in 
Christ, who until now remain faithful to the truth” (“Superest ut iam de medio fiat daemonium et 
meridianum, ad seducendos, si qui in Christo sunt residui, adhuc permanentes in simplicitate 
sua”) (33.16; I:245). The suspended longing for the noonday face of Christ is matched here by 
the indefinite fear of the noonday devil, whose seductive, deadening influence is worse even than 
the shameless hypocrisy of the Church. 
 As with his application of this fourfold schema to the temptations faced by his monastic 
audience, Bernard does not have very much to say about what this fourth and final phase might 
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look like. He is not one to indulge in Joachimite speculations as to the exact nature of Antichrist; 
as Bernard McGinn points out, this brief outline is as concrete as Bernard will ever get about the 
end times (“St. Bernard and Eschatology” 184).24 We are instead simply and ominously warned 
that when the Antichrist does come, he will be as misleading as possible, and will claim to take 
the place of Christ himself: 
For he is Antichrist, who pretends that he is not only the day but the very noon, who 
‘exalts himself against every so-called god or object of worship,’ whom ‘the Lord Jesus 
will slay with the breath of his mouth,’ whom he will destroy with the light of his 
coming, because he is the true and eternal Noontide, the Bridegroom and defender of the 
Church; he is God, blessed for ever. Amen.  
(“Ipse enim est Antichristus, qui se non solum diem, sed et meridiem mentietur, et 
extolletur supra id quod dicitur aut quod colitur Deus: quem Dominus Iesus interficiet 
spiritu oris sui, et destruet illuminatione adventus sui, utpote verus et aeternus Meridies, 
sponsus et advocatus Ecclesiae, qui est Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen.”) (33.16; 
I:245) 
These final lines of Bernard’s sermon reproduce in miniature the rhetorical figure that has 
distinguished the whole piece: the Saint seamlessly flips from a false noon back to a true one, all 
in the space of a subordinate clause. As was pointed out above, the whole sermon hinges on a 
 
24 He is, however—as McGinn also points out—just as urgent, if somewhat more vague, in the Preface to his Vita 
sancti Malachiae, where Bernard laments the spiritual “famine and sterility” (“fames et sterilitas”) of his day, which 
must be “either the herald of one now present or the harbinger of one who shall come immediately” (“Sive igitur 
nuntia iam praesentis, sive iamiamque adfuturi praenuntia”) (Praefatio; III:307)—Antichrist. “Whom, likewise, do 
you give me who is content with necessaries, who despises superfluities? Yet the law has been enjoined beforehand 
by the Apostles on the successors of the Apostles, Having food and raiment, let us be therewith content. Where is 
this rule? We see it in books, but not in men” (“Quem item das mihi contentum necessariis, contemptorem 
superfluorum? Lex est tamen praefixa ab Apostolis Apostolorum successoribus: Victum et vestitum habentes, 
inquiunt, his contenti simus. Ubi forma haec? In libris cernimus eam, sed non in viris”) (Praefatio; III:308). This 
text, unlike the thirty-third sermon on the Song, was written after the failure of the Second Crusade (McGinn, “St. 
Bernard and Eschatology” 184). 
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transition from a kind of prayer to, and poignantly expressed longing for, the true noontide that is 
the face of Christ, to a set of warnings against the fourfold temptations that are faced by both the 
individual monk and, in an analogous way, by the whole church—temptations that, in both cases, 
culminate in the arrival of the mysterious noonday devil. But this latter half of the sermon, as in 
the last line of the above citation, is shot through with abrupt re-entries into the register of the 
sermon’s first half, where Christ appears threaded throughout as the true noontide, himself the 
only place “where you pasture your flock, where you make it to lie down at noon”—in his own 
way just as unapproachable now as that eschatological paradise of presence and eternity and the 
image of God that Bernard laments, early on in the sermon, as essentially inaccessible to those of 
us still bound for now by memory, by time, and by what he calls simply the “slave’s condition” 
(“forma servi”): “the husk of the sacrament is not received with the same pleasure as the fat of 
the wheat” (“non pari omnino iucunditate sumitur cortex sacramenti et adeps frumenti”) (33.3; 
I:235). For Bernard, it is this experience of lack—“ritual failure,” as M.B. Pranger describes it 
(26), or what Julia Kristeva calls “this passion of the body wrenching itself—which is called 
love” (166)—that is the foundational Christian experience. It is from these humble and almost 
pitiful beginnings that the journey that ends in glorification, and in the noonday vision of the face 
of Christ, necessarily begins. 
 
Nede at noonday 
In my view, Langland’s Nede crystallizes a similar intuition in Piers Plowman. In order 
to see how it does so, and in order to disentangle the figure of Nede from the “inextricable 
difficulties” that Étienne Gilson says beset the question of “necessity” in St. Bernard’s work as 
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well (42),25 we will need to look closely at where and how this controversial figure appears in the 
poem, beginning with the poem’s end where Nede makes its most significant appearance. The 
final passus of both B- and C-Texts of Piers Plowman begins with its protagonist Will’s waking 
up. This is at least a little odd, because Will has just had a dream in which he saw the virtues of 
prudence, justice, and fortitude mocked and abused in turn; yet he wakes up before the fourth 
and final cardinal virtue, temperance, can come in for criticism. Only once awake does Will 
finally encounter not a critic or abuser of this last and traditionally least virtue,26 but instead the 
newly, or at least much more thoroughly, personified allegorical figure of Nede. Nede claims the 
right to speak both for temperance and against all the other virtues—“Spiritus fortitudinis . . . / . . 
. shal do more than mesure mony tymes and often,” and so on (C.XXII.20-34)—in his own 
allegorical person. The passus begins: 
 And as Y wente by the way, when Y was thus awaked, 
 Heuy-chered Y yede and elyng in herte, 
 For Y ne wiste where to ete ne at what place. 
 And hit neyhed neyh the noen and with Nede Y mette 
 That afrounted me foule and faytour me calde: 
 ‘Couthest thow nat excuse the, as dede the kyng and othere, 
 
25 Gilson refers to the way Bernard describes the needs of the body as primary, but sometimes describes 
concupiscence itself as “necessary” in the sense that it will always be with us in our fallen condition. Carnal love is 
where we begin, but to prefer it to spiritual love is culpable (39-43). This involves Bernard in the kinds of paradoxes 
described by Pranger and Kristeva. For Gilson, it is important to distinguish between these two ideas of “necessity,” 
but difficult to do so this side of heaven. 
26 David Aers asks us to “recall Aquinas explaining how without the presence of prudence (the cardinal virtue 
perfecting reason) we will simply lack temperance.” After all, “temperance is below prudence and justice and 
fortitude. This is because prudence perfects reason, whereas the other cardinal virtues perfect the appetite powers” 
(Beyond Reformation? 89). In his Summa Theologiae, to which Aers refers, Aquinas states that “The proper end of 
each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason,” and that “it belongs to the ruling of prudence 
to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds” (IIa-IIae, q. 47, a. 7, 
resp.). I will have more to say about this, with specific reference to Bernard, later on. 
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 That thow toke to lyue by, to clothes and to sustinaunce, 
 Was bi techyng and by tellyng of Spiritus temperancie 
 And that thow nome no more than nede the tauhte? 
 And nede ne hath no lawe ne neuere shal falle in dette . . . ’ (C.XXII.1-10) 
The self-proclaimed mouthpiece and master of temperance, Nede, begins this last rebuke of Will 
by immediately upbraiding him for perhaps the one thing he has not yet been accused of in the 
poem: being too hard on himself (“Couthest thow nat excuse the . . . ?”). In response to this 
perceived over-scrupulosity, Nede not only recommends something that has looked to Mary 
Carruthers and to some other critics like simple stealing;27 he also boasts that “nede at greet nede 
may nyme as for his owne / Withouten consail of Consience or cardinale virtues / So that he 
sewe and saue Spiritus temperancie, / For is no vertu be ver to Spiritus temperancie” 
(C.XXII.20-3). This not only turns the most traditional ranking of the cardinal virtues on its 
head; it also appears to call into question the whole vision of the sowing of the cardinal virtues 
that was celebrated in the poem’s penultimate passus, where “Grace gaf Peres graynes, 
cardinales vertues, / And sewe it in mannes soule” (C.XXI.274-5). It is not immediately clear 
how or whether this prior passage’s orderly prioritization of the virtues can be reconciled with 
Nede’s radical re-purposing of them, or whether the spirit of the Nede sequence can be 
reconciled with the rest of the poem at all. 
 
27 “Considering what the king and the rest have done with the virtues to which they appealed, this introduction 
should serve as a warning for what follows. Need’s argument, baldly stated, is a justification for stealing” 
(Carruthers 160).  Whereas Carruthers argues that “Temperance and mesure. . . .do not apply to the unusual situation 
of extreme need,” referring to the latter as a “nonmoral condition,” Richard Firth Green suggests that Nede must be 
understood in terms of the “notoriously subjective” difficulty (“Nede ne hath” 23) of determining whether the 
“necessity defense,” a new legal reality from the late thirteenth century on, might apply in a given case of apparent 
theft (19). Nede’s defiant declaration that “nede at greet nede may nyme as for his owne” (C.XXII.20) implies at 
least an awareness of the problem of determining what counts as “greet nede,” and a broader determination to make 
judgments concerning this question the cornerstone of a whole need-based morality. 
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 The circumstances immediately following Nede’s appearance are no more propitious. 
Once Will swoons and falls asleep again at the end of Nede’s speech, he dreams immediately 
that “Auntecrist cam thenne and al the crop of treuthe / Turned hit tyd vp-so-down and ouertulde 
the rote / And made fals sprynge and sprede and spede menne nedes” (C.XXII.53-5). This raises 
the difficult question of the specific, suspicious timing of the Nede episode: why does Nede 
appear just when the Antichrist is about to arrive, and the Unite of the Church is about to 
unravel? Ryan McDermott’s recent book Tropologies has urged us not to neglect the 
tropological—that is, the moral, action-prescriptive—implications of Piers Plowman and other 
works of late medieval poetry; but McDermott also suggests that we would do well not to ignore 
the anagogical sense: as he puts it, Piers’s “final passus has plenty of ethical and institutional 
failure, to be sure, but the gap between tropological making and anagogical fulfillment retains an 
analogical interval that invites hope” (188). McDermott’s focus on tropology means that he does 
not advance a systematic application of this insight into the place of “anagogical fulfillment” and 
hope in Piers Plowman, but his attention to the importance of chiasmus for understanding certain 
formal cruxes in the poem suggests an answer to the problem of Nede’s appearing just as the 
Antichrist is about to arrive and the world is about to unravel: a reading of Piers Plowman, and 
of the figure of Nede in particular, in terms of a balanced anagogical movement at once “down” 
toward apocalypse and “up” toward humbled grace and redemption.28  
 In this respect the Nede sequence might be usefully compared not just with Bernardine 
anagogy as it is modeled in the Sermons on the Song of Songs but also with the more doggedly 
tropological structuring schema of Bernard’s first treatise, De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae 
(“On the Steps of Humility and Pride”). In the De gradibus, the steps of humility are said to be 
 




exactly the same as the steps of pride, only in reverse: one must retrace one’s steps down each 
individual step up to pride in order to climb back up toward humility again.29 In an analogously 
chiastic understanding of the poem’s final shame-inducing “lakkyng” of the Dreamer, the 
encounter with Nede in Passus XXII of the C-Text would represent—even as Nede is indeed in a 
sense a harbinger of the approaching Antichrist—a final necessary “bottoming out” that is also 
the beginning of a new search, in a new and a more humbled spirit. “Y gan awake” 
(C.XXII.386), after all, are the very last words of the poem; if Will is to be understood as waking 
back up in the same place where he was when he fell into his dream, then he must also be 
understood as waking up, at the end of the poem, once again in the presence of Nede.30 The end 
of Piers Plowman, then, implies not only the ongoing, newly pilgrimage-inflected search of 
Conscience, who “wol bicome a pilgrime /  . . . / To seke Peres the plouhman, that Pruyde myhte 
destruye” (C.XXII.380-2)—and who spares two of the poem’s final lines on the “freres” who 
“for nede flateren,” and who therefore need a “fyndynge” (C.XXII.383)—but also the beginning 
of a new journey for Will, accompanied now by the unpredictable but not necessarily unorthodox 
mouthpiece of temperance—and so by a new awareness of his own fundamental neediness, 
which his encounter with Nede has urged him to embrace. 
 A look at Nede’s other appearances in the poem will help to make this humbling itinerary 
more clear. When critics reach beyond Nede’s appearance at the beginning of the final passus of 
the poem, they tend to look ahead to Nede’s intervention—confoundingly reasonable-seeming, 
 
29 Bernard’s reproof of curiosity, the first of the steps of pride and the one he spends the most time on by far, is 
particularly resonant with Piers Plowman: “Look to the earth, that you may know yourself. It will represent yourself 
to you, because you are earth, and into the earth you will go” (“Terram intuere, ut cognoscas teipsum. Ipsa te tibi 
repraesentabit, quia terra es et in terram ibis”) (X.28; III:38). 
30 Nicolette Zeeman pointed this out to me in response to a truncated version of this chapter, which was given as a 
paper at the International Piers Plowman Society Conference at the University of Miami in May 2019. 
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for those in the anti-Nede camp31—almost two hundred lines on, after Will has fallen asleep 
again and retreated into the besieged barn of Unite. Barricaded inside the barn against the 
ascendant forces of Antichrist, Conscience calls for help from Clergie; in response he receives a 
group of friars who, offering their assistance in Conscience’s time of crisis, ask to be let into the 
barn. Nede, who seems correctly to anticipate that the friars’ famously easygoing confession will 
eventually threaten the Unity of the Church, advises Conscience not to let them in, for, “senne 
freres forsoke the felicite of erthe / Lat hem be as beggares or lyue by angeles fode!” 
(C.XXII.240-1).32 Nede’s advice is not heeded, and before long the barn is in ruins. Conscience 
protests the introduction of one “frere Flatrere” on the grounds that “We haen no nede” 
(C.XXII.315-8), but by then the fatal step has already been taken, and the “frere with his fisyk . . 
. doth men drynke dwale [opiate], that they drat no synne” (C.XXII.378-9). In one of the poem’s 
most strikingly counter-intuitive inversions of its allegorical figures, we are told that 
“Contricioun hadde clene foryete to crye and to wepe” (C.XXII.369). The barn of Unite has been 
corrupted from the inside. 
 The most cursory reading of this passage would suggest that, whatever its motivations, 
Nede is right to be suspicious of the friars. However, because it is at least possible to argue that 
the Nede who appears on this level of the dream is significantly different from the Nede who 
appears in the passus’s previous passage, and because Nede’s being right here does not 
 
31 Mary Carruthers’s Search for St. Truth is admirably consistent in its application of anti-Nede mistrust to this 
passage as well: “This is an analysis that shows no understanding at all of patient poverty,” she writes of Nede’s 
advice to Conscience on the friars. Her suggestion that Nede seriously implies “that the friars should be rich so that 
they would not have to beg food from hard-working men,” however, strains credulity (166). 
32 More typical than Carruthers’s consistent critique is Robert Adams’s invocation of a “neutral” Nede at work in 
this passage (“The Nature of Need” 279)—a Nede who understands the friars’ motivations, more or less, because it 
takes a thief to know one. Until they have a “patrimonie” of their own, Nede knows, they will remain in need of 
financial support—and so will be forced to continue offering up easy confession in exchange for alms: “And for thei 
aren pore . . . / Thei wol flatere, to fare wel, folk that ben riche” (C.XXII.234-5). Nicolette Zeeman writes of this 
passage, “Bizarrely, Nede then includes some unexceptionable remarks . . . ” (Piers Plowman and the Medieval 
Discourse of Desire 280). 
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necessarily mean it is right always, a thorough reading of the figure’s place in the poem should 
begin instead with a passage less frequently cited in the criticism: Passus XIII of the C-Text, 
where Imaginatif appears and encourages the Dreamer to re-commence his search for Dowel, 
and where Nede appears as a possibly personified allegorical figure for the first time in the 
poem. The Dreamer’s previous search for Dowel was broken off by Will’s long, introspective 
excursion into the “lond of longyng.”33 In Passus XIII, Imaginatif suggests that Will would have 
learned significantly more on this earlier quest, had he been patient and suffered Clergie and 
Resoun to speak for longer, remaining silent himself. Instead, the Dreamer acted like Adam, who 
“mamelede aboute mete and musede for to knowe” (C.XIII.226). Imaginatif goes on to explain 
that it was “For pruyde or presompcioun of thy parfit lyvynge” that “Resoun refusede the,” as 
did Clergie, for both knew that a proud person can’t learn anything of substance anyway: 
For shal neuere, ar shame come, a shrewe wel be chasted.  
For lat a dronkene daffe in a dykke falle,  
Lat hym lygge, lok nat on hym til hym luste to ryse;  
For thogh Resoun rebuke hym thenne, recheth he neuere,  
Ne of Clergie ne of Kynde Wyt counteth he nat a rusche;  
To blame hym or to bete hym thenne Y halde hit but synne.  
Ac when Nede nymeth hym vp, anoen he is aschamed  
 
33 The potential for comparison here between Langland’s “lond of longyng” and Bernard’s “regio dissimilitudinis” 
(“realm of unlikeness”), a phrase borrowed originally from Augustine’s Confessions and brought to scholarly 
attention by Étienne Gilson in particular, is evident; but I do not treat it in detail in this chapter. This decision was 
motivated by a desire to focus on the anagogical dimension in Langland’s thinking, and by the fact that the theme 
has already been thoroughly explored, both by Margaret E. Goldsmith in her article “Piers’ Apples: Some 
Bernardine echoes in Piers Plowman,” and at the length of an unpublished dissertation, Out of the Land of 
Unlikeness: Bernardine Mystical Theology and Piers Plowman, B and C, by Lisa Haines Wright. The specifically 
Bernardine sense of the phrase, especially as it is employed in his Sermones super cantica canticorum, will be 
described later on in this study in a more speculative application of the regio to the work of Thomas Malory in 
Chapter Four. It is nonetheless of course suggestive, as I have noted above, that this “longyng” episode begins with 
the citation of a Pseudo-Bernardine treatise. 
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And thenne woet he wherfore and why he is to blame. (C.XIII.233-40) 
This early appearance of Nede as a redemptive principle linked with shame is less commonly 
noticed than the later episodes—in part, surely, because it is not even clear that Nede is 
personified yet—but there is no obvious reason to call Imaginatif’s assessment of Nede’s value 
as a necessary humbling agent into question.34 Langland’s allegorical figures are famously 
unstable,35 but the passage can be shown to directly prefigure Nede’s later, longer appearance, 
where Nede certainly humbles Will, and where, in language directly recalling the earlier scene, 
Nede once again specifically “nymeth” (C.XXII.17) and is said to “nyme” (C.XXII.20).  
 The passage in Passus XIII also hearkens back to the first use of the word “nede” in the 
poem, where Holy Church advises Will that “resoun sholde reule yow alle / And Kynde Witte be 
wardeyn youre welthe to kepe / And tutor of youre tresor and take it yow at nede / For 
hosbondrye and he holdeth togederes” (C.I.50-3). With remarkable consistency, Langland 
suggests an interdependence between a necessary “nyme”-ing at the hands of Nede, and the 
capacity to be ruled by the reasonable advice of “Kynde Witte”—thereby firmly, if furtively, 
 
34 In his treatise De diligendo deo (“On Loving God”) Bernard recommends that one must always keep in mind 
“both what you are, and that you are not so by your own power, so that you do not either not glory at all, or vainly 
glory” (“et quid sis, et quod a teipso non sis, ne aut omnino videlicet non glorieris, aut inaniter glorieris”) (II.4; 
III:122)—the one in order to guard against despair, and the other in order to guard against the kind of 
“presumpcioun” Imaginatif warns the Dreamer against. As a sort of Bernardine homiletic tool, Imaginatif’s 
invocation of shame is evidently not intended to provoke despair at the Dreamer’s most essential identity—which, as 
God-given, can only be taken as a cause for shame in a really presumptuous spirit. Bernard’s Sermon on the Nativity 
of the Virgin Mary makes a very Langlandian point about the generative role of imagination in the Christian life: 
“The Word has become flesh and lives in us. For it clearly lives by faith in our hearts, it lives in our memory, it lives 
in our thought and it descends to the seat of imagination itself. How else would a man be able to think about God, 
unless it were by fashioning idols in his heart?” (“Verbum caro factum est, et habitat iam in nobis. Habitat plane per 
fidem in cordibus nostris, habitat in memoria nostra, habitat in cogitatione, et usque ad ipsam descendit 
imaginationem. Quid enim prius cogitaret homo de Deo, nisi forsitan idolum corde fabricaretur?”) (10; V:282). As 
Nede’s first appearance also suggests, the crucial question is how such idols may be appropriately “chasted.” 
35 Nicolette Zeeman observes that, “at crucial moments” in the poem, “terms, personifications and even narratives 
turn out to be less than they seem.” She describes how “Langland integrates multiple interpretive discourses into his 
allegorical narrative in a highly unsettling fashion. His disintegrative narratives purposely subvert expectation, 
illustrating the extremes to which he is prepared to go in order to probe understanding and interrogate desire” 
(“Medieval religious allegory” 161). My argument implies that “Nede” is one of those few figures who resist this 
disintegration—or, perhaps better, that Nede is the dissolving agent in which the other figures are reduced. 
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linking the figure of Nede with the Dreamer’s central quest for a “kynde knowyng” of the truth 
and true love (C.I.136-7). The C-Text’s Passus XIII therefore seems to me to offer the most 
obvious reading of Nede’s role in the poem, as it is the reading of the figure that the poem itself 
explicitly and consistently offers: the experience of need, and a consequent attunement to the 
problem of taking for oneself only “at nede,” alone makes it possible for the prideful, 
presumptuous person to “reche” the rebukes of Reason and the teachings of Clergy and Kind 
Wit. Without an experience of Nede, it seems, it is not only impossible for the proud sinner to be 
reformed; it is in fact even sinful to “blame hym,” so far is he from being able to receive that 
blame in the right spirit. As in the early Christian catechetical document called the Didache, in 
Piers Plowman “need” becomes one of the constitutive categories of Christian ethics.36  
Providing an overview of Bernardine theology in his Introduction to the “Classics of 
Western Spirituality” series’ Selected Works, the celebrated Bernard scholar Jean Leclercq sets 
out the importance of humility and need for Bernard’s thought in very similar terms to the ones I 
have been inferring from Piers Plowman: 
 Man’s end is to recognize truth, which is God. To do this he must be aware that his 
 relationship with God is based on need. The obstacle to the relationship is pride; the 
 
36 Although there is surely no direct connection, the Didache—in fact the earliest extant Christian catechetical 
document—dedicates much of its first chapter to the question of need: “Give to everyone who asks you, and do not 
demand it back. . . .Woe to the one who receives. If anyone receives because one is in need, this one is innocent. But 
the one who receives without a need will have to explain why and for what purpose he received, and he will be 
thrown into prison and will be interrogated about what he did, and he will not be released from there until he pays 
back every last cent. For it has also been said concerning this: ‘Let your gift sweat in your hands until you know to 
whom to give it’” (Kalantzis 76-7). Gilson describes the way Bernardine spirituality centers itself on the “needs of 
the body,” the “primary necessity” of which “throws ramifications over the whole field of human life, giving rise to 
the arts—of clothing for instance, of building, of curing bodily ills” (39). Gilson sounds very much like Langland’s 
Imaginatif when he observes that, for Bernard, “That the will has overstepped the limits of natural necessity may be 
recognized by this sign: that it no longer sees any reason to keep its desires within bounds” (41). The passage in 
Bernard’s writing that resonates maybe the most with Nede’s discourse comes at the beginning of his first sermon 
on the Ascension: “[Christ] has no scorn but rather compassion for our needs, if we make provision for the flesh not 
out of desire but out of need” (“nec dedignatur necessitates nostras, sed miseratur, si tamen curam carnis non in 
desiderio facimus, sed in necessitate”) (1; V:123). 
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 remedy is humility. Grace is the condition for meeting God in Christ. The result is the 
 esteem man places on his dignity, rediscovered in God’s image. While self-ignorance and 
 pride lessen man’s worth, humility, which recognizes man’s need as well as his capacity 
 for God, reveals man to himself. (38) 
According to Leclercq’s Bernard, then—as according to Langland’s Imaginatif—there is no 
other way, at least for a “shrewe,” to come to his senses, than to be humbled by the realization 
“that his relationship with God is based on need.” From the evidence of the C-Text’s Passus 
XIII, it would seem that a weighty reason to read the final passus of Piers Plowman against the 
text would be necessary, in order to compel one to see the Dreamer’s final confrontation with 
Nede as anything other than his being humbled by a confrontation with his own fundamental 
neediness as a final remedy for pride. Although its results are not depicted in the poem, Will 
therefore at least potentially arrives, in Piers’s last passus, at that redemptive principle of shame-
inducing humility that is recommended, by both Imaginatif and by St. Bernard, as a kind of 
beginning of wisdom.37 He is finally prepared now, having reached the bottom of the ladder of 
pride, to ascend. 
 
Nede and the critics 
 
37 In his second sermon for the Ascension, Bernard admonishes: “It is impossible for you to ascend unless you begin 
by descending. That is an eternal law: ‘He who exalts himself will be humbled; he who humbles himself will be 
exalted’” (“Neque enim ascendere potes, nisi descenderis, quia, ut aeterna lege fixum est, Omnis qui se exaltat 
humiliabitur, et qui se humiliat exaltabitur”) (6;V:130). Commenting on the De gradibus treatise, M.B. Pranger 
notes that, “By focusing on descent rather than ascent, Bernard introduces the category of failure as a constitutive 
factor in the monastic life” (Bernard of Clairvaux 50). Following Pranger, G.R. Evans describes this idea of 
constitutive failure as “deeply attractive to [Bernard] because it went with the sacrifice and struggle to which he 
believed Christ had called his people” (Bernard of Clairvaux 4). Although it eventually comes down on the side of 
the anti-Nede camp, Zeeman’s Piers Plowman and the Medieval Discourse of Desire, sensitive as it is to the 
constitutive role of failure and lack in the poem, is in my view broadly resonant with my own Bernardine reading. 
54 
 
 It is the tendency of the anti-Nede critics to want to see the action of the final passus of 
Piers Plowman as more or less straightforwardly bad,38 rather than to look for the logic of a 
finally necessary humbling—which is also, necessarily, a kind of unravelling—that has led them 
to miss the “analogical interval that invites hope” McDermott identifies. A somewhat closer look 
at the substance of those anti-Nede critics’ arguments, and at the way the negativity they identify 
in the final passus of the poem itself serves to open up that “interval” of humbled prayer with 
which Piers Plowman concludes, will help to describe the “downward” side of the poem’s 
chiastic trajectory, and to see how a Bernardine anagogical lens casts new light on this double 
movement. Although it has already emerged that my own reading skews “pro-Nede” in its 
tendency to see Nede as a kind of master trope for Piers Plowman, conditioning Langland’s 
implicit assessment of everything—“is this really necessary?”, or, again, will it help me to “saue 
my soul”? 39—this is in part because I believe the pro-Nede argument can be effectively 
reconciled with the essence of the anti-Nede position, drawing the crucial insights of this latter 
camp up into its own orbit without simply negating them. I do not believe the same can be said 
of the opposite position. It is this reconciliation between something like, on the level of Christian 
practice, the “perfectionist” mentality of the anti-Nede critics, and the more “mediocrist” pro-
 
38 Zeeman describes Conscience’s cry in terms of the “narratives of denial and loss” that “have shaped the poem 
since its inception.” Her suggestion that “one more such narrative brings the poem to its famously gaping close” is 
representative of anti-Nede readings of Piers’s conclusion (Piers Plowman 283), and depends partly on her seeing 
Nede as “problematic precisely because he is the corruption of something Langland values” (279). Rebecca Davis’s 
recent Piers Plowman and the Books of Nature, despite its description of what Davis calls Langland’s “optimistic 
theology” (243), follows Zeeman in not seeing anything particularly optimistic about Nede: “Need should not be 
understood as demonic or inherently immoral,” Davis says, but “this passage is designed to unsettle readers. . . .The 
world Need describes in order to justify theft is already a world in which Antichrist reigns because it is a world 
devoid of charity” (192). My argument implies that the Nede episode is hopeful, without being at all optimistic. 
39 Holy Church begins her instruction of Will with the advice that, in order to be faithful to God and to do as truth 
teaches, Will must take the necessities of life (“bilyue”) “in mesure” (C.I.18-9), for “Mesure is medecyne” (C.I.33). 
As I pointed out above, she goes on to specify that “resoun sholde reule yow alle / And Kynde Witte be wardeyn 
youre welthe to kepe / And tutor of youre tresor and take it yow at nede” (C.I.50-2). Will’s later complaint that he 
has “no kynde knowyng” of truth and true love (C.I.136-7) is therefore introduced in the context of a conversation 
about moderation and needfulness; “Kynde Witte” knows what is “at nede.” 
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Nede approach, that I see the poem as working toward,40 and that I understand as characteristic 
of the anagogical Bernardine theology implicit in his Sermones super cantica canticorum, but 
not fully developed, and often frustrated, in the history of his influence.  
 Jill Mann’s 2004 article “The Nature of Need Revisited” responds directly and at length 
to Robert Adams’s influential study from 1978, “The Nature of Need in ‘Piers Plowman’ XX.” 
There are many battle-lines between them, but Mann identifies and responds to four specific 
objections that Adams makes to the character of Nede: his close textual proximity to the 
appearance of Antichrist, which Adams relates specifically and originally to the apocalyptic 
figure of the “noonday demon” of Psalm 91.6; his un-traditional prioritization of temperance as 
the highest of the four cardinal virtues, inverting the order established by Aristotle and followed 
by Aquinas; his following on the heels of a series of parodically inverted virtues that begins with 
the lewed vicory’s lamenting the way “Spiritus prudencie among the peple is gyle” (C.XXI.455); 
and his sounding to some critics like one of the friars, who have sometimes been identified as 
Langland’s most inveterate ideological enemies (Mann 5-10). Mann’s answers to these 
objections are generally convincing. She finds a relevant, orthodox analogue for Nede’s 
 
40 I use these terms with specific reference to Nicholas Watson’s article “Chaucer’s Public Christianity,” which 
distinguishes between Chaucer’s “mediocrist world, in which practical human arrangements and actual human 
desires hold temporary sway, urged as they are by the would-be moral imperatives of religion” (112) and 
“alternative perfectionist models” that, by the late fourteenth century, “gave almost the same opportunities—and 
made almost the same demands on—the devout laity as they did professional religious and the clerisy” (101-2). 
Watson aligns the latter with Langland, “for whom the search for salvation and the search for perfection intertwine 
to the point that seeking God comes to constitute the only valid form of living, and who parodies the weaker, 
mediocrist position in the figure of Haukyn, or Activa Vita” (104). Eleanor Johnson’s emphasis on the importance 
for Piers of the “mixed life”—which Watson tends to see in terms of emerging perfectionist models (102)—suggests 
a sense in which Langland might be seen as both caught between and attempting to reconcile the two opposing 
drifts. Johnson  suggests that the transformation of the B-Text’s Haukyn into the C-Text’s more generously portrayed 
Activa Vita implies that, “In the moral universe of the C-Text . . . labor is the only path to salvation” (Staging 
Contemplation 102). In my view, one function of the figure of Nede is to suggest that the perfectionist and 
mediocrist models need to be reconciled, in a vision of life that is truly “mixed” in its attention to real needs of every 
kind. Part of Will’s (and Conscience’s) being humbled, it seems to me, is his giving up a certain degree of 
“perfectionism.” It seems to me not coincidental that the dichotomy between mediocrist and perfectionist positions 
is roughly reproduced in the modern-day critical camps. 
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inversion of the virtues,41 suggests that the passus break between the lewed vicory and Nede 
firmly separates the latter from the parodies of the virtues that precede him, and draws on the 
work of Kathryn Kerby-Fulton in particular to argue that views of Langland as simply and one-
sidedly anti-Franciscan are plainly myopic. Moreover, and more positively, she convincingly 
argues for a Langlandian “need ethos,” defined by the “ius necessitatis” that she sees Langland 
as yoking together, in a “brilliant stroke,” with the justification for the redemption of man by 
Christ (27). To dismiss Nede, in Mann’s reading, is to discard the very cornerstone of the poem, 
and one of Langland’s most distinctive poetical-intellectual flourishes: he identifies simple 
human vulnerability as the precise point of contact between a needy mankind and a God who is 
said to act always out of necessity.42 
 Mann’s answer to Adams’s strong association of Nede with the “noonday demon” of 
Psalm 91, and so with Antichrist and apocalypse, is, however, less carefully realized than her 
other counter-arguments. The disagreement between the two critics on this point, elaborated at 
somewhat comical cross-purposes, centers around the question of whether it means anything 
significant that Nede appears to the Dreamer specifically as it “neyhed neyh the noen” 
(C.XXII.4). In his thoroughgoingly exegetical mode, Adams construes this line as evidence that 
 
41 Mann traces the influence of the twelfth-century Moralium dogma philosophorum, which similarly inverts the 
hierarchy of the virtues, through Brunetto Latini to John Gower (4-5). As I will make clear below, this seems to me 
among the least convincing—and least necessary—of her counter-arguments. Langland may have had specific 
analogues for Nede’s speech, but what he does with need and the virtue of temperance is, as Mann suggests 
elsewhere, startlingly original—and yet also broadly resonant with entirely orthodox sources, such as St. Bernard. 
As Caroline Walker Bynum puts it, Bernard shows “a deep commitment to reversal as lying at the heart of the 
Christian vocation” (Metamorphosis 126). See Footnote 16 above for more on Bernard’s inversion, or perhaps even 
collapse, of the hierarchy of the virtues. 
42 Following Gilson, Julia Kristeva notes that “Bernard defined carnal love as primary, de facto if not de jure” (162). 
As I suggest above, this “primary necessity” is for Bernard where the journey to God necessarily begins (Gilson 39). 
For a more recent, more Thomist attempt to ground human identity in necessity and dependence, see Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals, which argues that resisting the commonplace temptation to “imagine 
ourselves as other than animal, as exempt from the hazardous condition of ‘mere’ animality,” helps us to not lose 
sight of another defining quality of human experience: our essential vulnerability, and our consequently definitive 
state of dependence (4). This is something like the lesson Will learns (at last) in the final passus of Piers Plowman. 
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Nede must be understood as representing the final apocalyptic figure in a fourfold paradigm of 
church history developed originally by St. Augustine in his Enarrationes in psalmos and later 
elaborated, as we have seen, by Bernard in his Sermones super cantica canticorum. Mann, on the 
other hand, dismisses the timing of the encounter as a “simple joke,” indicating no more than that 
the dreamer is “seriously hungry” because it is almost dinnertime (6). As I have pointed out 
above, Adams was the first to identify Langland’s figure of Nede with the “egestas” (“need”) 
that is said, in Job Chapter 41 in the Vulgate, to precede Leviathan—and that was generally 
understood, by the time of St. Bernard at least, as a kind of allegory for Antichrist: “it was 
commonly believed that the period immediately prior to the Antichrist tribulation would be 
marked by widespread famine and indigence as well as spiritual impoverishment” (“The Nature 
of Need” 282).43 This theory was influentially elaborated in St. Gregory the Great’s “Moralia in 
Iob,” which Adams believes to have been almost certainly a significant and direct source for 
Langland’s Nede episode; in that text, Gregory distinguishes between the “need of the elect”  
(“egestas electorum”) that occurs “when the true riches of the heavenly homeland return to their 
souls, and, placed as they are in this execrable exile of the present life, they remember 
themselves to be poor” (“cum verae divitiae coelestis patriae ad eorum animum redeunt, et in hoc 
aerumnoso praesentis vitae exsilio positi, pauperes se esse meminerunt”), and the “need of the 
reprobate” (“egestas reproborum”), whereby the wicked “are refilled with vices, and evacuated 
of the riches of the virtues” (“replentur vitiis, virtutum divitiis vacuantur”) (PL Vol. 76, cols. 
719c-720b). The latter “need,” Gregory suggests, tends to privilege the visible necessities of life 
 
43 It is usefully corrective to Adams’s view to observe that, in his first sermon for the Circumcision, Bernard also 
follows Jerome and Isidore in identifying Leviathan with “excess—that Leviathan, the poison of sinful desire and of 
unrestrained and disordered enticements to pleasure” (“additamentum illud Leviathan . . . , venenum scilicet 
concupiscentiae et immoderatae atquae inordinatae illecebra voluptatis”) (1; IV:274). Whatever else Nede may be, it 
is hard to imagine him as a figure for “excess.” 
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to such an extent that the soul becomes unable to even imagine the existence of more spiritual, 
invisible needs. This “need of the reprobate” is, of course, the need that Adams identifies with 
the Nede of Langland’s poem—who is, after all, suspiciously attentive “to clothes and to 
sustinaunce,” and with whom Adams is determined to connect that ultimate reprobate, 
Antichrist.44 
 As Adams points out, when the Dreamer falls asleep and the apocalypse commences at 
the end of Nede’s speech, the Antichrist doesn’t just arrive; he is also spoken of specifically in 
terms of manipulating mankind’s “nedes”: “in mannes fourme / Auntecrist cam thenne and al the 
crop of treuthe / Turned it tyd vp-so-down and ouertulde the rote / And made fals sprynge and 
sprede and spede menne nedes” (C.XXII.52-5). David Aers’s gloss of this passage in his recent 
study Beyond Reformation? is representative of the way anti-Nede critics tend to see Nede as, at 
the very least, guilty by association: “in multiplying our so-called nedes . . . , Antichrist teaches 
us to forget the word enough” (90). Mann’s response to this particular observation displays a 
characteristic blend of etymological precision and simple common sense: she points out first that 
Adams’s demonization of Nede depends in part upon a simple mistranslation of the Middle 
English phrase “spede menne nedes” (C.XXII.55), which Adams takes to mean that mankind 
will become more needy at the time of Antichrist’s coming.45 Mann cites the Middle English 
Dictionary and Chaucer’s Reeve’s Tale to show that this set phrase instead means something 
 
44 Adams rounds out his Gregorian critique of Nede with a passage from Gregory’s commentary on the first chapter 
of Job, where the saint stresses that no virtue may really exist in isolation from the others—“Disjoined, [the virtues] 
may by no means be perfected” (“Disjunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt”) (PL Vol. 76, col. 212c)—
thereby undercutting Nede’s suggestion that a truly temperate soul would possess all the other virtues by default. 
Bernard, however, takes a similar line to argue, much like Nede, that since all the virtues are interrelated and 
moderate one another, they can all almost by summarized by a principle of prudential moderation. See Footnote 16 
above. 
45 More specifically, Adams views “mennes nedes” here as endlessly multiplying, like “a kind of uncontrollable 
weed in the blighted garden of truth” (“The Nature of Need” 279). I would retain the metaphor, but suggest that the 
weeds ought to represent, following the Bernardine schema as Julia Kristeva describes it, the “negatively connoted 
cupidity that carries away (trahit),” stifling the “amor that acts (urget) out of necessity” (164). 
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more like “to satisfy one’s desires” or “to get what one wanted” (6), turning Adams’s point on its 
head. On this reading, it is precisely the refusal, or conditioned inability, of men and women to 
“byde and to be nedy” (C.XXII.48)—as Nede recommends just a few lines before the “spede 
menne nedes” phrase is used—that renders them vulnerable to the wiles of Antichrist. The 
apocalypse of Piers Plowman’s last passus, then, is not so much a matter of Adams’s 
“widespread famine and indigence” as it is of a “spiritual impoverishment” brought on by a lack 
of true neediness. Derek Pearsall’s gloss of the phrase in his edition of the C-Text—“prosper 
men’s (worldly) desires” (366)—aligns nicely with this reading, and therefore suggests again 
that there may be a sharp break, rather than a linear progression, between the appearance of Nede 
in the first fifty lines of the poem’s final passus and the assault of Antichrist that begins just 
afterward, when Will has fallen back asleep. 
 Mann’s intervention here overlaps with my proposed chiastic reading of the poem, where 
the final passus of the B- and C-Texts must be understood in terms of a conjunction of humbled 
grace and dramatic unraveling. In this reading, Nede’s appearance would represent a kind of 
final desperate altar call, where the homilist strains the bounds of language and of doctrine in a 
last desperate effort to inoculate Will against the coming dissolution. But this still leaves open 
the question of why Nede must appear just before the hour of noon, and the whole problem of 
intersecting allegorical planes at the poem’s end. If, following Mann and Green, I am right, and 
Nede is best understood as both “apocalyptic sign” and “redemptive principle” at once, then we 
would expect to find a dramatic switching of allegorical gears when Will falls asleep and the 
Antichrist appears; we have seen Nede as a redemptive principle, and now we will see the 
apocalypse he wanted to save us from. Firmly situated “before the face” of Leviathan—only with 
a greater stress on the separation implicit in this critical “before” than Adams’s reading allows—
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the Nede who confronts the Dreamer at the beginning of the C-Text’s Passus XXII could even be 
imagined, in this reading, as himself giving Will a vision of the universal humbling to come, 
something like Dickens’s ghost of Christmas Future: this is what comes, the vision suggests, of 
those who do not understand themselves to be needy.  
 As I have already pointed out, Mann’s interpretation of the nearness of noon in Passus 
XXII tends to minimize these apocalyptic implications, referring the passage’s singularly precise 
timing to the most banal of cultural contexts: “If Langland meets Need at noon, it is because, in 
fourteenth-century England, noon is dinner-time, as is made quite clear elsewhere in Piers 
Plowman (B.5.492-93; C.9.247), and that is when one would start to get seriously hungry. Need 
first emerges in this passus as the voice of Langland’s rumbling tummy; to ignore this is to 
overlook the wit and precision of the allegory” (“The Nature of Need” 6). Against Mann, and in 
line with Adams’s identification of Nede both with Gregory’s “egestas” and with the “noonday 
demon” of the Augustinian-Bernardine scheme, which Adams defines as “the period of universal 
deception initiated by the advent of the final Antichrist” (“The Nature of Need” 299), I would 
suggest instead that Langland should be understood as re-interpreting and re-purposing the figure 
of the noonday devil to his own ends, much as he re-interprets the “egestas reproborum” of 
Gregory’s apocalypse more in terms of a multiplication of soul-deadening acquisition than of a 
period of widespread, literal famine and indigence. The Dreamer’s encounter with Nede is 
indeed, as Mann describes it, a kind of material experience-based allegory of a literally and 
spiritually hungry Dreamer who, in his deeply felt neediness, comes at least potentially to know 
Christ more “kindly,” as he has hoped to all along;46 but it is also an apocalyptic encounter in 
 
46 In her lecture “Langland and Allegory” and her article “Eating and Drinking in Piers Plowman,” Mann beautifully 
captures the way “Langland makes us constantly aware of the way in which life is lived at the intersection of the 
material and the non-material, the concrete and the abstract” (“Langland and Allegory” 30), suggesting “an extra 
dimension of meaning” beyond either the concrete or the abstract in isolation (39). In the Tree of Charity scene, 
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which Will comes face to face with the temptation of the noonday devil, as Langland 
dramatically re-imagines it. The ambiguous promise and menace of noontide as it is portrayed in 
Bernard’s thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs, which Adams himself cites only at 
secondhand,47 suggests that Langland’s noon may be a significantly more ambivalent time than 
has yet been recognized, with serious consequences for how we should read the allegorical figure 
who appears, berating the Dreamer for not taking what he needs and singing the praises of his 
own virtue, as that fateful hour approaches.  
 
“Y moet nede abyde”: Needing anagogy in Piers Plowman 
Vincent Gillespie and Maggie Ross describe the traditional distinction between negative 
and positive theologies in terms of a “play of absence and presence” that “characterizes the 
human experience of engagement with the ineffable” (53). The same phrase might be used to 
characterize St. Bernard’s thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs, and William Langland’s 
Piers Plowman. One recent high-water mark in Piers criticism, Nicolette Zeeman’s Piers 
Plowman and the Medieval Discourse of Desire, stressed the place of absence and frustrated 
desire in the poem to tremendous effect. The above readings of Piers and of Bernard’s thirty-
third sermon on the Song of Songs, however, should suggest that desire for Bernard and for 
 
“Charity and the growth of an everyday tree become parallel mysteries, neither of which takes precedence over the 
other” (30): “The only way you can know apples, for Langland, is to eat them” (“Eating and Drinking” 41).   
47 In his “Nature of Need” article, Adams makes regular reference to Bernard McGinn’s study “St Bernard and 
Eschatology.” McGinn sees Bernard as poised between a “spiritualizing eschatology and purely vertical anagogy” 
more typical of monastic spirituality in general, and a “major resurgence of historicizing anagogy”—as exemplified, 
albeit in a relatively moderate form, by the Augustinian fourfold scheme—which McGinn understands as 
characteristic of certain shifts in twelfth century Christian thinking on the apocalypse (163). In his later, related 
article “Some Versions of Apocalypse: Learned and Popular Eschatology in Piers Plowman,” Adams depicts 
Langland as a champion of an “otherworldly and moralistic vision of human destiny endorsed by many generations 
of learned exegetes,” as opposed to a “volatile melange of popular vaticinations that threatened to poison spirituality 
at its roots by redirecting mankind’s energies from the task of personal ascesis to a sterile curiosity about current 
events” (195). Adams’s own reading is certainly “moralistic,” but I think this predisposes it to miss the flexibility of 
an exegete like Bernard, and of a poet like Langland—and so of “popular” eschatology more broadly. It is possible, 
as I think Piers Plowman proves, to vaticinate in an otherworldly vein. 
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Langland can, in its own way, have as much to do with presence as with absence. This seems to 
me near the heart of the anti- and pro-Nede debate: Jill Mann et al. constitute a kind of party of 
presence, advocating for the poem’s vision of a needy Christ who identifies with his creation to 
such an extent that he would of course identify with, and even make himself present himself to, 
the inglorious vicissitudes of real physical hunger. Nede’s Christ himself stresses this theme: 
“Bothe fox and foule may fle to hole and crepe 
And the fisch hath fyn to flete with to reste, 
Ther nede hath ynome me that Y moet nede abyde 
And soffre sorwes ful soure that shal to ioye torne.” (C.XXII.44-7)48 
The promised turn from sorrow to joy here, like Bernard’s sudden fits and starts from abjection 
to intimations of a noontide at once already prefigured in the sunrise of Christ’s resurrection and 
still to be accomplished at an indefinite point in the future, is both something that has already 
happened and something that is still happening, at least potentially, to the Dreamer now; it is also 
still, and always, to be desired: “Y moet nede abyde.” Thus the needy “abiding” of the suffering 
Christ engenders a hope that holds past and present and future together in an “eschatological 
tension” something like what Augustine describes, in his Narration on the thirty-seventh Psalm, 
as the “way of desire”: “There is another way of praying, interior and unbroken, and that is the 
way of desire. Whatever else you are doing, if you long for the sabbath, you are not ceasing to 
pray” (37.14). “abyde,” after all—a word that, as we will see, Nede consistently associates with 
 
48 It is sometimes pointed out, as a knock against Nede’s character, that he claims Christ said this “in his sorwe on 
the sulue rode,” when the relevant passages really occur much earlier in Christ’s career (Matt. 8.20, Luke 9.58). But 
it seems to me typical of Piers’s compressed temporal landscape as it approaches its end—and resonant with Nede’s 
exhortation to Will to identify with the suffering God who “cam and toek mankynde and bicam nedy” 
(C.XXII.41)—that the life and death of Christ should be collapsed here into the moment of crucifixion. Paul writes, 
“Non enim judicavi me scire aliqiud inter vos, nisi Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum” (“I judged myself to know 
nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified”) (1 Cor. 2.2).  
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the neediness he recommends as a kind of beginning of wisdom—is very near, in Middle 
English, to the words for bending or bowing, for humbling oneself, and for prayer.49 
 A positive and even hopeful emphasis on the place of a kind of Bernardine anagogical 
longing for the eternal in time in Piers, or even for something like Augustine’s “way of desire” 
as also a “way of Nede” could, I think, usefully nudge our reading of a poem, sometimes 
depicted as almost hopelessly gloomy, into a more appropriately hopeful key.50 Adams himself 
contrasts hope in Piers Plowman with “the hope of the Joachites, which is in the future”; Piers’s 
hope, ultimately, is “in something that has already happened, something that can begin to redeem 
Will at any moment he chooses to allow it” (“Some Versions of Apocalypse” 200). Even 
Adams’s strong emphasis on the “basically pessimistic, penitential function of present time in 
Augustinian eschatology” (196) is not necessarily at odds with this more positive, chiastic 
reading.51 The anti-Nede party of absence, which sometimes risks becoming the party of 
pessimism, tends rightly to emphasize this “penitential” quality in the poem, and the way it 
doggedly insists on inhabiting the vicissitudes of time, rather than straining upward toward some 
perhaps inevitably overreaching vision of the eternal. In her study The Place of God in Piers 
Plowman and Medieval Art, Sister Mary Clemente Davlin contrasts the emphatic earthliness of 
Piers Plowman’s close with the “Mens imago Dei est”-type epiphany at the end of Dante’s 
 
49 According to the Middle English Dictionary, the verb “beden” means “1a. To offer (sth.),” but also “6a. To ask for 
(sth.), beg, demand, request . . . b. to pray.” The verb “beien,” which takes similar forms, is defined as, “a. to bend 
(sth.), bow (the head); 2a. To humble (one’s heart, mind, etc.); 3a. To convert . . . To change (one’s mind, 
someone’s heart).” The verb that Nede actually uses, “abiden,” even takes the extra sense of “8a. To expect . . . esp. 
to hope for, look forward to; to hope to see or hear or find (sth.).” It seems clear to me that the word here crystallizes 
for Langland a way of prayerfully inhabiting time or even, in the Augustinian vein, of inhabiting time as prayer. 
Nede is the poem’s great spokesperson for this way of “abiding.” 
50 Mann adduces Julian of Norwich’s “tyme of oure nede” as an analogue at the end of her article (“The Nature of 
Need” 27). 
51 Adams does perhaps go a bit far when he suggests that “Langland’s pessimism, too, sometimes seems bleaker 
than what the detached, scholarly tradition of Augustine would warrant” (“Some Versions” 197); but it must be 
admitted that Langland “seems” a lot of things, at different points in the poem. 
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Divine Comedy,52 writing, “Where God is in Piers Plowman does not provide a comfortable 
ending to the narrative; it cannot, since the poem is about faith in this world, not sight in the 
next” (170). No amount of hopeful reading, I hope, will risk making Piers Plowman 
“comfortable.” 
 What a more hopeful, “anagogical” reading of Piers does make possible is a keener 
attention to the chiastic pattern of the poem’s ending, and to the way this ending throws light 
back on the whole rest of the work, “turning” it humbly toward joy. I noted above in passing that 
Bernard’s thirty-third sermon on the Song set forth two distinct theories of history that seemed, at 
least on the surface, to contradict one another: one in which the sunrise of the resurrection—“a 
new beauty, with a more serene light than usual” (“novum . . . decorem, et sereniorem solito 
lucem”) (33.6; I:237)—initiates a gradual growing in light that continues into Bernard’s own 
day—“Since then the Sun has risen indeed, and has gradually poured down its rays over the 
earth; its light has begun to appear increasingly clearer, its warmth to be more perceptible” 
(“Sane ex tunc elevatus est sol, et sensim demum infundens suos radios super terram, coepit 
paulatim clarior apparere fervidiorque sentiri”) (33.6; I:237)—and another, the more rigorously 
schematic, fourfold Augustinian model adduced by Adams, in which the trials of the church only 
get worse and worse until Christ comes and history is ended.53 A much more modern theologian 
than Bernard, Ivan Illich, has reminded his readers of the place of the “mysterium iniquitatis” in 
 
52 The three circles that make up the Trinitarian “circulazion,” says Dante, “mi parve pinta de la nostra effige” 
(“seemed to me painted with our effigy”). See Paradiso, Canto XXXIII, lines 127-31 (324-5). I have consulted 
Robin Kirkpatrick’s edition and translation, cited in my Works Cited below. 
53 Bernard presents yet another model, or at least another metaphor, in his first sermon for Advent: “Evening was 
drawing on and the day was nearly over; the Sun of Righteousness had withdrawn just so far that his great brilliance 
and warmth could hardly be perceived. . . .Surely a fullness and abundance of temporal things had brought about a 
loss and forgetfulness of things eternal. Eternity came opportunely, when temporality was at its strongest” (“Vere 
enim advesperascebat et inclinata erat iam dies, recesserat paulo minus Sol iustitiae, ita ut exiguus nimis splendor 
eius aut calor esset in terris. . . .Nimirum plenitudo et abundantia temporalium oblivionem et inopiam fecerat 
aeternorum. Opportune ergo tunc advenit aeternitas, quando magis temporalitas praevalebat”) (9; IV:167-8). 
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early Christian apocalyptic thought from the Second Letter to the Thessalonians on,54 and so of 
the idea that the propagation of the Gospel itself had begotten a kind of anti-gospel that would 
eventually itself bring about the end of all things (169-70). If we keep something like this early, 
chiastic version of Christian eschatology in mind, it is possible to see the last passus of Piers 
Plowman as capturing this trajectory of simultaneous ascent toward the kingdom of God and 
descent toward the coming of Antichrist. Bernard’s dual theory of church history, a distant echo 
of this “mysterium iniquitatis” model, seems to me a more satisfactory explanation of what is 
going on in this final passus, and in Piers Plowman more generally, than the more 
pessimistically and purely negative interpretations of Adams et al. A Nede who is at once a 
harbinger of Antichrist, a kind of neutral allegory for neediness and even bare hunger, and a 
really “redemptive principle” as Richard Firth Green describes him, is in a way as ominous as 
the anti-Nede critics suggest; only there is, as I have attempted to suggest, significantly more to 
the story.55 
The priority of this chiastic, dual movement model of an “eschatalogical tension” or “way 
of desire” in Piers Plowman is thoroughly confirmed, in my view, by close attention to the 
specific language Langland uses to describe Nede, and doubly confirmed by perhaps the most 
significant intervention he made in revising the B-Text of the poem into the C-Text. In the 
 
54 See especially chapter two. 
55 Morton Bloomfield observed, in his influential study Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth-century Apocalypse, that “It 
is clear that there are apocalyptic elements in Piers and that the whole poem implies the hope of a better world 
which is predestined to solve the crisis of Langland’s own time. . . .The sad state of the contemporary Church could 
be explained only on these grounds. God was planning, if not a new age, at least a renewal of the good and the just. 
The evil was the result of the birth throes of the good” (104-5). Anti-Nede critics like Adams have argued that this 
“better world” must be for Langland only the eschatological City of God, and not the Joachimist, literalized 
“renewal” in this world that Bloomfield and Kerby-Fulton have seen the poet as anticipating. Adams et al. rightly 
emphasize that Nede makes no promises of renewal. And yet Bloomfield’s identification of something like “birth 
throes” at work in the poem seems to me a crucial insight, and one not done any justice to by Adams’s more 
determinedly pessimistic reading. This raises the question of the specific quality of Langlandian hope, which I am 
attempting to address here. 
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former case, with a blistering bit of wordplay that constitutes the poem’s most concentrated 
acrobatics around a single linguistic root, Nede declares: 
          Homo proponit, deus disponit; 
God gouerneth all gode vertues. 
          Ac Nede is nexst hym, for anoen he meketh 
And as louh as a lamb for lakkyng that hym nedeth, 
For Nede maketh neede fele nedes louh-herted. 
Philosopheres forsoke welthe for they wolde be nedy 
And woneden wel elyngly and wolden nat be riche. (C.XXII.33-9) 
In the space of the middle three lines here “nede” moves from verb (“nedeth”) to allegorized 
noun (“Nede”) to nominalized adjective (“neede”) to adverb (“nedes”) and back to plain 
adjective (“nedy”), modeling in grammar the hopeful way of “abiding” in time that Nede’s 
Christ explicitly theorizes.56 Like Bernard’s “face of Christ,” the root word “nede” becomes 
itself the generative principle and object of desire that draws one on here, as Bernard might have 
put it, toward the true noontide; even as, on another allegorical plane, Langland may indeed 
intend to represent the book of Job’s “egestas” that goes before the face of Leviathan.  
 This is where the ambivalence of Bernard’s “noontide devil” and even of Gregory’s 
twofold “egestas” makes a new, more dynamic reading of the poem’s ending possible. The 
encounter with Nede, suspended as it is just on the cusp of the encounter with the “noontide 
devil”—who is, I believe, figured in Langland’s poem not so much in the person of Nede 
himself, but rather in the temptation to reject him, and then in terms of the subsequent coming of 
 
56 I would compare this with the way, at the end of Augustine’s De Trinitate, a single creative word is said to stretch 
out in time—only to gather up, in its anagogical scope, all of time into its eternal present. It is, so to speak, 
grammatically inflected; and yet still endlessly itself. This word is said to express the endless praise of the faithful, 
which is itself a kind of expression of dependence, or need (XV.28). 
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Antichrist, the flattery of the friars, and the forgetting of Contricioun to weep—represents a 
moment of obscure temptation that Bernard in his sermon was forced, in a similar way, to only 
indirectly represent. This is the temptation of the noonday devil, which Bernard could only 
describe in terms of Mary and Joshua and the Apostles’ having feared demonic deception, while 
remaining in fact undeceived. The encounter with Nede is a similar moment of un-deception, and 
an elaborate trap for Will and the reader alike: a last temptation, in the face of one’s own simple 
neediness, to despair of Christ’s manifest presence in the poem.57 The ambiguity of the noonday 
moment, as in Bernard’s reading, is therefore preserved; there is no way to describe the 
temptation precisely, other than to say that one is tempted to put one’s faith in something that is 
not God, and therefore to miss the possibility of encountering God in the flesh, in the face of 
Christ, at the true noontide.  
 In my view, the narrow exegetical schemes of the anti-Nede critics would fall under this 
heading, offering a deceptively compelling set of reasons to misrecognize Christ’s presence. 
Discussing the parable of the Good Samaritan—so evidently dear to Langland—Illich writes:  
It has become almost impossible for people who today deal with ethics or morality to 
think in terms of relationships rather than rules. . . .The stress which the New Testament 
puts on relationship is also visible in the new account of virtue which appears amongst 
Christians. In the Platonic and Aristotelian teaching, virtue is something that I can 
cultivate in myself by the discipline of repeating good actions until they have become a 
second nature. . . .The flowering of [Christian] virtues, as evidenced by what Hugh [of St. 
Victor] calls the delicacy of their perfume, can come about only as a gift to me and not 
 
57 The figure of the noonday devil in fact originates in the experience of desert monks facing the temptation to 
despair of their hermetic commitments in the heat of noonday (Nault 28-30). This is another useful corrective to 
Adams’s one-sided Gregorian reading of the figure, and to narrow exegetical readings in general. 
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something which I can do on my own, as in classical tradition. Virtue in that view is very 
self-centered, building on my powers. Hugh presents the gifts of the Holy Spirit as gifts 
which come to me through those with whom I live. (52)58 
Although I have argued that Robert Adams’s foregrounding of the fourfold historical schema of 
St. Bernard is in fact essential for the structure of Piers Plowman’s final passus, Adams’s 
specific application of that schema to the poem seems to me, in the last analysis, a fatal 
misreading—but one that, fascinatingly, Langland may be said almost to encourage. The 
encounter with Nede is not only a call to, but in effect also a test of, humility; one either admits 
to one’s fundamental neediness—however unsettling its spokesperson may be—or else one 
constructs some defense, in Adams’s case an admirably elaborate and exegetical one, against that 
admission. The critical aversion to Nede must be understood, then, as an especially 
 
58 In a similar vein, the contemporary theologian John Milbank recalls that “Augustine charged the Romans with 
having no real virtue, because they knew no real peace,” and suggests, much like Nede, that “where virtue is 
conceived even in residually heroic terms . . . it will tend to reduce to a matter of self-control, whether of the soul, or 
of the city” (367). “Charity,” on the other hand, Milbank writes, “does not, like prudence, really ‘form’ a passionate 
material that wells up from below; rather it produces its own material, shaping it according to its precise needs for 
every occasion” (364). As Aquinas famously argues, charity is the “form” of the virtues. Bernard himself exclaimed, 
in his fiftieth sermon on the Song of Songs, “How often for the sake of administering worldly affairs we very rightly 
omit even the solemn celebration of Masses! A preposterous order; but necessity knows no law. Love in action 
devises its own order, in accord with the command of the householder . . . swayed not by worldly values but by 
human needs” (“Quoties pro administrandis terrenis iustissime ipsis supersedemus celebrandis missarum solemniis! 
Ordo praeposterus; sed necessitas non habet legem. Agit ergo suum actualis caritas ordinem iuxta patrisfamilias 
iussionem . . . nec pretia consideret rerum, sed hominum necessitates”) (50.5; II:81). There is perhaps a danger of 
over-emphasizing this ad hoc quality in Christian virtue: Jennifer Herdt’s study Putting on Virtue warns against 
“early modern hyper-Augustinians” for whom “Even where some place remained for habituation or growth in 
charity . . . this had to be preceded by some moment of exclusively divine action on the passive human self”; in 
consequence, “A pure will, a pure heart, must first be given by God in some way outside of, and discontinuous with, 
ordinary moral psychology” (3). Herdt opposes this warped Augustinianism to “Erasmus’s understanding of true 
virtue as developing through the imitation of Christ” (6). It seems to me that Langland and Bernard, pre-modern as 
they certainly are, both attempt to have it both ways. For Bernard, this is elaborated under the category of 
“experience”—as Illich suggests, something arrives “as a gift to me,” in my experience, to which I must respond; 
there is therefore no virtue that is not fundamentally responsive (as opposed to purely “passive”). For Langland, the 
language of need, of prayer, and of “abyde”-ing carves out this middle space of gift and response. Even Herdt’s 
Erasmian model seems to me to presuppose an essentially isolated subjectivity that must evaluate and manage its 
own virtuousness. As we will see in Chapters Two and Three, the Bernardine/Pseudo-Bernardine tradition in Middle 
English can be fairly accused of certain “hyper-Augustinian” tendencies. 
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presumptuous form of despair:59 an elaborate scheme of the virtues, transposed onto an actually 
relevant apocalyptic scheme, is preferred to the admission of a fundamental neediness that is the 
poem’s one condition for hope. As Bernard writes in his early treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio 
(“On Grace and Free Will”), “Besides, if the merits that we refer to as ours are rightly so called, 
then they are seed-beds of hope, incentives to love, portents of a hidden predestination, 
harbingers of happiness, the road to the kingdom, not a motive for playing the king. In one word: 
it is those whom he has made righteous, not those whom he found already righteous, that he has 
magnified” (“Alioquin si proprie appellentur ea, quae dicimus nostra, merita, spei sunt auaedam 
seminaria, caritatis incentiva, occultae praedestinationis inidicia, futurae felicitatis praesagia, via 
regni, non causa regnandi. Denique quos iustificavit, non quos iustos invenit, hos et 
magnificavit”) (XIV.51; III:203). Likewise, according to Gregory the Great, the “true riches of 
the heavenly homeland” can only “return” to those who “remember themselves to be poor”; for 
those readers who reject this remembrance, the encounter with Nede does indeed become an 
encounter with “egestas reproborum” (“the need of the reprobate”). For those who do not, Nede 
becomes instead the “egestas electorum,” the “need of the elect.” The poem lets us decide. 
 Later on, in its final words of advice to the Dreamer—which follow on the words of 
Nede’s Christ who “moet nede abyde” the sorrows that “shal to ioye torne”—Nede seizes 
specifically on this idea of “abiding” as a recommendation to Will of a certain way of inhabiting 
time: “Forthy be nat abasched to byde and to be nedy / Sethe he that wrouhte al the worlde was 
willefolliche nedy / Ne neuere noen so nedy ne porore deyede” (C.XXII.48-50). If Christ himself 
suffered time as a kind of prayerful interval of unfulfilled desire, Nede implicitly asks, why can’t 
Will be content to do so? A similar question is posed, if only by Will to himself, in Langland’s 
 
59 See Footnote 34 above for a brief recapitulation of the Bernardine teaching on presumption and despair, which 
Bernard understands as itself resulting from a kind of presumptuousness.  
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most significant addition to the C-Text, which is also the poem’s closest formal analogue to the 
above wordplay with “nede.” In this crucial passage, in which Will reveals more of his way of 
life and perhaps of his temperament than he does anywhere in the previous versions of the poem, 
it is explicitly stated, by Will himself, that his profession has been to “begge / Withoute bagge or 
botel but my wombe one” (C.V.51-2), in exchange for prayers for those who show him charity. 
He initially defends his choice of profession—“For in my consience Y knowe what Crist wolde 
Y wrouhte” (C.V.83), he assures Reason—but he is at once upbraided by Conscience himself, 
who, although he admits he “can nat se this lyeth,” declares it “no sad parfitnesse in citees to 
begge, / But he be obediencer to prior or to mynistre” (C.V.89-91). Will responds: 
 ‘That is soth,’ Y saide, ‘and so Y beknowe 
 That Y haue ytynt tyme and tyme myspened; 
 Ac yut Y hope, as he that ofte hath ychaffared 
 And ay loste and loste and at the laste hym happed 
 A bouhte suche a bargayn he was the bet euere 
 And sette al his los at a leef at the laste ende, 
 Suche a wynnyng hym warth thorw wyrdes of grace: 
            Simile est regnum celorum thesauro abscondito in agro. 
            Mulier que inuenit dragmam. 
 So hope Y to haue of hym that is almyghty  
 A gobet of his grace and bigynne a tyme 
 That alle tymes of my tyme to profit shal turne.’ (C.V.92-101) 
This passage, new to the C-Text of the poem, works in part to clarify the Nede episode later on. 
It makes it much more clear just what Nede is saying Will ought to simply “excuse” himself for 
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in that later passage: begging without excess accumulation (“Withoute bagge or botel”) and 
following an obscure sense, identified with a “consience” that apparently conflicts with the 
allegorized Conscience himself at this point in the poem,60 of “what Crist wolde Y wrouhte.”61  
This new passage is also connected with the latter confrontation with Nede, and with the whole 
final passus of the poem, at a deeper thematic level, where the categories of “need” and “time” 
blur into one another. Like Nede’s Christ who suffers “sorwes ful soure that shal to ioye torne,” 
the Dreamer in his C-Text “apologia” to Conscience imagines a kind of eschatological turn or 
recoup of all his misspent time, a final “wynnyng” that will retroactively redeem all that has been 
lost so far; and yet this “time,” like Augustine’s God who must be in some sense known before 
He can be sought, is anticipated by Will almost as a kind of memory before the fact, a secondary 
and subsequent interpretation of a primary, given content that is already obscurely known in 
Will’s “consience.”62 Like Nede’s dizzying deployment of the word “nede” as almost every 
 
60 The divide between Will’s conscience and Conscience itself is fascinating to a degree that I cannot deal with here. 
In his essay “Religious forms and institutions in Piers Plowman,” James Simpson describes the “fact that 
Conscience errs in allowing Friar Flatterer into the church” in the poem’s final passus (ignoring the advice of Nede) 
as “an acceptance of the limited vision, and the consequent check on anger, that Christ’s own sufferance entails. 
That limited vision is a refusal of eschatological certainty and eschatological anger” (113). On the other hand, 
“Langland would seem to locate the source of reform in the individual conscience” (110). I will discuss the figure of 
Conscience more in Chapter Two. 
61 Langland’s vocational crisis here is emblematic of what I would describe as a tension between “pilgrim” and 
“crusading” mentalities in Bernardine theology, a theme that I will explore at greater length in Chapter Two. It is 
only at the end of the poem, when Conscience “wol bicome a pilgrime” (C.XXII.380) and Will wakes up (perhaps) 
with Nede again, that the way is clear for Will to inhabit his role in the world without an overly scrupulous 
conscience that is, in a sense, “crusading” against itself, unable to accept the relative simplicity of what Holy Church 
asks of it. My metaphorical paradigm may apply here more literally than it would seem, since Langland did in fact 
have an association—perhaps even one of patronage—with the Despenser family, famous for their own crusade in 
Ghent against the anti-pope Clement VII (Kerby-Fulton 121). William E. Rogers convincingly argues that a number 
of revisions in the C-Text “emphasize the prelatical responsibility for dealing with the enemies against whom the 
crusades are being undertaken” (“The C-Revisions” 150). Along these lines, Langland’s Liberum Arbitrium warns 
that, should the clergy not curb their covetousness, “clerkes of holi churche / Sholle ouerturne as the Templars dede, 
the tyme approcheth faste” (C.XVII.208-9). In carving out space for a “pilgrim” theology of need and a humbled 
conscience, then, Langland may have been literally defining himself against a “crusading” Christianity, still 
identified in his time with the Templars. 
62 Anne Middleton writes of this sequence: “imagined within the fictive narrative as launched at the moment in the 
poet’s youth when habit (and habitus) were first challenged, then transformed into vocation rather than renounced, 
this new waking episode positioned early in the poem stands paradoxically within its production history as the poet’s 
last word” (214). It is almost as if, in writing this final scene, the poet prays for his own past. 
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possible part of speech, the Dreamer’s C-Text confession turns its own key word, here “tyme,” 
into a kind of mantric prayer, expressing the desire for a “gobet of his grace” and a new kind of 
“tyme” more than it does any abstract conceptualization of Will’s vocation and its conscientious 
timeliness (or lack thereof). There will be a new kind of “tyme,” it starts to seem, simply because 
there needs to be. 
 There are, of course, significant differences between the two passages. Although the 
sense of the word changes throughout the course of Will’s defense of himself, in Passus V of the 
C-Text the poet retains “tyme” as a static series of nouns, in what is in essence a kind of counter-
syntax to the one later employed by Nede. This grammatical uniformity is paralleled on the 
conceptual level by a perhaps unpromising tendency of Will’s to see time itself in terms of the 
monetary metaphor of gambling, as if a certain static quantity of time could be bartered for 
another. We are, after all—however late in the poem’s history this passage may have been 
composed—still quite early on in the C-Text itself, and perhaps the Dreamer is to be understood 
as here still significantly far from the humbled state that he is, at least potentially, to achieve at 
the poem’s end, in his climactic encounter with Nede. But this only makes it all the more 
essential to set this passage beside the Nede sequence, where the counter-mantra of “nede” 
proposes itself, even in its grammar, as something like the very alternative “tyme” the Dreamer 
hopes for early on in the C-Text of Piers Plowman—a way of “abiding” in which the past, 
present, and future of nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs are all hazarded in the “hope” for, 
even the need for, the grace that one should yet be permitted to “bigynne a tyme.”  
 This new beginning in time would represent, in turn—as the Nede passage newly 
suggests in its new C-Text context—not only a new period in Will’s life, but also a whole new 
way of inhabiting time as well, like Augustine’s “way of desire” or Julian of Norwich’s “tyme of 
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oure nede.” Piers Plowman ends with a beginning: “Y gan awake” (C.XXII.386). This and other 
passages in the poem make a strong argument for identifying a purposeful manipulation of the 
poem’s tempo and temporality towards its end, which in turn strengthens the connection I have 
made above between the two passages of time and of nede: the most evident formal marker of 
the poem’s progress toward its own end times is its acceleration of the intervals between the 
dreamer’s falling asleep and waking back up again, creating a kind of fast-forwarding time warp 
effect that coincides with the approach and eventual appearance of the apocalyptic figure of 
Nede. In a pattern that reaches its apex in the Nede sequence itself, where a scant fifty lines 
separate the dreamer’s waking from his falling back asleep again, these intervals increasingly 
shorten as the poem nears its end. At the same time the dreamer’s awakenings, previously in the 
poem described once only and then dispensed with, begin at Passus XX in the C-Text to double 
up: “riht with that Y wakede” (C.XX.468) pairs with “Thus Y wakede and wrot” (C.XXI.1) to 
describe, for the first time, the same awakening twice; likewise, “Y wakned therwith and wroet 
as me mette” (C.XXI.481) pairs with “as Y wente by the way, when Y was thus awaked” 
(C.XXII.1). This gives rise, on the one hand, to a thematization of the idea of “awakening”; 
coming awake comes to be depicted as not merely something you do and are done with, but 
rather as something you have to do again and again, sometimes just after you’ve done it. On the 
other hand, it also suggests a more fundamental breakdown in the way time has worked so far in 
the poem; time begins to catch on itself like a tape skipping in its tape head, and the frame of the 
poem itself becomes visible as some new temporality altogether, like Bernard’s “true noonday,” 
the face of Christ that is outside of all representation, begins to assert itself. This pattern hits its 
highest pitch with the poem’s final and unique “Y gan awake” (C.XXII.386), which suspends 
Piers Plowman in a moment of awakening marked forever as something only yet “begun,” 
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something still—and for the poem at least, always—under way.63 Its ending is thus appropriately 
“anagogic,” in de Lubac’s sense of incorporating at once the futura to come and the invisibilia 
that represent the eternal as already present now: it gestures toward eternity by means of a figure 
for an endless process of awakening that is always beginning again, “in this world” as Davlin put 
it, in time; the reader, in his or her response to the figure of Nede, is firmly caught up in this 
process. Although the Dreamer’s “hope” to “bigynne a tyme” therefore seems to be prospectively 
fulfilled, the poem itself may be said—somewhat in the manner of Bernard’s thirty-third sermon 














63 In Middle English “Y gan awake” often means just “I woke up,” but my argument is more about the fact of the 
poem’s ending on this moment of awakening than it is about than the specific grammatical idea of “beginning to 






The Two Bernards 
Tensions in Bernardine theology and its literary heirs 
 
A great philosophy is not that which passes final judgments, which takes a seat in final truth. It is 
that which introduces uneasiness, which opens the door to commotion. 
 




The previous chapter’s reading of Piers Plowman in terms of one of Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs assumes a certain stability to Bernard’s thinking, 
reading Langland in light of a given lens that is supplied by an exemplary text from Bernard’s 
masterwork. This seemed to me useful because I believe Bernardine theology can illuminate 
certain key features that have been misunderstood in the literary texts under its influence, and 
because Piers explicitly engages with the Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine traditions I will be 
grappling with for the remainder of this dissertation. However, it is also potentially misleading. 
If I have depicted Piers Plowman as a poem riven with generative contradictions—perhaps best 
encapsulated by the late addition, in the C-Text, of a scene in which the dreamer Will cites the 
dictates of his “consience” against the allegorical figure of Conscience itself (C.V.83)—I will 
clarify in this chapter that the thought of Bernard of Clairvaux was itself laced with fault lines 
and fissures. The mystical, what I have termed “anagogical” quality in his writings is aptly 
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embodied in his thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs,1 and is a major element in his thought 
that, in my view, fourteenth and fifteenth-century Middle English literary authors from Langland 
to Julian of Norwich to Chaucer to Malory attempted, in their different ways, to re-boot and re-
capture. But in order to understand Bernard, it is necessary to keep in mind that this element is 
itself internally conflicted, marking nothing less than the attempt to inhabit a certain kind of 
tension as fulfillment. This is the tension that Bernard characterizes in terms of “memory,” 
“time,” and the “reflection” of the “face of Christ” that intimates the ambiguous presence of the 
eternal in time, “noontide light,” even in its very apparent absence. It is characteristic of a 
Bernardine “pilgrim” theology, content to remain within the ambiguity of this “interim” period, 
as opposed to more “crusading” attempts to collapse the interval between present saeculum and 
eternal Kingdom of God: “Meanwhile I have to be content with the husk of the sacrament, with 
the bran of the flesh, with the chaff of the letter, with the veil of faith” (“Me oportet interim 
quodam sacramenti cortice esse contentum, carnis furfure, litterae palea, velamine fidei”) (33.3; 
I:235), Bernard says in the sermon on the Song of Songs I analyzed Chapter One. As we will see 
in this chapter, this is not necessarily a tension that Bernard himself always maintained. 
This is also the quality in Bernard’s thought that led Caroline Walker Bynum to describe 
what she calls Bernard’s “sense of radical doubleness,” which she critiques as a sign of 
Bernard’s insufficiently historical, unresolvedly dualistic thinking (Metamorphosis 249).2 This is 
 
1 I am hesitant to put much weight on the term “mystical” because it is not one that Bernard used in this way. Denys 
Turner’s study of apophatic theology, The Darkness of God, argues that “mysticism” is in an important sense a 
modern invention, which only makes sense in a context where theology as a speculative endeavor has been 
separated out from its roots in religious experience (7). I think Bernard’s “theology of experience” is strongly 
resistant to this kind of separation. 
2 The charge of dualism is not one that Bynum makes herself, but seems to me the theological corollary of her 
critique of “doubleness.” She notes how for Bernard the language of “mixture” typically signals disgust. However, 
Bynum also points out that “Bernard’s most complex rhetorical contrast is admiratio/imitatio,” and that the 
experience of “admiratio” is often tied for Bernard to the encounter with various startling mixtures: “As Bernard 
explained: when we are offered a golden goblet, we consume, absorb, incorporate the drink (that is, imitate the 
virtues), but we give back (that is, we wonder at) the goblet. Thus we wonder at what we cannot in any sense 
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a thoughtful critique, characteristic of many contemporary critical reactions to Bernard, and one 
that will occupy the rest of this chapter. I should say at the outset, however, that I do not believe 
it is correct. In fact, I think the essence of what Bernard contributes to those literary authors 
under his sway is lost in this reading, and that Bynum’s view of Bernard is in fact symptomatic 
of fatal mis-readings of the saint that were already underway in his time. To be fair to Bynum 
and to Bernard’s other mis-interpreters, it is a mis-reading that Bernard, somewhat like 
Langland, at times may be said to encourage. It is Bernard’s ceaseless drive toward tension, and 
ultimately “eschatological tension” in Rowan Williams’s phrase,3 that makes it so easy to 
mistake his many dualistic formulations for real dualism, and his many binaries for what Bynum 
describes in terms of a “nameless hybrid” (127), lacking a “sense of midpoint or median” (129). 
As Denys Turner has recently argued of Julian of Norwich, much of what Bernard says needs to 
be understood as inextricable from its rhetorical context, and so as a series of hypothesized 
contradictions that the saint sets out to prospectively resolve without simply reducing.4 Bynum 
herself suggests something like this when she observes that Bernard is concerned with “Paradox, 
 
incorporate, or consume, or encompass in our mental categories; we wonder at mystery, at paradox, at admirabiles 
mixturae. The ecstasy and stupor Bernard calls admiratio is triggered above all, he says, by three hybrids beyond 
nature and comprehension: the mixture of God and man, of woman and virgin, of belief with falsity in our hearts” 
(Metamorphosis 53). In other words, Bernard’s “radical doubleness” at its height is tied to a perception of the 
impossible paradoxes at the core of the Christian faith. It should be understood, I think, as an attempt to do justice to 
them. 
3 I cited Williams’s critique of Bernard’s tendency to collapse “the eschatological tension between Church and 
society” in Chapter One (“Three Styles” 28). As my reading of the songs of Jaufre Rudel below will demonstrate, I 
think Williams is right to observe that Bernard’s more ideological writings, and especially his crusade preaching, 
tend to break down on this score. But I also think that Bernard is, as the thirty-third sermon on the Song of Songs 
demonstrates, the great theologian of personal and ecclesiological “eschatological tension” in the homiletic genre. 
4 Turner argues, for instance, that Julian’s “godly” and “beastly” wills need to be understood in this way; that is, that 
Julian does not suggest that the soul is finally divided into two wills, one good and one bad, but that, given our 
presently incomplete, sinful condition, we operate as if it were. This is, as Turner puts it, “the experiential by-
product of a fundamental fracture in the human condition” (Julian of Norwich 206). Patricia Dailey clarifies how 
even though these wills may be “parallel constructs—one reflecting the image of God, the other reflecting the 
promise of the divine in a temporal medium—the lower will may misalign itself in relation to the higher potential of 
the divine will” (169). Karl F. Morrison has described the tendency to emphasize rather than elide these tensions in 
Bernard’s writing in terms of “enigma.” John Bugbee has more recently defended Bernard on this score in terms of 
“paradox.” I would suggest the use of the term “mystery” in the technical sense in which the word was originally 
used to describe the sacraments. As a sacramental theologian Bernard is firmly on the side of the mysterious. 
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not process” (161);5 the saint routinely entertains hypothetical perspectives in a quest to capture 
the drama of struggling for salvation in time, where nothing can be finally resolved, where the 
world often looks to us to be split in two, and the soul often seems to be wandering in a “regio 
dissimilitudinis” (“realm of unlikeness”).6 Whereas Bynum views Bernard’s “hybrid 
monstrosities” as symptomatic of an overly static resistance to real change, or what she terms 
“metamorphosis,” his impact on the late medieval authors I am analyzing suggests that the effect 
of this hybrid quality may have been the opposite of this. In the hands of later vernacular authors 
like Langland, Chaucer, Julian of Norwich, and Malory, the problems and tensions that are 
embodied in Bernard’s sermons and sayings, as they are filtered down through manuscript 
transmission, florilegia, and secondhand vernacular sources like the popular Prick of 
Conscience,7 become themselves fertile seedbeds of change, invitations to thinking toward a 
richly vernacular theology that enacts, if only in ovo, a real metamorphosis in Christian thought. 
 
5 G.R. Evans draws attention to the way “Bernard came to enjoy paradoxes. He discovered them everywhere, in the 
writings of the Fathers, in Scripture itself, in the demands of daily life. He held them up to his listeners as jewels 
sparkling with divine mystery. . . .Bernard’s treatises rest upon a series of grand paradoxes, within which he 
explores a multitude of smaller ones. . . .they do not alarm him. He is confident in his power to use them to bring a 
point home to the reader with the vividness only amazement can produce.” Like Alan of Lille in his poem “Rithmus 
de incarnatione Domini,” Bernard “speaks of the salubris copula” as a way of understanding the mediating power of 
the Word, “the copula which links the disparate parts of every proposition” (The Mind of St. Bernard 219-21). In his 
treatise De consideratione Bernard advises Pope Eugenius III that “There is a useful connection [salubris copula] 
between thinking of yourself as Supreme Pontiff and paying equal attention to the vile dust that you not only were, 
but are. Your thoughts should imitate nature, and what is more worthy, should imitate the Author of nature, in 
joining what is highest with what is lowest. Did not nature in the person of man join the breath of life with vile dust? 
Did not the Author of nature, in the person of himself mix together the dust of the earth and the Word? Thus, take 
your model both from the substance of our origin and from the mystery of redemption” (“Salubris copula, ut 
cogitans te Summum Pontificem, attendas pariter vilissimum cinerem non fuisse, sed esse. Imitetur cogitatio 
naturam; imitetur et, quod dignius est, Auctorem naturae, summa imaque consocians. Nonne natura in persona 
hominis vili limo vitae spiraculum colligavit? Nonne Auctor naturae in sui persona Verbum limumque 
contemperavit? Ita tibi sume formam tam de nostrae concretione originis quam de sacramento redemptionis”) (II.18; 
III:426). 
6 As I note in Chapter One, this is an Augustinian phrase that Bernard co-opts to describe the sense of dislocation 
that human sinfulness engenders. Étienne Gilson’s The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard broke significant ground 
in drawing attention to this (in fact infrequently occurring) phrase in Bernard’s work. See Gilson’s Mystical 
Theology for an extended meditation on the significance of this phrase for Bernard (33-59). 
7 Christopher Holdsworth’s survey “The Reception of St Bernard in England” concludes that, by the time of the 
Ancrene Wisse’s composition in the early thirteenth century, “the abbot of Clairvaux was indeed wellknown and 
loved, both by people who had Latin and those who did not, he was part of the spiritual landscape” (176).  
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As Bernard himself says in his treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio (“On Grace and Free Will”), 
“we are reformed in Christ into a spirit of freedom” (“reformamur per Christum in spiritum 
libertatis”) (XIV.49; III:201). This is the story of that spirit’s movement.  
It is not, however, a story that is without its complications. This chapter will explore 
those complications in as concentrated a form as possible. I will look for “radical doubleness” in 
Piers Plowman; in the songs of the troubadour Jaufre Rudel, whose songs uniquely serve as a 
point of possibly direct contact with Bernard’s preaching; and—looking forward to the arrival of 
Bernard’s writings in England—a Latin treatise that circulated widely there under Bernard’s 
name: the Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis (“Pious Meditations on the 
Understanding of the Human Condition”). In general, I will argue that it is an inauthentic, 
distorted Bernardinism that implicates itself in various dualisms in the way Bynum describes, 
and so suggest that Bernard’s authentic thought is marked by its pushing through and past its 
paradoxes to intimate something of the “noontide light” in its mysterious abiding in time. Even 
so, there is undoubtedly something dark and conflicted in Bernard’s rhetorical and intellectual 
DNA that the Christian tradition has found ceaselessly fascinating, whether it is celebrated by 
Martin Luther or regretted as an unfortunate medieval regression by Rowan Williams.8 He is, as 
Brian Patrick McGuire has put it, the “difficult saint,” and he deserves to be handled in all his 
difficulty. This chapter sets out to ensure that the problems that are worked out partly through the 
creative repurposing of the figure of Bernard in later writers are understood as problems, in all 
their urgency and apparent intractability, first. For heuristic purposes, it may be helpful here to 
 
8 As Bernard McGinn points out in his Introduction to Bernard’s treatise On Grace and Free Choice, “after St 
Augustine, Bernard was Luther’s most admired theologian.” McGinn also discusses “Luther’s distinction between 
Bernard the preacher and Bernard the disputant,” concluding that it is a false one (45). This chapter makes a slightly 
different distinction between Bernard the mystic and Bernard the crusader. Beyond Williams, Geraldine Heng 
describes Bernard as an advocate of religious “genocide” (115). 
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speak of two Bernards: the mystical abbot responsible for the Sermons on the Song of Songs and 
On Loving God, identified by Williams as “some of the finest analyses of the life of supernatural 
charity to come from the pen of any Christian writer”; and the crusade preacher Williams 
describes as the “one of the first great ideologists of the mediaeval Western church” (“Three 
Styles” 36). In order to understand Bernard, it is necessary to understand both of these figures, 
and to hold them in productive tension, as we examine his wide-ranging influence in the 
vernacular. 
 
“Redde quod debes”: Theological fault lines in Langland and Bernard 
I have argued in Chapter One that Langland’s Piers Plowman ultimately, if haltingly, 
outlines a theology of need, recapturing the spirit of the early Christian Didache by way of a 
detour through Bernardine thinking on the primacy of self-knowledge and the importance of 
understanding oneself as utterly dependent, or “needy,” as the foundation for all the other 
virtues.9 This is what Langland’s Imaginatif describes in terms of the “chaste”-ing of the 
“shrew.”10 I did not spend as much time describing the other side of this tension: the extent to 
which Piers Plowman appears at times to be haunted by an almost overwhelming sense of the 
soul’s unpayable debt to God and to others,11 which oscillates wildly with the simple ethic of 
neediness set out by Holy Church in the poem’s first passus. This preoccupation is nicely 
encapsulated by Langland’s use of the phrase “redde quod debes,” a refrain that recurs 
 
9 Bernard sometimes states the primacy of humility and acknowledged neediness very starkly, as in his second 
sermon on the Purification: “we have the greatest need of the greatest virtue, humility” (“humilitatis virtus maxima 
maxime necessaria est”) (3; IV:340). 
10 In her book Piers Plowman and the Moderni Janet Coleman makes the interesting suggestion, which I did not 
address in Chapter One, that Imaginatif may be meant to embody the speculative nominalism of Ockham and the 
moderni. I will discuss Langland’s relationship with fourteenth-century theology in more detail below. 
11 As Richard Firth Green puts it, “the dreamer is obsessed by a paradox he finds at the very heart of the baptismal 
contract. Dowel . . . is either possible for sinful humanity or it is not. If it is not, how can God justly enter into a 
contract whose fulfillment is impossible?” (A Crisis of Truth 363). 
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throughout the penultimate passus of both B- and C-Texts of the poem and that appears in its 
original context in scripture in an oddly inauspicious place: the Parable of the Servant in 
Matthew Chapter 18.12 In this parable, Jesus tells the story of a servant who, having asked his 
master and creditor for “patientia” and received it, nonetheless holds his own debtor ruthlessly 
accountable for what he owes, exclaiming “Redde quod debes!” (“Return what you owe”) (Matt. 
18.28) and throwing him into jail until he can pay back the whole sum. It is obviously a story of 
how one should not behave, and even comes with a clear warning that the one who does not 
forgive his debtors will be held accountable for the “universum debitum” (“whole debt”). This 
makes it very strange that the next to last passus of Piers Plowman seems to settle on this phrase 
as a salutary call to repentance. It is not clear whether Langland is aware of the scriptural tension 
built into the phrase, but, as the tearing of the pardon scene in the B-Text vividly illustrates,13 he 
is clearly aware of, and sensitive to, similar tensions in Christian theology in general: in 
particular, a tension between theologies that emphasize the importance of works and God’s 
justice and those that emphasize his mercy and grace.14 In any case, Langland is deeply 
concerned with the question of what one owes to God, and how the model of debt can or can’t be 
mapped onto a religion in which the master is supposed to forgive the servant, and the request for 
patience is always meant to be heard.15 
 
12 Eleanor Johnson’s article “Reddere and Refrain” argues that “Langland’s repetition of reddere . . . does not create 
stable, fixed, extractable meanings through the action of argumentation or cumulative reasoning; instead, it is 
associative and non-linear, and it creates palimpsestic interpretive crises more often than paraphraseable lessons” 
(4). We must think of the “reddere repetitions,” she argues, as “poetic refrains” (6). My reading follows this 
procedure, arguing that the instability of the refrain’s relationship with scripture instigates one of the great 
interpretive crises in the poem.  
13 See B.VII.1-105 for the pardon scene. 
14 Drawing on the work of John Alford and Judson Boyce Allen, Johnson observes, “It is clear . . . that Langland 
derives his clusters of citations around particular lexemes from trawling through concordances, distinctiones, or 
commentaries” (“Reddere” 6). It therefore seems unlikely that he was unaware of the tension here. 
15 This comes to the surface for the first time in a major way in the poem in the fourth passus of the C-Text, where 
the distinction between “mede” and “mercede” is examined.  
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Whether it is used with an awareness of its negative scriptural connotations or not, “redde 
quod debes” shows up at moments in Piers Plowman where the question of what one owes to 
God, and how one pays it, is at least implicitly raised and complicated. A close examination of 
its several appearances in the poem will make Langland’s attitude toward these questions, and so 
toward a form of “dualism” embedded in this scriptural refrain—one that would threaten to 
separate God’s justice from his mercy, demanding a recompense separate from the context of 
God’s love—more clear. When it occurs in Piers for the first time, the phrase is used by 
Conscience to describe Christ’s giving St. Peter the power of pardon after Pentecost as the “do 
best” of Conscience’s brief recapitulation of the life of Christ. In this passage, the practice of 
sacramental penance is depicted as the “return” that makes forgiveness possible:  
And whan this dede was doen, do best he thouhte 
And yaf Peres pardoun and power he graunted hym, 
Myhte men to assoyle of alle manere synnes, 
To alle manere men mercy and foryeuenesse  
In couenaunt that they come and knoleched to pay  
To Peres pardoun the ploughman Redde quod debes. (C.XXI.182-7) 
The phrase is originally introduced into the poem here with reference to the founding of the 
institutional Church via the granting of the power of “pardoun” to Piers. Conscience immediately 
clarifies that Piers has “power, be his pardoun payed, / To bynde and to vnbynde bothe here and 
elles / And assoile men of alle synnes, saue of dette one” (C.XXI.188-90). He then imagines 
Christ returning to reward “hym riht wel that reddet quod debet, / Payeth parfitly as puyr treuthe 
wolde. / And what persone payth hit nat punischen he thenketh” (C.XXI.193-5). When the 
phrase next occurs in the passus, it is imagined that Conscience will be crowned King and Grace 
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will, it says, make “Peres the plouhman my procuratour and my reue / And registrer to reseyuen 
Redde quod debes. / … / And for to tulye treuthe a teme shal he haue” (C.XXI.258-61). This 
associates the phrase with another litany of institutional formations—procurator, reeve, registrar, 
purveyor, plowman—and with the overburdened word “treuthe,” which itself may carry 
connotations of traditional authority.16 Its third and final appearance comes just before the crisis 
that precedes and sets the stage for the poem’s frantic final passus:  
Grace thorw godes word gaf Peres the plouhman power,  
Mythe to make hit and men for to eten hit aftur 
In helpe of here hele ones in a monthe 
Or as ofte as they hadden nede, tho that hadden payed 
To Peres pardon the plouhman Redde quod debes. (C.XXI.386-90) 
This injunction immediately sets off a revolution from below: “‘How?’ quod alle the comune, 
‘thow conseylest vs to yelde / Al that we owen eny wyhte or that we go to hosele?’” (C.XXI.391-
2). Conscience says yes, and the rest is history: the “comune” revolts, Will wakes back up, and 
the ambiguous figure of Nede arrives to set the scene for Antichrist and the attack on 
Conscience’s barn of Unite. 
There is clearly a meditation here on the meaning of debt, both sacramental and 
otherwise,17 but there is also a very deliberate picture painted of an institutional church with real 
 
16 Richard Firth Green’s A Crisis of Truth, which I will discuss in more detail below, suggests that this word is a 
major semantic battleground in the late Middle Ages in England, staging a transition from “an illusion of communal 
coherence founded on ethical truth” to “the unwavering insistence of written evidence on a depersonalized 
intellectual truth” (39). 
17 It is worth pointing out in this connection that Langland refers to the Pauline phrase, “Reddite ergo omnibus 
debita” (“Therefore pay your debts to all”) (Romans 13:7) (C.VI.315), in conjunction with the Augustinian reminder 
that “Numquam dimmitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum” (“Sin is never remitted, unless what was stolen is 
restored”) (C.VI.257), in an earlier passage exploring the themes of penitence and satisfaction. The latter phrase is 
later referenced by the Samaritan in his own discourse on repentance (C.XIX.290). This makes it more plausible that 
the phrase “redde quod debes” is meant to be heard as a much harsher, perhaps even a misguided, way of demanding 
that one do penance. It at least seems clear that the phrase captures, as James Simpson says of Nede, a “matter of 
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limitations. In other words, it is not at all clear that Langland is straightforwardly on the side of 
Conscience. The beginning of Conscience’s account of the founding of the Church is colored 
with a Christus victor vision of “Iesus the ioustare” (C.XXI.10) and “Crist with his croes, 
conquerour of cristene” (C.XXI.14). This was already a somewhat outdated model in Langland’s 
time,18 and we may be meant to feel that Conscience’s instinctive recourse to the language of 
courtly chivalry and royal power—“Thou knowest wel,” he says when Will asks him to explain 
the name of Christ, “That knyht, kyng, conquerour may be o persone” (C.XXI.26-7)—colors his 
whole account, including the odd description of “do wel” at the wedding at Cana in terms of a 
demonstration of “lawe and lyf-holinesse” (C.XXI.111), the definition of Christ’s “Dobet” in 
terms of his sheer miraculous power, and the ultimate association of “Dobest” in the life of 
Christ with the penitential system of the church, rather than with the passion, the resurrection, or 
the sending of the Holy Spirit. The mounting sense that Conscience may be a somewhat over-
sanguine company man comes to a head when he exclaims, near the end of his speech, “Y care 
nat now . . . thow Pryde come nouthe; / The lord of lust shal be ylette al this lente” (C.XXI.381-
2). This overconfident assertion comes just before the final use of the phrase “redde quod debes” 
in the poem and the immediate revolt of the commons, and seems an obviously ironic 
 
great intellectual tension” for Langland (Piers Plowman 205-6). Green points out that F.W. Maitland described the 
early English common law as missing the “vast gulf which to our mind divides the ‘Give me what I own’ and ‘Give 
me what I am owed’” (A Crisis of Truth 47). What God “owns” would seem to be not sin, but the soul itself. A 
usage in this vein occurs in Bernard’s first sermon for the Feast of All Saints, when the saint observes that Adam, 
had he “thirsted for righteousness,” “would doubtless have been anxious to give back what he owed, not only to his 
wife but much more to his Creator” (“si esurisset iustitiam, curasset sine dubio reddere quod debebat, non solum 
uxori, sed multo magis Creatori”). What he owed to God in this case, Bernard says, was “obedience and subjection” 
(“oboedientiam atque subiectionem”) (11; V:336).   
18 Green points out how Langland also espouses a “pre-Anselmian soteriology” that depicts “the redemption as a 
legal process . . . , which makes Langland . . . vulnerable . . . to Anselm’s refutation of the devil’s rights theory.” 
Green does not think Langland naively adopts this position, but rather prefers it as intimating something that is 
difficult to capture discursively (A Crisis of Truth 360-1). 
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manifestation of pride at work in its very disavowal. In all his institutional bravado, Conscience 
has forgotten about his own susceptibility to sin. 
Richard Firth Green has described the tension that is illustrated here in more intellectual-
historically situated terms, which in turn help relate this set of questions back to the figure of 
Bernard. Green’s landmark study A Crisis of Truth draws attention to a consequential divide 
between “covenantal” theologies in which God is seen in a sense as owing something to mankind 
due to the covenant he has made with it, and those in which an emphasis on God’s 
incommensurable power leads to a denial of the idea that God may be said to owe anything to 
anyone. As Green’s chief theological source William J. Courtenay points out, the late medieval 
nominalists with whom Langland is sometimes associated can be understood in terms of a desire 
to restore the sense that God had meaningfully committed himself to his creation, and so “often 
interpreted the covenant of salvation in the sense that God was a debtor, committed to reward 
with grace, and, eventually, with eternal life the man who did what was in him” (“Covenant and 
Causality” 118). This would seem to square with a reading of Piers in terms of an undercurrent 
of resistance to the idea that institutional forms of satisfaction, particularly when they are 
imagined in terms of a one-sided debt, can rightly stand at the center of the Christian life. It also 
suggests how Langland may have had a tendency to promote a more cooperative model of God’s 
relationship with his creation, and aligns with various “semi-Pelagian” readings of the poem that 
stress the poet’s sympathy with the Lollards and other radical reform movements.19 
 However, this is not the whole story. The sensitivity of Green’s reading lies in his 
reaching back beyond the nominalists to Anselm of Canterbury’s earlier “assault on covenantal 
theology,” where the “reciprocity of the covenant between God and humanity” was denied—
 
19 David Aers summarizes and disputes the ascription of semi-Pelagianism in his book Salvation and Sin (84-8). 
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since, according to Anselm, “God owes nothing to anyone; rather, all creatures are in his debt. 
Thus it is not fitting for human beings to act toward God as if with an equal” (Cur Deus Homo, 
1.19). In this view, “divine promises” had to be seen as “conferring only a debt of gratitude, 
never rights” (Green, A Crisis of Truth 352). Even further back, beyond this eleventh-century 
model, Green identifies a strongly covenantal confidence in the efficacy of baptism premised on 
the “interweaving of divine contracts,” a strain that persists in lay religiosity long after Anselm’s 
time, and that is still recognizable in the Middle English sermons of John Mirk (343).20 This is 
what leads Green to argue that, while “Langland’s covenantalism” may owe something of its 
“articulation” to the nominalists and moderni, “its roots run far deeper than the Oxford schools of 
his youth” (376).  Questioning whether Anselm’s original reaction against the covenantal model 
may not have had something to do with a “growing authoritarianism in both church and state” 
(350), and so with a desire to stress the absolute power of the one divine ruler,21 Green therefore 
sees Piers Plowman as reaching back behind both this implicitly authoritarian model and the in 
their own way infamously divine potentia-stressing theologies of the nominalists, for whom “an 
omnipotent God owes us nothing de potentia absoluta,” though “we may still have complete 
faith in his commitment to honor his promises de potentia ordinata” (356). In this respect, 
Langland shows a strong “sympathy for a theology of entitlement that was omnipresent in 
 
20 Green observes: “The guarantee of salvation for those that keep their covenant with God is theologically . . . 
problematical . . . , but Mirk offers such a guarantee quite explicitly.” He illustrates his claim with an example from 
a sermon for the circumcision in which Mirk depicts mankind and God as servant and master, bound to each other 
by the one-time, two-way covenant of baptism (A Crisis of Truth 343). 
21 G.R. Evans notes that, “Where Anselm thought in terms of God’s having raised the humanity in Christ to one with 
his divinity, Bernard was speaking for his own contemporaries in talking of the ‘descent’ and humiliation involved. 
He insists that so startling an act, so extreme a departure from immutability into mutability, as God’s becoming man, 
could only be accounted for by a compelling necessity” (The Mind of St. Bernard 158). Bernard does not necessarily 
downplay God’s ultimate “authoritarianism,” but he does more dramatically depict the descent of the ruler into his 
creation. Evans also notes that, in their contrasting treatments of the battle between the vices and the virtues, 
“Anselm could evidently tell a good story,” but “the more schematic accounts of his tales and their perhaps cooler 
atmosphere suggest that he was less gifted than Bernard at creating suspense and carrying the audience breathlessly 
with him. . . .Bernard was first and foremost a preacher” (68). 
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traditional culture” (371), and that was innocent of this distinction in the “powers” of God—a 
theology something like the one Jill Mann argues for, when she stresses the way Langland’s God 
identifies with the barest particulars of human neediness.22  
Piers Plowman is not ultimately, then, a nominalist or “modern” poem so much as one 
that attempts to depict and provisionally respond to the breakdown in theological systems to 
which these movements themselves responded. Langland calls into question theologies to that 
would, in the case of Anselm, deny the covenantal nature of God’s commitment to his creation, 
or, in the case of the nominalists, introduce a distinction into the nature of God that would seem 
to compromise that covenant even as it seeks to preserve it. This implies that Langland was 
acutely sensitive to the theological currents of his time, but also committed to certain lay forms 
of religiosity that cannot necessarily be squared in any simple way with even the Anselmian 
innovations, much less the nominalist ones. It also explains some of the ambiguity of his passus 
depicting the founding of Holy Church: the complications of the old, fiercely covenantal 
Christus victor model are both sympathetically depicted and ultimately seen as inadequate to the 
challenges of Langland’s time: “And thow, Consience,” Langland’s “lewed vicory” charges, “in 
kynges court and sholdest neuer come thennes” (C.XXI.424)—in other words, if you like the 
King so much, you should stay with him. Langland is therefore both in a sense more traditional 
than the nominalists and, as I have suggested in my reading of the phrase “redde quod debes” 
above, just as, if not more, committed to working beyond the ossified, overly simple 
identification of the church with institutional formations, and with a version of the “cardinale 
virtues” (C.XXI.393) that too often coincided with the interests of the “cardinale that . . . cam fro 
the pope” (C.XXI.413). From this point of view, the command to “return what you owe” would 
 
22 See Mann’s essay “Eating and Drinking in Piers Plowman” for a summary of this view. 
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speak less to a unilateral demand for satisfaction than to a mutuality that would really offer “To 
alle manere men mercy and foryeuenesse,” in a “couenaunt” that has less to do with payment and 
pardons than with God’s commitment to return, if not what he owes, than what he has promised, 
to his creation.23  
There was in Langland’s time at least one strong, already by his time traditional 
theological current that spoke clearly and influentially to this set of concerns. As Green observes 
but does not develop, St. Bernard is, bar none, the most prominent medieval voice for a 
theological stance that remains deeply covenantal while also uncomplicated by the later, 
“modern” split between the powers of God.24 This is, on the intellectual level, what makes him 
the ideal figure for a close study of vernacular theology as it is embodied in literary texts like 
Piers Plowman, The Canterbury Tales, and the Morte Darthur: Bernard is an unquestionably 
revered, unimpeachably traditional authority who is nonetheless identified with, and actually 
taught, a form of covenantal Christianity that remained latent in lay religiosity throughout the 
late Middle Ages, and that still shows up everywhere in the era’s most popular literary 
productions. This aspect in Bernard’s thought comes through particularly clearly in his view of 
the sacraments: while Aquinas argued for the eventually orthodox idea of “instrumental 
causality,” which stipulated that “the sacraments of the New Law not merely signify but actually 
 
23 Nicholas Watson’s article “Visions of Inclusion: Universal Salvation and Vernacular Theology in Pre-
Reformation England” offers an analogous reading of Piers Plowman, while pushing its soteriological implications 
further than I do. Patricia Dailey’s book Promised Bodies helps to clarify what I mean by “promised” with reference 
to specifically mystical experience: “the mystic undergoes what I call an unlived experience, an experience that does 
not find its roots in the time and place of the body proper, or the time and space of the here and now, but in the inner 
body and a promise that will unfold itself in time while never being entirely realized. This unlived experience, the 
experience of union with God, is experienced as a promise of union. . . .Augustine and Paul provide the mystic text 
with a sense of the atemporal, that is, the eternal time of God, which is manifest in the perspective of the present, 
and in how a moment outside of time may be hosted by a moment in time without ever being reduced to it” (24). 
Covenantal theology seeks to extend this sense of eternal promise into the sphere of everyday life.  




cause grace” (Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 62, a. 1, resp.), Bernard subscribed to a “sine qua non” 
model of sacramental causality that, according to Courtenay, reflects a belief that God’s grace 
“operates according to a pact or covenant” (“Sacrament, Symbol” 117). To illustrate, Green 
compares Bernard’s view of the sacraments with the “tokens used in trothplight,” such as a ring 
used to mark the transfer of the title of an estate: the signs of trothplight are invested with 
meaning in a way that seems more additive than transubstantial (A Crisis of Truth 355), 
modeling a form of “ascribed” rather than “inherent” virtue that is nonetheless just as “effective” 
(Courtenay, “Sacrament, Symbol” 117).25 As Courtenay puts it, the sacraments in this view are 
“common things that receive their new significance by having an additional value applied or 
ascribed to them by some person . . . , by some agreement or covenant, or by their recognized use 
in a particular ceremony” (“Sacrament, Symbol” 114). In stressing the formal execution of the 
ritual, Aquinas’s instrumental model “minimized the covenantal implications of the sacraments 
in the interests of promoting divine, or (the skeptic might suggest) ecclesiastical, authority” 
(Green, A Crisis of Truth 356). Bernard, on the other hand, states clearly that “God is not free to 
reject those who have been baptized and who desire salvation” (Courtenay, “Sacrament, 
Symbol” 116), and emphasizes the covenantal efficacy of the sacraments in a way that would 
seem to restrict even the freedom of God, not to mention ecclesiastical authority.26 Likewise, 
 
25 Bernard’s sermon for the Lord’s Supper, to which Courtenay refers here, outlines this point of view: “A sacrament 
is a sacred sign or a sacred rite. Many things are done simply for their own sake, but others in order to represent 
other things, and these are called signs and are indeed so. Let us take an example from everyday life. A ring is given 
purely as a ring and has no significance; but if it is given as a token of some hereditary office it is a sign, so that the 
one who receives it may now say, ‘In itself, the ring has no value, but it denotes the hereditary office I was seeking’” 
(“Sacramentum dicitur sacrum signum, sive sacrum secretum. Multa siquidem fiunt propter se tantum, alia vero 
propter alia designanda, et ipsa dicuntur signa, et sunt. Ut enim de usualibus sumamus exemplum, datur anulus 
absolute propter anulum, et nulla est significatio; datur ad investiendum de hereditate aliqua, et signum est, ita ut 
iam dicere possit qui accipt: ‘Anulus non valet quidquam, sed hereditas est quam quaerebam.’”) (2; V:68). In the 
same sermon, Bernard refers to Christ’s washing the disciples’ feet as “done as a sacrament and not merely as an 
example,” because in it “something that is necessary for salvation is hidden” (“pro sacramento illud est, non pro solo 
exemplo factum. . . .Aliquid igitur latet quod necessarium est ad salutem”) (4; V:71). 
26 The point here is not to argue that Aquinas’s model of sacramental causality is insufficient; it is to bring out the 
somewhat sidelined strengths of Bernard’s point of view. Bernard McGinn points out that, while “Some later 
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Bernard seems untroubled by Aquinas’s concern that the sacraments be seen to “merely signify”; 
it does not even seem thinkable to him yet that there should be anything “mere” about the 
“visible signs that call forth the gift of grace on the basis of a value attributed to them by God” 
(117).27 In this respect, as I have suggested in Chapter One, it seems useful to think of Langland 
as straining backwards toward something like a Bernardine equilibrium, however tense, while 
remaining aware of and alive to contemporary debates. He does, of course, think mankind really 
owes something to God; but he is committed to a deeply covenantal, and in an important way 
almost semiotic, “visible sign”-based model of the mystery of what that means.28 
 
“Patientiam habe in me”: Surface reading Bernard 
As I hope has begun to become clear, I see the work of Bernard of Clairvaux as 
embodying certain key tensions in medieval theology in condensed and influential form. But it is 
not just that Bernard’s work nicely illustrates and encapsulates a set of questions with which later 
English vernacular writers from Langland to Chaucer to Thomas Malory grapple; nor even just 
that Bernard’s authentic work and the itself often hybrid, authentic-and-inauthentic figure of 
Bernard are frequently employed as tools with which these and other writers attempt to address 
 
medieval mystics were to find the center of their piety in contact with Christ in the sacraments, especially the 
Eucharist. . . .The abbot of Clairvaux. . . .so concentrates on the magnum mysterium, the sacrament of the marriage 
of Christ and the church, of which the other sacraments serve as exemplifications . . . that he did not feel compelled 
to discuss the latter in detail. It is through the foundational sacramentum/mysterium that we gain access to Christ, 
who united himself in a personal union without abandoning his substantial union with the Father” (The Growth of 
Mysticism 180). The view of all the sacraments as indicative of a “marriage” pact is one strong manifestation of 
Bernard’s “covenantal” theology. 
27 David Aers attacks the sine qua non model in terms of “a ‘modern’ model of a sacrament as in itself a worthless 
coin but one that can be exchanged for a large sum of money according to the king’s arbitrary will,” as opposed to 
the Thomistic idea that “sacraments both signify and cause the grace that draws people into the life of the Trinity” 
(Salvation and Sin 68). As Green and Courtenay suggest, a covenantal theologian like Bernard means much more 
than this idea of a pure, proto-capitalist exchange value when he talks about the way the sacraments signify. 
28 Emero Stiegman describes Bernard’s “classical augustinian focus on sacramental efficacy through signification,” 
summarized in the Augustinian maxim that “The sacraments effect grace by signifying” (“Sacramenta significando 
efficiunt gratiam”) (“Three Theologians” 102). Jill Mann’s “Langland and Allegory” advances a productive reading 
of Langland along similar linguistic lines. 
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these questions. It is also the case, as the theologian Andrew Louth has argued, that Bernard 
stands on the cusp of, and himself arguably inaugurates, a new era in the intellectual life of 
Europe, and that the seeds he sows in the twelfth century are still being cultivated, hybridized, 
and re-planted in new soil in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Bernard is therefore himself 
both on the one hand a somewhat regressive, traditionalist figure—“late summer fruit,” Henri de 
Lubac playfully labels Bernard’s richly layered scriptural exegesis as it is modeled in the 
Sermons on the Song of Songs (150)29—and on the other a really prophetic one, looking forward 
to shifts in sentiment that are still being worked out in the Reformation era and beyond. As Louth 
puts it, “in Bernard we have a shift in the understanding of man, a shift that renders no longer 
tenable the classical, Platonic-Augustinian synthesis” (8). This shift is most marked by a change 
in the way we understand the categories of love and knowledge, intellect and affect. For the 
mainline currents of the tradition that precedes and informs him, “Love and knowledge of God 
are united in the kind of knowledge we have of God, namely, wisdom, sapientia”; for Bernard, 
on the other hand, “there is a sharp contrast between knowledge and love, for love is not 
primarily a desire for possession and delight in possessing, as with Augustine, but a feeling” (3). 
In this “disjunction between thought and feeling,” Louth argues, “Bernard is very modern. We 
are moved by our feelings, not our thoughts: feeling is, in that sense, deeper than thought” (8).30 
This is similar to the point I have tried to make about Piers Plowman in Chapter One: a classical 
 
29 I have followed M.B. Pranger’s translation of de Lubac here, as opposed to the more literal “late season fruit” 
given in the standard translation I have used elsewhere. 
30 A good illustration of this occurs in Bernard’s ninth sermon on the Song of Songs. Early in the sermon Bernard 
ventriloquizes the bride of the Song, protesting, “There is no question of ingratitude on my part, it is simply that I 
am in love. The favors I have received are far above what I deserve, but they are less than what I long for. It is desire 
that drives me on, not reason. Please do not accuse me of presumption if I yield to this impulse of love” (“Non sum 
ingrata, sed amo. Accepi, fateor, meritis potiora, sed prorsus inferiora votis. Desiderio feror, non ratione. Ne, 
quaeso, causemini praesumptionem, ubi affectio urget”) (9.2; I:43). This speaks to a certain anxiety in Bernard’s 
writing around what is most distinctive in his thought: the prioritization of love seems to be feared as a potential 
source of “presumption,” which Bernard is constantly warning his listeners against. 
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synthesis, something like what goes under the heading of “virtue ethics” today,31 is in fact 
already felt to be broken, or at least in need of real reformulation, in Langland’s time. The figure 
of Bernard is one important means by which Langland attempts to strain both backwards and 
forwards, beyond it.32  
Prominent critics of Piers Plowman have tended to situate the poem in more rigid, less 
historically situated theological frameworks. When Morton Bloomfield points out that “redde 
quod debes” was a phrase that was “frequently used in the definition of justice,” he refers to 
Aquinas’s definition—“reddere debitum unicuique” (“render what is due to everyone”)—and 
argues that in it “the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of each receiving his due was assimilated to 
Christian morality.” This is true enough—as is Bloomfield’s further claim that, according to this 
notion, “Christian perfection must in part, if not fundamentally, be social, and hence must 
involve action. Justice, as summed up in redde quod debes, is Christianity in action” (131-2). 
This much aligns with my above reading of Piers Plowman, and in particular with Eleanor 
Johnson’s strong reading of the poem in terms of participatory theology and the priority of social 
relationships and labor in Piers. But it must also be said that Piers Plowman strains beyond both 
what Bloomfield calls the “Platonic-Aristotelian notion” of justice and what Louth refers to as 
the pre-Bernardine “Platonic-Augustianian synthesis” by which knowledge and love were seen 
as fundamentally, if not uncomplicatedly, co-inhering. As I argued in Chapter One, with respect 
to the former framework Piers suggests that if charity is really the “form of the virtues,” then 
virtue itself may look very different in the Christian context than it does in the classical. With 
 
31 I am thinking in particular of David Aers’s recent work on Langland, and in general of scholarship informed by 
the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre.  
32 I refer to the way Langland re-poses, in part through some citations of Bernard, the question of what exact kind of 
knowledge is necessary. Nicholas Watson points out how “only Piers (the poem’s figure for experiential 
understanding, the incarnation, and, I suggest, the vernacular) ‘parceyveth’ the human heart deeply enough to find 
charity there, where clerks seek him on the surface. . . .only Piers has the ‘kynde knowing’ of the humanity he 
represents and the God he serves to demand God meet humanity’s needs” (“Conceptions of the Word” 118). 
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respect to the latter “synthesis,” Piers Plowman likewise exists in an unresolved in-between, 
depicting a “Will” set adrift from its Augustinian enmeshment in the operations of memory and 
reason, and a mental landscape in which thought and feeling—not to mention a whole host of 
other allegorized faculties—often appear to be working at cross purposes.33 It is therefore a poem 
set importantly after the shift in sentiment that Louth characterizes in terms of a prioritization of 
love over reason, where to a significant degree “Thought is separated from feeling, theology 
from spirituality” (9).34 Piers, like Bernard’s theology, “draws its power from [its] understanding 
of man’s affective depths: only there is a man deeply engaged” (Louth 8). It also draws from this 
understanding its deep internal confusion. 
This is a different order of analysis from that offered by critics sensitive to the roles of 
different models of specifically fourteenth-century theology in the poem, such as those engaging 
with the problems of nominalism, voluntarism, “semi-Pelagianism,” and a whole host of 
questions raised by its engagement with the theological moderni. While it is endlessly difficult to 
situate figures like Langland and even Chaucer, about whose biography we know much more, in 
terms of such specific, contemporary theological controversies, it seems to me easier—and 
possibly more rewarding—to take a close look at what they do with the theological voices with 
 
33 As Gilson points out, the likeness to God that must be restored lies for Bernard “in a good use of free-will, and the 
restoration effected is therefore essentially the restoration of liberty” (Mystical Theology 239); “while Augustine 
seeks [the image of God] for preference in intellectual cognition . . . , St. Bernard puts it rather in the will, and very 
especially in freedom” (46). I have not had the space to elaborate on the way Bernard, somewhat like Langland, 
distinctively locates the image of God in human freedom in particular (liberum arbitrium), rather than in (or at least, 
more frequently than in) the traditional Augustinian triad of memory, reason, and will. 
34 This should probably be connected with Bernard’s striking emphasis on “personal experience.” Bernard McGinn 
notes: “Even more important, and indicative of significant innovation in the abbot’s thought, is his constant 
insistence on the necessity of the personal experience of his listeners as the only way to understand his message” 
(The Growth of Mysticism 185). This distinguishes his work from that of his friend William of St. Thierry, who 
more regularly stresses the necessary interrelatedness of love and knowledge. For William, David N. Bell writes, “It 
is love which grasps the ungraspable and comprehends the incomprehensible” (The Image and Likeness 247); at the 
same time, “Reason ‘forms’ the will, directs it, endows it with the knowledge of the good and the desire for it, and 
reason itself finally ‘mounts on high to become love (amor)’” (154). This latter citation draws on William’s 
ubiquitous Golden Letter, which often circulated under Bernard’s name.  
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which they explicitly engage. This is not necessarily a retreat into a less rigorously historicist 
retrenchment or Bernardine neo-Robertsonianism.35 As David Aers cautions, “a historicism 
driven by a synchronic model of context is never going to be adequate to the study of Christian 
writing in the Middle Ages. This is because theologians understood St. Augustine or St. Bernard 
or Peter Lombard or St. Thomas Aquinas as contemporary authorities who belonged to 
contemporary conversations and disputes” (Salvation and Sin 56-7). Paradigmatically, Chaucer’s 
Nun’s Priest cites “Augustyn, / Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn” in his playful self-recusal 
from examining the problem of predestination (VII.3241-2). This method might be aligned with 
what has been called “surface reading,” as opposed to more “symptomatic” approaches to 
literary texts: “When symptomatic readers focus on elements present in the text, they construe 
them as symbolic of something latent or concealed,” looking for absences that “signify the 
questions that motivate the text, but that the text itself cannot articulate” (Best and Marcus 3); on 
the other hand, “what lies in plain sight is worthy of attention but often eludes observation—
especially by deeply suspicious detectives who look past the surface in order to root out what is 
underneath it” (18). My reading of the figure of Bernard, and more particularly of Nede’s role in 
Piers Plowman and the figure of the Host in The Canterbury Tales in the next chapter, seeks to 
locate features of these texts that they do articulate, but that are too close to the “surface” for 
much literary criticism to see. As I suggest in my Introduction, I do not propose Bernard of 
 
35 Steven Justice’s article “Who Stole Robertson?” describes the way that, for D.W. Robertson, Jr., “Chaucer’s 
poetry . . . was allegory, whether it looked that way or not; it was indifferent to worldly and humane engagements 
and pursued the single aim of wrenching human desire from its self-deforming attachments,” and documents how 
this approach dead-ended and was essentially memory-holed in medieval literary criticism (609). Justice argues, 
however, that “the last generation of medieval literary study could not trenchantly criticize Robertson’s intellectual 
vices . . . because it practiced similar vices in different tones of voice,” premised as this more recent criticism was on 
overlapping forms of historical relativism and materialism (614). This overlaps somewhat with Nicholas Watson’s 
observation that “historicist training” begins with “the separation between desire and reason,” which medieval 
mystics uniformly refuse (“Desire for the Past” 91). Part of what I hope to get from Bernard is a theoretical lens that 
pushes past this separation.  
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Clairvaux as a Robertsonian master-key for understanding late medieval literature, but instead as 
an analogue for formal and conceptual innovations in later literary texts, a particularly common 
interlocutor whose influence is felt almost everywhere, and a fellow “imaginative theorist” 
whose style and ideas can help us to read the surfaces of the works we study better.  
Langland in effect requires a “surface” reading like this with a pun on Bernardine 
theology, when dame Studie jokes about the style of debate current among the “lewed” and 
learned: 
Nowe is the manere at the mete when munstrals ben stille 
The lewed ayen the lered the holy lore to dispute, 
And tellen of the trinite how two slowe the thridde 
And brynge forth ballede resones, taken Bernard to witnesse 
And putten forth presumpcioun to preue the sothe. (C.XI.33-7) 
This is not in fact the casual reference it might seem; as I will develop at greater length below, 
“presumpcioun” is one of the key terms of Bernardine theology, and suggests that Studie 
specifically means to imply that this style of public argumentation risks a grave sin of which St. 
Bernard was the great diagnostician. The older tradition, in a sense, “reads” the contemporary 
situation here, and provides dame Studie with a punning vocabulary adequate to suggesting that 
the playful conjecture of both learned and lewd might be understood more accurately as a sign of 
a pervasive, unacknowledged tendency toward presumptuousness. Reading the reference to 
Bernard on the surface of the disputants’ text, Studie is sure that they presume too much. 
This brings us back to Bernard with a greater understanding of the role the saint might 
have to play in his later literary incarnations. His appearance on the surface of these later literary 
works often signals an attempt to reach back to an older, ostensibly richer tradition to address 
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some contemporary issue, exposing the theological fault lines these later texts oriented 
themselves toward. Noticing the internal divisions in Piers Plowman–like the one around the role 
of Conscience in relation to Will’s individual conscience—is therefore not just a matter of 
reading the poem well, or avoiding over-simplifications of its theological agenda. Through 
noticing its splitness, we can arrive at a greater understanding of the tensions in the cultural and 
intellectual landscape around it, marking the way the Christian tradition in general is evolving 
and emending itself in and through literary productions like Piers and, as I will argue in Chapters 
3 and 4, the more unlikely sites for theological reflection that are The Canterbury Tales and the 
Morte Darthur. Close attention to the figure of Bernard, and the broader influence of Bernardine 
thought and writing in these works, can therefore help us to track the shifts in thinking and art 
that are taking place between Bernard’s twelfth century and Malory’s fifteenth, and to see how 
these well-known literary texts act as both heirs and agents of the change that is effected through 
Bernardine theology and its many literary descendants. The figure of Bernard can serve as a kind 
of genetic marker for following this change as it develops out of a dialogue between the saint and 
the authors who engage with his legacy, as it does here in the case of Langland’s interest in 
covenantal theology and the fraught question of what it means to “return what you owe” to God. 
As this chapter’s epigraph suggests, Bernard’s work is not of the kind that tends to provoke tidy 
resolutions of theological problems; rather, it tends to “stir up a commotion,” driving forward the 
sort of formal and conceptual innovation that is modeled by Langland’s Piers Plowman, a highly 
experimental work of theo-poetics that attempts a radical Bernardine “interiorization of the 
mystery,” a “kynde knowyng,” of nothing less than God’s eternal covenant with the soul. 
As Bynum observes, Bernard’s many “oppositions and incompatibilities” generate an 
oddly paradoxical, in some ways even starkly modern, vision of the human being’s place in the 
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cosmic hierarchy (Metamorphosis 129): “Thus, as [Bernard’s] De conversione makes clear, the 
human being is not really a middle position in the chain of being; rather, it is zenith and abyss. 
Nor is it primarily a viator on the way to God. Forever dispars, it is also forever already there” 
(131).36 As M.B. Pranger puts it in terms of its consequences for religious experience, “Seen 
from a retrospective point of view, Bernard can be considered one of the first theologians in 
western Christendom who has drawn attention to the emotional aspects in the human experience 
of the divine” (“Bernard the Writer” 239). This is a vision that requires some working out, and 
that Bernard himself never systematically defined. He is perhaps best understood, as M.B. 
Pranger has suggested, as “Bernard the writer,” not Bernard the theologian; he sets out to capture 
all the tension and turmoil of existence in the pre-heavenly saeculum, and is often more careful 
to accomplish this feat than to be clear about the precise theological implications of his 
language.37 His is a vision that requires, like the servants in the parable, patience to understand: 
“Patientiam habe in me, et omnia reddam tibi” (“Have patience with me, and I will return 
everything to you”) (Matt. 18.29). This was the lesson that Will learned, in my reading, at the 
end of Piers Plowman: the willingness to dwell in time without reaching beyond the ambiguous 
horizon of neediness and the chastened pilgrimage of a humbled Conscience. It is also a lesson 
from which the contemporary reader of Bernard, and of his literary heirs, could benefit. A 
willingness to stay with the surfaces of the works we study can make our readings more 
historically informed, not less, because this patience allows the works themselves to more deeply 
 
36 This might be usefully contrasted with the Cistercian Isaac of Stella’s more Neoplatonic view of the “golden 
chain” of being, which Bernard McGinn discusses at length in his study The Golden Chain, and with other more 
Neoplatonic and Pseudo-Dionysian theologies (61-102). Bernard’s vision, although influenced by some of the same 
sources, is never that neat. 
37 Étienne Gilson’s book The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard is well known for bringing Bernard to serious 
scholarly attention as a theologian in his own right. However, I am not sure the stress on Bernard as theologian, or 
Denys Turner’s more recent stress on Julian of Norwich as theologian, does adequate justice to the way the 
theologies of both are deeply “artificial,” in Pranger’s terms; that is, they are theologies of “experience” that 
deliberately resist being systematized, more like elaborate works of art than scholastic summae. 
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inform our readings of them. It may also make it more likely that we can read and write about 
them without simply reproducing our own “symptoms.” 
 
“I must divide my will”: Bernardine crusade theology in the songs of Jaufre Rudel 
 The “radical doubleness” of Bernardine theology had major consequences for the 
theological and ecclesiastical landscape of his own day and beyond. As I alluded to above, one 
persistent difficulty in approaching Bernard is the by no means self-evident relationship between 
his explicitly theological and exegetical writings, such as the mystical Sermones super cantica 
canticorum (“Sermons on the Song of Songs”) and the treatise De diligendo deo (“On Loving 
God”), and the more ideologically motivated, occasional pieces that emerged out of his work as 
an active and influential figure in the ecclesiastical and political milieu of his time.38 Besides 
having been an important, if at first hesitant, supporter of the foundation of the Knights Templar, 
and so of the first order of warrior-monks, Bernard was also a close advisor to Pope Eugenius III, 
the first Cistercian pontiff and a sort of spiritual son of Bernard’s, in a crucial period in the 
history of the relationship between the institutional Christian church and violence. Eventually, on 
Eugenius’s request, Bernard preached the Second Crusade to tremendous effect, becoming so 
synonymous with the enterprise that the saint’s Vita Prima goes out of its way to demonstrate 
that the abbot was in fact “by no means the instigator of the crusade,” acknowledging that he 
“was blamed for the part which he took in preaching the holy war” (116). Bernard himself 
boasted of France that, as a result of his preaching, “one may scarcely find one man among seven 
 
38 Emero Stiegman suggests that “To read [Bernard] as theologian, one does well to turn away from the highly-
colored surface of twelfth-century confrontations . . . and to seek out, instead, the contemplative who escorted Dante 
to the throne of the Trinity” (“Bernard of Clairvaux” 131). This dissertation attempts to see both Bernards at once. It 
is worth noting that some of Bernard’s more confrontational writings, particularly his Apologia against the over-
adornment and laxity of Cluniac monasteries, were unusually popular in England (Holdsworth 171). 
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women, so many women are there widowed while their husbands are still alive” (Ep. 247.2; 
399).  
 Before examining Bernard’s influence in the Middle English vernacular in more detail in 
Chapter Three, it will be useful first to take a closer look at his “crusading” side of his work, and 
at the way it complicates the covenantal focus I have described above in relation to Piers 
Plowman. A 2013 article by Lisa Perfetti, “Crusader as Lover: The Eroticized Poetics of 
Crusading in Medieval France,” raises the kinds of questions of theological overlap with literary 
texts that I deal with throughout this dissertation, in relation to a possibly direct connection 
between Bernard’s crusade preaching and a rich contemporary body of imaginative literary 
work. Perfetti’s article examines the songs of the troubadour and likely crusader Jaufre Rudel,39 
in addition to some other crusade lyrics, in terms of what she calls the “deep-seated appeal of 
sacrificial desire as a way to demonstrate virtue in courtly culture” (957). She characterizes this 
appeal as working through a “rhetoric of exchange, in which a gift requires a return gift, which 
then gets a reward,” “typical of much crusade poetry and of crusade preaching as well,” which is 
then often offset by an “appeal to the pains of love” that “interrupts this exchange, returning 
again to the idea that the poet willingly sacrifices without hope of a reward” (954). Although 
Perfetti describes “the interpenetration of secular and spiritual language relating to the crusader’s 
willingness to give up his life,” and the way the Christian and the courtly work together as 
“complementary discourses grounding the subject’s identity in sacrifice” (947), she offers no 
thoroughly diagnostic evaluation of the sacrificial theology behind the pervasiveness of this 
appeal (932). I will attempt to describe these theological underpinnings here, with special 
 
39 Barbara H. Rosenwein reviews the evidence for Jaufre’s participation in the Second Crusade: the two vidas that 
claim he went on crusade to see his far-off lover, and his fellow troubadour Marcabru’s reference to Jaufre’s having 
traveled to the Holy Land. She notes that it is still possible he went only as a pilgrim (130). 
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reference to Bernard’s crusade preaching. A close reading of Jaufre’s songs in relation to this 
crusade preaching will make it possible to see how the tension embodied in Piers Plowman’s 
refrain “redde quod debes” also characterizes a fault line in Bernard’s thought, which at times in 
the history of his influence generates a kind of negative image or even polar opposite of the 
orientation toward God that was so painstakingly cultivated in his more contemplative writings. 
As we will see, in Jaufre’s songs Bernard’s repeated exhortations to a kind of balance between 
the fear and love of God, and the consequent avoidance of presumption and despair, are 
frequently overpowered by an acute awareness of an emphatically distant love object’s 
absence—resulting, at least potentially, in a deeply felt sense of deprivation that consequently 
threatens despair. Bernard’s call to “return what you owe” in the Holy Land existed side by side 
with the more covenantal, “pilgrim” focus that I have described above. Putting the unlikely pair 
of Langland’s Piers Plowman and Jaufre Rudel’s troubadour songs together will help us to see 
how these “two Bernards” existed in constant tension in the history of his influence, recombining 
in surprising ways in later literary works. 
 Although something like Perfetti’s “sacrificial desire” plays a role in all of Jaufre’s songs, 
the only song that explicitly references crusade is his “Quan lo rossinhols el folhos” (“When the 
nightingale in the leafy wood”). As Simon Gaunt points out, the well-known “Lanquan li jorn 
son lonc en may” (“When the days are long in May”) was also likely written at about the time of 
the Second Crusade in the mid to late 1140s, but neither it nor any of Jaufre’s other songs moves 
beyond the ambiguous “imbrication of love and religion” Gaunt describes as typical of the 
crusader’s work (1). “Quan lo rossinhols el folhos” begins with a delicate celebration of the 
natural mutuality of love: 
 Quant lo rosignols el fuoillos 
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 Dona d’amor e·n quier e·n pren 
 E mou son chant jauzen joios 
 E remira sa par soven, 
 E·ill riu son clar e·ill prat son gen, 
  Pel novel deport que reingna, 
 Me ven al cor grans jois jacer. 
 (“When the nightingale in the leafy wood / gives of love, asks for it and takes of it / and 
 composes his song rejoicing and joyous / and beholds (reflects) his equal often, / and the 
 streams are clear and the fields are pleasant, / through the new sense of pleasure that 
 reigns, / great joy comes to lie in my heart.”) (Pickens 70-1; 1-7)40 
The simultaneity of giving, asking, and receiving in the second line models an effortless, almost 
trinitarian circulation of love that is embodied for the speaker, as for Chaucer at the beginning of 
The Canterbury Tales, in the courtship of birds. This love’s naturally issuing in song likewise 
elides the artificiality of songwriting, inviting the speaker and listener into a process of mutual 
reflection in which the nightingale through its mate, like the listener through the singer, “remira 
sa par” (“beholds (reflects) his equal”). This “new pleasure” quickly ripens into a settled joy.  
 This self-contained moment of reflection is quickly disrupted by the second stanza’s 
complaint that, running toward its beloved, the speaker somehow seems to turn backwards—
“Quant eu vauc ves leis corren, / Vejaire m’es c’a reüsos / Me·n torn e qu’ella m’an fugen” 
(“when I go running towards her (it) / it seems to me that backwards / I turn and that she (it) 
continues fleeing me”) (70-1; 9-11)—and the third stanza’s concern with the speaker’s inability 
 
40 I have cited Jaufre with reference to Rupert T. Pickens’s edition, cited in my Works Cited below. I cite Pickens’s 




to articulate its desire, since “non ll’aus merce querrer” (“I dare not beg her for mercy”) (70-1; 
21). Version One of the song in Rupert Pickens’s edition complicates this further with an abrupt 
about-face, after the fourth stanza’s reflections on the “cors tan gen” (“noble (agreeable) body”) 
and “cor plaisen” (“pleasing heart”) (72-3; 25-6) of the beloved. The speaker suddenly turns to 
address its “Amors”—presumably the same one who is spoken of in the third person throughout 
the rest of the song—and declares: 
 Amors, alegre·m part de vos 
 Per so car vau mon miellz querren,  
 E son d’aitan aventuros 
 Qu’enquar n’aurai mon cor jauçen 
  La merce de mon bon Guiren 
  Que·m vol e m’apel’ e·m deigna 
 E m’a tornat en bon esper. 
 (“Love, eagerly I depart from you / because I go seeking (beseeching) my better, / and I 
 am so fortunate / that soon I shall have my heart enjoying / the mercy of my good 
 Protector, / who desires me and calls me and finds me worthy / and has turned me to 
 good hope.”) (72-3; 29-35) 
This abrupt ending is perhaps explained, or at least somewhat demystified, by the alternative 
versions of the song collected in Pickens’s edition. The manuscript history of “Quan lo 
rossinhols” demonstrates the flexibility of Jaufre’s “amor du lonh” (“love from afar”) tradition, 
and its potentially sacrificial implications: a sixth stanza of the song, included in Pickens’s 
Versions Two and Three, abruptly shifts the song into an explicitly crusading register. This 
alternate final stanza explains the parallelism between the nightingale the speaker describes in 
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the first stanza—who “Dona d’amor e·n quier e·n pren” (“gives of love, asks for it and takes of 
it”) (70-1; 2)—and the love of the fifth stanza’s “bon Guiren / Que·m vol e m’apel’ e·m deigna” 
(“good Protector, / who desires me and calls me and finds me worthy”) (72-3; 33-4), in terms of 
a turn away from a vaguely dissatisfied romantic love and toward a more starkly defined call to 
crusade. This is also therefore a turn from a prospectively mutual love to a love in which the 
speaker becomes a purely passive figure, “desired and called and valued” rather than giving and 
asking and receiving.  
 In executing this about-face, the optional sixth stanza of “Quan lo rossinhols” colors the 
whole “distant love” tradition of Jaufre Rudel with a question about the crusading implications of 
what Perfetti describes as the “absolute submission to the Other’s desire,” constituting the 
singer’s “grounds for existence,” and the “focus more often on suffering than on fulfillment” that 
goes along with it (946). The stanza’s turn from addressing an ambiguous “Amors” to something 
like crusade preaching is executed abruptly, without introduction: 
 E qi sai reman delechos  
 E Dieu non sec en Bellïen,  
 Non sai com sia ja mais pros  
 Ni com si veinha ha gerimen, 
 Q’ieu crei e sai mon escïen  
  Qe cell cui Jhesu Crist seinha 
 Segura colpa pot tener. 
 (“And who remains here full of delight / and does not follow God in (into) Bethlehem, / I 
 do not know how he may ever have prowess / or how he may come to good healing, / for 
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 I believe and know by my own knowledge / that he to whom Jesus makes a sign (who 
 takes Jesus Christ as a sign n) / can have a sure confession.”) (76-7; 36-42) 
The majority of manuscripts do not include this final stanza, but it is regarded by Pickens as 
probably authentic (67). In versions that include it, it is the “good healing” and, in the final line, 
the “segura colpa” (“sure confession”) of Version Two (76-7; 42) or, in Version Three, the 
“segura escola” (“sure school”) of Jesus, that resolves the song’s central problematic of the 
speaker’s desire’s being defined by distance. Bethlehem offers a “regio”—a “realm,” in the sense 
here of an all too specific place—in which the nagging discomfort of the love object’s persisting 
absence will presumably, at long last, be cancelled. Perfetti’s observation that the “putative 
object of [the singer’s] desire must . . . always be kept at a distance . . . for it is desire, not 
fulfillment, that endows the subject with integrity and wholeness” (942) is circumvented by 
means of a literalization of the desire that makes attainment possible: the singer will go to 
Bethlehem, and the act of going will constitute the wholeness he was longing for.  
 The fate of the final line of Pickens’s Version One as it appears in one of the crusading 
versions of the song provides one final example of just how decisive the presence or absence of 
crusade ideology in the song can be: the final line “E m’a tornat en bon esper” (“and has turned 
me to good hope”) in the non-crusading Version One (72-3; 35) becomes, in the crusading 
Version Three of the song, “M’es ops aparcer mon voler” (“I must divide my will (desire)”) (80-
1; 35). In the latter, crusading version, the “bon Guiren” (“good Healer”) is said to introduce a 
sense of division in the singer’s self, rather than a consoling turn to good hope. This offers a kind 
of reflexive interpretation of the call to crusade, suggesting that this apparent resolution of the 
speaker’s frustrated desire also brings with it a duplicity or even “dualism” in the singer’s 
experience of love. Formerly situated in the relatively straightforward realm of “distant love” and 
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perpetually unfulfilled desire, the new crusading voice of stanza six introduces, at the end of 
stanza five in Pickens’s Version Three of the song, a painful moment of introspection in which 
the consequences of going on crusade are weighed, and a poignant expression of what it means 
to give up on the vision of mutuality that is movingly voiced in the song’s first stanza. “Quan lo 
rossinhols” itself, therefore, “divides its will” across incompatible versions and readings, torn 
between a longing for mutuality in love and the sacrificial call to Bethlehem. It therefore 
provides a close vernacular analogue to what Bynum calls the “radical doubleness” of St. 
Bernard’s at once both mystical and violent, “pilgrim” and “crusading” theology. 
 
“How has the gold been darkened”: Bernardine simplicity and crusading duplicity 
 In the exploration of the image of God near the end of his Sermones super cantica 
canticorum, Bernard attributes three fundamental qualities to the soul in its native state, each of 
which is seen as uniquely emblematic of the soul’s dignity as made in that image: freedom of 
will, immortality, and simplicity. Of these, simplicity is described first and at greatest length 
(81.2; II:284-5). In fallen mankind, the native simplicity of the soul is compromised by the 
duplicity of sin. In the Sermones Bernard suggests that sin must always involve a disavowal of 
the soul’s complete dependence on God—the mark of its natural and simple state—and the 
assertion of a putatively autonomous self-will over and against the will of God. This disavowal 
in turn results in a self-imposed fragmentation of the self, a state of duplicity that arrives not 
because of some threateningly arbitrary divine punishment, but rather because the soul’s natural, 
God-given simplicity cannot co-inhere with its asserted autonomy; it cannot serve two masters, 
so to speak. The resulting state of sinful duplicity is what Bernard calls, in a phrase taken from 
106 
 
Augustine’s Confessions, the “regio dissimilitudinis” (“realm of unlikeness:).41 To paraphrase, in 
this state the sinful soul becomes “unlike” itself because it has become unlike that dependent 
simplicity that God made it to be. The soul in this state can even sometimes sense its alienation 
from the native simplicity and simple dependence of the whole created order; it has become 
fundamentally dislocated with respect to itself, and to reality.  
 Surprisingly, Bernard takes this state of duplicity to be, in a sense, grounds for hope. The 
deeper Bernard’s description of “duplicity” goes, the darker the soul’s situation seems, the more 
emphatic is Bernard’s insistence that a state of complete simplicity is in fact native to the soul, 
whereas its state of fallen duplicity is merely secondary and acquired. This is what Bynum has 
described, in not wholly flattering terms, as the way in which, for Bernard, “nothing can ever 
really be added, at least not intrinsically,” to the soul; “Bernard often speaks as if roles and sins, 
despair and death, are only overclothing” (Metamorphosis 131). The very intensity with which 
the soul senses its dislocation testifies, in Bernard’s view, to the reality of the soul’s real 
location, its rightful “home” in its simple dependence on its creator. Bernard succinctly 
summarizes this point in his eighty-second sermon on the Song of Songs, which presents his last 
and most mature reflection on the image of God’s abiding presence in the soul:42 “nonetheless, 
there perseveres in every soul, along with its original duplicity, a native simplicity” (“perseverat 
nihilominus in omni anima cum originali duplicitate generalis simplicitas”) (82.3; II:294). An 
earlier passage treats the same theme in greater detail: “Scripture says ‘made of unlikeness,’ not 
 
41 This summary of Bernardine thinking on the subject of simplicity is especially indebted to Gilson’s The Mystical 
Theology of Saint Bernard, and to Thomas Merton’s essay “St. Bernard on Interior Simplicity.” For Augustine’s 
regio, see his Confessions VII, 10.16. 
42 Bernard McGinn points out that Bernard presents two substantially different models of the image and likeness of 
god in the soul: “The abbot of Clairvaux’s most extended reflections on anthropology occur in the Grace and Free 
Choice and at the end of the Sermons on the Songs of Songs. . . .There are significant differences between the two 
treatments. (Bernard admitted this in confessing in the latter text that what he had to say here was diversa . . . sed, ut 
arbitror, non adversa from the former, that is ‘different, but not opposed, I think.’)” (The Growth of Mysticism 168). 
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because the likeness is destroyed, but because another has been superadded. . . .‘Their foolish 
heart has been darkened,’ says the Apostle; and the Prophet: ‘How has the gold been darkened, 
and the best color changed?’ He laments that the gold has been darkened, but it is gold 
nonetheless” (“quod Scriptura loquitur de dissimilitudine facta, non quia similitudo ista deleta sit 
loquitur, sed quia alia superducta. . . .Denique Obscuratum est insipiens cor illorum, Apostolus 
ait; et Propheta: Quomodo obscuratum est aurum, mutatus est color optimus? Obscuratum aurum 
plangit, sed aurum tamen”) (82.2; II:293). Moreover, Bernard identifies that ineradicable, 
“native” likeness with the inherence of Christ as the Word in the soul as the very condition of its 
existence, offering His “kinship” to the both passive and active human subject as a kind of 
“turning,” a certain grain that every soul, no matter how “darkened,” remains free to follow. 
Concluding the same sermon, Bernard insists that the soul “does not lack grounds for hope: its 
turning is to the Word. The dignified kinship of the soul with the Word is not in vain . . . and its 
persisting likeness [is] a witness of that kinship” (“Nec deest occasio praesumendi: ad Verbum 
est conversio eius. Non est apud Verbum otiosa animae generosa cognatio . . . et cognationis 
testis similitudo perseverans”) (82.7; II:297). The perception of duplicity is, for the Bernard of 
these Sermones, a first necessary step in recognizing and recovering the soul’s simplicity, a way 
of working backwards toward the “gold,” the best and original color beneath all the darkening; 
but it is equally, if not more, important to always keep one eye on the soul’s inherent dignity as 
represented by that gold. An incipiently dualistic over-emphasis on the “original” sin or 
dissimilitude in the soul is, for Bernard, at least implicitly diagnosed as a symptom of sin and the 
way it sees the world; the soul’s deepest reality consists in a participatory likeness that cleaves 
between and comprehends both an intensely felt sense of the soul’s tendency toward duplicity, 
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which guards against presumption, and a just as deeply felt sense of the soul’s inherent worth, 
which guards against despair.  
 It is in maintaining this tension that Jaufre’s songs, perhaps under Bernard’s more 
crusading influence, tend to waver. Marisa Galvez has written recently of the way crusade lyric 
must negotiate “the physical and psychological distance between here and there, Christian and 
profane values, social affirmation as a ‘chevalreus’ crusader and longed-for union with an 
idealized object of desire” (184-5). Proposed as a kind of penitential pilgrimage, crusade seems 
to have been imagined by Bernard as an emergency route back to the soul’s innate simplicity.43 
If “Quan lo rossinhols” is any indication, it may in fact have been experienced, at least by some 
crusading knights, as a painful sundering of the self. However, Jaufre’s peculiarly “distant” love 
is still more distinctively divided against itself than this: unlike the specifically crusading objects 
of Galvez’s study, and unlike Bernard’s emphatically un-romantic interpretations of the Song of 
Songs,44 Jaufre’s songs specifically encourage a blurring of the border between romantic love 
and the love for God as it was expressed in crusading contexts.45 In this way, in Bernardine 
terms, the potential for destructive duplicity here becomes still more severe, because it threatens 
to involve one’s most fundamental perceptions of the soul in relation to God. The potential 
problem lies not merely, or even primarily, in the blurring of sacred and secular loves. It lies 
more fundamentally in the way Jaufre’s songs, if they are taken as having to do with God, would 
 
43 As Richard Kaeuper points out, “Sermons generally offered crusaders just what they surely needed to hear and 
wanted to possess: unambiguous assurance of sins forgiven in this world and a safe passage through devilish perils 
to glory in the next” (69).  
44 As Stiegman puts it, “Bernard could see no intrinsic worth in the fleeting things of the temporal order. A further 
problem posed by the body was its sexuality. . . .At several points in interpreting the Song of Songs (his canticum 
spirituale), he dismissed the idea that its imagery involved sexual feeling, ‘something corporeal.’ With this, he 
perpetuated a difficulty in perceiving, specifically in the spousal intimacy of sex, a supernal sign value in marriage” 
(“Bernard of Clairvaux” 136). 
45 Simon Gaunt writes of “Lanquan li jorn”: “critics have wondered whether Jaufre was alluding to a woman (and if 
so whether she is real or fictional), or whether the amor de lonh represents social distance, the Virgin Mary, God, or 
indeed the Holy Land? The poem is famously susceptible to different readings” (1). 
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seem to characterize the human experience of the divine as one of near-despairing distance and 
frustrated longing—and therefore threaten to dramatically “obscure” the “gold” that represents, 
in the Bernardine schema, the soul’s most intimate possession, the image of God in the soul. 
 Margaret Switten has written convincingly of the mixture of divine and human love in 
“Lanquan li jorn,” arguing that “departure for the crusade could bring to the poetic theme of 
absence a powerful spatio-temporal context. Crusading knight and poetic lover desire and long 
for a distant goal: the lady, Jerusalem, paradise, finally” (67-8). Switten parallels Bernard’s and 
Jaufre’s making the love-object the “object of salvation,” but makes a qualification that I would 
complicate and push further: “for Bernard, the desire for God is finally fulfilling because God 
has loved us first, and our desire for him through his love for us can become an attainment of 
bliss. The vernacular poet is more somber” (74). This echoes critical judgments going as far back 
as Étienne Gilson’s attempt to disentangle courtly love from Bernard’s teachings: Gilson claimed 
that what the sacrificial or “disinterested” quality in troubadour song had to be understood as 
little more than an attempted trick of seduction, pretending disinterestedness until the desired 
“reward” was achieved or “hope vanishes for good and all” (180). Gilson also claimed that the 
“suffering” characteristic of unrequited love in courtly lyric was “precisely the suffering that 
Bernard would avoid, and from which he would help us free ourselves”46 He asks, “Is an 
unrequited love even conceivable? St. Bernard and all the Christian mystics answer, no. Love 
belongs to the order of friendship, and friendship essentially implies mutual good will. . . .What 
the courtly poets call by this name is merely desire in the eyes of the Christian mystics” (181). 
This is a hard teaching. In my view, and as Perfetti suggests, the specific case of crusade songs 
that operate under the sway of Bernard’s own preaching, or at the very least against the 
 
46 According to Gilson, “Men suffer because they love and are not loved in return; love therefore God and you will 
never know what it is to feel an unrequited love: for—let us never forget it—God has loved us first” (181). 
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theological background that Bernard came to dominate, cannot be so easily contrasted with 
Bernardine theology in general. It is undoubtedly the case that for Bernard, God loves us first. 
But a closer examination of Jaufre’s best-known song, and the saint’s crusade writing in relation 
to it, will show that for Bernard, as for Jaufre Rudel, things were not always so simple.  
 
“When the days are long in May”: Crusade preaching and distant love 
 While it is almost certainly the case that Jaufre Rudel went on the Second Crusade, and it 
is certainly true that Bernard of Clairvaux vigorously preached and promoted it, Bernard and 
Jaufre may be yoked together even more closely and confidently than this. In a discussion of 
Jaufre’s song “Qan lo rius de la fontana,” Roy Rosenstein argues persuasively that the Hugh VII, 
Count of La Marche, with whom he identifies the “Hugon Brun” of that song’s tornada, was 
close family friends with Jaufre. He goes on to suggest that, because Hugh is known to have 
heard Bernard preach the Second Crusade to an infamously large and enthusiastic crowd at 
Vézelay on March 31, 1146, it is very likely that Jaufre himself heard that famous kick-off to the 
crusade preached in person (231). In any case, it is safe to assume that at least the gist and spirit 
of Bernard’s preaching would have reached Jaufre, due not only to Hugh’s presence there but 
also to the presence of several other of Jaufre’s other family friends, including some others to 
whom he refers specifically by name in other songs (232). There is every indication that this 
preaching was a remarkable, epochal event—a sort of medieval tent revival, which involved 
Bernard’s preaching on a raised platform in a field because the town’s basilica court was too 
small to accommodate the crowd (Phillips 68). The twelfth century monk and historian Odo of 
Deuil agrees with Bernard’s Vita Prima in asserting that Bernard’s address was so successful that 
the saint ran out of the crusading crosses he had prepared to distribute, and was consequently 
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“forced to tear his own garments into crosses and to sow them abroad” (9). The exact contents of 
this galvanizing sermon are lost, though several of Bernard’s crusade-related letters, some of 
which possibly even repeat sections of the original sermon’s contents, do survive. One widely 
distributed encyclical, in which Bernard declares prospective crusaders “blessed to be alive in 
this year of jubilee, this year of God’s choice” (Ep. 363.3; 462), likely conveys some of the 
enthusiasm of the crusade preaching to which Jaufre must have been privy, whether in person or 
by proxy. 
 The paradigmatic song of what is now known as the “amor du lonh” (“distant love”) 
tradition, and of which Jaufre’s work is the great exemplar, is saturated with just enough crusade 
language to make it possible to understand the whole song, and even the kind of love it is famous 
for celebrating, in terms of this crusading context. The song’s first indirect reference to crusade 
comes in its second stanza: “Tant es sos pretz verais e fis / Qe lai el renc dels Sarrazis / Fos eu 
per lieis chaitius clamatz” (“So much is her (its) worth true and fine / that there in the kingdom 
of the Saracens / would I be called, for her sake, captive”) (164-5; 12-4).47 The “renc dels 
Sarrazis” is the first noun specifically used to describe the “amor de loing” of which the faraway 
birdsong at the song’s beginning reminds the speaker:  
 Lan qand li jorn son lonc e mai  
 M’es bels douz chans d’auzels de loing;  
 E qand me sui partitz de lai  
 Remembra·m d’un’ amor de loing  
 (“When the days are long in May / I like a sweet song of birds from afar, / and when I 
 have gone away from there / I am reminded of a love from afar.”) (164-5; 1-4)  
 
47 I am using Pickens’s “Version 1” of “Lanquan li jorn” (164-9). 
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The second possible crusading reference occurs in stanza five, and significantly complicates the 
picture: “Ai! car me fos lai peleris / Si qe mos fustz e mos tapis / Fos pelz sieus bels huoills 
remiratz!” (“Ah! would that I were a pilgrim there / so that my staff and my cloak / might be 
reflected in (beheld by) her beautiful eyes!”) (166-7; 33-5). The “bels huoills” are the song’s 
only description, physical or otherwise, of the speaker’s love object, inviting a romantic reading 
of the song; and yet, this isolated and formulaic description is preceded by a very pointed 
reference to pilgrimage, which in turn invites a reading of the poem as an allegory for the love of 
God as expressed in pilgrimage or on crusade, specifically centered in the “realm of the 
Saracens.” A more or less straightforwardly romantic construal of the song is more than possible, 
but then so is a spiritual, or even a crusading, one. Whatever his intentions, Jaufre undeniably 
bends the romance toward the realm of crusade. 
 This confusion of human, divine/pilgrim, and/or divine/crusading love objects is 
reinforced by the song’s extended play on “lai,” the Provençal word for “there.” The word occurs 
first in line three, “qand me sui partitz de lai” (“when I have gone away from there”), where it 
indicates the speaker’s withdrawal from the place where he first heard the birdsong in the song’s 
first stanza. The motif of something absent and longed-for is introduced into the song even 
earlier, by way of the speaker’s recounting that this birdsong was first heard “de loing” (“from 
afar”): the speaker listens to the song over there, then moves away from where he was at first, 
making the “here” of the first two lines immediately into another “there,” effecting a double 
remove at the poem’s beginning. It is only when the listener arrives at “car me fos lai peleris” in 
stanza five that the “there” of stanza two makes possible a more specific orientation: “lai el renc 
dels Sarrazis,” introducing the realm of crusade as the first definitive location toward which the 
song orients itself. The same tension between song of romance and song of pilgrimage and/or 
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crusade can be seen in play in the song’s many ambiguous pronouns, which regularly defy the 
translator to choose between “it” and “her” or “its” and “hers.” The “worth true and fine” for 
which the speaker would be declared captive, for instance, might be translated as “her” worth or 
“its” worth, and similar cases make it possible to understand the love object as a “her” or an “it” 
in most instances. Variations among manuscripts show that the same ambiguity was enacted 
across different versions of the song as recorded and likely as performed; for example, 
manuscript C and Version Three in Pickens’s edition has “Mas tot sia cum a lieys platz!” (“but 
all be as it pleases her!”) (176-7; 28), whereas the more frequently attested version I have used 
retains some variation of “Mas tot sia cum a Dieu platz!” (but all be as it pleases God!”) (166-7; 
21). This confusion between God and an ambiguous “she” is a natural outgrowth of the thematics 
of the song itself, insofar as it consistently effects a confusion between the romantic and the 
spiritual planes. It is also part and parcel of the whole totalizing drive of Jaufre’s “distant love,” 
which characteristically converts every possibility of presence into a register of rigorously 
enforced distance.  
 Although it is not voiced as clearly in the song, something of the expression “M’es ops 
aparcer mon voler” (“I must divide my will”) hangs over “Lanquan li jorn” as well. The singer’s 
preference for frozen winter, his description of himself as “de talan enbroncs e clis” (“bent and 
bowed with desire”) (164-5; 5), his exclamation that “per un ben qe me n’eschai / N’ai dos mals, 
car tant m’es de loing” (“for one good thing which befalls me from it, / I have two griefs because 
she (it) is so far away from me”) (166-7; 31-2), all convey a sense of the self as split by the 
desire described. As I have suggested above, Bernard’s own writing at times betrays similar 
tendencies. The emphatic “there”s and “distant shore” of a letter written by Bernard on the 
subject of the Second Crusade to his Uncle Andrew, himself a Knight of the Temple, resonate 
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deeply with Jaufre’s “amor de loing,” and suggest potentially substantial overlap between the 
crusading mindsets of the saint and the troubadour: 
 What profit has man for all his labour under the sun? Let us rise above the sun and let our 
 conversation be in heaven, going ahead with the mind to where we shall soon follow with 
 the body. There, my dear Andrew, there you will receive the fruit of your labours, there 
 you will have your reward. Under the sun you fight as a soldier, but for the sake of him 
 who is above the sun. Let us who fight upon earth look to him for largesse. Our reward 
 for fighting comes not from the earth, not from below, but is “a rare treasure from distant 
 shores.” (Ep. 288.1; 479) 
Bernard’s “rare treasure from distant shores” constitutes a reference to the “procul et de ultimus 
finibus pretium eius” of Proverbs 31.10. In its original context, the phrase occurs in response to 
the question, “Mulierem fortem quis inveniet?” (“Who will find a virtuous wife?”). This gives a 
good sense of what a tangled web is woven in Bernard’s letter to his uncle: in the context of 
crusade, the saint references offhand a section of Proverbs describing the ideal wife in great 
detail; the “reward” of crusading, then, is understood as analogous to the aim of searching for a 
perhaps literal, perhaps allegorical wife. In what could be understood as a rigorous if 
symptomatically over-literal application of Bernard’s own frequent recommendations to 
prioritize the spiritual sense over its figures in the temporal realm,48 romantic love becomes here 
implicitly a figure for a specifically crusading love for God and for the Holy Land as in need of 
military re-conquest.  
 
48 Bernard’s De laude novae militiae (“In Praise of the New Knighthood”), written in support of the Knights 
Templar, is particularly insistent on this point. The treatise’s long second half describes the spiritual significance of 
several sites in the Holy Land, and specifically argues that the Temple where the knights are stationed must be 
understood in terms of the spiritual virtues it houses now, as opposed to its perishable ornaments and colors (V.1).  
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 Likewise, in Jaufre’s “Lanquan li jorn,” it is the “pretz” (“worth”) of the speaker’s 
beloved for which the speaker declares he would be taken captive “el renc dels Sarrazis” (“in the 
realm of the Saracens”) (164-5; 12-3). As with “la cambra e·l jardis” (“the chamber and the 
garden”)—two locations with particular significance for the Song of Songs49—that the speaker 
says “Mi resembles totz temps palatz” (“will resemble to me forever a palace”), if only he can 
see his “amor de loing” again (166-7; 41-2), Jaufre’s “pretz” does not necessarily require a 
scriptural context, but nonetheless carries rich scriptural connotations. This final statement of 
what will happen to the speaker if he sees his beloved again could be taken to suggest the bliss 
that can occur anywhere where the beloved is; it might just as well be taken to mean something 
like the Psalmist’s one request of the Lord, “that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the 
days of my life, to see the pleasure of the Lord and to visit his temple” (Psalm 26.4). Though 
perhaps moving in different directions, Bernard and Jaufre alike, making use of the same 
scriptural language of pretium/pretz, so confound the romantic and the spiritual planes that it 
becomes more or less impossible to isolate either, or to understand one without reference to the 
other. In the above letter in particular, Bernard himself, in language that is very reminiscent of 
Jaufre’s, can be seen to construe the love of God as the love of something that must be sought, 
for the crusader if not for Bernard and his monks, always over “there,” at a distance, in the 
manner of one seeking “a rare treasure from distant shores.”50 Instead of being drawn ecstatically 
 
49 See the Song of Songs 1.3 for the chamber, and 4.15-6 (and elsewhere) for the garden.  
50 Pranger points out how this crusading structure of desire does not apply to the Cistercian monks themselves, for 
whom Jerusalem remains conveniently accessible at home: “Both coming together in the notion of Jerusalem, 
Bernard’s attitude toward the failure of the second crusade will turn out to depend on his ultimate reduction of the 
historic Holy Place in Palestine to the Jerusalem of Clairvaux” (Bernard of Clairvaux 27). Writing about a monk 
who stopped at Clairvaux on his way to crusade and never left, Bernard once specifically described Clairvaux as a 
“short cut” to Jerusalem. Pranger describes the way this kind of thinking informed Bernard’s later explanation of the 
Crusade’s failure: “That short cut which conditions . . . God’s battle orders as well as the rhythm of life in the 
Jerusalem of Clairvaux, leaves the broken dreams of the crusaders intact, indeed, cruelly so, while absorbing them in 
a ritual of superior failure and consolation” (44). In annexing the idea of Jerusalem to the monastic context, “a 
complete reversal of temporal and spiritual order takes place. The monastic re-creation claims a priority of the 
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outside of himself, into the kind of mutual giving and taking that is modeled at the outset of 
Jaufre’s song “Quan lo rossinhols,” Bernard’s imagined knight-lover is captivated by a certain 
transferable, abstractable “worth,” which renders him open to the obscuring of boundaries 
between the love for God and its application in terms of the “value” of a Holy Land reconceived 
as the crusaded-after beloved. For Bernard and for Jaufre, loving release is alternately longed-for 
and, at times as in Bernard’s letter, in danger of becoming something infinitely deferred, annexed 
to a purely spiritual realm that is never quite allowed to incarnate itself within the realities of 
one’s daily life. 
 A closer look at one more key work of Bernardine theology will, I hope, serve to better 
define the nature and effects of this simultaneous deferral and literalization. As I alluded to 
above, in his De diligendo deo (“On Loving God”) treatise Bernard writes at length on the 
balance between presumption and despair, depicting the spiritual life as one of constantly calling 
to mind one’s distance from the divine ideal without losing one’s sense of the soul’s inherent 
dignity as created by God, and so of its abiding kinship with and proximity to the divine. “It is 
necessary that you know two things,” Bernard says: “both what you are, and that you are not so 
by your own power, so that you do not either not glory at all, or vainly glory” (“Utrumque ergo 
scias necesse est, et quid sis, et quod a teipso non sis, ne aut omnino videlicet non glorieris, aut 
inaniter glorieris”) (II.4; III:122). To over-value the self is to presume, to treat one’s gifts as 
though there had been no giver; to feel shame for what you are is to despair, a kind of reverse-
presumption in its presuming to fathom the soul with no feeling for its being created by, and so 
infinitely valued by, God. This schema found its natural home within a chivalric culture that 
 
spiritual over the literal, of imagination over facts, of the artificial over the natural without excluding the one from 
the other” (48). Langland’s Clergie puts this idea more succinctly, in a passage excised from the C-Text: “if hevene 
be on this erthe, and ese to any soule, / It is in cloister or in scole” (B.X.297-8). 
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placed emphasis on “praise” and “blame,” “honor” and “shame,” and Bernard in fact appealed 
freely to these categories in his crusade writing. In the widely disseminated crusade encyclical 
referenced above, he warns readers that if the “vessels of wrath”—the Muslims who had taken 
Edessa, believed to have been the first city to have adopted Christianity—“but once lay hands 
upon these holy places there shall be no sign or trace of piety left. Such a catastrophe would be a 
source of appalling grief for all time, but it would also be a source of confusion and endless 
shame for our generation” (Ep. 363.3; 461). The De diligendo’s warning against despair is, it 
seems, here lost in the shuffle of the occasion’s demanding a shame-based call to arms; Bernard 
cannot read the re-conquest of the literal Jerusalem as anything but a real threat to the 
eschatological Jerusalem. 
 Of course, this blurring of the lines between spiritual and more worldly, chivalric values 
and categories of thought was by no means unique to Bernard.51 Michael Routledge has drawn 
attention to the way crusade ideology provided a “perfect structure” for the categories of praise 
and blame—praise for going on crusade, blame for staying home—and pointed out that crusade 
songwriters in fact often made explicit use of these categories (97). Though Jaufre’s stubbornly 
mysterious love songs are rarely so explicit about anything, the category of “shame” does 
resonate strongly with the final exhortatory stanza of the first song discussed in this chapter, 
“Quan lo rossinhols el folhos.” As we saw above, the final, often omitted, stanza of the song 
completely disrupts the romantic push-and-pull of the song’s first five stanzas, declaring, “E qi 
sai reman delechos / E Dieu non sec en Bellïen, / Non sai com sia ja mais pros / Ni com si veinha 
 
51 It is important to note, hoewver—as I do in Chapter One—that Bernard’s enthusiastic support for the Second 
Crusade was not a default position. Jean Leclercq’s essay “Saint Bernard’s Attitude toward War” clarifies that other 
clerics, including fellow Cistercian Isaac of Stella, opposed the foundation of the Templars and the crusade itself 
(28-9). As Leclercq remarks, it was only with Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century that a really authoritative 
extension of Augustine’s provisional “just war” theory was attempted (6).   
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ha gerimen” (“And who remains here full of delight / and does not follow God in (into) 
Bethlehem, / I do not know how he may ever have prowess / or how he may come (n) to good 
healing”) (76-7; 36-9). This at least verges on Bernard’s rhetoric of shame, and seems to 
anticipate Marcabru’s infamous “lavador,” which represents the Holy Land of crusade as a place 
of surefire soul-cleansing in his popular song “Pax in nomine domini.” The final line of the 
song’s sixth stanza in particular recalls the Second Crusade’s peculiar advance on the first: its 
promise not just of the remission of penance (“pena”) but of the remission, to the confessed 
crusader, of the “culpa” (“guilt”) of sin itself (Phillips 55). This in turn speaks to a peculiarity of 
Bernard’s theological career: despite his emphasis on the importance of contrition in making a 
good confession,52 Bernard was, against Abelard, a proponent of the priest’s power not merely to 
offer absolution to the sinner but in some sense “actually themselves to remit the divine 
punishment” (Constable, “The Second Crusade” 250-1). Hence, perhaps, Bernard’s capacity to 
preach with such apparent conviction Eugenius III’s papal bull, Quantum praedecessores, which 
concludes with the declaration that “whosoever devoutly begins and completes so holy a journey 
or dies on it will obtain absolution from all his sins of which he has made confession with a 
contrite and humble heart” (282). Bernard’s crusade preaching, then, might be said to have 
offered the would-be crusader, among other things, a hitherto unprecedented means of dealing 
with any lingering despair over his own sinfulness. Crusade itself would heal the crusader’s soul, 
finally providing Jaufre and his fellow knights with their longed-for “guerimen” 
(“reward/healing”) of forgiven, blameless simplicity. 
 As we saw above, the presence or absence of the crusading, shaming sixth stanza 
transforms “Quan lo rossinhols” completely, determining whether it is explicitly a crusade song 
 
52 As we will see in Chapter Three, Bernard is cited to this effect in the first part of Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale. 
119 
 
or not. The very fact that the song can and did survive entirely without the final crusade stanza, 
moreover, testifies to what I have described in terms of the protean, catch-all malleability, and 
totalizing drift, of Jaufre’s “distant love.” Pickens’s Version One, well represented in the 
manuscript tradition, lacks the sixth stanza, and so appears to conceive of romantic love itself as 
characterized by furious and frustrated longing. Without this crusading sixth stanza, “Quan lo 
rossinhols” becomes still more similar to “Lanquan li jorn”: suggestions of a spiritualized love, if 
taken seriously, may determine the whole experience of the song; then again, it is easy to gloss 
over them and to experience the “distant love” as a purely romantic one—and so to experience 
the “bon esper” with which Version One ends as, instead, the good hope of attaining the love 
object, by turns lamented and celebrated, of stanzas two through four (72; 35). The ease with 
which the love described in “Quan lo rossinhols” may be understood as romantic, or spiritual in 
the more “pilgrim” fashion, or specifically and forcefully “crusading,” demonstrates that a song 
does not have to be a crusade song, or even to make any identifiable reference to crusading at all, 
to be substantially determined, or at least deeply troubled, by a crusading mindset. The 
“romantic” version of the song, without the crusading stanza, is involved in the same difficulties 
of conceiving of all love objects as distant, and of negotiating a sense of fundamental division in 
the self and the self’s will; the whole tenor of desire itself in Jaufre’s songs, whether romantic or 
spiritual or both, depends consistently on a sense of the love object as always over “there,” 
insistently deferred, a “rare treasure from distant shores.” Consequently, for these songs, the 
ideal love object comes at times to seem simply the one that makes the most demands on us, the 
one that moves us furthest from ourselves, the most “distant” one possible.  
 The crusading versions of “Quan lo rossinhols,” with their abrupt shifts from a vague 
romantic love object to a specific crusading agenda and even to a particular city or destination of 
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desire, “Bethlehem,” pose for the modern reader or listener of the song some of the same 
questions Jaufre Rudel’s songs may have posed to his contemporary listeners: is the final stanza 
of “Quan lo rossinhols,” or, for that matter, the reference to captivity at the hands of the Saracens 
in “Lanquan li jorn,” the interpretive key to the song, or a merely epiphenomenal flourish? Or, to 
bring the question closer to the subject of this chapter: is either of the two “distant love” songs I 
have discussed here a specifically “crusade song,” or are they both perhaps “crusading” songs in 
a sense much more all-encompassing than that? If Jaufre depicts the dialectic of frustrated desire, 
the back-and-forth of presence and absence, experience and memory, he may do so—as I have 
argued about Bernard above—deliberately, in order to capture the “radical doubleness” of 
existence that Bynum criticized as a lack of historicity in St. Bernard. It is at least possible that 
Jaufre may be best understood as depicting, as one critic puts it, “lai (there)” as a “source of 
memory, which in this case is a source of poetry,” attempting to capture the “eschatological 
tension” that generates it (Spillenger 22). But “lai” is also explicitly for Jaufre the realm of 
crusade, “lai el renc dels Sarrazis”; and so his songs, like Bernard’s crusade sermons, also model 
the way desire at a distance can become destructive, even violent, when it is not balanced by a 
“pilgrim” sense of the desired object’s essential un-possessability.  
 If this chapter must leave open many important questions about Jaufre and his songs, it 
may at least suggest one or two things more about Bernard of Clairvaux and the specific 
character of his theological imagination. Jaufre’s insertion into his song “Quan lo rossinhols,” 
almost without warning, of this specific location, this Bethlehem where one may attain a good 
school or good confession, is reminiscent of nothing else in Jaufre’s limited, and more or less 
specificity-resistant, corpus. It is, however, entirely typical of Bernard, whose imagination was 
distinctly topographical long before it was turned to preaching the Crusade—in his celebrated 
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recourse to the Augustinian idea that the state of sinfulness may become a kind of place, a 
“regio,” and in his earlier treatise De laude novae militiae (“In Praise of the New Knighthood”), 
where he describes with relish, and with many allegorical flourishes, the specific locales of the 
Holy Land that constituted the sworn “realm” of the Knights Templar. In that treatise Bernard 
spends, in fact, a whole chapter on the city of Bethlehem where, as he puts it, man’s dignity was 
restored, so that the Christian “who has found life in the words of Christ no longer seeks the 
flesh” (“qui in verbis Christi vitam invenit, carnem iam non requirit”) (VI.12; III:225). Much 
later, writing to the Cluniac abbot Peter the Venerable in the wake of the Second Crusade’s 
failure, Bernard complained that “the Lord of heaven is losing his land, the land where his feet 
have stood.” “What does this mean,” he asked, “but that the very grounds of our salvation, the 
riches of the Christian people are being taken away?” (Ep. 521.1; 473). Following Bernard’s own 
allegorical principles as they were set out in the De laude treatise and elsewhere, I would suggest 
that a realm of the “flesh” that is merely spiritualized, rather than anagogically re-infused with 
and re-interpreted in terms of the spirit and so of its eternal significance, will inevitably and 
dramatically return as over-spiritualized flesh and over-literal spatializations of time and time-
deprived place. This is why the twentieth-century theologians Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac 
were right, I think, to stress the importance of the anagogical sense and of its diminishment in the 
interpretive frameworks of the later Middle Ages: the confusion of the literal Jerusalem with the 
“very grounds of our salvation” is, at least in part, an exegetical failure, and a confusion about 
the way eternal significance relates to its temporal signs.53  
 
53 Following Congar, de Lubac sees a “lack of the eschatalogical sense” as “the most crucial defect arising from 
scholasticism,” emerging “precisely from the fact that theology then no longer has the form of an exegesis” (195). 




 It may appear incredible, with the benefit of a near millennium of hindsight, that Bernard 
should ever have discussed Christendom’s losing Jerusalem as if it were a significant “loss” to 
the Godhead itself, or as if it jeopardized “the very grounds of our salvation.” Phrases such as 
Bernard’s declaration, in the widely circulated encyclical to which I have referred earlier in this 
chapter, that the crusade was “a cause in which to conquer is glorious and for which to die is 
gain” (Ep. 363.4; 462)—an adaptation of St. Paul’s statement that for him “to live is Christ and 
to die is gain” (Philippians 1.21)—may sound remarkably tin-eared to most modern readers, and 
especially shocking because they proceed from the pen of the famously “mellifluous doctor.” 
Scholars of Bernard often describe the saint as, in this respect, “a true child of his time” (Kahl 
38); John Gordon Rowe writes of the Second Crusade’s failure, “Having in great degree a holy 
simplicity of his own, [Bernard] often achieved simplicity in his exhortations, particularly when 
he was not fully aware of the complexity of certain events” (87). But, if what I have argued about 
the crusading mentality in the songs of Jaufre Rudel holds true, it should be considered not only 
that Bernard may have been a gravely mistaken evaluator of the Second Crusade’s likely 
success, not to mention the souls of a crusading force that Bernard clearly imagined as an army 
of pious penitents, but that the tenor of his crusade preaching may have affected the whole 
character of the desire of those under its influence—their souls, so to speak. 
 In this section of Chapter Two I have suggested that Bernard’s preaching of the Second 
Crusade may have been a matter not merely of encouraging a certain number of men to kill and 
to die on crusade, but also of radically impacting the whole psyches of those many men who took 
up the cross54—their conception of themselves with relation to God, and of what those selves’ 
 
54 Perfetti notes that “Crusade sermons designated the crusader in several ways: as pilgrim (peregrinus), he who has 
taken the cross (crucesignatus), and as soldier, vassal, or servant in the service of Christ or God” (936). The notion 
of being “signed by the cross” has interesting resonances with Bernard’s peculiarly sign-based sacramental theology. 
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rightly ordered love of God was meant to feel like. It is probably beyond the reach of scholarly 
writing to suggest that there was something symbolic about that rending of the monk’s robe to 
make crosses for the crusaders at Vézelay, but it may not be beyond the student of Bernard to 
suggest that there is a certain split, a kind of tear, between the Bernard who put as eloquently as 
anyone before or after the idea of God’s love for each soul as that soul’s most intimate, 
inalienable attribute, and the Bernard who so aggressively preached the “jubilee” of full 
remission as available only to those willing to fight and die on crusade. The sense of a “split 
will” that is indelibly described by Jaufre, at least, suggests a psychic state of crusading love that 
is very far from the settled simplicity Bernard describes, both in brief in his De laude novae 
militiae treatise and at greater length in his Sermones super cantica canticorum, as the ideal state 
of every soul. And it is probably not beyond the student of Jaufre Rudel to suggest that this idea 
of the love object as always over “there,” located in an ever-receding elsewhere, if taken to be a 
description of a love that is meant to be importantly analogous to one’s experience of loving 
God, locates the lover in a strange spiritual space, a different kind of “regio dissimilitudinis”—
under the curse, in a phrase from the conclusion of Jaufre’s “Lanquan li jorn,” “Qu’ieu ames e no 
fos amatz” (“that I should love and not be loved”) (176-7; 49).55  
 
Bernard and the Pseudo-Bernard in England 
For some in the twelfth century, the church’s command “redde quod debes” (“return what 
you owe”) was heard as a call to crusade. For many others then and after, what that demand 
meant was defined by a theology that was, in its own way, as shaped by Bernard’s voice as was 
 
55 It is worth noting here that Jaufre’s “Lanquan li jorn” is thought to have served as a melodic model for Walther 
von der Vogelweide’s “Palastinalied,” a song of the Fifth Crusade that celebrates the “just claim” of the Christians 
to the Holy Land over the claims of the Muslims and Jews (Husmann 17-8). 
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the Second Crusade’s preaching. The influence of Bernard’s Sermones super cantica canticorum 
is diffuse and difficult to trace in the vernacular;56 Bernard’s De diligendo deo (“On Loving 
God”) treatise was also popular in England from the middle of the thirteenth century on, 
represented in about fifteen manuscripts from the last half of that century alone, and was even 
obliquely referenced in Julian of Norwich’s Revelation of Love, a notoriously non-citational 
text.57 Even more popular—“hard to overestimate . . . both in England and on the continent”—
were the Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis (“Pious 
Meditations on the Understanding of the Human Condition”), an important source for Pope 
Innocent III’s influential treatise De miseria humanae condicionis (“On the Misery of the Human 
Condition”)58 and undoubtedly the most circulated Bernardine or Pseudo-Bernardine59 material 
in thirteenth and fourteenth century England (Bestul, “Devotional Writing” 23).60 This is the 
source that, along with Innocent’s treatise itself, dominates the first few parts of the Prick of 
Conscience (Morey, “Introduction” 1), the most widely circulated long poem in Middle English. 
 
56 As Anne Savage and Nicholas Watson point out, “the body of twelfth-century Cistercian mystical writings . . . are 
the fountainhead for virtually all late medieval writing in this vein of ‘bridal mysticism’—particularly Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs” (25). These Sermons play a vital role in the Ancrene Wisse and The 
Wooing of Our Lord. As we will see, one of them is also used in Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale. 
57 Nicholas Watson and Jacqueline Jenkins observe: “Truer than many visionary writings to the logic of their genre, 
which attends to what can be known through a chosen individual’s experience, rather than through the authoritative 
teachings of others, [Julian’s writings] say almost nothing directly about their intellectual affiliations” (6).  
58 Donald R. Howard judges that this treatise influenced Innocent’s De miseria “more than any other.” According to 
Howard, the Meditationes argues that “the prime requirement of repentance . . . is self-knowledge,” a point that its 
author drives home by undertaking “a treatment of man’s nature from his birth, his conduct in life, and his manner 
of death” (xxix). 
59 Thomas H. Bestul warns that “the understanding of Bernard as a medieval devotional writer cannot derive only 
from his authentic Sermons on the Song of Songs, but must be completed by taking into account the enormous 
number of devotional treatises that circulated under his name.” To strictly separate out Bernardine from Pseudo-
Bernardine texts is to unduly restrict “the meaning of Bernard as signifier within the realm of medieval culture and 
society” (Texts of the Passion 15). I strongly agree. Tracing the influence of Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine 
texts together will help us see how the two mix together to generate some of the most impactful “signifiers” in late 
medieval English literature. 
60 In another article, Bestul describes the Meditationes piissimae as “among the most widely circulated Latin works 
of any genre in fourteenth-century England” (“Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale” 603). 
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Despite its wide-ranging influence, however, the Meditationes has gone largely under-
studied, and has not been seriously considered in assessments of Bernard’s legacy.61 Describing 
its decisive influence on the Middle English lyric Sayings of St. Bernard as they appear in the 
Bodleian Library’s MS Laud Misc. 108, J. Justin Brent notes that the Meditationes develop “the 
idea of ascent to God through self-knowledge,” addressing a “monastic audience” on the theme 
of the “inward search for divine salvation”; on the other hand, “The Middle English derivatives . 
. . focus almost exclusively on the admonitory sections of this work,” and therefore often lack 
“the contemplative speculation that characterized its source” (161). Beyond what Brent claims, 
however, the “contemplative speculation” of the Meditationes treatise is in fact already 
diminished, marked by a somewhat piecemeal, inconsistently applied recapitulation of the 
Augustinian idea of the trinity’s imprint on the mind—a schema with which Bernard often 
showed himself familiar,62 but that was articulated with more consistency in the work of his 
friend and eventual fellow Cistercian, William of St. Thierry.63 Whereas Bernard tends to invoke 
“personal experience” in a role that was played more consistently for Augustine and for William 
by memory64—the faculty of the mind that all three theologians consistently identify with the 
Father and the Father’s power65—in the Meditationes piissimae the Augustinian trinitarian 
 
61 Takami Matsuda’s article “The Reception and Influence of ps.-Bernardine Meditationes Piissimae in Middle 
English” surveys the importance of the Meditationes for Middle English writing in general, drawing on the work of 
Robert Bultot. David Aers has also recently cited the Meditationes treatise approvingly in his book Versions of 
Election. 
62 See, for instance, Bernard’s sermon De conversione: “For the soul itself is nothing but reason, memory, and will” 
(“Denique tota ipsa (anima) nihil est aliud quam ratio, memoria et voluntas”) (VI.11; IV:84). The formula is also 
repeated several times in the Sermones super cantica canticorum. 
63 M.-D. Chenu observes that “William of Saint-Thierry preserved the features of Augustinian thought more 
carefully [than Bernard]” (61).  
64 See the first of Bernard’s Sermons on the Song of Songs, which begins with an invitation to “look back on your 
own experience” (“vestram experientiam advertatis”), to “learn by what you experience that man’s life on earth is a 
ceaseless warfare” (“sicut militiam esse vitam hominis super terram incessanter experimini in vobismetipsis”), and 
to recognize that “only experience” can “teach” the meaning of the Song (“sola addiscit experientia”), “the fruit of 
all the other [songs]” (“ceterorum omnium ipsum . . . fructus”) (1.9-11; I:6-7).  
65 As Roland Teske observes, “The primacy of memory for Augustine’s account of human cognition is seen from its 
analogy with the Father who is first in the Trinity” (157). In Augustine’s more approximately analogous trinity of 
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schema tends to give way to a set of agonistic binaries. Centered on the crucial Pauline 
distinction between spiritus and caro, the spirit and the flesh—tellingly elided at times with the 
less obviously symbolical opposition between anima and corpus, the soul and the body66—the 
Meditationes begins by making a distinction between exteriora and interiora, then proceeds to 
dichotomize everything in its path, culminating in a strong distinction on the institutional level 
between saeculum and claustrum, the world and the cloister. Unlike even Bernard’s most 
ideologically motivated writings, the Meditationes is often plainly dualistic on its surface, and is 
as dramatic an example as one could ask for of what M.-D Chenu described in terms of a 
Christianized “Platonic dualism,” overshadowing the “biblical feeling for historical actuality” 
with a “radical indifference . . . to the world of concrete things” (64).67 
What results might be fairly described as a “crusading” mentality, transposed into the key 
of internal division and implicit violence. Where anima merely dominates and denigrates corpus, 
and claustrum simply excludes and looks down upon saeculum, existence itself comes to be 
construed as an endless war to master what the text itself describes as the “domesticum hostem,” 
the “familiar enemy” of the body and the flesh (XIII.35), and the soul is summoned to a constant 
 
the “outer man,” the role of the Father is played by the object seen, whereas the Son corresponds with vision and the 
Spirit with the act of looking that holds them together (De Trinitate 11.2). This illustrates the enigmatic role of 
memory and of the Father, which Henri de Lubac in turn aligns with anagogy and the theological virtue of hope 
(181): it is as if the whole system depends on something that is never fully present within it. Likewise, in the soul 
memory is not something I have, but something I am; and yet my memory is never fully, transparently present to 
me. The reduction of the importance of memory tends to obscure this paradox.  
66 A desire to avoid this sort of dualistic theological impasse may be one reason why Langland revises the C-Text of 
Piers Plowman to propose Liberum Arbitrium, rather than Anima, as the Dreamer’s climactic guide to self-
understanding. Nicholas Watson argues that Langland’s “figure of lay sinfulness, Haukyn or Activa Vita, a minstrel 
and provider of communion wafers” shows the poet, like Chaucer and Julian in their own different ways, echoing a 
lay “incarnational theology” that “assumed that the world Christ redeemed was a world of sinners.” Watson 
compares this figure to Chaucer’s Host (“Christian Ideologies” 79). As I will argue in Chapter Three, I think the 
comparison between the Host and Langland’s Nede is at least as suggestive. 
67 According to Chenu, Augustine “favored a theology of grace . . . through personal encounter between God and 
man, irrespective of the order or disposition or intelligibility of nature; nature became thereby a mere field for man’s 
interior experience” (64). Whether or not this is true of Augustine or of Bernard, Chenu’s remarks could serve as an 
apt introduction to the Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae. In my view, Bernard’s authentic thought more 
typically and originally substitutes the ambiguous category of “personal experience” both for the neglected 
Augustinian “memory” and for a more general attention to the “world of concrete things.” 
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state of emergency, since “mihi subjugari non potero” (“I am not able to subjugate myself”) 
(IX.24).68 As a result, “omnia timeo” (“I fear all things”) (XII.34). In terms of the monk’s 
recommended self-understanding, this unending internalized conflict issues in the overriding 
dominance of an unhappy, self-accusing “worm of conscience” (“conscientiae vermem”) 
(III.10), a phenomenon distinctly at odds with the careful balance between presumption and 
despair, fear and hope, awareness of judgment and awareness of mercy, that was consistently 
recommended by St. Bernard.69 As we will see, this gnawing worm, which haunts and shadows 
without quite overwhelming William Langland’s Piers Plowman,70 would eventually determine 
the whole shape and program of the very dour, very popular Prick of Conscience, thereby 
cementing itself as an essential feature in the landscape of Middle English “vernacular theology.” 






68 I will cite the Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis by chapter and section number. 
Reference is to the Patrologia Latina, Vol. 184, cols. 485-508b. Translations are my own. For this reason, and 
because I read the Meditationes more closely than some of my other Latin sources, I have provided the Latin text 
first in this case. The Meditationes needs an English translation. 
69 In his sixth sermon on the Song of Songs, for example, Bernard speaks of “those spiritual feet of God to which the 
penitent’s first kiss ought to be directed” (“illos spirituales pedes Dei, quos primo loco spiritualiter osculari 
paenitentem oportet”): “Let us call one of these feet mercy, the other judgment” (“quorum alterum misericordiam, 
alterum iudicium nominemus”) (6.6; I:28-9). 
70 As I referenced at the beginning of this chapter, in the “apologia” passage original to the C-Text of Piers 
Langland’s Will sets his own obscure sense of what God wants him to do—“For in my conscience Y knowe what 
Crist wolde Y wrouhte” (C.V.83)—against the strident demands of a more thoroughly allegorized, accusatory 
“Conscience.” My above reading would at least partly equate this latter, more reified Conscience roughly with the 
“worm of conscience” that dominates the Meditationes piissimae and the Prick of Conscience. I do not think it is a 







“Bernard the monk ne saugh nat all” 
Chaucerian theology and the Bernardine tradition 
 
I can no longer hide the fact that for the second time he who is from heaven speaks of the earth 
so agreeably and so intimately, as if he were someone from the earth.  
 
(“Minime iam dissimulare queo, quod ecce secundo is, qui de caelo est, de terra loquitur: utique 
tam dignanter, tam socialiter, quasi unus e terra.”) 
 




Following the opening line that was reproduced in Piers Plowman—“Multi multa sciunt, 
et seipsos nesciunt” (“Many know many things, and do not know themselves”)—the popular 
Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis begins by neatly 
dividing the world into two categories: the “exteriora” by means of which those misguided 
“many” search for God, and the “interiora, quibis interior est Deus” (“inner things, than which 
God is more inner”), through which He really should be sought. The journey inward begins with 
a conventionally Augustinian relation of the faculties of the mind to the three persons of the 
Trinity: “Secundum interiorem hominem tria in mente mea invenio, per quae Deum recolo, 
conspicio, et concupisco. Sunt autem haec tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas sive amor. Per 
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memoriam reminiscor: per intelligentiam intueor; per voluntatem amplector” (“According to the 
inner man I find three things in the mind, through which I recollect, discern, and desire God. 
These three are memory, intelligence, and the will, or love. Through the memory I remember; 
through intelligence I perceive; through the will I embrace”) (I.1).1 The second section of this 
first chapter relates this theme explicitly to the image of God in the mind: “Repraesentemus ergo 
in nobis imaginem ejus in appetitu pacis, in intuitu veritatis, et in amore charitatis. Teneamus 
eum in memoria, portemus in conscientia, et ubique praesentem veneremur. Mens siquidem 
nostra . . . ejus imago est” (“Therefore we represent in ourselves His image: in the desire for 
peace, in the consideration of the truth, and in the love of charity. Let us hold Him in memory, 
carry Him in conscience, and everywhere revere Him as present. For our mind . . . is His image”) 
(I.2). This latter formula begins the Meditationes’ gradual, significant swerve away from the 
traditional Augustinian schema: “conscientia” silently replaces the term “intelligentia,” which 
was used in the earlier passage. If the verb “veneremur” describes the activity of the third faculty 
of the mind, simply replacing the noun—“voluntas sive amor”—then “conscientia” stands in a 
more liminal position, introducing a new term for the intelligence that also seems to overlap 
somewhat with memory’s role of “holding” God. 
 The key term “conscientia” comes to dominate the treatise more and more as it goes on. 
Here it appears to mark the place between passivity and activity, the middle position where what 
is remembered is carried over into actionable form.2 By the end of the treatise, however, 
 
1 As in Chapter Two, I will cite the Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis by chapter and 
section number. Reference is to the Patrologia Latina, Vol. 184, cols. 485-508b. Translations are my own. 
2 In this way it might be compared with Marshall Leicester’s term “practical consciousness,” which is said to exist 
“in the area between discursive consciousness and the unconscious” (19) and which, according to its coiner Anthony 
Giddens, “consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social life 
without being able to give them direct discursive significance” (qtd. in Leicester 19). This mode of consciousness, 
Leicester says, “has largely to do with matters of routine and habit”; it is defined by Pierre Bourdieu as “habitus, the 
disposition or way of holding oneself vis-à-vis the social world of institutionalized practices that enables agents to 
negotiate its vicissitudes” (qtd. in Leicester 20). The term plays a critical role in Leicester’s analysis of The 
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“conscientia” has become a site of perpetual self-recrimination and even of self-torture; one 
chapter heading describes conscience as “remordentis,” biting, gnawing, and the chapter begins 
with the author’s lament that “Peccata mea celare non possum, quoniam quocunque vado, 
conscientia mea mecum est, secum portans quidquid in ea posui, sive bonum sive malum. . . .Sic, 
in domo propria, et a propria familia habeo accusatores, testes, judices et tortores. Accusat me 
consciencia, testis est memoria, ratio judex, voluptas carcer, timor tortor, oblectamentum 
tormentum. . . .nam inde punimur, unde delectamur” (“I am not able to hide my sins, because 
wherever I go, my conscience is with me, carrying with it whatever I have put there, whether 
good or evil. . . .Thus, in my own house, and from among my own family I have accusers, 
witnesses, judges, and torturers. Conscience accuses me, memory is the witness, reason the 
judge, pleasure the jail, fear the torturer, delight, the torment. . . .For we are punished, there 
where we delight”) (XI.32).3 When it is specifically described as a “worm” earlier on—“In carne 
 
Canterbury Tales, because Leicester believes that “a great many effects of Chaucer’s text . . . are produced in the 
undecidable area between conscious and unconscious.” Its interest for my study lies more specifically in the way 
“the distinction between unconscious and preconscious is a function of the operation of memory.” According to 
Leicester, the Freudian idea of the preconscious was introduced to describe “the status of material that is not 
conscious in the descriptive (or discursive) sense but is not repressed, such as memories that are not immediately 
conscious” (19). Leicester equates this realm with the kind of knowledge necessary to tell a story, speak a language, 
or drive a car (20). This is exactly the kind of identity-grounding awareness that tends to be neglected when the 
Augustinian idea of memory as one of the three definitive faculties of the mind is forgotten; Bernard’s “personal 
experience” and the Pseudo-Bernardine “conscience” represent two possible replacements for it. I favor Bernard’s 
term over the Pseudo-Bernard’s or Leicester’s, because “conscience” and “practical consciousness” both tend to 
perform the very abstraction and disembodiment that “memoria” itself so firmly resists. To say “I am my memory” 
is not the same as to say “I am my preconscious practical skills,” or even “I am my conscience,” where conscience is 
construed as a kind of sidelined moral umpire. “I am my experience” more firmly resists the reduction of the person 
to sheer intelligence and will. 
3 This passage marks a significant distortion of the treatise’s Bernardine sources. The closest passage in Bernard’s 
genuine work is found his second sermon for the feast of the Assumption: “Seized from the very beginning by 
conspiracy and foul betrayal, my soul was handed over as a prisoner in her own home, and her torturers were none 
other than those of her own household. For conscience was the prison, and reason and memory the torturers, and 
they are cruel, stern, and pitiless. . . .But blessed is the Lord, who has not given me as prey to their teeth!” (“Ab ipso 
nempe coniurationis et proditionis pessimae deprehensa principio, non alibi quam in domo propria carcerali est 
mancipata custodiae, nec aliis quam suae illius familiae data tortoribus. Erat enim illi conscientia carcer, erant 
tortores ratio et memoria, atque hi quidem crudeles, austeri et immisericordes. . . .Sed benedictus Deus, qui non 
dedit me in captionem dentibus eorum”) (4; V:234). The Meditationes characteristically excises the rhetorical 
context, and adds the extra note about the soul’s being punished specifically for its pleasure. 
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cruciabuntur per ignem, in spiritu per conscientiae vermem” (“In the flesh they will be tortured 
by fire, in the spirit through the worm of conscience”)—the pangs of conscience are identified 
with a state of living-in-death: “Sic tamen morientur, ut semper vivant; et sic vivent, ut semper 
moriantur” (“Nonetheless they will die in such a way that they are always living; and they will 
live in such a way that they are always dying”) (III.10). This earlier passage explicitly describes 
the state of the damned in hell, but is in fact characteristic of the way the soul’s experience of its 
own conscience is depicted throughout. A constant state of anxiety is both recommended and 
deliberately induced by the Meditationes piissimae, which presses the soul toward an early 
acquaintance with the gnawing “worm of conscience” and out of any provisional state of peace 
to which the “appetitus pacis,” associated in the treatise’s first section with the faculty of 
memory, might otherwise have led it. For souls in this unsettled state, “conscience” names the 
place in the mind where the distinction between death and life blurs together into an 
undifferentiated experience of gnawing fear—as opposed to the place where, as in the treatise’s 
first chapter, the memory of God shades into the revering of Him in all things. Augustine’s 
trinitarian schema collapses into a practical dualism, where the self’s conscience stands in 
despairing judgment against itself. Memory is reduced to a passive witness. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, conscience is a key figure in William Langland’s Piers 
Plowman. In this chapter, I will argue for the importance of this and other key themes from the 
Meditationes piissimae for Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales as well—in particular, the broader 
categories of dualism and despair. In my view, Chaucer not only engages with the theological 
problem of dualism and its experiential corollary in despair; he deliberately constructs a counter-
theology, embedded in his poetics, that responds with real originality to these problems as they 
were presented in some of the most popular theological works of his time. From the possible 
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citations of the Prick of Conscience to his alleged translations of a sermon on Mary Magdalene 
and of Innocent’s De miseria humanae condicionis treatise, the record of Chaucerian 
engagement with explicitly religious sources tells us significantly more about his theological 
sensibility, and about its centrality for his poetical project, than has been generally supposed. His 
possible engagement with the Prick of Conscience is amply documented in the study of the 
sources of The Parson’s Tale on which the Riverside Chaucer’s notes are still based (Petersen). 
His engagement with Innocent’s treatise in the Prologue to the Man of Law’s Tale is 
unmistakably nuanced, and his multiple translations of Bernard’s hymn to the Virgin from 
Dante’s Paradiso, in addition to his early “ABC” to the Virgin, suggest a lively interest in 
Bernard and in Marian theology. More suggestive for my purposes, a manuscript that has long 
been associated with Chaucer contains even more potentially significant Chaucerian material 
than has been previously realized: in addition to the De miseria treatise and the Pseudo-Origen 
homily that Chaucer claims to have translated in his youth, Cambridge Peterhouse MS 219 
contains, immediately following the homily, a copy of the Meditationes piissimae treatise, 
labeled “Meditationes sancti bernardi.” The manuscript also contains some genuinely 
Bernardine material.4  
In this chapter I will argue that Chaucerian theology should be understood in terms of a 
both significantly Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine context, best characterized in terms of a 
push-and-pull between the dualistic, “crusading” tradition represented by the Meditationes and 
more contemplative, authentically Bernardine works like the De diligendo deo (“On Loving 
 
4 See https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-PETERHOUSE-00219/244. The description observes that “some scholars . 
. . hypothesize the Peterhouse manuscript as one of several candidates for Chaucer’s own copy of his source texts.” 
The manuscript includes an excerpt from Bernard’s thirty-sixth sermon on the Song of Songs that is labeled 
“Bernardus de cruce” (115v), and a copy of Bernard’s Homilae quattuor super Missus est, also known as Homilies 
in Praise of the Blessed Virgin Mary (132v-145v). It also contains an extensive Bernardine miscellanea. I will 
discuss the Missus est sermons briefly in my Conclusion.  
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God”) and the Sermones super cantica canticorum (“Sermons on the Song of Songs”).5 In The 
Legend of Good Women Chaucer jokes, “Bernard the monk ne saugh nat all” (F.16). But Chaucer 
did see something through Bernard, whether directly or indirectly, or even through misattributed 
works like the Meditationes. Beginning with the Meditationes piissimae, the single most 
significant source for the “figure of Bernard” in Middle English, I will attempt to describe what 
he saw. 
 
Different shades of contemptus: Innocent III and the Pseudo-Bernard 
 It might be tempting to dismiss the dualistic gloom of the Meditationes piissimae as a 
mere matter of its inhabiting its contemptus mundi genre, but other works in the genre are not so 
unsparingly bleak. Pope Innocent III’s treatise De miseria humanae condicionis, which 
Chaucer’s Man of Law re-shapes to warn that his audience should “Be war, therfore, er thou 
come to that prikke” of poverty (II.119),6 draws on the Meditationes extensively, but qualifies its 
grim pronouncements with certain key mitigating features. Although Innocent’s De miseria does 
its own fair share of disparaging the body—“[The just man] endures the world as an exile, shut 
up in the body as in a prison” (“Sustinet seculum tanquam exsilium, clausus in corpore tanquam 
 
5 Christopher Holdsworth records that the three medieval English Cistercian monasteries with surviving book lists 
held six copies of the De diligendo deo treatise, as much as any other, and four of the Sermones super cantica 
canticorum. In English cathedrals and monasteries surveyed in the late thirteenth century Registrum Librorum 
Anglie, the Sermones were by far the most popular of Bernard’s works, and are recorded in 28 libraries. The De 
diligendo and Bernard’s Apologia to William come in second, with 14 copies documented (172). The fact that both 
Gilbert of Hoyland and Baldwin of Ford attempted to continue the Sermones testifies to the influence of the work in 
England (175). The Registrum records that a copy was held at Canterbury Cathedral, among many other places 
(Bell, An Index 22). 
6 Innocent’s pathetic representation of poverty is in fact amplified by the Man of Law with an original couplet: “If 
thou noon aske, with nede artow so woundid / That verray nede unwrappeth al thy wounde hid!” (II.102-3). A 
ventriloquized warning against ignoring the needy is also added to his source: “Parfay . . . somtyme [the poor man’s 
neighbor] rekene shal, / What that his tayl shal brennen in the gleede, / For he noght helpeth needfulle in hir neede” 
(II.110-2). However, the Man of Law’s translation eventually swerves away from these themes to warn against 
poverty and to praise the “prudent” merchant, who is careful not to be poor (II.123). As I will argue, “nede” is a key 
term for Chaucer’s theology, as it is for Langland’s. The Man of Law’s praise of selfish prudence and forgetting of 
temperance is in fact exactly the sort of thing that Langland’s Nede warns Will against. 
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in carcere”) (I.18; 23)7—and announcing the omnipresence of death—“The future is forever 
being born, the present forever dying, and what is past is utterly dead. We are forever dying 
while we are alive; we only cease to die when we cease to live” (“Semper enim futura nascuntur, 
semper presentia moriuntur, et quidquid est preteritum totum est mortuum. Morimur ergo semper 
dum vivimus, et tunc tantum desinimus mori cum desinimus vivere”) (I.23; 26)—it also includes 
a long central section on the vices, which focuses its energies on curtailing injustice through self-
discipline; the whole arena of social existence, and even the natural world, opens up as a realm in 
which one must strive to do right by nature and by others, despising the world in a sense that 
makes it possible to love it better in another. Innocent complains of the glutton, for instance, that 
“the fruits of the trees, the different kinds of vegetables, the roots of various plants, the fishes of 
the sea and beasts of the earth, the birds of the heavens—none of these are enough . . . but he 
must pick out colors, compare aromas, fatten up plump birds” (“non sufficiunt fructus arborum, 
non genera leguminum, non radices herbarum, non pisces maris, non bestie terrae, non aves celi; 
sed queruntur pigmenta, comparantur aromata, nutriuntur altilia”) (II.17; 45). Innocent’s glutton 
here is not called to despise all these earthly things in themselves; rather, through the temperate 
discovery of “enough” he is called to enjoy them more fully, and so to better appreciate them for 
what they really are. 
 The same distinction applies to the realm of human relations: elsewhere in the De miseria 
Innocent writes against selfish ambition, “For it is not through honors but through onerous 
service that one arrives at the Kingdom” (“Non enim honore, sed onere pervenitur ad regnum”) 
(II.35; 60). In the Meditationes, the “onerous”-ness of Christian self-denial comes to seem almost 
 
7 I will cite Innocent’s De miseria first by book and chapter number, according to Michele Maccarrone’s edition of 
the Latin text; then, following a semicolon, by the corresponding page number in Donald R. Howard’s translation of 
the text, which I have used here. An earlier edition of the text is available in the Patrologia Latina at Vol. 217, cols. 
701-746b.   
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the whole point of virtue, as if pleasure in itself merited punishment, and the arena of service to 
God and to others recedes far into the background. Likewise, fleshly vices like gluttony appear 
as the natural outworkings of essentially corrupt equipment, rather than the abuse of the God-
given, sensible goods of nature and of the body.8 This is most clear in the treatise’s vivid 
description of our conception “de vili materia factus, vilissimo panno involutus, menstruali 
sanguine in utero materno . . . nutritus” (“made of vile matter, swaddled in the vilest garment, 
nourished by menstrual blood in the maternal womb”), which is followed up immediately with 
an inventive description of the body’s being eaten by worms after death—“Sic in non hominem 
vertitur omnis homo” (“Thus every human is turned into a non-human”) (III.8)—and which 
perhaps not unpredictably issues in an overwhelming sense of the sheer burdensomeness of 
existence: “ego ipse mihi sarcina sum” (“I am a burden to myself”) (X.27). The treatise’s strong 
prospective emphasis on the non-human to which we are all eventually reduced prompts the 
speaker to imagine and even inhabit his own annihilation: “sicut aqua effusus sum, et ad nihilum 
redactus sum, praeteritorum obliviscens, praesentium negligens, futura non providens” (“I am as 
water poured out, and I am brought to nothing; forgetting the past, neglecting the present, and 
not providing for the future”) (X.30).9 Time itself evaporates, along with the speaker’s 
burdensome selfhood; the treatise itself tends toward nonbeing, structuring a subjectivity that 
almost deliberately declines toward the “non hominem”: “Si me non inspicio, nescio meipsum: si 
autem me inspicio, tolerare me non possum” (“If I do not examine myself, I do not know myself; 
 
8 Emero Stiegman’s doctoral dissertation centers on the related question of Bernard’s alleged “negativism”: “the 
denial for invalid reasons of the reality or worth of some elements of man’s life and experience—the condemnation, 
for example, of inclinations that are not sinful” (The Language of Asceticism 2). Stiegman believes this in general to 
be an anachronistic misconception of what he terms Bernard’s “asceticism.”  
9 It is worth pointing out that this passage begins a conventional scriptural citation of Psalms 21.15—“sicut aqua 
effusus sum”—that Bernard himself uses in his own second sermon In Quadragesima, for the beginning of Lent (2; 
IV:361). However, the Meditationes characteristically bends the passage toward articulating a self-absorbed despair 
it does not mitigate or transcend.  
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if, however, I do examine myself, I am not able to tolerate myself”) (X.31). There is no obvious 
solution other than ceasing to exist. 
 Viewed in isolation, these passages are all still relatively conventional. The difference 
between the “contempt” recommended by Innocent’s treatise and that which is depicted and 
enacted in the Meditationes is reflected on its deepest level by a relative imbalance in the works’ 
respective capacities for anagogical reflection. An early section in the third and final book of 
Innocent’s De miseria pauses to dwell on “the Coming of Christ on the Day of Any Man’s 
Death” (“adventu Christi ad diem mortis cuiuslibet hominis”): “We read about four comings of 
Christ. Two are visible: the first in the flesh, the second at judgment. And two are invisible: the 
first in the soul through grace . . . and the second at the death of each of the faithful. . . 
.Wherefore death is called a meeting, because Christ comes to meet the soul” (“Quatuor namque 
leguntur adventus Christi. Duo visibiles: in carne primus, ad iudicium secundus. Et duo 
invisibiles: primus in mente per gratiam . . . alter in obitu uniuscuiusque fidelis . . . Unde dicitur 
obitus, quia obviam venit ei Christus”) (III.3; 69-70). When this passage directly precedes a 
reflection “On the Putrefaction of the Dead Body” (“De putredine cadaverum”) (III.4; 70), 
Innocent’s own observations on the body’s corruptibility and the gnawing “worm of conscience” 
(“Vermis conscientie”) (III.5; 72) take on a very different cast than they do in the course of the 
more purely rebarbative Meditationes.10 The first of Innocent’s two “invisible” comings of Christ 
in fact precisely corresponds with Henri de Lubac’s anagogical invisibilia, neglected according 
to de Lubac in the scholastic era and in my view already in danger of being lost—in a much 
more intensely self-reflexive way—in the more traditionally monastic spirituality of the 
 
10 In this respect, it is worth remembering that the Meditationes piissimae is itself a compilation, collecting 
fragments of Ambrose, Augustine, Boethius, and Seneca, among others (Wittig 212). I am analyzing it here as a 
complete work with a certain gestalt spirituality, because I am attempting to trace the influence of the whole treatise 
and the idea of an authorial “Bernard” it might have constructed for its readers. 
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Meditationes piissimae, where the presence of Christ “in the soul through grace” is at best a 
minor theme, and an obsession with the anagogical futura takes precedence.11 It is this sense of 
the pervasiveness of the eternal invisibilia in time, and first “in the flesh,” that the Meditationes 
systematically neglects and which, as we will see, Chaucer creatively represents and re-purposes.  
 An early passage in the De miseria humanae condicionis captures the relative complexity 
of Innocent’s more anagogically and incarnationally inflected vision: “And God addresses man: 
‘Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return.’ ‘I am compared to mud and likened to embers 
and ashes.’ Now, mud is made of water and dirt, both remaining what they are; but ashes are 
made of fire and wood, both being consumed. In this a mystery is revealed” (“Hinc et Deus dicit 
ad hominem: ‘Cinis es, et in cinerem reverteris.’ ‘Comparatus sum, ait, luto et assimilatus sum 
faville et cineri.’ Lutum efficitur ex aqua et pulvere, utroque manente; cinis autem fit ex igne et 
ligno, utroque deficient. Expressum misterium”) (I.2; 7). For the De miseria, despite its evident 
similarities to and direct dependence on the Meditationes, even our “being consumed” takes on a 
mysteriously regenerative significance, like ashes burned by fire; and even the corruptible nature 
of the body is implicitly involved in this creative consumption. In this light, even mankind’s 
damnation has something to do with its inherent dignity: “But with the wicked He will be angry 
forever, for it is just and right that those who go astray in their portion of eternity shall have 
God’s wrath throughout His eternity” (“Reprobis autem Deus irascitur eternaliter, quia iustum es 
ut quod impius in suo prevaricatur eterno, Deus ulciscatur in suo”) (III.13; 80). It is mankind’s 
capacity for acts of eternal significance, its being able to do what it will with its “portion of 
 
11 As I mentioned in passing in Chapter Two, de Lubac sees a “lack of the eschatalogical sense” as “the most crucial 
defect arising from scholasticism,” emerging “precisely from the fact that theology then no longer has the form of an 
exegesis” (195). The same might be said of the Meditationes piissimae. The treatise does not really interpret the 
body, or conscience, much less Scripture; rather, it assumes a self-abasing hermeneutic—“Cogita itaque de Deo 
quidquid melius potes, et de te quidquid deterius vales” (“Think therefore of God the best that you are able, and of 
yourself whatever is worst”) (VI.18)—and smuggles a constantly self-recriminating “conscience” in for the 
Augustinian operation of intelligence or reason.  
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eternity,” that raises it to the dignity of being damned. The Meditationes piissimae, on the other 
hand, practically suffocates this sense of mankind’s eternal significance, and of its freedom to 
accept or reject it; all that remains is the vileness of the body, the collapsed nothingness of past 
and present and future, and the self as burdensome to itself: “ego ipse mihi sarcina sum.” If the 
peculiar word “sarcina” recalls its one use in the Vulgate Bible—“Narratio fatui quasi sarcina in 
via: nam in labiis sensati inveniatur gratia” (“The speech of a fool is like a burden in the way: but 
on the lips of the wise grace may be found”) (Sirach 21.19)—then the Meditationes again leaves 
out one side of its Biblical and patristic formulas, recalling the speech of a fool but not the lips of 
the wise, mankind’s misery but not its dignity, the danger of presumption but not of despair. 
Along with its eventual displacement of both memory and intelligence in favor of the accusatory 
“worm of conscience,” this demonstrates the treatise’s excision of everything aligned with the 
theological virtue of hope, and with the bodily “mystery” of mortality and corruption that 
Innocent illustrates with ash and fire.12 
 There is, however, at least one key respect in which the Meditationes piissimae is a 
markedly more complex text than the De miseria. At one of the Meditationes’ highest pitches of 
self-accusation, it abruptly turns to address a particular reader: “Statue te ante te, tanquam ante 
alium; et sic temetipsum plange. . . .Cumque coram eo in lacrymis te maceraveris, precor te ut 
memor sis mei” (“Stand before yourself, as before another; and thus lament for yourself. . . .And 
when in [God’s] presence you vex yourself with tears, I pray that you remember me”) (V.14). A 
long biographical section follows on this oddly personal aside: 
 
12 As I also mentioned in a footnote in Chapter Two, Henri de Lubac theorizes the alignment between exegetical 
modes and the theological virtues, and specifically associates the anagogical sense with the virtue of hope: “After 
allegory which built up faith and tropology which built up charity, there is anagogy which builds up hope” (181).  
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Ego enim ex quo cognovi te, in Christo diligo te. . . .Ad altare namque Dei cum peccator 
sto, sed sacerdos, tui me comitatur memoria. . . .Ibi recordatione tecum esse praesens 
desidero. . . .Nec mireris, si dixi, Praesens: quoniam si me amas, et ideo amas, quia imago 
Dei sum, ita tibi praesens sum, ut tu ipse tibi. . . .Imago enim Dei est omnis anima 
rationalis. Proinde qui in se imaginem Dei quaerit, tam proximum quam se quaerit: et qui 
illam in se quaerendo invenerit, in omni homine eam cognoscit. . . .Si ergo te vides, me 
vides, qui nihil aliud sum quam tu. Et si Deum diligis, me imaginem Dei diligis: et ego 
Deum diligendo, diligo te.  
(“For since I have known you, in Christ I have loved you. . . .And when I stand before the 
altar of God, a sinner but a priest, your memory accompanies me. . . .There in 
recollection I desire to be present with you. . . .Do not wonder if I say “present,” for if 
you love me, and for this reason you love, that I am the image of God, in this way I am 
present with you, as you are with yourself. . . .For every rational soul is the image of God. 
Therefore whoever seeks God’s image in himself, seeks his neighbor as much as himself; 
and whoever, seeking that image in himself, finds it, recognizes it in every person. . . 
.Therefore if you see yourself, you see me, for I am nothing other than you. And if you 
love God, you love the image of God in me; and I, in loving God, love you.”) (V.15) 
This is the beating affective heart of the treatise, an unresolved affection and inconsistently 
applied insight that the rest of the text constantly complicates and resists. Like Jaufre Rudel’s 
crusade singer, who judges that whoever “remains here full of delight / and does not follow God 
in (into) Bethlehem” will never “have prowess” (76-7; 36-8), the Meditationes author elsewhere 
militates against all pleasure and bodily desire, advocating instead for a kind of interiorized 
crusade against the flesh, the body, and the secular world outside of the cloister. And yet, in this 
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one passage, what Bernard might have called the “personal experience” of the speaker sweetly 
yields to a sense of shifting presence and absence that, like the mix of marriage and chastity that 
characterizes Bernard’s interpretation of the Song of Songs, does not simply negate the stirrings 
of a homely and even fleshly desire; rather, it follows them through to their natural conclusion: 
in some mysterious way we are the same, and, in loving the image of God in ourselves, we find 
that we already love each other. 
 Of course, this idea is not consistently developed over the course of the Meditationes 
piissimae. Instead, the gradual decay of the trinitarian schema it sets out at its beginning 
culminates in the recommended crucifixion of the “vetus homo” (“old man”) who “pro nihilo 
habet terram desiderabilem” (“holds the earth desirable for nothing”) at the treatise’s end 
(XV.39). The “domesticum hostem” (“familiar enemy”) of the flesh becomes here implicitly also 
a hostia (“sacrifice”) that must be offered up so that the soul may enter into the heavenly realm 
where “nulla omino necessitas. . . .Ibi est requies a laboribus, pax est ab hostibus” (“there is no 
need at all. . . .For there there is rest from labors, and peace from enemies”) (XIV.37).13 The 
Lord’s assistance is requested at this sacrifice, which is not just a rejection of the flesh but, even 
explicitly now, of the body itself: “Adjuva me, Domine Deus meus, quoniam inimici mei 
animam meam circumdederunt: corpus scilicet, mundus, et diabolus. A corpore fugere non 
possum, nec ipsum a me fugare” (“Help me, Lord my God, because my enemies surround my 
soul: the body, that is, the world, and the devil. From the body I am unable to flee, nor may I put 
it to flight”) (XII.33).14 In an earlier passage, by the almost imperceptible resolution of the 
 
13 This passage could be compared with with Langland’s treatment of “Nede” as it was analyzed in Chapter One, 
and with the Parson’s discussion of “nede” in terms of the works of mercy near the end of his tale, which I will 
discuss below. The word evidently focalized something important for both Langland and Chaucer, whereas in the 
Meditationes it is only a limitation to be transcended. 
14 Siegfried Wenzel notes that Bernard “is responsible for a formula which became ubiquitous in the following 
centuries [after the twelfth]: ‘The flesh offers me softness, the world vanities, the devil bitterness.’” Together 
Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor re-popularized the idea of these “three enemies” of the soul (166). Like the 
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Augustinian schema of memory, reason, and will into the more simplistic, manipulable binary of 
intellect and affect, the ground is cleared for the later separation of new man from old, inner man 
from outer, flesh from spirit and even body from soul: the blessed man, “in cujus conscientia 
peccatum inventum non fuerit” (“in whose conscience no sin will have been found”), “Videbit 
Deum ad voluntatem, habebit ad voluptatem, fruetur ad jucunditatem. In aeternitate vigebit, in 
veritate fulgebit, in bonitate gaudebit. . . .Semper libet eum aspicere, semper habere; semper in 
illo delectari, et illo perfrui. In illo clarificatur intellectus, et purificatur affectus ad 
cognoscendam et diligendam veritatem. Et hoc est totum bonum hominum, nosse scilicet et 
amare Creatorem suum” (“will see God at his will, hold Him at his pleasure, enjoy Him to his 
delight. In eternity he will flourish, in the truth he will shine, and in goodness he will rejoice. . . 
.He will be able to see Him always, and always hold; always in Him delighted, fully enjoying 
Him forever. In Him the intellect will be made clear, and the affect purified, for the 
understanding and love of the truth. And this is the whole good of men, to know and to love their 
Creator”) (IV.11). The idea of memory as designating the place where God is held and embraced 
in the mind is progressively forgotten; a distant echo of it sounds in the verbs “vigebit” and 
“habere,” recalling the identification of memory with God’s own abiding power, the very ground 
of His existing, and yet the trinitarian schema comes overall to provide little more than a bare 
threefold formality, filled in now with dualistic content.15 
 
Meditationes author, in developing this threefold scheme Bernard does occasionally elide the distinction between 
flesh and body. Interestingly, “Bernard in general seems to have set no store by the series of the capital vices” (171).  
15 David N. Bell observes how “Memoria . . . became for Augustine a theory of divine illumination and 
participation. . . .not simply a mental function directed towards the past, but the latent presence of God in the soul, 
and . . . the latent participation of the soul in God. Memory provides man with a certain innate knowledge of God 
which remains to be actualized, to be made explicit . . . and it acts as a force driving him on towards its realization” 
(The Image and Likeness 25-6). 
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 The end product of all this is the widespread idea of the soul as split between intellect and 
affect, with one or the other tending inevitably to be prioritized.16 In this brief paragraph it is 
possible to witness the process of degeneration by which the one schema is resolved into the 
other, the Augustinian complexity of memory as modeling the power of the Father withering 
away into a reduction of “memoria” to the threateningly static “book of conscience”—of which 
we are asked, in the treatise’s final section, “Sed quid prosunt hae litterae admonitionis, nisi 
deleas de libro conscientiae tuae litteras mortis?” (“But what will these letters of exhortation 
profit you, unless you delete the letters of death from your book of conscience?”) (XV.40). The 
inflexibility of this death-bearing text demands not just the deletion of sin, but of all fleshly 
existence, including the dangerously un-textual body.17 It would perhaps even require, were it 
followed through to its logical conclusion, the deletion of the speaker’s own threateningly 
changeable affection for the fellow monk to which the treatise is, if only in one oddly digressive 
section, directly addressed: “In monasterio namque saepe dum oro, non attendo quod dico. Oro 
 
16 James Simpson distinguishes between traditions stressing the “intellectual cognition of God” and “the voluntarist, 
affective tradition of theology,” which he aligns with Piers Plowman (“From Reason to Affective Knowledge” 20). 
It might be useful to speak of a “memorialist” or “realist” tradition beyond this dichotomy, which could be aligned 
with the work of moderate realists like Aquinas and Chaucer’s friend Ralph Strode. Although I foreground 
something like Bernard’s importance as an “affective” theologian in Chapter Two, I believe Bernard’s unique 
innovation lay in the way he stressed how intellect and affect correspond in the “experience” of God. 
17 Janet Coleman makes a similar observation of Bernard’s authentic work, claiming that, where memory is 
concerned, Bernard “goes far beyond Augustine’s teaching to make his distinctively monastic point”: “For Bernard, 
all past events are to be censured. The memory stores up in its secret recesses the remembrance of past evil deeds. . . 
.For Bernard, man’s memory is stained. It can only be purified by living the word. . . .Augustine’s treasure house of 
memory has become a sewer for Bernard. The belly of Bernard’s memory is congested with filth. . . .The soul, 
protected in the monastery, seeks to purify the memory. But even when the outward temptations have been 
eliminated by moving into the cloister, the memory remains so tainted that the source of evil is still within the soul. 
The heart of the struggle then, is to purify the memory from its stains; it must be blanched” (Ancient and Medieval 
Memories 181). Although Coleman is right to point out that Bernard’s sermon De Conversione tends to reduce 
memory to a catalog of sins, making use of the same metaphor of the book of conscience (182), her conclusions are 
ultimately more applicable to the Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae than to Bernard’s genuine work. As 
Emero Stiegman’s work in particular suggests, for the authentic Bernard the memory must be “blanched” only in the 
sense that its iterative recollection of its sins is to be more and more forgotten; the rich soil of “experience,” and not 
just experience of books, is to be harvested in its place. Bernard is better understood as updating and filling in the 
gaps in an outmoded vocabulary than as throwing out memory altogether. As I will describe in my Conclusion, 
Bernard’s sermons on Mary are one place where he elaborates his own idea of “memoria.” 
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quidem ore, sed mente foris vagante, orationis fructu privor. Corpore sum interius, sed corde 
exterius: et ideo perdo quod dico” (“For in the monastery when I pray, I often do not attend to 
what I say. Indeed I pray with my mouth, but my mind is far away, and I deprive myself of the 
fruit of prayer. I am more inside myself than my body, but more outside than my heart; and 
therefore I miss what I say”). Approaching God in this in-between state, the monk commits a 
horrible act of presumption: “fetorem horribilem ejus aspectibus ingero” (“I bear a terrible stink 
before His countenance”) (VIII.22). The Meditationes treatise therefore dissolves the difficult 
conjunction of body and soul, not into the ash that memorializes wood and fire of Innocent, but 
into a drifting, stinking fetor, which must be wafted away in favor of a tensed attentiveness to the 
recriminative book of conscience.18 It dissolves itself as well; every distraction from that other, 
more unforgiving book must be erased.19 
 
“More deth then lyfe as clerks demeth”: The two Bernards in the Prick of Conscience 
 
 In at least one key respect, the Prick of Conscience is an accident. Embodying in the 
vernacular the contemptus mundi tradition from which the Meditationes piissimae and Innocent’s 
De miseria treatise emerged, the most widely circulated poem in Middle English is at least in 
part a by-product of Innocent’s infamous failure to complete the project he advertised in the De 
miseria’s Prologue: “I will henceforth, with Christ’s favor, describe also the dignity of human 
 
18 I do not mean to set up a simplistic binary between body and book, time and text. Patricia Dailey describes the 
way that, “As with Bernard’s liber experientiae, the mystic treats the vision as an experience that makes manifest 
scriptural truths. Far from being disembodied, the vision stages a moment of textual exegesis that is inextricable 
from its translation into embodied forms, eventually written into the material of life” (75). My sense is that the 
Meditationes, and the Prick of Conscience to an extent, tends itself to collapse this productive tension between 
exegesis and experience, text and body. The “liber conscientiae” as it appears in the Meditationes piissimae tends to 
insist that the anagogical account of our experience is simply identical with a textual accounting of our sins. 
19 Though I do not have time to draw them out here, there are clear parallels with Langland’s treatment of 
Conscience, and broader themes of guilt and accountability, in Piers Plowman. The tearing of the pardon scene in 
particular seems to encapsulate anxieties over something like this textualization of conscience.  
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nature, so that, as in the present work the proud man is brought low, in that the humble man will 
be exalted” (“dignitatem humane nature Christo favente describam, quatinus ita per hoc 
humilietur elatus ut per illud humilis exaltetur”) (Prologus; 3). Innocent never got around to 
exalting the humble man, and neither does the Prick of Conscience. The Prick does not even bear 
any trace of the Meditationes’ oddly personal asides, nor is it quite as creatively dour in its 
denunciations of the body. Whereas the Pseudo-Bernardine Latin treatise acts as a compilational 
guide to monastic self-knowledge, with a specific if infrequently addressed cloistered audience, 
the Prick of Conscience is part of the fourteenth-century explosion of works of religious 
instruction in the vernacular and, like Langland’s Piers Plowman, bears the marks of this era in 
its consisting of a series of Latin quotations around which the Middle English poetry itself 
gathers (Morey, “Introduction” 5). Unlike Piers Plowman, it is also unflaggingly didactic. As I 
have indicated above, the evidence for its direct influence on Chaucer, or presence in fragments 
in an intermediate text translated by Chaucer, is produced at length in the same monograph that 
firmly established the Parson Tale’s chief sources as Raymond of Pennaforte’s Summa de 
casibus poenitentiae and Peraldus’s Summa de virtutibus et vitiis (Petersen 78).20 Careful 
attention to the way the Prick adopts and adapts the Meditationes’ distinctive preoccupations—
and to the way it represents Bernard, who appears explicitly in the Prick in a way he never does 
in the Meditationes—will therefore help us see how Chaucer himself responds to the most 
distinctive devotional themes of his era, and to the problems of dualism and despair that were 
raised by my reading of the Meditationes treatise and of Bernard’s crusading legacy above. 
Written somewhere in the first half of the fourteenth century, the Prick of Conscience 
exists in around 130 manuscript copies, as compared with 64 for the Canterbury Tales and some 
 
20 Petersen notes specific points of overlap on pages 7, 12-14, and 30 of her study. She lists a long sequence of 
parallels between the Parson’s and the Prick’s accounts of the pains of hell on page 13. 
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200 for the Wycliffite Bible (Morey, “Introduction” 1).21 Due perhaps to its dogged formal 
unremarkableness—a four beat line in rhyming couplets—and to the obviously derivative nature 
of its content—the poet himself boasts that his book is “on Ynglese drawen / Of sere materes þat 
er unknawen / Til laude men þat er unkunnand / Þat can na Latyn understand” (336-9)22—the 
poem has received relatively little critical attention, and still awaits the fulfillment of J.A. 
Burrow’s wish that it should be “reabsorb[ed] . . . into the great spectacle of literature” (21). 
Although I am unlikely to do so here, I will at least suggest some ways in which the Prick can 
cast light on Chaucer’s theological agenda and on the broader Bernardine tradition in general. I 
have already suggested that I see the Meditationes as a polemically moralistic reduction of that 
strong current of thought, and the Prick as a further reduction; but the Prick also pushes back 
against its own reductiveness, explicitly theorizing the balance between dread and love 
recommended by Bernard and, in one particularly odd and possibly original Bernardine citation, 
implying a lesson about God’s mercy that goes against the grain of its otherwise unremittingly 
grim theological outlook. In the Prick, then, the authentically Bernardine anagogy of the 
invisibilia is haltingly rebooted and re-articulated, even as it is often drowned out by other, often 
Pseudo-Bernardine, futura-obsessed voices. 
 Bernard is the Prick of Conscience’s most cited authority from its 355-line Entre on 
through its Third Part, and the ambiguous “boke” to which the poet refers as his primary source 
throughout is, at least when the term is first used, maybe the Meditationes itself: “He þat right 
 
21 A recent count by Ralph Hanna has 170 complete or fragmentary manuscripts of the Prick (Cornelius 400). 
22 I cite the Prick of Conscience by line number, in parentheses, according to Ralph Hanna and Sarah Wood’s 
edition of Richard Morris’s Prick of Conscience for the Early English Text Society. I have also consulted James H. 
Morey’s TEAMS edition of the Prick. Hanna and Wood note that none of the “‘justifications’ for ignoring PC”—
such as its “unpleasant . . . doctrinal emphases,” “unvarnished ‘papist’ theology” and defiantly “regional culture”—
“really any longer merits much respect. Any text that survives in this number of copies must clearly have been 
central to the interests and aspirations of Middle English literary culture.” They note that the poem “was known all 
over England (not to mention Anglo-Ireland) and even managed, as few Northern texts did, to penetrate, in an 
important context, metropolitan culture” (xiii-xiv). 
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ordir of lyfyng wil luke / Suld bygyn þus, als says þe boke: / To knaw first what hymself es, / 
Swa may he tyttest com to mekenes, / Þat es grund of al vertus to last, / On whilk al vertus may 
be sette fast” (205-10).23 The poem’s first citation of a Latin authority follows closely on this 
statement of theme, and on the observation that “som men has mykel letting, / Þhat lettes þam to 
haf right knawyng / Of þamselfe, þat þai first suld knaw” (237-9). There are, specifically, “four 
thynges” that “mase a mans wytt ofte blynd,” and so “lettes” him that “hymself forgettes” (241-
4): 
Of þis saynt Bernard witnes bers 
And er þa four wryten in þis vers: 
Forma, favor populi, fervor iuvenilis, opesque 
surripuere tibi noscere quid sit homo. 
Þat es, “favor of þe folk and fayrnes, 
And fervor of [yhouthe] and riches 
Reves a man sight, skylle, and mynde 
To knaw hymself, what he es of kynde.” (245-52) 
The Latin text incorporated here is from the Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae de 
cognitione humanae conditionis, which is also directly referenced three times in the First Part of 
the poem, where Bernard and Innocent alone are cited as extra-scriptural sources. At the 
beginning of the Prick of Conscience, then, Bernard is introduced as the definitive voice of the 
contemptus mundi tradition, and as the great authority on the vices that keep sinners from the 
 
23 Other suggestive references to the poet’s “book” in the First Part of the poem are to Scripture itself—Sirach and 
Job—but tend to coalesce around the theme of the worms’ consuming the body that is also the topic of the first 
Bernardine citation in that part of the poem (904-919). 
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humble self-knowledge that would otherwise lead them “til mekenes and drede” (230). St. 
Bernard himself is the haunting presence that urges fear on the Prick’s readers.24 
Of course, this emphasis on dread and self-knowledge was in itself entirely conventional, 
and at least in part an understandable “prick” toward taking the newly mandatory annual 
confession, and the virtue of humility itself, seriously. The unique innovation of the Prick of 
Conscience lay not so much in its introducing an entirely new category of material, as in its 
radically expanding on and re-emphasizing the already recommended awareness of the 
anagogical futura to which the contemptus mundi and fear of God themes were almost always 
tied. As the Prick author warns, vices “lette a man þat he noght sese / Þe perils of þe werld ne 
vanitese; / Ne of þe tym of dede þat es to com / Thynkes noght, ne of þe day of dom; / Ne he can 
noght undirstand ne se / Þe paynes þhat after þis lyfe sal be / … / Ne þe blise þat gude men er 
worthy” (261-8). Likewise, “For if he hymself knew kyndely, / He suld haf knawyng of God 
almighty, / And of his endyng thynk suld he / And of þe day þat last sal be” (221-4). Although 
the poem’s first three, broadly Pseudo-Bernardine parts—like Innocent’s De miseria treatise—
describe and denounce the worldly vanities that come between the sinner and true self-
knowledge in terms of an ingressus, progressus, and egressus schema of mankind’s life, the final 
four parts of the poem focus entirely on the future things, situating them firmly at the center of 
 
24 For further uses of Bernard’s authority in support of contemptus mundi themes, see the Middle English lyric 
“Sayings of St. Bernard,” present in different forms in the Laud manuscript analyzed by Brent, and in Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, MSS Digby 86, Add. E.6 (R), Vernon MS, MS Harley 2253, and in the Auchinleck MS, where the 
poem’s ubi sunt section is reproduced in isolation (Brent 162). A few representative lines from the MS Harley 
redaction capture the spirit of these Meditationes-inspired lyrics: “The holy man sayth in is bok / That mon is worm 
ant worms kok, / Ant worms he shal vede” (7-9). In the Vernon MS the theme of man’s three foes—world, flesh, 
and devil—is announced in the poem’s opening lines—“Her telle seynt Bernard / Mon hath threo enemy’s hard” (1-
2)—preceding the introductory worm stanza, whereas in Harley the opening stanza is more general. I have consulted 
the EETS edition of the text in the former case, and the TEAMS edition in the latter, and have cited by line number, 
in parentheses. The “Sayings” in the Vernon MS are available at pages 511-22 of the EETS edition, Part II, edited 
by F.J. Furnivall, and in the TEAMS edition of MS Harley 2253 at Volume 3, Art. 74. 
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its spirituality: purgatory, doomsday, hell, and heaven.25 The Prick is therefore much more 
futura-oriented than either the Meditationes piissimae or Innocent’s treatise, modeling a vision of 
the Christian life that consists almost entirely in thinking on judgment day and afterward. 
 In the First Part of the Prick, material from the Meditationes serves especially to 
reinforce the disgust for the body that is recommended as one of the foundations of humbled 
self-knowing, which in turn spurs the reader on to more strictly eschatological reflection. Three 
Pseudo-Bernardine citations cluster around this theme: first, “Saynt Bernard says, als þe buke 
telles, / Þat ‘Man here es nathyng elles / Bot a foul slyme, wlatsom til men, / And a sekful of 
stynkand fen / And wormes fode’ þat þai wald have, / When he es dede and layde in grave’” 
(562-7). A bit later on, “And þarfor says saynt Bernard right: / . . . / ‘If þow wille,’ he says, 
‘ententyfly se / And byhald what comes fra þe, / What thurgh mouthe, what thurgh nese 
como[n]ly, / And thurgh other overt[ur]es of [þe] body, / A fouler myddyng saw yhow never 
nane,’ / Þan a man es, with flesche and bane” (619-29). The Prick’s final citation of the 
Meditationes arrives near the end of the poem’s First Part, and marks a significant advance on 
the others: 
For saynt Bernard þos in metre says: 
Post hominem, vermis; post vermem, fetor et horror, 
et sic in non hominem vertitur omnis homo. 
“Aftir man,” he says, “vermyn es, 
 
25 Giorgio Agamben’s recent Il Regno e il Giardino (“The Kingdom and the Garden”) argues that, for much of 
Christian thought, “Il Giardino deve essere rispinto in un arcipassato” (“The Garden must be driven back into an 
archaic past”), while “il Regno . . . viene proiettato nel futuro e spostato nei cieli” (“the Kingdom . . . gets projected 
into the future and displaced to the heavens”). According to Agamben, “Contro questa forzata separazione dei due 
poli, occorre ricordare . . . che il Giardino e il Regno resultano dalla scissione di un’unica esperienza del presente e 
che nel presente essi possono pertanto ricongiungersi” (“Against this forced separation of the two poles, it must be 
remembered that the Kingdom and the Garden stem from the splitting up of one single experience of the present, 
and that in the present they can still be rejoined”) (119-20). In my view, Bernardine “experience,” like Augustinian 
memory, attempts to do just that. Translations here are my own. 
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And aftir vermyn stynkand uglynes, 
And swa sal ilk man turned be þan 
Fra a man intil na man.” (913-9) 
Cumulatively, the First Part of the Prick of Conscience shifts the image of Bernard subtly from 
anatomizer of vice to grim mortician of the body’s dead and living filth. The common theme is 
Bernard as preacher of humble self-knowledge: first, of the knowledge of one’s self-deceiving 
tendencies, and second, of the repulsiveness of one’s own bodily existence—both of which 
should humble us and bring us to the fear of God that, for the Prick poet, “may a lof bygyn” 
(345). The First Part’s third and final citation of the Meditationes also picks up on one of the 
more subtle drifts in its source: the way it seeks to incite an almost existential dread in its reader, 
freely mixing body horror with the terror of contingent non-existence, the specter of the “non 
hominem” after death. This mixed fear of and longing for annihilation, faithfully reproduced in 
the vernacular, paves the way for the Prick’s later evacuation of the present in favor of the 
anagogical futura to come. 
 Although the Meditationes treatise is not cited again after the poem’s First Part, passages 
much later on in the Prick suggest a continued sensitivity to its dominant themes: the Fifth Part’s 
treatment of the book of Daniel’s judgment day in terms of the “bokes” of “conscience,” which 
record the sins that “Sal þam accuse, als þe boke bers wittnes. / For þair syns sal ay with þam 
last, / Als þai war bunden obout þair nekes faaste” (5449-57), and its untraced citation of “saynt 
Bernard . . . þe haly man” (5653) to the effect that, when the anagogical futura of judgment 
arrive, “‘swa sal be na moment, / Of alle þe tyme þat God had sent, / Of whilk sal be made na 
pleynyng’ / In þe tyme of þat last rekkenyng” (5660-3).26 More so than in the Meditationes itself, 
 
26 This untraced citation is also reproduced, including the attribution to St. Bernard, in The Parson’s Tale (X.253-4).  
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a self-conscious textuality is one marker of the poem’s own drive to conceive of the final 
judgment in terms of a simple documentary cataloguing of sins, escaping the nuances of both 
Augustinian memory and Bernardine “experience.” Knowledge of this judgment and punishment 
to come is itself doubly grounded in textual authority: “But of alle þa paynes can I noght say, / . . 
. / Bot yhit wille I speke somwhat mare / Of þe general paynes þat I shewed are, / And with som 
auctorites þam bynd, / Als men may in sere bukes writen fynd” (6585-90). The textual 
“auctorites” here “bynd” the catalogue of punishments already offered, “als þe boke bers 
wittnes”—reflecting the irreversibly written nature of conscience’s accounting, and the damning 
permanence of the Prick’s own written word. 
 According to the Prick, the awareness that such an accounting will take place should 
issue in the soul’s inhabiting a constant state of fearfulness: “Als þe haly man says, saynt 
Bernarde: / . . . / ‘Wha . . . may þis lyfe here lede / Withouten tremblyng and drede?’” (2529-33). 
The Prick of Conscience, like the Meditationes piissimae, constructs the very “book of 
conscience” it theorizes, anticipating the anagogical futura with its own pseudo-anagogical, 
textual visibilia. And yet, as with the Meditationes’ personal aside, there is at least one 
significant wrinkle. The poem’s least conventional citation of St. Bernard comes in its Third 
Part, where a long deathbed sequence without apparent source in Bernard’s biographies is 
described:27 
And in þe life of saynt Bernard, 
We rede þat when he drogh til dedeward, 
Þat þe devel þat es grisely and grym 
 
27 In the Golden Legend, for instance, Bernard asks his brothers to have mercy on one another as he always did on 
those who hurt him, and reports back to another abbot on the incomparability of the divine science: “Here is no 
science . . . but there above is plenty of science” (Vol. 5, 29). The Vita Prima leans on a fragment from Bernard’s 
deathbed letter to Arnold of Bonneval (242-3). 
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Til hym come and asked hym 
By what skille he wald and be what ryght 
Chalange þe kyngdom of heven bright. (2248-53) 
Bernard replies that he is indeed “unworthy” of salvation, but that he will nonetheless be saved 
because his “lorde Ihesu Crist” owns his soul “thurgh doble ryght”—that is, by virtue of his 
“Faders heritage” as Bernard’s Creator and, of course, “Thurgh right of hys hard passioun / Þat 
he tholed for our raunson” (2255-63). “‘Of was gyfte I chala[n]ge it by skille,” Bernard says, 
“Als þe lagh of his mercy wille’” (2266-7). The devil disappears at once.  
 The stated moral of this strange deathbed sequence is that, if a saint of such stature as 
Bernard had to face the temptation of devils on his final day, we should all expect to face—and 
therefore fear—that final trial. And yet, the emphatic reference to the “lagh of his mercy” sounds 
a note that sits awkwardly beside the rest of the poem’s many recommendations of the fear of 
God’s just judgment, recalling the covenantal focus that William J. Courtenay and Richard Firth 
Green associated with Bernard’s theological program. This is not the only such moment in the 
poem. Much as Bernard’s sixth sermon on the Song of Songs warns that “a man who thinks only 
of the judgment will fall into the pit of despair” (“recordatio solius iudicii in baratrum 
desperationis pracecipiat”) (6.8; I:30), the Prick of Conscience near the end of its Fifth Part on 
doomsday cautions its reader that “Na mon” should for fear of judgment “in dispayre be,” for 
“alle þat has mercy here sal be save, / And alle þat here askes mercy sal it have, / Yf þai it seke 
whilles þai lyf bodily / And trewely trayste in Goddys mercy / . . . / And do mercy here and 
charite” (6290-7). Likewise, near the whole poem’s end the otherwise implacably saturnine poet 
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explicitly recommends a salutary balance of dread and love,28 for “þe drede es noght medeful to 
prufe, / Þat accordes noght halely with þat lufe, / For if drede stand by itself anely, / Na mede of 
God it es [þan] worthy. / Þarfor drede suld be lufes brother” (9488-92). The phrase “to prufe” 
even suggests something of a Bernardine theology of experience, of dread alone’s having been 
tried and found wanting when it came to the “prufe.” Whereas in the Meditationes piissimae the 
Augustinian view of the trinity’s image in the mind, and the personal experience of loving one 
another in the image of God, slip just barely through the cracks of the otherwise gloomily 
existential, determinedly dualistic and anti-bodily treatise, in the Prick of Conscience such 
material as this commentary on dread and love sits simply and almost naively alongside the 
poem’s literally thousands of lines of fear-mongering, futura-obsessed speculation on the horrors 
of hell and the conscience-wracking terrors of judgment day. It is not quite possible to say that 
one side of this very uneven equation is the “real” Prick and the other a mere ad hoc addition, for 
there is an at least conjectural intellectual coherence to its systematic balance of dread and love, 
however asymmetrically it may have been developed over the whole sprawling length of the 
poem. Certainly, “Þer er Bernard wordes þat says, / ‘Al my lyfe here me flays, / . . . / It semes 
noght elles here until me / Bot owther syn þat þe saul mast deres / Or barran thyng þat na fruyt 





28 As I indicated in Chapter Two, this is a genuinely Bernardine theme. It is also, in my view, a typically paradoxical 
note, and indicative of the reason anagogical figures like Nede tend to be misread in one direction or the other. The 
metaphor of a chord is maybe better than that of “balance.” 
29 As I have suggested in Chapter Two and in my Introduction, it is best to follow Yves Congar in asserting that the 
saint was “un orateur et une homme d’action, non un théologien des écoles” (“an orator and a man of action, not a 
theologian of the schools”). He was also a “contemplatif” (136) and, I would add, an artist. 
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“But thyng that wol nat be, lat it be stille”: Chaucer’s Private Christianity 
 
 Kate O. Petersen took note of several possibly direct or indirect citations of the Prick of 
Conscience in the Parson’s Tale over a century ago, but this suggestion has not been pursued 
further, and the Prick’s potential influence on the Parson’s Prologue has not been examined at 
all. There are significant points of possible contact.30 The most direct such point comes in the 
Parson’s apologetic preface to his tale: “But nathelees, this meditacioun / I putte it ay under 
correcioun / Of clerkes, for I am nat textueel; / I take but the sentence, trusteth weel. / Therfore I 
make protestacioun / That I wol stonde to correccioun” (X.55-60). This echoes almost exactly a 
pair of lines from the end of the Prick of Conscience: “And if any man þat es clerk, / Can fynde 
any errour in þis werk / I pray hym he do me þat favour / Þat he wille amende þat errour. / . . . / I 
make here a protestacion / Þat I wil stand til þe correccion” (9584-91). The Prick author also 
recalls the Parson in his wishing specifically that the “sentence” of his “tretice” will “Pryk and 
stirre a mans conscience” (9568-9), and in his fretting over his shortcomings in the realm of 
versification: “haf me excused at þis tyme, / If ye fynde defaut in þe ryme, / For I rek noght, 
þogh þe ryme be rude, / If þe maters þarof be gude” (9580-9583). Of course, in his tale itself the 
Parson does not versify at all; a “Southren man,” he defensively protests that he “kan nat geeste 
‘rum, ram, ruf,’ by lettre, / Ne, God woot, rym holde I but litel bettre” (X.42-4), before going on 
to deliver his unstintingly textual “myrie tale in prose.” Thus the Parson echoes the Prick author 
on at least three points: his specific use of the rhyming phrases “make protestacioun” and 
“stonde to correccioun” to indicate his openness to censure before a more expertly “textueel” 
 
30 Thomas H. Bestul argues that the Parson deliberately “shifts the didactic treatise” of his source “in the direction of 
a private meditation” (“Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale” 606), and that he is surprisingly “up to date” with contemporary 
devotional trends (618), but he does not explore the potential relationship with the Prick of Conscience. 
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class of clerks, his insistence on focusing on the “sentence” of what he has to say, and his self-
conscious failure to versify. 
 In short, when the Parson rhymes, he rhymes like the Prick of Conscience. This may 
signal a deliberate engagement with the Prick, and certainly signals one with the mix of late 
medieval devotional and catechetical genres it exemplifies. The Parson’s re-deployment of the 
Prick’s concluding tropes to preface his own treatise shows him making subtle, playful 
adjustments to the traditional forms of devotional address; his suggestion that he will tell a 
“myrie” tale, and his protesting that he is not “textueel” just before he delivers a treatise that is 
patently unimaginable as an artifact of oral transmission—or, still more striking, his claim that he 
cannot rhyme just as he completes a five-beat rhyming couplet—suggest that with the Parson’s 
Tale we enter the realm of deliberate paradox, of being asked to find the merriness in the 
scrupulous anatomization of sin, and even the actual un-textuality of such an apparently textual 
subjectivity as the penitential manuals the Parson translates would seem, by their form, to want 
to structure. As Lee Patterson has argued, “the Parson’s Tale begins with the fictional construct 
but becomes the tale to end all tales, and its conclusion inevitably escapes from the narrative 
frame and now refers to the larger context of biography. The tale becomes not simply the last 
element of a sustained poetic enterprise but a crucial and even decisive piece of evidence about 
the moral worth of Chaucer himself” (“The ‘Parson’s Tale’” 380). Itself a “meditacioun” that 
will “stonde to correccioun,” the Prick of Conscience’s also self-mislabeled “tretice” is 
reimagined by Chaucer as also a “myrie tale in prose,” structuring an over-textual subjectivity 
that—unlike the Prick of Conscience itself—is playfully aware of itself as such. With his 
“Retractions,” Chaucer willfully implicates himself in this paradox.  
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 These are the most direct points of contact between the Parson’s Prologue and the Prick 
of Conscience, but the overlap between the Prick and the Parson’s Tale in terms of a mixed 
Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine spirituality is much more pervasive. A closer look at this 
particular form of correspondence can help us to better understand the distinctive theological 
preoccupations of both the Parson and the Parson’s author, and to see how the Bernardine 
tradition transforms in its Middle English adaptation. The Parson’s explicit use of Bernard 
himself can be separated out into three broad categories, based on the three major divisions of 
the Parson’s Tale: the lengthy treatment of penance and contrition with which the tale begins, 
which refers directly to Bernard more than to any other non-scriptural authority;31 the treatment 
of confession and catalogue of the sins, where Bernard appears directly only with reference to 
acedia, twice; and the concluding summary on the topics of satisfaction and the Kingdom of 
Heaven, where Bernard is not directly cited but where the problems of dualism and despair 
raised by the Meditationes and in Bernard’s genuine work are nonetheless decisive.  
Unlike in the Prick of Conscience, the Bernard of the Parson’s Tale does much more than 
warn the reader of the threat of judgment day and the vileness of the body. The Parson’s Bernard 
also addresses the genuinely Bernardine themes of contrition, passion meditation, and the danger 
of despair—discussed by the Parson in terms of acedia—in particular. Although I do not argue 
for a specifically Bernardine Chaucer, the influence of the probably Cistercian sermon De Maria 
Magdalena that Chaucer claims to have translated early in his career (Gross 3),32 of Dante’s 
figure of Bernard as it appears in Chaucer’s two translations of the Paradiso’s Bernardine 
 
31 Bernard is cited five times; Augustine is cited four times, and paraphrased twice; Gregory is cited three times, and 
Jerome is cited twice.  
32 In the Legend of Good Women, Alceste says that Chaucer “made also, goon ys a gret while, / Origenes upon the 
Maudeleyne” (F.427-8). This translation project has been persuasively identified with the Pseudo-Origen’s homily 
De Maria Magdalena, which was occasionally attributed to Bernard (McCall 491). 
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soliloquy, and even possibly of the most popular genuine Bernardine treatise of Chaucer’s era in 
England, the De diligendo deo, do seem to me to have played a decisive role in shaping his 
theological and poetical imagination.33 Attention to the figure of Bernard in Chaucer will 
therefore help us to see how The Canterbury Tales works, through this figure but also through 
many other devices, to open itself up to a profoundly anagogical perspective, distinctly at odds 
with the implicit dualism of the Meditationes piissimae and, to an extent, the Prick of 
Conscience. 
 The Parson’s references to Bernard in his tale’s opening section on contrition are 
conventional, but more generously and eclectically selected than those of the Prick of 
Conscience. First, a passage from Nicholas of Clairvaux is attributed to Bernard, to the effect 
that contrition must be “hevy and grevous, and ful sharp and poynaunt in herte” if it is to be 
effective (X.130). The Pseudo-Bernardine Sermo ad prelatos in concilio is then deployed, also in 
Bernard’s voice, to warn the reader that on judgment day “we shullen yeven rekenynge of 
everich ydel word,” for “alle oure werkes shullen openly be knowe” (X.165-6). Next, in this first 
section’s latter half, Bernard is cited three times in quick succession: first, with reference to an 
unidentified source that was also used by the Prick of Conscience poet, to warn again that on 
judgment day “ther shal nat perisse an heer of his heed, ne a moment of an houre ne shal nat 
perisse of his tyme, that he ne shal yeve of it a rekenyng”; therefore, since the “grace of the 
Hooly Goost fareth lyk fyr, that may nat been ydel” (X.250-4), we must not wait until then to be 
contrite. The passage’s second reference to Bernard makes use of the genuinely Bernardine 
Sermo in quarta feria hebdomadae sanctae, also known as De passione domini—or, in the 
 
33 It would also be interesting, though I do not have the space to do so here, to take a closer look at the influence of 
the work of the Cistercian Guillaume de Deguileville, whose Le pèlerinage de la vie humaine is the source of 
Chaucer’s “ABC” to the Virgin. 
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Peterhouse MS, Bernardus de cruce—and reproduces the popular figure of Bernard as an expert 
meditator on the passion of Christ and Christ’s humanity in general:34 “Whil that I lyve I shal 
have reembrance of the travailles that oure Lord Crist suffred in prechyng” (X.256). This 
citation, not present in Pennaforte, raises the interesting possibility that Chaucer may have 
interpolated at least one Bernardine citation himself. The third reference is to an unidentified 
source, and depicts Bernard as responding to this passion meditation with the exclamation, 
“Accursed be the bitternesse of my synne, for which ther moste be suffred so muchel bitternesse” 
(X.274). In these passages, then, unlike in the Prick of Conscience, Bernard offers not just an 
authority figure to be heeded, but a model of contrition and contemplation that is to be directly 
imitated by the Parson’s audience.35 
 In the long second section of the Parson’s “myrie tale,” Bernard is cited explicitly only in 
the Parson’s treatment of acedia—which, despite its not being one of the longer treatments of the 
sins, deserves more attention as a central section of the Parson’s Tale and an interpretive key to 
the whole Canterbury Tales.36 In this section, a passage from William of St. Thierry’s massively 
 
34 This Bernard dominates whole sections of Nicholas Love’s popular early fifteenth-century Mirror of the Blessed 
Life of Jesus Christ, due to the widespread influence of the twentieth of Bernard’s Sermons on the Song of Songs and 
of William of St. Thierry’s Golden Epistle (Sargent x-xi). Bestul observes that Bernard’s “great contribution” to 
“devotion to the Passion of Christ” was “his unremitting zeal for affective meditation on the Passion . . . as a way 
toward spiritual perfection” (Texts of the Passion 38). 
35 There is a long tradition of Bernard’s playing this role in Latin and in the English vernacular. The Vernon MS’s 
“Lamentacioun þat was bytwene vre lady and seynt Bernard,” for example—itself a translation of a Latin source—
sees the crucifixion through the eyes of Mary, but only as her experience is relayed through the contemplative prism 
of Bernard’s attentive listening (Horstmann 297-328). This could be compared with the mediating role Mary plays 
in the prologues to the Prioress’s and Second Nun’s tales, the second of which refers explicitly to Bernard. 
36 David E. Berndt argues that monastic acedia informs Chaucer’s characterization of the Monk and his tale: 
“Having defiantly cut himself from all . . . traditionally recommended remedies [for acedia], daun Piers will 
probably not overcome the spiritual disease which the Parson likens to an inferno. . . .The final tragedy is that if the 
Monk cannot overcome his spiritual listlessness, then the end result will be despair” (449). Thus the “worldly, 
seemingly jovial Monk of the General Prologue” and the “somber, somewhat pedantic narrator of the Monk’s Tale” 
(435) might be aptly characterized in terms of the vicious dialectic of presumption and despair, which the section on 
acedia comes closest to diagnosing. This insight should be pushed further: from The Book of the Duchess on to the 
Pardoner’s own “confession of despair” (Patterson, “The Subject of Confession” 170), Chaucer interrogates the state 
of listlessness that is described, by the narrator of the Duchess, in terms of having “felyng in nothyng”: “melancolye 
/ And drede I have for to dye. / . . . / I have lost al lustyhede. / Suche fantasies ben in myn hede / So I not what is 
best to doo” (11-29).  
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popular Golden Epistle, mis-attributed to Bernard for centuries, is used to assure the reader, “as 
seith Seint Bernard,” that labor makes a man strong but “slouthe maketh hem feble and tendre” 
(X.690); a little later on, Bernard’s fifty-fourth sermon on the Song of Songs enters the Middle 
English vernacular when, as the Parson describes the slow descent of the soul into the listlessness 
of acedia, he warns that “Thanne comth undevocioun, thurgh which a man is so blent, as seith 
Seint Bernard, and hath swich langour in soule that he may neither rede ne singe in hooly 
chirche, ne heere ne thynke of no devocioun, ne travaille with his handes in no good werk, that it 
nys hym unsavory and al apalled” (X.723). At this point, several other vices enter in: the slothful 
soul “soone wol be wrooth, and soone is enclyned to hate and to envye. Thanne comth the synne 
of worldly sorwe, swich as is cleped tristicia, that sleeth man. . . .For certes, swich sorwe 
werketh to the deeth of the soule and of the body also; for therof comth that a man is anoyed of 
his owene lif. Wherfore swich sorwe shorteth ful ofte the lif of man, er that his tyme be come by 
wey of kynde” (X.724-7).37 In this middle section of the Parson’s Tale, Bernard appears as an 
expert diagnostician of the descent into despair, and of the way both soul and body can become 
implicated in the time-collapsing crisis of being unable to trust in God’s mercy. It is a role he 
more than earned in his writings, and almost the opposite of the one he plays in the Prick of 
Conscience: the saint reminds us where “wanhope, that is despeir of the mercy of God, that 
comth . . . somtyme of to muche drede,” can lead us (X.693).38 
 
37 The Parson calls “ydelnesse” the “yate of alle harmes” (X.714). Along similar lines, Siegfried Wenzel observes 
that for Hugh of St. Victor acedia acts as a kind of hinge vice: once the soul has been weakened by the more 
spiritual vices of pride, envy, and wrath, acedia prepares it for the dull pursuit of worldly goods through the more 
fleshly vices of avarice, gluttony, and lust (39-40). Having mispositioned itself spiritually with respect to God 
(pride), others (envy), and the self (wrath), the soul affected by acedia is simply too weary now to resist the lures of 
riches, food and drink, and sexual pleasure. 
38 As Siegfried Wenzel points out, “Since the continuity of acedia was assured by the connection of Cassian’s 
teaching with monasticism . . . until about 1200 acedia . . . remained primarily a monastic vice, that is, one which 
attacked chiefly religious who devoted themselves to the contemplative life” (35). The decisive role that the 
language of acedia plays in The Parson’s Tale, and in Chaucer’s work in general, is all the more striking because it 
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This Bernardine theme in turn becomes the central focus of the Parson’s Tale’s, and so of 
the whole Canterbury Tales’, conclusion. According to the Parson in the conclusion to his tale’s 
brief third section, there are finally only four things that really “destourben penaunce”: “drede, 
shame, hope, and wanhope, that is desperacion” (X.1057). In the first case, one is afraid that one 
“may suffre no penaunce” (X.1058); in the second, ashamed to go to confession; in the third, 
hopeful for riches in this world and a delayed deathbed confession, due to “surquidrie that he 
hath in Cristes mercy” (X.1067); and, in the fourth, in a state of desperation concerning “the 
mercy of Crist” or one’s own perceived inability to “persevere in goodnesse” (X.1070). For all 
four of these disturbances—arguably all shades of acedia—the Parson’s recommended solution 
is a combination of contemplation of the anagogical futura—the pain of hell will be far worse 
than bodily penance, the shame of doomsday worse than the shame of confession, and the 
“perpetueel wil to do synne” will soon be rewarded with “perpetueel peyne” (X.1069)—and of 
the invisibilia, since God is already aware of all our thoughts and Christ’s mercy is always with 
us, as “the passion of Jhesu Crist is moore strong for to unbynde than synne is strong for to 
bynde” (X.1072). The repentant sinner, the Parson reminds his listener, “shal han strengthe of the 
help of God, and of al hooly chirche, and of the proteccioun of aungels, if hym list” (X.1075). 
Perhaps mistakenly—perhaps not—he even forgets to address the problem of “surquidrie,” or 
over-confidence, in Christ’s mercy; the two anagogical aspects, then, are kept in equal balance, 
futura and invisibilia, and there is if anything a slight tendency to stress mercy over judgment, 
love over—in the Bernardine schema—fear. 
 The Parson rounds from here into his rousing conclusion on the Kingdom of God:  
 
begins its career as a specifically monastic vice, tied to the idea of the “noonday devil” and the threat of renouncing 
the monastic commitment to stability.  
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Thanne shal men understonde what is the fruyt of penaunce; and, after the word of Jhesu 
Crist, it is the endelees blisse of hevene, ther joye hath no contrarioustee of wo ne 
grevaunce . . . ther as the body of man, that whilhom was foul and derk, is moore cleer 
than the sonne; ther as the body, that whilom was syk, freele, and fieble, and mortal, is 
inmortal. . . .This blisful regne may men purchace by poverte espiritueel, and the glorie 
by lowenesse, the plentee of joye by hunger and thurst, and the reste by travaille, and the 
lyf by deeth and mortificacion of synne. (X.1076-80) 
As the Riverside Chaucer notes, this passage on the “fruyt of penaunce” is not present in the 
primary source for the Parson’s conclusion in Raymond of Pennaforte’s Summa (965). It is a 
common theme, and one for which Chaucer may have had any number of sources; but it appears 
with a special relevance in a passage from Bernard’s De diligendo deo, the Meditationes’ “only 
rival” for popularity among treatises attributed to Bernard in late thirteenth century England on 
(Bestul, “Devotional Writing” 23). Like the conclusion to the Parson’s Tale, this passage firmly 
links the “fruit of penance” to the theme of the glorified body:  
No wonder if the body seems now to bestow glory on the spirit, since it was of no little 
use to it even when it was infirm and mortal. . . .The body helps the soul to love God 
when it is weak, when it is dead, and when it is resurrected; first, to the fruit of penitence; 
second, to peace; and lastly, to consummation. Rightly the soul does not wish to be 
perfected without it, for it perceives deeply that the body has served it well in every state. 
(“Nec mirum si corpus iam gloriae conferre videtur spiritui, quod et infirmum et mortale 
constat ipsi non mediocriter valuisse. . . .Valet Deum diligenti animae corpus suum 
infirmum, valet et mortuum, valet et resuscitatum: primo quidem ad fructum paenitentiae, 
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secundo ad requiem, postremo ad consummationem. Merito sine illo perfici non vult, 
quod in omni statu in bonum sibi subservire persentit.”) (XI.30; III:145)  
Chaucer’s evident taste in Bernardiana suggests that it is unlikely he missed the most popular 
genuinely Bernardine treatise of his time;39 in any case, the two authors distinctly overlap in 
offering a counter-vision to both the Meditationes piissimae’s and the Prick of Conscience’s 
tendency to denigrate the body and to despair of all things earthly. The Parson’s final paragraph 
offers a much more authentically Bernardine vision: heaven as a place—or better, as the Parson 
puts it, as itself a “parfit glorious pilgrymage / That highte Jerusalem celestial” (X.50-1)—“ther 
as the body” is glorified and not simply discarded, anagogically recouped as one of the “fruyts of 
penaunce” that make it possible to achieve what Bernard calls the “fruit of penitence” here on 
earth. For all the Parson’s apparent sympathy with the Prick of Conscience author’s contemptus 
mundi themes, here at the end of the Parson’s Tale, where the whole kaleidoscopic treatment of 
the sins and of their remedies is telescoped down to the problem of the despair of God’s mercy, it 
is a vision of the glorified body that is the Parson’s final recommended remedy for despair.40  
 
39 As I detail above, I refer to not only to the many citations of Bernard in the Parson’s Tale, but also to the two 
translations of Bernard’s hymn to the Virgin from Dante’s Paradiso, and to the lost translation of the De Maria 
Magdalena, which was “in almost every case . . . found with works by (or ascribed to) Bernard of Clairvaux” 
(McCall 494). There is also the playful idiomatic expression, from which I draw my chapter title, near the beginning 
of Chaucer’s Legend of Good Women.  
40 Bernard is himself at times ambivalent about the body; however, in his earliest treatise—On Grace and Free 
Will—he celebrates the way the Incarnation reconciles the body and soul with the world’s more formal perfection: 
“That very form came, therefore, to which free choice was to be conformed, because in order that it might regain its 
original form, it had to be reformed from that out of which it had been formed. Now, wisdom is the form and 
conformation means that the image fulfills in the body what form does in the world” “Venit ergo ipsa forma, cui 
conformandum erat liberum arbitrium, quia ut pristinam reciperet formam, ex illa erat reformandum, ex qua fuerat et 
formatum. Forma autem, sapientia est, conformatio, ut faciat imago in corpore, quod forma facit in orbe”) (X.33; 
III:189). A passage from the sixth sermon on the Song of Songs sets the two strands in Bernard's thinking on the 
body alongside one another: “How sad indeed that men should degrade and exchange the one who was their glory 
for the image of a grass-eating ox. But God had mercy on their errors. . . .He became incarnate for the sake of carnal 
men, that he might induce them to relish the life of the Spirit. In the flesh and through the flesh he performed works 
of which not man but God was the author. . . .In the flesh, I repeat, and through the flesh, he powerfully and openly 
performed wonderful deeds” (“Heu! sic homines perdiderunt et commutaverunt gloriam suam in similitudinem vituli 
comedentis fenum! Quorum Deus miseratus errores. . . .Obtulit carnem sapientibus carnem, per quam discerent 
sapere et spiritum. Nam dum in carne et per carnem facit opera non carnis, sed Dei. . . .In carne, inquam, et per 
carnem potenter ac patenter operatus mira”) (6.3; I:27). A tendency to rankle at the “grass-eating ox” of the body 
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 In fact, the Parson’s final point of emphasis is echoed throughout the Canterbury Tales, 
and is more essential than has been realized to the Tales’ deliberate, artfully developed 
theological program. The focal figure of this endeavor is the Host himself, whose possibly 
Eucharistic connotations have been noted by Nicholas Watson (“Christian Ideologies” 79), but 
who has to my knowledge never been thoroughly interpreted in this way. In what remains of this 
chapter, I will argue that Harry Bailey, the Host—the figure in the poem who most consistently 
expresses himself in language that refers directly to the body, and who leads the Tales’ own 
“glorious pilgrymage”—is Chaucer’s pattern for an anagogically inflected selfhood, the 
interpretive center of the Canterbury Tales, and the cornerstone of a Chaucerian incarnational 
theology. It is in the figure of the Host that Chaucer concentrates his attempt to do justice to the 
neglected themes of the anagogical invisibilia, where eternity is seen as always already 
interpenetrating time, and of the Incarnation, where the eternal Son Himself is literally present in 
time and in the body. Although the Host is the most “literal”-minded of the pilgrims,41 once he 
has set the tale-telling game in motion he in fact acts as a kind of transformer through which all 
the tale-tellers’ efforts run—passing “juggement” on them, as he puts it (I.805)—and offering 
nuanced interpretive commentaries on the pilgrims’ stories precisely when he appears to be 
responding with the most reflexive artlessness. In this respect, the Chaucer pilgrim himself might 
 
often exists side by side in Bernard’s writing with a strong sense of the Incarnation’s having sanctified all the 
particulars of bodily existence. In Chapter One, I cited Kristeva’s definition of Bernardine love as “this passion of 
the body wrenching itself” (166), and Étienne Gilson’s claim that Bernardine spirituality centers itself first on the 
“primary necessity” of the “needs of the body” (39). Another way to put this would be to say that for Bernard the 
body cannot be understood except through the lens of salvation history: it is both the most pitiful, needy part of our 
created nature and, as such, also the most dramatic testament to Christ’s capacity to glorify. 
41 Richard Utz identifies a “literalistic attitude throughout Chaucer’s poetry,” which he associates with the teachings 
of John Wyclif and with a “tendency to point to the chasm between the primary meanings of words and their 
figurative, metaphorical, or allegorical implications” (168). This seems to me to miss the point of Chaucerian 
literalism. The Host both takes things at face value and takes advantage of the way meanings are always playfully 
shifting; as Chaucer repeatedly alleged, the best jokes are both funny and true. For the Host, the “chasm” between 
words and meanings is first of all an opportunity for play. 
163 
 
be seen as a kind of literary-critical red herring; he has drawn much of the scholarly debate 
around the question of apparent naivete and implied irony to himself,42 deflecting attention away 
from the more garrulous, still more obtuse-seeming Host—who actually, somewhat like 
Langland’s Nede, represents the interpretive principle on which the whole poem depends.  
 
Chaucer’s sacrificial Host 
 The first sign of the Host’s suppressed centrality lies in the rich associations of the word 
“Hoost” itself. The Middle English noun brings with it a host of ambiguities: according to the 
Middle English Dictionary’s third entry, “host(e)” means not only “one who entertains guests” 
(1a) and “the landlord of an inn or lodging house” (1b), but also the opposite: “an invited guest, a 
guest at a feast or other meal; a stranger or a traveller entertained in one’s home” (2a). A little 
further afield, the MED’s fourth listing confirms that “host(e)” may also mean “the bread 
consecrated in the Eucharist” (2), deriving from the broader sense of “an animal offered for 
sacrifice, a sacrificial victim; also, any sacrificial offering, a sacrifice” (1a) and, more 
figuratively, “a spiritual sacrifice; one’s life or body; Christ” (1b).43 Additional shades of 
meaning are supplied by the word’s first and third MED listings: first and most frequently, 
“hoste” as “an army” (1a) or “a body of attendants or followers” (2a), often used to indicate an 
armed or angelic congregation; and thirdly, “hoste” as the name of “a place of lodging and 
 
42 Leicester, for instance, assumes the Host has “missed the point of the Pardoner’s self-presentation”: “His brutal 
literalism cuts through the tissue of spiritual allusion and moral self-dramatization in the Pardoner’s final speech, 
reducing the Pardoner, his relics, and his ‘coillons,’ if has them, to mere matter, and matter that is not even 
blasphemous, only insulting. The Host’s explosion begins to restore a perspective that has been largely lost in the 
course of the tale’s development when the Pardoner’s voice is the only one before us—the perspective of the 
ordinary world” (58). But what if this were the point? 
43 This association would likely have been strengthened by the Canon for Mass as recorded in the Sarum Missal, 
which repeats the word “hostia” three times in the Oblation: “Hostiam puram, hostiam sanctam, hostiam 
immaculatam” (Maskell 98). As the MED entry makes clear, the Middle English equivalent “hoste” was already 
used in this sense in Wyclif’s time. 
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entertainment” itself. Taken together, these wide-ranging definitions make it clear just what a 
precisely overcharged selection the word “Hoost” for the Tales’ master of ceremonies was: the 
word means a host but also a guest; the keeper of an inn but also the inn itself; a single person 
but also a group of soldiers or angels; an animal sacrifice that is also Christ; and, through its 
connection to the Eucharist, food that is also God. These interlocking layers of paradox make 
Harry Bailey the ideal anagogical figure: a surface that is also a depth, a “literal” sense recharged 
with eternal significance, at once one and many— the Host represents and manifests a meaning-
drenched incarnational theology that gives the whole vivid tale-telling competition its 
distinctively polyvalent playfulness. They also suggest, against the prevailing critical 
consensus,44 that Chaucer was not just interested in theological ideas, but was deliberately 
developing a wholly original, remarkably strange theological project at the center of his most 
celebrated work. This project is aptly summarized in the Parson’s rousing panegyric on the 
glorified body, but it deserves further teasing out in terms of the way it functions in the Tales 
more generally, and in the figure of the Host in particular. 
 Once the polyvalence of the word “hoste” is noticed, it seems hard to deny that Chaucer 
consciously plays with at least some of its multiple layers of meaning. In just the second line of 
his appearance in the General Prologue, Harry Bailey “to the soper sette . . . us anon,” and 
“Strong was the wyn” (I.748-50). A “semely” (I.751), “large” (I.753), “myrie” (I.757) man, the 
Host “pleyen . . . bigan” (I.758) after supper, as if the pilgrims’ act of sharing this meal had 
awakened him—the body of Christ, so to speak, has come alive among them—and announces, 
 
44 For instance, Eleanor Johnson suggests that The Canterbury Tales “does not have a unified didactic goal or 
message that emerges for a reader gradually and progressively as he or she approaches the end of the work,” leaving 
its readers “walking among ethical penumbras” (Practicing Literary Theory 26). As I will argue, the Host is 
anything but a penumbra, and in my view he himself represents the “goal” of the whole work. I strongly agree, 
however, that this is more a matter of “how and whether” than of “what particular lesson a narrator might learn from 
a literary work.” The Host models a “how,” an approach, not the sort of doctrinal and ethical lessons that are blithely 
dispensed by the Prick of Conscience. 
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“Fayn wolde I doon yow myrthe, wiste I how” (I.766). The Host then uses the key term “quite” 
for the first time in the poem: “Ye goon to Caunterbury—God yow speede, / The blisful martir 
quite yow youre meede!” (I.769-70), and adds, “Now, by my fader soule that is deed, / But ye be 
myrie, I wol yeve yow myn heed” (I.781-2). This immediately activates the word’s sacrificial 
meaning: the Host quite over-graphically promises that his game will make the pilgrims merry, 
or he will sacrifice himself for them. This suggests in turn a deeper activation of the end of the 
General Prologue as a kind of re-imagined Creation and Incarnation narrative, in its own way as 
original as Julian of Norwich’s famous collapsing down of the moments of Adam’s fall and 
Christ’s birth:45 the Host designs a game for sheer pleasure—for which purpose the pilgrims are 
given the opportunity and even, one might figuratively imagine, the capacity to speak, since 
“confort ne myrthe is noon / To ride by the weye doumb as a stoon” (I.773-4)—and the winner 
“Shal have a soper at oure aller cost” (I.799); that is, the pilgrim whose tale is “of best sentence 
and moost solaas” (I.768) will be the beneficiary of the promised act of sacrifice.46 Entering 
among the pilgrims as their equal, and giving up something of his own to do so—the Host 
promises, “And for to make yow the moore mury, / I wol myselven goodly with yow ryde, / 
Right at myn owene cost, and be youre gyde”47—the Host nonetheless retains his right to be their 
judge: “And whoso wole my juggement withseye / Shal paye al that we spenden by the weye” 
(I.802-6). Their “governour,” “juge,” and “reportour” (I.813-4), who nonetheless “of manhod . . . 
 
45 Julian collapses the two pivotal moments in salvation history down into the single act of God’s sending out His 
servant to retrieve something for Him (273-5). As I will discuss in my Conclusion, this has parallels with the way 
the Annunciation has sometimes been imagined as happening on the date of both the Crucifixion and the Creation of 
the world. The Golden Legend, for instance, makes this association (Vol. 3, 100). 
46 The fact that there is no clear indication of who is winning or losing the game at any point perhaps supports the 
broad arc of Nicholas Watson’s article “Visions of Inclusion: Universal Salvation and Vernacular Theology in Pre-
Reformation England,” which argues that universal salvation was more thinkable in the late Middle Ages than we 
tend to imagine. Even the Pardoner is not excluded from the company of pilgrims. On the other hand, the Canon 
excludes himself. 
47 See Philippians 2.6-8. 
166 
 
lakkede right naught” (I.756), Harry Bailey will “sette a soper at a certeyn pris” (I.815); waking 
the pilgrims up the next morning as their “aller cok”—another traditional symbol for Christ48—
he “gadrede us togidre alle in a flok” (I.823-4). The symbolic significance here is almost too 
obvious to see; the Host speaks so loudly—he is, after all, “Boold of his speche” (I.755)—that 
the Christological commonplaces act as a kind of background noise, too ubiquitous and almost 
obtusely literalistic to have provoked much critical interest. Chaucer has him administering wine, 
setting a sacrificial meal at a certain price, gathering his flock as their judge, and entering into 
the game he himself has made in a sacrificial act of merry-making; and yet the Host’s cover as 
rowdy man of the flesh—“Harry Bailey” itself might be translated, with some allowances, as 
“fleshly seneschal”—is so vividly drawn as to render all this almost invisible. 
 The symbolic patterns established in the General Prologue recur consistently throughout 
the first fragment of the Tales. It is a critical commonplace to suggest that the Host keeps subtle 
control of the “quiting” game, from his possibly rigged provision that the Knight should go 
first—“Were it by aventure, or sort, or cas” (I.844)—to his giving the game its distinctive shape 
with his recommendation that the Miller, who is said to speak “in Pilates voys” (I.3124), should 
“Somwhat… quite with the Knyghtes tale” (I.3119), to his first real confrontation, with the 
Cook, over the question of whether “A man may seye ful sooth in game and pley” (I.4354). The 
Cook responds, “sooth play, quaad pley,” and threatens, “therfore, Herry Bailly, by thy feith, / 
Be thou nat wrooth, er we departen heer, / . . . / But er we parte, ywis, thou shalt be quit” (I.4357-
62). The first time the Host’s authority is outright challenged in the poem, then, the Cook makes 
a threat that might be construed as violent or, so to speak, proto-sacrificial, at the same time as he 
 
48 Pope Gregory I is supposed to have declared the rooster the “emblem of Christianity,” beginning its widespread 
use as a weathervane atop church steeples (Hore 202). In Gregory’s well-known Moralia in Iob, the cock is 
compared with preachers, who “awaken the sluggish” and adjust their message according to the relative 
understanding of their listeners (Birth 134). Both associations seem relevant here. 
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seeks to disengage truth from playfulness49—one of the key intersections around which the 
Host’s paradoxical and incarnational identity is constructed—and the first time the Host is 
challenged at all, the Miller is said to sound oddly like Pilate. The first fragment of The 
Canterbury Tales therefore reinforces the Host’s role as judge and “governour” in the broadest 
sense, but it also represents him as threatened by the other fate of the “hoste,” in the meaning 
derived from the Latin word hostia: the stranger or foreigner who is also a sacrifice. As we will 
see, this is a role Chaucer depicts the Host as deliberately playing: drawing the pilgrims’ 
sacrificial energy to himself, he manages to keep the pilgrimage and storytelling game going, 
without ever allowing its constant “quiting” tension to break out into real violence. 
 Other fragments of the Tales expand on the Christological significance of the Host, while 
at the same time widening out its meaning to encompass themes of timeliness, embodiment, and 
a dynamic peace that is sustained by means of constant creative tension.50 The “wordes of the 
Hoost to the compaignye” with which the Man of Law’s tale is prefaced offer a wistful 
meditation on time’s un-recoverability, which is oddly but characteristically tied to the 
irreducible particulars of the body: “‘But los of tyme shendeth us,’ quod [the Host]. / It wol nat 
come agayn, withouten drede, / Namoore than wole Malkynes maydenhede, / Whan she hath lost 
it in hir wantownesse. / Lat us nat mowlen thus in ydelnesse” (II.28-32). Later on, the Host calls 
for peace—“Pees, namoore of this!” (III.1298)—between the Summoner and the Friar (III.1279), 
corrects the diffident Clerk’s un-incarnational attachment to “sophyme” (IV.5) and study, 
 
49 We may even be meant to remember Pilate’s question to Jesus, “quid est veritas?” (“What is truth?”) (John 
18.38). The Cook apologizes for telling a tale “of an hostileer,” (I.4360), which is the word used for the innkeeper in 
the parable of the good Samaritan in the Wycliffite Bible—another association that may be relevant here. 
50 My reading overlaps somewhat with Barbara Page’s article “Concerning the Host,” which ties the Host to “themes 
of time and destiny” (1) and argues that he is “a time-bound and earth-bound man” who “represents the immediate 
present” (11), “an expansive man whose thought and action are constricted by thought time and the immediate 
physical locale” (12): “He is always expansive and—intellectually, at least—ungovernable” (10). But I believe Page 
misses the incarnational intentions behind this “expansive,” “ungovernable,” and yet time-bound presence. 
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opining that “what man that is entred in a pley, / He nedes moot unto the pley assente” (IV.10-1), 
and describes the Monk’s many tragedies as “nat worth a boterflye, / For therinne is ther no 
desport ne game” (VII.2790-1). He also asks the Merchant to tell them a tale of marriage, “Syn 
ye so muchel knowen of that art” (IV.1241), and the Squire to “sey somwhat of love,” because 
he must “Konnen theron as muche as any man” (V.2-3), demonstrating a preference throughout 
for personal experience, the body, and above all for sheer playfulness; his “pees” is characterized 
by a “quiting” tension that he encourages even as he redirects it when it threatens to boil over. 
The notable exception to this is peace-making function is the Pardoner, whose own, aggressively 
monetized literalism culminates in his request that the pilgrims “Unbokele” their “purs” and pay 
him for his pseudo-relics (VI.945), and who prompts Harry Bailey to exclaim, with his 
distinctive mix of literalistic piety and foul-mouthed fleshiness, “by the croys which that Seint 
Eleyne fond, / I wolde I hadde thy coillons in myn hond / In stide of relikes or of seintuarie” 
(VI.951-3). Like Judas and Christ, the Pardoner and the Host eventually kiss; but the Host’s 
otherwise often naïve-seeming reactions to the other pilgrims’ self-representations lend an 
unconventional moral to this story: of all the pilgrims, even the Monk, the Host finds the 
Pardoner’s practiced money-making act to be the most unforgivably mirthless.51 The Pardoner is 
specifically asked to tell a “myrie tale” (VI.316), and his multi-layered refusal to do so is the 
greatest direct defiance of the Host that we witness in the Tales.52 
 Still more strictly allegorical and even doctrinal language accumulates around the figure 
of Harry Bailey, and points up a Chaucerian meditation on violence and peace that is conducted 
in and through the figure of the Host. Harry’s fraught relationship with his wife is one such 
 
51 It is striking that the Host is associated with Bacchus, the god of wine and merrymaking—“O Bacus, yblessed be 
thy name, / That so kanst turnen ernest into game!” (IX.99-100)—just before the Manciple tells a story of Apollo’s 
jealousy. If the Host is Chaucer’s Christian God, he is also in an important sense Dionysian.  
52 It is worth pointing out that this is the same thing the Parson promises and—so far as we know—delivers. 
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overcharged area for inquiry: he reacts to the Clerk’s tale of Griselda with the perhaps 
deliberately over-enthusiastic, “By Goddes bones, / Me were levere than a barel ale / My wyf at 
hoom had herd this legende ones! / . . . / As to my purpos, wiste ye my wille; / But thyng that 
wol nat be, lat it be stille” (IV.1212b-g). He expands on this reaction when he exclaims at the 
conclusion of Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee, “I hadde levere than a barel ale / That Goodelief, my 
wyf, hadde herd this tale! / For she nys no thyng of swich pacience” (VII.1893-5); instead, we 
are told, Goodelief encourages Harry to beat his servants more severely, and asks him to take 
revenge on whoever slights her socially in church. “I woot wel that she wol do me slee som day / 
Som neighebor” (VII.1917-8), the Host worries, anticipating that this wife will eventually push 
him to use his strength—“For I am perilous with knyf in honde” (VII.1919)—to do evil, and 
suggesting that he is more than a little scared of her himself. It is also suggestive, in connection 
with this, that the wife of the historical Harry Bailey’s name was Christian (Riverside 928); if 
Harry is taken for a figure for Christ, then Chaucer may be offering here a comic play on the 
allegory of Christ and the Church as the Bridegroom and the Bride. “Goodelief” the Christian, 
named after a Flemish saint known for her patience, is—unlike Harry Bailey—not at all simply 
what she is named; in fact, she is the polar opposite, an impatiently violent woman who ensures 
that her husband gets no rest, much less a good life of his own. The Bride of Christ, in this 
allegorical reading, is constantly egging the Body of Christ on to violence, and pharisaically 
construing the perceived faults of others as causes for divine punishment; she is the bride, not as 
finally redeemed and “quiting” only in the sense that martyrs “quite,” but as sinfully manifest in 
the sacrificial violence of earth. Harry is worried, in essence, that she will send him on crusade. 
 In addition to this potentially allegorical aspect of these few details of Harry’s personal 
life, there is a more characteristically literalistic dimension to the way the language that accrues 
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around the figure of the Host tends to work. Harry’s multiple uses of the word “mateere” 
(VII.1923, IX.102, X.28), and his oddly worded response to the dreary un-playfulness of the 
“Monk’s Tale”—“For sikerly, nere clynkyng of youre belles / . . . / I sholde er this han fallen 
doun for sleep, / . . . / And wel I woot the substance is in me, / If any thyng shal wel reported be” 
(VII.2794-804)—suggest a careful manipulation of his language toward punning around the key 
terms of Eucharistic theology: the host is God in “mateere,” the “substance” of Christ’s body 
with all the accidents of bread. Even the very first word used to describe the Host—“A semely 
man OURE HOOSTE was withalle” (I.751)—indicates a play on something like substance and 
accident, seeming and being; he is a man of surfaces, of meaning present in the material, 
substance in matter, a “seemly” man. The next two of the three lines in the General Prologue in 
which the word “Hoost” appears—“Up roos oure Hoost, and was oure aller cok” (I.823), and, 
“And there oure Hoost bigan his hors areste” (I.827)—also conspicuously associate the Host 
with animals, perhaps strengthening the secondary “sacrificial animal” meaning in the Middle 
English. This proclivity for animality is echoed in the Host’s addresses to the two religious men 
he deems ripe for breeding: “Thou woldest han been a tredefowel aright / Haddestow as greet a 
leeve as thou has myght” (VII.1945-6), he says both to the Monk and to the Nun’s Priest, the one 
before his tale and the other after. Of the Nun’s Priest, the Host adds: “He loketh as a sperhauk 
with his yen” (VII.3457). These lines further illustrate the way Harry’s mind works consistently 
in a series of analogical leaps, by which the “accidents” of figural language—here the 
“tredefowel”—do nothing to distract him from, and in fact seem only to make him savor more, 
the “substance” of its essential meaning—in this case, the religious men’s virility.53 The Host is 
 
53 Bernard in fact explicitly theorizes an incarnational approach to language in his sermon De passione domini, cited 
in Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale but not in his source in Pennaforte: “As a thought clothes itself in a physical sound 
without any diminution of itself, neither before nor after it is spoken, so the Son of God took flesh, suffering neither 
commixture nor diminution, neither before nor after taking flesh” (“Sicut autem cogitatio vestit sibi vocem 
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not only an incarnational figure; he also models a way of reading, so to speak, incarnationally, on 
the surfaces of things. 
 This last point suggests some of the upshot of reading the Host in the way I am 
suggesting we must. If the Host is a both serious and seriously playful figure for the incarnate 
God, he is also the figure in the Tales whose attitudes and opinions ought to be taken—provided 
we can catch onto the trick of deciding what he really means, without bowdlerizing the jokes—
the most seriously. His odd way of framing his reflections on the monk’s hypothetical potency—
“God yeve me sorwe, but, and I were a pope, / Nat oonly thou, but every myghty man, / Though 
he were shorn ful hye upon his pan, / Sholde have a wyf; for al the world is lorn!” (VII.1950-
3)—might represent, if taken as a serious ecclesiological recommendation from the “hairy 
bailiff” of God, a real program for reformation of the Church; moreover, taken this way, it even 
faintly suggests that the actual pope, like the actual Christians allegorized in the Host’s wife 
“Goodelief,” may not be acting exactly in step with the real, surprisingly playful “substance” of 
Christ’s Eucharistic presence on earth. In fact, the Host himself implies that we should read him 
in something like this way, echoing one of his favorite phrases as he rounds off his long address 
to the monk: “But be nat wrooth, my lord, though that I pleye. / Ful ofte in game a sooth I have 
herd seye!” (VII.1963-4). It may not be wrong to characterize the Host’s words as merely 
hazarded suggestions—he rides, as they all do, “To Caunterbury-ward” (I.793), and they do not 
arrive; there is a certain playful provisionality to the whole pilgrimage—but, as he says himself, 
this is not the same as saying there is no “sooth” in them. The Host’s final words, which are 
addressed to the Parson just before he begins his “myrie tale in prose”—“Be what thou be, ne 
breke thou nat oure pley,” he has just warned him (X.24)—restate his infatuation throughout 
 
corpoream absque sui diminutione vel ante vocem, vel post vocem, sic Filius Dei assumpsit carnem, non 
commixtionem passus nec diminutionem, nec ante carnem, nec post carnem”) (13; V:65). 
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with all things potentially fruitful, whether they be tale-telling games or sadly celibate religious 
men, as if through him the Creator God’s recommendation to “be fruitful and multiply” still 
echoed: “But hasteth yow; the sonne wole adoun; / Beth fructuous, and that in litel space, / And 
to do wel God sende yow his grace! / Sey what yow list, and we wol gladly heere” (X.70-3).54 
Taken together, the Host’s three characteristic preoccupations—the continued playfulness of the 
tale-telling the game, even at risk of conflict; its corollary in the recommended fruitfulness of the 
whole company, especially where procreativity is concerned; and the crusading behavior of his 
violent wife, who needs to be set a better example—might constitute the three pillars of a serious 
reforming program,55 which cannot be adequately summarized in my own “litel space”; but it 
can safely be said that the outlook the Host both prescribes and models is consistently anagogical 
in the sense of de Lubac’s neglected invisibilia, where the eternal is recognized as manifest on 
the literal surfaces of personal experience and in the prosaic passing of time—in the body, in 
bodily love, and in the simple play of shared human creativity that characterizes the Host’s tale-
telling game. 
 
“Straw for youre gentillesse!”: A brief revision of Chaucerian subjectivity 
 If my reading of the Host is right, it indicates a serious critical blind spot. To conclude, I 
want to suggest exactly what this blind spot is, and how it might be corrected. To this end, I will 
briefly examine two landmark studies of The Canterbury Tales—Marshall Leicester’s 
Disenchanted Self and Jill Mann’s Chaucer & Medieval Estates Satire—and argue that the 
 
54 Bernard’s sermon De passione domini begins, “Vigilate animo, fratres, ne infructuose pertranseant vos huius 
temporis sacramenta” (“Take care, brothers, that you not let the mysteries of this time fruitlessly pass you by”) (1; 
V:56). 
55 John Bossy compares the Parson’s understanding of sin with Dante’s in terms of a “community ethics making 
more excuse for the sins of concupiscence than for those of aversion,” such as pride, envy, and anger. According to 
Bossy, in Chaucer’s time the “diseases of the spirit were more to be avoided than diseases of the flesh,” because the 
“sins of aversion destroy community” (35). 
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insights of both must be radicalized, if a critical impasse around anagogical and incarnational 
language and subjectivity is to be overcome. But first I want to offer a more positive articulation 
of the anagogical reading of Chaucer I am recommending here. In a way, it is not so dissimilar 
from the reading I have offered of Langland in Chapter One: Chaucer is concerned with 
redirecting theological attention toward bodily existence and bodily needs, which are in turn 
linked, more so by Chaucer than by Langland, to human creativity and general fruitfulness, 
including the distinctively Chaucerian emphasis on the way nature “priketh hem . . . in hir 
corages” toward both pilgrimage in the world and procreativity (I.11). Near the very end of the 
Parson’s Tale, Chaucer in fact added a passage on the works of mercy, with specific reference to 
the needs of the body, to the Parson’s source: “Now been ther thre manere of almesse: contricion 
of herte . . . pitee of defaute of his neighebores; and the thridde is in yevynge of good conseil and 
comfort, goostly and bodily, where man han nede. . . .And tak kep that a man hath nede of thise 
thinges generally: he hath nede of foode, he hath nede of clothyng and herberwe, he hath nede of 
charitable conseil and visitynge in prisone and in maladie, and sepulture of his dede body” 
(X.1030-1). There is a meaningful distinction between Langland’s more agonistic, individual 
journey of the will—which nonetheless begins with Holy Church’s recommending that Will 
center his search for the truth on the barest bodily needs—and Chaucer’s fraught but communal 
quiting game,56 but Bernard’s De diligendo deo treatise provides a good epigraph for an 
unwritten work on the incarnational, “nede”-based spirituality of both Chaucer and Langland 
alike: “For the need of the flesh is a certain language, and it brings back word of the kindnesses it 
has experienced. And so it will not be difficult for the one thus affected to keep the 
 
56 Ann Astell notes that, in contrast with Dante’s quest for “imaginative, theological transcendence,” Chaucer “takes 
an immanent route that dramatizes debate and rivalry, preserving quaestiones as quaestiones and using them as an 
avenue to a humble self-knowledge” (63). 
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commandment of loving one’s neighbor. . . .This one loves chastely, and keeping the 
commandments is no burden to the chaste” (“Est enim carnis quaedam loquela necessitas, et 
beneficia quae experiendo probat, gestiendo renuntiat. Itaque sic affecto, iam de diligendo 
proximo implere mandatum non erit difficile. . . .Amat caste, et casto non gravatur oboedire 
mandato”) (IX.26; III:141). Another passage might be adduced to capture the distinctively 
Chaucerian twist, which Langland even at his poem’s end seems somewhat to resist: “Plainly the 
flesh is a good and faithful companion to the good spirit—which, if it weighs down, it aids; or if 
it does not aid, it unburdens; or certainly aids, and does not burden at all” (“Bonus plane 
fidusque comes caro spiritui bono, quae ipsum aut, si onerat, iuvat, aut, si non iuvat, exonerat, 
aut certe iuvat, et minime onerat”) (XI.31; III:145). Chaucer’s Host embodies his distinctive 
sensitivity, as does his Parson at the Parson’s Tale’s end, to the sense in which the flesh remains 
a “good and faithful companion,” even in the midst of the “hunger and thurst” that it experiences 
now (X.1080), whenever it is taken seriously as always gesturing toward the “parfit glorious 
pilgrymage / That highte Jerusalem celestial” (X.50-1). My long analysis above of the 
Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis, and of its adaptation in the Prick of 
Conscience, has I hope foregrounded some of the theological pressures that may have provoked 
this response, and made it easier to perceive that response’s real originality. It has also perhaps 
made it possible at least to begin to see how Chaucer and Langland’s different relationships to 
the Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine material may have helped determine their own different 
points of emphasis. 
The specific quality of the critical un-noticing of this aspect of Chaucer’s work, however, 
deserves another moment’s consideration. Leicester’s is the more nearly contemporary, and the 
more typically conditioned by deconstructive and psychoanalytical modes of reading. He is 
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aware of this; he protests that he is “neither deconstructing nor psychoanalyzing Chaucer’s text,” 
but instead sees “these discourses as descriptions, and to a degree as analogues, of Chaucerian 
practice. He uses them only as “part of an attempt to describe what the text of the Canterbury 
Tales depicts.” The Pardoner, for instance, “is an active deconstructionist who deliberately 
mimes official discourses in such a way as to bring out their underlying contradictions” (16); that 
is, Leicester is not so much saying that Chaucer needs to be deconstructed, as that Chaucer 
himself deliberately gives voice to deconstructionist modes of reading within his text. In 
Leicester’s reading, the Pardoner is the most “disenchanted” of the pilgrims—which codes 
roughly as “enlightened,” or “good”—and therefore the one who most clearly sees “that what 
had been thought to be other-originated, the product of transcendent forces not directly 
susceptible of human tampering and subversion, is in fact humanly originated, the product of 
human creation. . . .In its extreme form [disenchantment] is the suspicion, or even the conviction, 
that the category of transcendence itself is a human construction and that there are only 
institutions” (26-7). But Leicester is so beholden to disenchanted ambiguity that he obscures the 
obvious point that the Pardoner is also one of the most manipulative and malign, incipiently 
sacrificial pilgrims in the whole Canterbury Tales; if everything is an institution, the Pardoner’s 
canny despair starts to look like a commendable index of his refusal to be taken in. In line with 
his failure to notice the Host at all, Leicester makes nothing of the Pardoner’s having to be 
reconciled to the Host with a kiss; Harry Bailey is, after all, a literalist simpleton, and the 
Pardoner rightly disenchanted of all that the Host admires. The effect is deeply symptomatic of 
the theological blind spots of such modes of literary criticism: the “fruyt” is thrown out with the 
“chaff,” the playful Host is sacrificed in favor of the poem’s most cynical villain, and meaning is 
thrown back on itself so that we, as Leicester says in his book’s final words, may “keep reading” 
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(417). It is not noticed that it is institutionally beneficial for Leicester to say so. In this respect 
Leicester simply becomes the Pardoner: he sells his disenchanted wares; he betrays the Host with 
a kiss, and betrays the reader into believing that we must go on reading, for unclear professional 
reasons, with very little “sentence” and even less “solaas.” Chaucer might have called this The 
Critic’s Tale. 
 If Chaucer is critical of naive enchantment, he is at least as critical of smug 
disenchantment. A careful reading of the Host, and of his violently negative reactions to the 
Pardoner and to the Monk, makes this abundantly clear. Leicester is careful to advise that we 
“disengage” the Weberian idea of “disenchantment” from the “developmental-historical context 
of the rise of a scientific worldview that leads Weber to adopt the vocabulary of calculation and 
technics, in contrast to magic and religion” (26). This neatly brackets out his often brilliant 
reading of The Canterbury Tales from the broader context of the insights that led Weber to 
declare the disenchanted age one of “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart” (182)—
an abstraction that sits uneasily beside Leicester’s frequent salutary recommendations that we 
stick with the literal sense of the text longer than more allegorical modes of reading would like. 
His recommendation that we view “subjectivity and its implications” in terms of “an 
understanding of the human fact of the self as that impossible thing, that insatiable desire, that 
ceaselessly escapes and returns,” a more or less Bernardine idea in itself, leads him on to the 
impossibly un-Chaucerian conclusion that “‘Chaucer’ shares the Derridean desire to escape 
knowledge and certainty, to reach a point of not knowing any longer where he is going because 
of the constraints such ‘knowledge’ imposes” (413). Who knows where he is going better than 
the Host? Which work of literature has a more clearly defined destination than The Canterbury 
Tales? For Chaucer, unlike for Leicester, it is possible to have a destination without having yet 
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arrived there—the pilgrim’s “sperandarum substantia rerum” (“substance of things hoped for”) 
that is the biblical definition of faith (Hebrews 11.1). Despite his admirably careful attention to 
the way different Canterbury pilgrims betray whole implicit worldviews in the way they tell their 
tales—his reading of the knight’s repressed nihilism is particularly insightful—Leicester misses 
the way, with the Pardoner, Chaucer deliberately depicts the pitfalls of a certain cynically anti-
institutional, and yet at the same time deeply institutionalized, “disenchantment,” which is not 
able or willing to admit that the categories of “transcendence” and “human construction” need 
not be mutually exclusive. 
 A more historically situated foundation for Leicester’s instructively surface-oriented, 
incipiently anagogical mode of reading can be found in Mann’s seminal Chaucer & Medieval 
Estates Satire, where Mann, like Leicester, has an essential insight into the Tales that 
nonetheless needs to be radicalized. Leicester is rightly critical of the way Mann brings “that 
institution [of estates classification] into the center of the poem” without “an attention to how the 
text represents the act of description and classification itself in the person of the narrator” (393), 
but he misses one crucial aspect of Mann’s foregrounding of the estates satire aspect of the 
Tales—the relative conventionality of the General Prologue’s listing of a cast of characters by 
their estate, and the relative originality of Chaucer’s tendency to describe more than to 
moralize—that Mann herself consistently minimizes: her brilliant identification of the “omission 
of the victim” as a key mechanism that drives the “quiting” game of the Tales, as when “the 
social effects of [the pilgrims’] sometimes dubious practices are left out of account” (Chaucer 
and Medieval Estates 86). If this is taken, as Leicester would suggest it should be, as something 
that the Tales very deliberately represents, and set alongside my own reading of the Host, it 
becomes immediately clear that it must also be one of the interpretive cruxes of the whole work: 
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the Host—the hostia, literally “sacrifice”—himself is the great omitted victim of The Canterbury 
Tales, the sacrificial body of Christ who puts himself at risk of conflict not only with the 
Pardoner, but with the Miller, and the Cook, and the Manciple, and even the mysterious Canon 
near the Tales’ end. Mann is right that this omission mechanism is “part of the Prologue’s 
peculiar social ethic, which extends even to the pilgrims that Chaucer presents as morally 
admirable” (191), but she reads this anachronistically as a matter of the ultimate relativization of 
all moral values, rather than as itself an anagogically moral, even apocalyptic unveiling of the 
nature of all the pilgrims save the Host himself: they are all inclined to acts of sacrifice, and 
without his mediating work they will inevitably be drawn to sacrificing one another.57 This can 
be seen especially clearly near the end of the Tales, where the drunken Cook who yawns “As 
though he wolde swolwe us anonright” (IX.36) “wax wrooth and wraw” (IX.46) with the 
Manciple. The Manciple responds in kind, until he is reminded by the Host of his own 
“rekenynges, / That were nat honest if it cam to preef” (IX.74-5). Recalling the Manciple’s own 
misdeeds, the Host convinces him to give the Cook what he calls a “good drynke,” which “wol 
turne rancour and disese / T’acord and love” (IX.96-8)—once again defusing the rivalrous 
conflict that is always in danger of overwhelming the pilgrimage game, specifically through the 
medium of wine. 
 
57 The Canterbury Tales would probably respond well to a reading through the lens of the work of René Girard on 
sacrifice, which I do not have the space to offer here. Bernard theorizes something similar in his sermons for Palm 
Sunday, where he observes the “strange connection” between the passion and procession in the liturgical calendar: 
“what did our forebears have in mind when they added the passion to the procession? . . .The present age is a 
mixture of both. . . .Truly for as long as this present age abides, it ebbs and flows” (“quid cogitaverunt Patres nostri, 
passionem addentes processioni? . . . Istis enim mixtum est praesens saeculum, . . .Verum hoc interim dum praesens 
saeculum manet, vel magis manat et fluit”) (2.1; V:46). Bernard’s idea of “the procession as representing the glory 
of our heavenly homeland and the passion as the way to it” (“in processione quidem caelestis patriae repraesentamus 
gloriam, in passione monstramus viam”) theorizes time as a chiasmus between sacrifice and love, an admirable 
“mixtio” that has to be embraced: “The glory of the procession makes even the suffering of the passion bearable, for 
nothing is difficult for a lover” (“Tolerabilem proinde reddit passionis laborem gloria processionis, quoniam Amanti 
nihil difficile est”) (1.2; V:43). As I have argued, the Canterbury “procession” also has sacrificial undertones. 
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 The confrontation with the Canon offers the Tales’ most thorough elaboration of the 
sacrificial mentality that the Host’s imposition of himself—and the seemingly literalistic, in fact 
anagogical perspective he consistently adopts—alone can avert. Drawing near to his servant as 
he speaks with the Host, the Canon “herde al thyng / Which this Yeman spak, for suspecioun / 
Of mennes speche evere hadde this Chanoun. / For Catoun seith that he that gilty is / Demeth alle 
thyng be spoke of hym, ywis” (VIII.685-9). At this point in the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue, the 
Yeoman has just begun his long description of the endlessly repetitious alchemical processes the 
Canon has coaxed him into assisting him with: “I am nat wont in no mirour to prie, / But swynke 
soore and lerne multiplie. / We blondren evere and pouren in the fir, / And for al that we faille of 
oure desir, / For evere we lakken oure conclusioun” (VIII.668-72). As the Yeoman laments, 
alchemy consists in an endless series of promised futura that never quite arrive: “Swich 
supposyng and hope is sharp and hard; / I warne yow wel, it is to seken evere. / That future 
temps hath maad man to dissevere, / In trust therof, from al that evere they hadde. / Yet of that 
art they kan nat wexen sadde” (VIII.873-7).58 Like the Pardoner’s relic-selling, the 
“multiplication” of alchemy also threatens to impact on the pilgrim host’s wellbeing: “A man 
may lightly lerne, if he have aught, / To multiplie, and brynge his good to naught! / Lo! swich a 
lucre is in this lusty game, / A mannes myrthe it wol turne unto grame, / And empten also grete 
and hevye purses, / And maken folk for to purchacen curses” (VIII.1400-5). Thus the Canon’s 
alchemy proves a kind of diabolical parody of the Host’s own valorization of pro-creativity and 
fruitfulness. The Yeoman even says that his master wants to ride with the company “For his 
desport; he loveth daliaunce” (VIII.592), making the Canon sound like the Host; but when the 
 
58 As Eleanor Johnson observes, the Canon’s Yeoman “is unable to stop himself from superimposing the future on 
the present,” demonstrating his “inability to grasp—let alone take comfort in—time’s linear progression as an 
epiphenomenal indication of divine providence and eternal love” (Practicing Literary Theory 147). 
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Canon is seen up close, he is obviously something more like the Host’s opposite: suspicious of 
everyone and jealous of his “priyvetee,” he is unwilling to speak for himself, much less to speak 
boldly. When the Yeoman speaks for him, “He fledde awey for verray sorwe and shame” 
(VIII.701-2). Although we are told that “it was joye for to seen hym swete” (VIII.579), much as 
the Pardoner claims of himself “That it is joye to se my bisynesse” (VI.399), the Canon does not 
ultimately allow us to see him work, and will not tell his tale; his futura-obsessed toil precludes 
that kind of play. Shame-ridden, something like Bernard’s penitent who thinks “only of the 
judgment” and so falls “into the pit of despair” (6.8; I:30), in the end it is the Canon alone, and 
not the Pardoner, who is excluded from the Canterbury fellowship. 
 Interposing himself between the pilgrims and this newcomer, as if he senses some unique 
danger from this pale horseman whose animal “swatte that unnethe myghte it gon” (VIII.563), 
the Host asks the Canon’s Yeoman, “Why is thy lord so sluttissh, I the preye, / And is of power 
bettre clooth to beye, / If that his dede accorde with thy speche?” (VIII.636-8).  He asks, in other 
words, why it is that the Canon cannot be a “semely” man like himself, not so much in the sense 
of being good to look at as in the sense of simply being what he seems, and what he claims to be. 
The Canon, who like the Host is associated with animals but who notably overworks them, is the 
Tales’ final and perhaps only great villain—a man who is ashamed of himself and of his own 
bodily appearance, and who therefore consistently turns “game” into “grame”; he is also, in his 
obsession with a promised future payoff that never quite arrives, a man who fundamentally lacks 
a conclusion, who seems to conceive of all existence in terms of transmuting matter into more 
material gain, and whose every interaction is therefore marked by a suspicion that everyone must 
really in the end be playing by the rules of his own power game. He is, in essence, un-anagogical 
man—or, in a phrasing more applicable to the Meditationes piissimae and the Prick of 
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Conscience, though stripped of their residual piety, a man obsessed with the futura at the 
expense of the invisibilia, to such an extent that the futura themselves are seen in terms of some 
literal payoff in the present. He is also therefore a man who is deeply “disenchanted”; like 
Leicester and the Meditationes author before him, he reflexively deconstructs whatever flashes 
of significance he detects—in his case, attempting to turn them to simple, cynical profit. The 
Host, on the other hand, is at once naively literal and cunningly aware of confidence tricks. He 
immediately perceives what is going on here in terms of a friction between claim and 
appearance, substance and accident; whatever the Yeoman may say about his supposedly fun-
loving master, the Host can see the Canon with his own two eyes; and, as always, he is in on the 
joke. 
Lee Patterson has argued that we must understand the Canon’s Yeoman in terms of the 
“foregrounding of an emancipated selfhood existing apart from social determinants,” and “the 
capacity to imagine oneself as other and more than an integer in a fixed social order, as an 
autonomous self”; “everywhere we look,” Patterson says, “Chaucer turns from a traditionalist 
objectivism to a subjectively centered modernity.” And yet, as Patterson admits, “if the Canon’s 
Yeoman represents Chaucerian modernity, he is an appropriately irresolute spokesperson,” 
marked by a “strangely unspecifiable guilt, a guilt we can now perhaps recognize as generated by 
the feeling that modernity itself may be a sin” (“Perpetual Motion” 57). But what if that guilt 
could be specified, and what if it were not so much to do with the specific sins that are the 
constant refrain of popular late medieval works under the influence of what Nicholas Watson 
calls the “puritanical model” (“Chaucer’s Public Christianity” 102) as with the Canon’s numbing 
shame itself, a shame at modernity’s lacking something precisely like what the Host so vividly 
represents—a fatal split between “subjectivity” and “objectivity,” intellect and affect, memory 
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and the self, that has made it almost impossible to escape the feeling that Watson associates 
elsewhere with “a process . . . called modernity, through which the past may have tended, over 
the last two centuries, to become inert: more and more like those accumulations of lifeless 
images that, in monastic imaginative regimes, were once taken to herald the onset of accidia” 
(“Phantasmal Past” 36)? Patterson cites “the Yeoman’s fear that something crucial has already 
passed him by” (“Perpetual Motion” 57). What if the Host were a kind of literary last-ditch effort 
to revive a sense of the incarnate joys of time and of the body, in a time when these were, with 
the anagogical sensibility, in fatal danger of being lost? What if, in other words, we were not 
living in Patterson’s vibrant Chaucerian modernity, but living instead in the world the Prick of 



















“In good tyme” 
After despair in Malory’s “Book of Sir Launcelot and Queen Guinevere” 
 
 
One can only attain hope through truth, at the cost of great effort and long patience. To find 
hope, it is necessary to go beyond despair. . . .The highest form of hope is despair overcome. 
  
—Georges Bernanos, “France Before the World of Tomorrow” 
 
 
Often considered the product of Cistercian or otherwise monastic influences, the 
thirteenth-century Old French romance La Queste del Saint Graal defies easy categorization 
(Matarasso, “Introduction” 20-1).1 In recent years, some have argued that the Queste represents 
the sublimation of an essentially secular enterprise; it “systematically weights down” its source 
material “with a ‘figurative’ meaning,” as one critic puts it (Baumgartner 110). Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the Queste participates in a culture of what Barbara Newman has described in terms of 
secular and sacred “crossover.”2 This is illustrated in the Queste itself when the perfectly pure 
 
1 The classic argument for Cistercian authorship of the Queste is in Albert Pauphilet’s Etudes sur la Queste del Saint 
Graal (75-83). P.M. Matarasso’s book The Redemption of Chivalry: A Study of the Queste del Saint Graal offers a 
more balanced view (238-241). See also Jill Mann’s “Malory and the Grail Legend” for a concise argument against 
specifically Cistercian authorship (207-8). 
2 Nicolette Zeeman observes that in the Queste, “This new version of the Arthurian quest . . . develops and stands in 
tension with secular Arthurian narrative,” and that “the Queste continues to recognize the call of the secular.” The 
tale’s “emotional focus on Lancelot makes him not just an instance of failed questing, but the site of a division at the 
heart of the inspirational narrative of the Queste” (“Medieval religious allegory” 155-7). Following Jean Frappier, 
Jill Mann goes even further: “instead of representing an attempt to appropriate chivalry for religious ends, the Grail 
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Galahad and his father Lancelot finally cross paths. Galahad, a character invented for the Queste 
who distinctly embodies the ideal of the chaste warrior-monk as it was elaborated in Bernard’s 
treatise De laude novae militiae (“In Praise of the New Knighthood”) and elsewhere, expresses a 
deep and easy admiration for the famously adulterous and formerly best knight in the world, his 
father: “Upon God’s name I have desired to see and be with you beyond all men alive. And it is 
only natural that I should, for in you is my beginning” (257-8)3 (“A non Dieu, vos desirroie je a 
veoir et a avoir a compaignon sor toz cels del monde. Et je le doi bien fere, car vos estes 
comencement de moi” (250)).4 Here the Queste’s possibly monastic author has Galahad, the 
figure for spiritual perfection, humble himself before the embodiment of all things chivalric, 
something like Dostoevsky’s Father Zosima bowing down before Dmitri Karamazov. “In you is 
my beginning” strongly suggests that, for the Queste author, the ideals of romance already have 
some at least latent spiritual force of their own, and that the relationship between the Queste and 
the romance tradition it draws from is more than a matter of mere spiritualized flattening.  
This is true for Thomas Malory as well, in the opposite direction. It is often taken for 
granted that Malory, very much unlike the Queste author, pares back whatever religious elements 
appear in his sources; the argument is at least as old as C.S. Lewis and Eugène Vinaver, in their 
companion pieces “The English Prose Morte” and “On Art and Nature.”5 A notable exception is 
the 2013 volume Malory & Christianity: Essays on Sir Thomas Malory’s Morte Darthur, which 
collects several sensitive theological readings of Malory’s work. I want to argue, however, for a 
 
romances use religion as a means of exalting the dignity of the knightly class,” constituting a kind of “class gospel” 
(“Malory and the Grail” 208). 
3 References in English are to P.M. Matarasso’s edition and translation The Quest of the Holy Grail, cited in my 
Works Cited below. They are given by page number, in parentheses. 
4 References to the original Old French are to Albert Pauphilet’s edition La Queste del Saint Graal, cited in my 
Works Cited below. They are given by page number, in parentheses. 
5 Vinaver thinks Malory tends to excise the religious themes he finds in his sources; Lewis thinks this is too simple a 
generalization. Lewis concludes that Malory’s work is “ethical as against mystical. But we must not say ‘ethical, as 
against religious’” (17).  
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more specifically Bernardine lens on the text, by way of the dual influence of the possibly 
Cistercian Queste and of Bernard’s popularity in England. In the conclusion to her book-length 
study of Malory’s use of the Queste for his own “Tale of the Sankgreal,” Sandra Ness Ihle 
emphasizes that Malory grants the more worldly Lancelot, as opposed to the more spiritual 
Galahad, an expanded role in his work, and a closer experience of the Grail than is granted him 
in the Queste. She concludes that Malory has “adapted his source to give it a new meaning and 
significance; from a completely allegorical work whose adventures are a means to a partial 
discovery of a higher truth, he has fashioned a tale whose final goal becomes an excuse for the 
discovery, through adventure, of the good to which man can attain on earth” (164).6 Although 
this is a more balanced view than either Lewis’s or Vinaver’s, even this dichotomy should not be 
pressed too far.7 Malory’s work discovers not just “the good to which man can attain on earth,” 
but also, and arguably with more force, the evil there, too; and the good that is attained is 
therefore almost always “partial”—there are few more indelible figures for the partial intimation 
of higher truth than the enigmatic phrase on Arthur’s tomb, “rex quondam rexque futurus” (“the 
once and future king”).8 Newman uses the case of King David—who is, in his relationship with 
Bathsheba, a notorious sinner in what Newman calls the sensus litteralis, but a celebrated figure 
for Christ in the sensus mysticus—to illustrate what she identifies as part of the “deep structure 
 
6 Along similar lines, Fiona Tolhurst observes that Malory “integrates Galahad into a spiritualized but still secular 
Round Table community rather than into an unearthly Grail community” and “blends chivalric brotherhood with 
individual Christian identity” (136-7), staking out a “theological middle ground between the absolute moral standard 
of thirteenth-century monasticism and the flexible one of earthly chivalry” (149). This issues in what she describes 
as “Malory’s practical Christianity” (151).  
7 Ihle does claim that the “Sankgreal” is “not less religious” than the Queste; rather, Malory “locates religious 
standards within the requirements of chivalry” (161). Beyond this, I believe that Malory also locates the 
requirements of chivalry within the standards of religion, making the Morte a work of real “crossover” and of 
original theological speculation. 
8 As D. Thomas Hanks, Jr. points out, in Malory’s sources for the last book of the Morte Darthur, “Arthur dies and 
that’s the end of him. . . .Malory changes that, to hint that Arthur still lives, in some mystic stasis, and will return 
again.” While there are analogues for the idea that Arthur has perhaps survived, there are none for Malory’s 
suggestion that he has been transported by the will of Jesus so that he might return to win the Holy Cross, and so 
that this is a “somehow-Christian survival” (19). 
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of medieval romance,” which renders Ihle’s distinction still potentially misleading: an embrace 
of the “hermeneutics of double judgment” (23), whereby the same character or figure to can 
illustrate both a more literal, earth-bound lesson and a more mysterious, even sometimes 
contradictory, higher truth. What Ihle construes as a move away from the sensus mysticus in 
Malory is in my view a more daring embrace of this double structure, a staged confrontation 
between a more vividly imagined sensus litteralis and a still ultimate sensus mysticus—rather 
than an attempt, like the monastic Queste author’s, to assimilate the two onto one univocal 
narrative plane, where the literal husk of the text directly corresponds with and straightforwardly 
discloses the kernel of mystical, allegorical meaning. 
 Malory’s use of the Queste del Saint Graal should therefore be understood not as a 
“secularization” project, but rather as a deliberate ressourcement of a deeply theological text, re-
purposed to serve Malory’s own distinctive literary and even theological ends. After all, to be 
less allegorical is not necessarily to be less religious. My study so far has suggested that figures 
like Langland’s Nede and Chaucer’s Host in fact stage a fourteenth-century reaction, in the 
literary form of what Newman calls “imaginative theology,” against what might be called over-
allegorical, or un-anagogical, Christianity, where a moralistic dualism at times threatened to 
reduce popular theological discourse to the disembodied platitudes that drive the Pseudo-
Bernardine Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis and, to an extent, the 
Prick of Conscience. Along similar lines, Felicity Riddy has noted the “eucharistic emphasis of 
Malory’s treatment of the Grail” (132); the object that began as a mysterious dish in Chrétien de 
Troyes’s Perceval becomes in Malory, by a subtle adjustment of his source in the Queste, a 
markedly physical figure for the miracle of the Real Presence. In Riddy’s reading, this shows 
Malory adjusting his source “as a fifteenth-century layman,” conditioned by the threat of 
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Lollardy to emphasize the fact of transubstantiation (133). Less allegory could be said to mean, 
in this instance, more plain orthodoxy.9 In any case, Malory’s emphasis on the eucharist is in line 
with a by no means irreligious resistance to making too strong a distinction between “a partial 
discovery of higher truth” and the “good to which man can attain on earth.” The distinctions 
drawn by Ihle and others, spurred on by the assumption of a monastic authorship of the Queste, 
have tended to imply that a lay medieval writer like Malory would have likely foregone serious 
engagement with theological questions;10 the paradoxical result has been that Malory criticism, 
just when it comes to describe Malory’s relation to a possibly monastic source, has too often 
ignored the importance of monastic thought for all medieval culture, literary and political (even 
chivalric) as well as spiritual—this in spite of the fact that Malory’s fifteenth century was a time 
of noted lay interest in what it means to live the best possible religious life outside of the 
religious orders.11 It has therefore missed and minimized that same dimension that I have argued 
was particularly forgotten in recent treatments of Chaucer and of Langland: the importance of 
 
9 Catherine Batt provides an overview of the debate over Malory’s religious background in terms of the tension 
between Colin Richmond’s view of fifteenth-century gentry religion as an “increasingly individual and privatized 
experience” and Eamon Duffy’s idea of an “actively and publicly pious laity involved in the work of the Church” 
(133-4). As D. Thomas Hanks, Jr. and Janet Jesmok point out, Christine Carpenter has come down strongly on the 
side of Duffy, arguing for the “idea of strongly orthodox views among the greater part of the late medieval gentry 
class.” As they also observe, “The many later accounts of the prayerful vigil observed prior to the knighting 
ceremony suggest that Malory, coming from a lineage of knights, would have seen his vocation as armed godliness, 
related in kind to the Crusades” (3). It is interesting, in view of this, that Malory preserves the idea of Lancelot’s 
ending his life with a period of non-crusading penitence and religious service.  
10 As I have noted above, this tendency is of course not universal. Dorsey Armstrong’s maneuvering around the 
issue is, however, representative of a drift in the criticism: although there is an “emphasis on devotion to God” in the 
Suite du Merlin, not to mention the monastic Queste del Saint Graal—which Malory chooses to use despite the fact 
that “more secular versions of this story were available to him”—“In the Morte Darthur, such spiritual devotion is 
largely absent, eclipsed by more chivalric concerns. . . .Malory’s depiction of knighthood isn’t particularly religious, 
because knighthood is the religion.” On the very next page, stepping back to consider the importance of the Grail 
Quest for the whole Morte Darthur, Armstrong muses, “Christianity in Malory, it seems, is contradictorily both 
incredibly important and relatively insignificant” (112).  
11 This is exemplified in Middle English by the popularity of Walter Hilton’s writing, especially his Mixed Life. 
Giles Constable’s article “Twelfth-Century Spirituality and the Late Middle Ages” discusses the overlap between 
the spiritualities of the fifteenth and twelfth centuries, especially in terms of the fifteenth century’s resistance to the 
“distinction between the active and contemplative lives” and “the intrinsic superiority of monasticism” (43). 




anagogical and incarnational modes of thinking not just for the moments of explicit theological 
reflection in their respective texts, but even for the most essential building blocks of their literary 
forms. As we will see, some of Malory’s most distinctive formal interventions, and most original 
additions to his source material, serve distinctly theological ends. 
 
Translating the Queste 
We have every reason to believe that Malory took spiritual ideals, and the Queste del 
Saint Graal, very seriously. As Helen Cooper points out, the “Tale of the Sankgreal” is by far the 
book of Malory’s works that cleaves closest to its source, amounting to a sort of shorthand 
translation of the Old French Queste (“The Lancelot-Grail Cycle” 158). Malory himself called 
this sixth book “a tale chronicled for one of the truest and one of the holiest that is in the world” 
(847).12 As other scholars have shown, he significantly re-works the sources of every other one 
of his tales, but leaves the Queste more or less intact and in a pivotal position in the Morte, 
coming as it does just before the final two books that trace the gradual dissolution of the Round 
Table. This implies an appreciation of the monastic text on already established grounds, rather 
than a mere begrudging inclusion or hasty attempt to integrate the Queste’s more spiritualized 
vision of knighthood. The Queste itself was not at all, in my view, the source of Malory’s own 
religious interests, but rather a confirmation of them,13 and an encouragement to engage more 
deeply with what Erich Auerbach described as “another movement” that, arising 
 
12 All references to Malory are to P.J.C. Field’s edition of Vinaver’s The Works of Sir Thomas Malory, cited in my 
Works Cited below. Hereafter, references are given by page number, in parentheses. 
13 This raises the difficult question of the order in which the Morte Darthur’s books were composed. P.J.C. Field 
points out that Malory substitutes Pelleas for Perceval in his brief account of the Grail Quest at the end of “The Tale 
of King Arthur,” making it unlikely that he had translated the Queste before writing the first book at least of the 
Morte Darthur (1). This should serve as a caution against over-privileging Malory’s treatment of the Queste in any 
study of theology’s role in the Morte. As I will argue, Malory’s most original adaptations of and additions to his 
sources, many of which occur in his “Book of Sir Launcelot and Queen Guinevere,” are also the sites of his most 
sustained theological reflection. 
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“contemporaneously with courtly culture,” “gave expression to this graduated proving of 
election, as well as to the theory of love, with much greater rigor and clarity—namely, Victorine 
and Cistercian mysticism” (Mimesis 136). For Malory, chivalric and monastic ideals interrogate 
and reinforce one another, and are by no means mutually exclusive. 
In the Queste, on the other hand, the courtly does indeed tend to get subordinated to the 
monastic: the Quest for the Holy Grail acts as a winnowing vehicle of judgment, superimposing 
a new theological hierarchy on the previously established ranking of the knights’ prowess in 
battle. The Queste knights’ success is no longer determined by their value as icons of courtly 
largesse, but rather by their piety and purity alone. In this new, more spiritual order, even faithful 
marriage is devalued: the Queste does not necessarily condemn Arthur’s marriage to the Queen, 
but it does flatly disqualify him from even setting out on the Quest for the Grail.14 Arthur is left 
alone to mourn the disbanding of his Round Table. With the Queste the Round Table is 
ineluctably pulled toward its end in the now immanentized anagogical futura; what was 
introduced as an inexhaustible symbol of the cosmos, “devised . . . to embody a very subtle 
meaning” (99) (“qui ne fu pas establie sanz grant senefiance” (76)),15 has its eschatological Seat 
of Danger filled in by Galahad, and from now on the knights will all, as the Queste author 
admits, “consume their days in bootless pursuit of the Holy Grail” (99) (“toz dis foloieront . . . a 
quierre le Saint Graal” (77)). The Queste represents the pathos of this—“And even those men 
who fancied themselves hard and proud shed tears at this leave-taking” (53) (“Si plorerent assez 
a cel departement cil qui plus cuidoient avoir les cuers et durs et orgueillox” (26))—but it is 
 
14 Though Malory leaves this disqualification intact, he deletes a passage from the Queste on “the distinction 
between spiritual virginity (a lack of carnal desire as well as of carnal relations) and physical virginity (a lack of 
carnal relations),” in addition to an earlier passage on the necessity of Perceval’s remaining a virgin. In the former 
case, he also excises a related passage in which Adam and Eve experience “shame at the thought of copulating” on 
their way out of Eden (Tolhurst 133-7). 
15 Matarasso’s translation is strong here; Christopher Baswell suggests “not without considerable meaning.” 
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ultimately as unwavering in its mission as Galahad is in his own. Its author, like Chaucer’s 
Parson, has come to knit up all this feast and make an end. 
  Malory does react to, and in some respects even against, these drifts in his source. The 
mere fact of his not making the Queste the model for the last book of the Morte shows him 
denying this monastic romance the final word. As Riddy suggests, Malory shows a pointed 
preference throughout his work for orthodox eucharistic theology—and therefore for the tension 
between presence and absence, invisibilia and futura, that this theology entails. To stress the 
simplicity of the eucharistic real presence as a “fifteenth-century layman” is also to resist 
somewhat the Queste’s suggestion that the implications of this presence can be easily read into 
reality, in a way would collapse the “eschatological tension” of the present age on which the 
sacramental order is premised. Somewhat like Chaucer’s own eucharistic Host in his opposition 
to the Canon’s alchemy, Malory resists the Queste author’s attempt to make—in a much more 
sacred vein than that of the Canon—eschatological gold out of the rough materials of the present.  
In some cases, and in his own more earthbound way, Malory in fact refines the Queste 
author’s theological thinking. He pays particular attention to the psychological makeup of 
specific sins.16 Early in his quest, Lancelot sees the Grail heal a sick knight; half-dozing, he fails 
to approach the Grail himself. In both the Queste and in Malory’s “Sankgreal,” a white-habited, 
presumably Cistercian hermit soon explains to Lancelot that his mortal sin weighed him down 
and kept him from approaching the Grail as it passed. The specifics of the explanations offered, 
however, differ significantly: Malory removes a long reproach in terms of Jesus’s parable of the 
three servants—though he preserves the idea that Lancelot is to be specially reprimanded 
because he has been especially gifted—but introduces a new criticism of what the hermit calls 
 
16 As Tolhurst puts it, Malory has a “tendency to clarify his source text, whether or not theology is involved.” This 
leads him at times to undertake “revision for theological clarity” (134).  
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specifically Lancelot’s “presumpcion to take uppon you in dedely synne for to be in Hys 
presence, where Hys fleyssh and Hys blood was” (896). When Lancelot agrees to confess his 
sins, the two accounts once again diverge: in the Queste, the hermit adjures Lancelot, “promise 
me never again to trespass against your Maker by committing mortal sin with the queen” (“me 
creantez que ja mes ne mefferoiz a vostre creator en fesant pechié mortel de la reine”); 
acquiescing, “Lancelot plighted his troth as a true knight” (90) (“il li creante come loiaux 
chevaliers” (67)). The phrasing of Malory’s hermit is much more circumspect: “ensure me by 
youre knyghthode ye shall no more com in that quenys felyship as much as ye may forbere” 
(897). The whole confession scene shows Malory paying especially close attention to the specific 
nature of Lancelot’s sin, stressing more than the Queste author does its thoughtless pride and 
eucharistic insensibility. Again, Malory does not simply excise the Queste’s theology; instead, he 
carefully spins his source’s more monastic theology in a more lay-oriented, less purity-centered 
direction.17 
 Helen Cooper has recommended that, in considering Lancelot’s relationship with 
Guinevere, Malory’s readers “set aside the category of ‘adultery’ altogether: not because it is not 
an issue . . . but because it pre-empts too much. It puts an end to thought, just at the point where 
thinking ought to start” (The English Romance 320). In his treatment of Lancelot’s confession 
scene, Malory seems to be thinking harder about that adultery than the author of the Queste. His 
introduction of “presumpcion” marks an advance on the Queste hermit, who identifies the mortal 
sin of adultery as Lancelot’s problem but does not identify Lancelot’s sin of thinking himself 
worthy of the Grail in spite of it. The Queste’s identification of mortal sin is the more schematic; 
 
17 As I noted in Chapter Three, the historian John Bossy has described a fourteenth-century “community ethics” that 
made “more excuse for the sins of concupiscence than for those of aversion,” because “sins of aversion destroy 
community” (35). Purity, a monastic and especially Cistercian point of emphasis, is not at the center of Malory’s 
moral universe, as it was not at the center of the Parson’s. Community is. 
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Malory’s identification of presumption, the more thoughtfully diagnostic.18 The second 
divergence cited above shows Malory softening what the hermit asks of Lancelot, not necessarily 
because Malory endorses the adultery, but more likely because Malory knows that in his version 
of the story, Lancelot will in fact sin with the Queen again. The adjustments are made not so 
much to excuse Lancelot as to make his characterization over the course of the whole Morte 
Darthur more consistent, and to consistently identify the specific way in which Lancelot fails. 
Malory’s Lancelot has typical flaws—not just his adultery but also, and for Malory more 
seriously, his presumption and pride—but in the Morte Darthur he apparently keeps his promise 
to refrain from sin “as much as ye may forbere,” helping to make sense of his eventual salvation 
and even sanctification at the Morte’s end.19 Malory’s engagement with the Queste here and 
elsewhere therefore marks a movement not from the religious to the secular, but, as C.S. Lewis 
suggested, from the “mystical”-religious to the “ethical”-religious realm, where the things of this 
world are permeated with—without being overwhelmed by—the things of eternity (17). This 
leaves Lancelot’s freedom to judge and to act, crucially, still in play, even after his failure in the 
Quest, and at least all the way to the end of the “Book of Lancelot and Guinevere,” and leaves 
Malory room to explore the more mundane themes of sin and repentance that the Queste del 
Saint Graal systematically neglects.  
 The consequences of Malory’s turn toward ethical-religious questions reach far beyond 
his translation of the Queste. The “Sankgreal” is in fact used as a kind of organizing principle for 
 
18 Along similar lines, Nicolette Zeeman notes that in the Queste “these holy men with their schematic and (often 
literally) black-and-white glosses scarcely sum up the meaning and spiritual or affective impact of these narratives. 
The Queste knights who seek and suffer become part of a reiterative, typological narrative of sacramental wounding 
and sacrifice that stretches back to the crucifixion” (“Medieval religious allegory” 156). As I will argue, Malory is 
sensitive to this typological patterning, and fills in some of the gaps in the Queste’s over-schematism. 
19 Lancelot’s body is said to smell sweet after his death, and a Bishop sees a vision of him being welcomed at the 
gates of heaven. As Hanks, Jr. puts it, with this “added theme,” “central to the Morte,” “Christian doctrine insists 
and Malory’s fiction proclaims that human love, even adulterous human love, does not preclude a holy end” (22).  
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the rest of Malory’s work, often foreshadowed in the books preceding it and harkened back to in 
the books that follow. In his essay “‘The Tale of King Arthur’: Beginnings and 
Foreshadowings,” Thomas L. Wright makes two important points about the first tale of the 
Morte Darthur: first, that Malory’s Old French source for “The Tale of King Arthur,” known as 
the Suite du Merlin, presented its translator with a source text “conditioned by the idea that the 
Grail adventures impend as the central event of Arthurian history” (12); and second, that 
Malory’s response to that centrality was not at all to downplay the apparent importance of the 
Grail in favor of his less theology-burdened adventures, but rather to carefully clarify the place 
of the Grail, and of its particular religious sensibility, in relation to the other quests of the Round 
Table. As Wright points out, Malory makes Merlin a “spokesman of God” as never quite before, 
reinforcing the Suite’s already strong sense that providence plays a role in the installment of 
Arthur as King (26). On the other hand, this and other alterations to Malory’s source text mean 
that the Round Table is instituted not so much for the sake of the Grail Quest as for its own sake, 
heightening the eschatological tension between transcendence and immanence, the Grail and the 
Round Table, that the Queste del Saint Graal tends to simply collapse. Malory therefore 
responds flexibly to the presence of the Grail in his source, both cementing the ties between this 
first tale and his “Sankgreal” to come and, at the same time, making “The Tale of King Arthur,” 
and so the Round Table itself, more something of its own, dependent on the Grail quest for its 
fulfillment but not for its meaning in every instance. Somewhat like the Pseudo-Dionysian 
“symbol” in M.-D. Chenu’s reading of it, Malory’s use of the Grail demonstrates his unique 
“approach to intelligible reality,” which is emphatically not—as the Queste author’s tends to 
be—“an explanation of the world of sense by means of that reality.” Instead, the Morte Darthur 
author’s imagination begins most characteristically with “the lowest material level, on which the 
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mind of man found its connatural objects” (82)—with the Grail but also with the Round Table 
that precedes it; with Galahad, but also with Lancelot’s stubbornly irreducible, often 
presumptuous humanity. Unlike the monastic Queste author, Malory is always reluctant to leave 
the level of the merely human behind. 
 Wright’s conclusion concerning the first tale’s use of the Grail helps to clarify the role 
the Quest for the Grail plays in the Morte Darthur more generally: 
The Suite du Merlin achieved in the Grail quest a truly central motive which offered a 
sense of direction, an exceptional goal, an extraordinary challenge to test the moral sinew 
of a battle-proven court. But this test was spiritual and not social, a contest with the 
divine rather than the human, whereas it is above all else the struggle of man with himself 
that lies at the heart of Le Morte Darthur. (62-3)   
This struggle is also at the heart of Malory’s “Sankgreal,” where Lancelot struggles with himself 
as no one else does in the whole Morte Darthur. It also lies behind Malory’s depiction of the 
foundation of the chivalric order as something importantly separate from the Quest of the Grail; 
as Wright points out, “the Arthurian characters will move in a system of order which ultimately 
fails them, and which turns the structure of their society into chaos again” (66). But Malory’s 
emphasis on earthly conflict does not lead him to discard the irruption of transcendence that the 
Queste del Saint Graal represents; the whole rest of the Morte labors under the absence and in 
the aftermath of this “contest with the divine.” Malory’s most distinctive preoccupations lie 
instead in his insistence that the struggle with the self and the contest with the divine cannot at 
the deepest level be separated out, and his consequently close attention to the way the self 
understands itself in relation to others and to God. In a later section of this chapter I will offer an 
extended analysis of the two critical sequences in the Morte Darthur that are in my view most 
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informed by this preoccupation: “The Book of Balin” and “Lancelot and Guinevere,” especially 
the original “Healing of Sir Urry” sequence. But first, to describe the way Malory might have 
conceived of these two decisive struggles, I will turn again to the “greater rigor and clarity” of 
Cistercian mysticism, admired by Auerbach and perhaps, however indirectly, by Malory—an 
avid, if not impassive, reader of the possibly Cistercian Queste.  
 
Shame and simplicity in Malory’s Morte Darthur 
 Taking Jill Mann’s advice to begin our reading of Malory with the “terms . . . suggested 
by the work itself” (“Knightly Combat” 332), I will begin with presumption, the sin Malory 
specifically ascribes to Lancelot in the “Sankgreal” and a word that recurs at crucial points in the 
other books of the Morte Darthur. In a passage from his treatise De diligendo deo (“On Loving 
God”) that I have cited in passing earlier in this study, Bernard offers a summary of his view of 
the importance of self-knowledge and the corresponding dangers of presumption and despair:  
Therefore it is necessary that you know two things: both what you are, and that you are 
not so by your own power, so that you do not either glory not at all, or vainly glory. . . 
.what is most to be abhorred is presumption, by which you knowingly and deliberately 
dare to seek glory with goods that are not your own. . . .It is, in fact, pride, and the 
greatest sin, to use one’s gifts as if they were innate in oneself, and to usurp the glory of 
the benefactor by means of his benefices. 
(“Utrumque ergo scias necesse est, et quid sis, et quod a teipso non sis, ne aut omnino 
videlicet non glorieris, aut inaniter glorieris. . . .exsecranda illa praesumptio est, qua 
sciens et prudens forte audeas de bonis non tuis tuam quaerere gloriam. . . .Est quippe 
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superbia et delictum maximum, uti datis tamquam innatis, et in acceptis beneficiis 
gloriam usurpare benefici.”) (II.4; III:122-3) 
Here Bernard identifies the willful ignorance of presumption—exemplified in Malory’s Lancelot 
by his approaching the sacrament knowing himself to be in mortal sin—with pride, the “greatest 
sin.”20 But first, Bernard emphasizes something that crucially aligns his thought with Malory’s 
more chivalric ideal: the importance of combatting both over- and under-evaluation of the self. 
These are the two conspiring poles that Bernard refers to elsewhere as “pride” and “despair” or, 
when discussed in terms of their positive aspects, as the complementary attitudes toward God of 
“love” and “fear.”21 Perhaps Bernard’s greatest interpreter in Middle English, Julian of 
Norwich,22 produced several adaptations of this idea in her own writing. In her Revelation of 
Love she writes, “thus in this dred, I have matter of mekenesse, that saveth me fro presumption. 
And in the blessed shewing of love, I have mater of true comforte and of joy, that saveth me fro 
despair” (369).23 The answer for Julian, as for Bernard, is not an anxious balancing between the 
 
20 In his second sermon for the feast of St. Andrew, Bernard identifies pride with the noonday devil, and calls it the 
root of all sin: “But look! Here is the sickness that destroys at noonday, the spirit of pride that often rises up against 
us subtly in a shining array of virtues. We take care frequently to point out to you how pernicious this is. For the 
beginning of all sin and the cause of all damnation is pride” (“Sed ecce daemonium meridianum, superbiae scilicet 
spiritus, qui nimirum in maiori splendore virtutum acrius insurgere solet. Haec autem quam perniciosa sit, saepius 
vobis intimare curamus. Initium quippe Omnis peccati et causa totius perditionis Superbia est.”). This passage 
serves as another warning against the over-simplified exegetical readings of the noonday devil I criticized in Chapter 
One, and as a reminder that Bernard’s vision of the virtues is idiosyncratic and importantly monastic. For Bernard, 
there is no substitute for the humility of the cross: “it is only on this [top] arm [of the cross, which resists the 
noonday demon of pride] that the title of salvation and of sovereignty is inscribed, because only the one who 
humbles himself merits to be saved and lifted up” (“Sane hoc solum est, cui salutis pariter et regni titulus inscribitur, 
quia solus qui se humiliat salvari et exaltari meretur”) (7-8; V:439). 
21 See the thirty-seventh sermon on the Song of Songs: “As the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom, so the 
beginning of all sin is pride; and in the same way that the love of God lays claim for itself to the perfection of 
wisdom, so despair lays claim to the total consummation of malice” (“sicut Initium sapientiae timor Domini, sic 
Initium omnis peccati superbia; et quomodo perfectionem sibi sapientiae vindicat amor Dei, ita desperatio sibi 
omnem malitiae consummationem”) (37.6; II:12). 
22 I do not have space to defend this suggestion here. As I noted in Chapter Two, Julian recognizably cites Bernard, 
which is very rare in her writing. She is clearer and more original on the theme of presumption and despair than any 
other vernacular writer I am aware of, and is in my view the best representative of a Middle English counter-
tradition that recuperates the essence of Bernard’s mystical vision. 
23 A little earlier in the Revelation, Julian describes the “two manner of sicknesse that we have” in slightly different 
terms: “one is unpatiens or slouth. . . .The other is despair or doughtfulle drede.” Of the latter she writes, “we . . . fall 
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two extremes, but a love and an understanding of the self as loved that transcends them both: 
“For the blessed comfort that I sawe, it is large inough for us alle.” For now, however, most of us 
will tend to oscillate between the two.24 
 Knights in Malory tend to be on the one hand what could be called hieratic, or even 
simple-minded—their resistance to psychologizing has led Mann to recommend banishing the 
word “character” from the vocabulary of Arthurian studies altogether (“Knightly Combat” 
332)—and yet, they are constantly reflecting on themselves in terms of their “worship,” and on 
their “worship” as potentially compromised by their “shame.” “Worship” suggests at first 
something of the pride that we would expect Bernard or any other theologian to warn against. 
And yet “worship” in Malory often seems to work as a motivation for ethical behavior, and even 
for a sense of self-worth that is reminiscent of Bernard’s emphasis on the dignity of the soul as 
created by God; knowing “what you are” (“quid sis”) is, in the De diligendo deo’s formulation, 
most fundamentally a reason to glory. “Shame” has a similar double valence in the Bernardine 
scheme. For all Bernard’s emphasis on humility—his first treatise is written De gradibus 
humilitatis et superbiae (“On the Steps of Humility and Pride”)—he emphasizes equally that 
something like shame is only productive when it is directed toward God; to feel shame for what 
you are most essentially is to despair, and so to insult the goodness of God’s creation. If 
“worship” and “shame” both have a potentially sinful aspect, it is nonetheless easy to see how 
both could, therefore, in the Bernardine schema, also be made productive, harnessed toward a 
 
oftimes into so moche wrechednes that shame it is to say it. And the beholding of this maketh us so sory and so hevy 
that unnethes we can see ony comfort. And this drede we take sometime for a mekenes, but it is a foule blindhede 
and a wekenesse” (352-3). It is perhaps easier to see here than it is in Bernard’s writing itself just what the Pseudo-
Bernardine Meditationes piissimae and the Prick of Conscience were missing, and what imaginative theologians like 
Langland, Chaucer, and Julian attempted to recuperate.  
24 Julian describes herself as struggling with this oscillation: “In this liking, I was fulfillede of the everlasting 
sekernesse, mightely fastned without any painefulle drede. . . .This lasted but a while, and I was turned and left to 
myselfe in hevines and werines of my life and irkenes of myselfe, that unneth I could have patience to live…. And 
anon after this, oure blessed lorde gave me again the comfort and the rest in soule” (175-7). 
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regular recalibration of the self and its self-image that recalls mankind to its natural dignity when 
it has lost its sense of this, and reminds it of the distance between its present state and that 
original dignity when it is in danger of treating its gifts “as if they were innate in oneself.”  
In fact, this process of combatting under- and over-evaluation of the self is, I believe, just 
as important for Malory as it is for Bernard, and represents one way in which Malory may be 
said at times even to “sacralize” his romance sources. The de-psychologizing Mann notices 
really is one of the marks of the ideal Malorian knight; the “prevy hate” of Mordred and 
Aggravayne for Lancelot and Guinevere (1161), which brings about the fall of the Round Table, 
is characteristic of the way, in Malory’s work, what is depicted as peculiarly “inward” is almost 
always corrosive in its effects. As Elizabeth Edwards puts it, “subjectivity is presented as the 
result of errors, and as the source of errors” (Genesis 170). But this too has its corollary in 
Bernard’s description of the ideal Christian selfhood. In fact, an appropriately calibrated 
Bernardine soul might look much like the hieratic, de-psychologized selves Mann describes, 
entirely unlike the psychological tangles we tend to think of as proper fictional “characters.” This 
can be seen in the way Bernard describes the self before God in terms of three qualities, inherent 
in every soul and forfeited only by way of sin: natural freedom of will, natural immortality, and 
natural simplicity. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, simplicity is the first of the three that 
Bernard describes, and the one he discusses at greatest length (81.2, II:284-5); it is lost, he says, 
only when the soul foregoes the natural alignment of its will with God’s, substituting a putatively 
autonomous self-will for its necessarily dependent freedom. The resultant duplicity necessarily 
leads the soul into an unnatural “realm of unlikeness” (“regio dissimilitudinis”), an Augustinian 
formulation Bernard employs to describe the alienation from oneself and one’s creator that is 
experienced when this original simplicity is abandoned in favor of the self-will’s duplicitous 
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impositions.25 Even then, “there nonetheless perseveres in every soul, along with its original 
duplicity, a native simplicity” (“perseverat nihilominus in omni anima cum originali duplicitate 
generalis simplicitas”) (82.3; II:294). Fallen humanity, condemned by its illusion of autonomy to 
struggle with itself, forgetting that its own creation was an unwilled gift of grace, nevertheless 
cannot erase the mark, the “character,” of its former glory.  
The ideal knight for Malory and the ideal monk for Bernard are both therefore 
characterized by a simplicity that is free from the presumptuousness of self-will. Like human 
beings for Bernard, knights in Malory simply are glorious; but maintaining this glory depends on 
a faithful dependence on something like grace as the guarantee of one’s God-given identity. 
Otherwise, one will slide again into presumption and despair, over-assertion and hopeless 
disappointment. In a similar vein, Erich Auerbach calls the knight’s experience of “adventure” in 
romance a “fated and graduated test of election; . . . the basis of a doctrine of personal perfection 
through a development dictated by fate” (Mimesis 136). This emphasis on election is balanced by 
an insistence on the importance of individual volition: “The personal element in the courtly 
virtues is not simply a gift of nature; . . . preserving them requires the unforced will to renew 
them by constant and tireless practice and proving” (134). The process of “proving” oneself in 
adventures is, in Auerbach’s reading, importantly both passive and active; it is “fated,” a “test of 
election,” and yet it calls for the “constant and tireless” exercise of “the unforced will.” In his 
influential essay “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” Mikhail Bakhtin also 
emphasizes the importance of something like faith for the romance knight, acted out in this 
process of testing that is most typically called “adventure.” Unlike Auerbach, however, Bakhtin 
does not note the relationship between the ideals of chivalric romance and those of monastic 
 
25 Étienne Gilson’s The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard provides a good overview of these themes (45-6). As I 
noted in Chapter Two, for Augustine’s regio see his Confessions VII, 10.16. 
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mysticism. Perhaps it is because he is at no pains to distinguish “secular” chivalry from the realm 
of the religious, that his description of the experience of chivalric “adventure-time” resonates so 
easily and deeply with the Christian and specifically Bernardine ideal of the natural simplicity of 
the soul: 
Any adventure-time will contain a mixture of chance, fate, the gods and so forth. Indeed, 
this type of time emerges only at points of rupture (when some hiatus opens up) in 
normal, real-life, “law-abiding” temporal sequences, where these laws (of whatever sort) 
are suddenly violated and events take an unexpected and unforeseen turn. This 
“suddenly” is normalized, as it were, in chivalric romances; it becomes something 
generally applicable, in fact, almost ordinary. The whole world becomes miraculous, so 
the miraculous becomes ordinary without ceasing at the same time to be miraculous. . . . 
The hero of a chivalric romance . . . plunges headfirst into adventures as if they 
were his native element; for him, the world exists exclusively under the sign of the 
miraculous “suddenly”; it is the normal condition of his world. He is an adventurer, but a 
disinterested one (he is not, of course, an adventurer in the later sense of the word, that is, 
in the sense of a man who coldbloodedly pursues his own greedy goals by extraordinary 
means). By his very nature he can live only in this world of miraculous chance, for only it 
preserves his identity. And the very code by which he measures his identity is calibrated 
precisely to this world of miraculous chance. . . . (151-2) 
According to Bahktin, by his very nature, the knight must plunge “headfirst” into the world of 
“miraculous chance,” making no provisions for presumed autonomy or even for self-evaluation. 
The Bakhtinian knight is bound, in essence, to a faithful reliance on the intervention of grace, the 
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great “miraculous suddenly” that becomes, in the world of Christian theology as in the world of 
romance, “almost ordinary.”  
 And yet, this picture of the miraculous, adventuring knight is not without its own 
implicit tensions. In comparison with the Bernardine scheme, one might ask a question that 
seems to have occurred very clearly to Malory: in a world of pure grace, where is the guardrail 
against presumption? If the world of the miraculous suddenly is indeed the knight’s “native 
element,” it is clear that the knight himself is in some way miraculous; as Bernard might have 
put it, he has a “native simplicity” that is on some level inalienable from him, and that should 
guard him against the dangers of despairing of himself and of his essentially miraculous world. 
But what about Bernard’s “realm of unlikeness,” where the soul becomes misaligned with the 
world it was made for? Or, in other words, what about sin? This recalls Jennifer Herdt’s concern 
with those “early modern hyper-Augustinians” for whom “A pure will, a pure heart, must first be 
given by God in some way outside of, and discontinuous with, ordinary moral psychology,” 
conjuring an essentially “passive human self” (3). Malory’s ethical-religious bent leads him to 
refuse the temptation to sidestep this question, and so to emphasize not only the simplicity of the 
upright self as it is seen in the best of his knights, but also that this simplicity must be achieved 
by means of a habitual self-surrender, a progressively ingrained resistance to the more self-
centered “subjectivity” that Edwards identifies as a “source of errors.” At the same time, this 
brings Malory to rethink the nature of despair; as we will see, his most original contributions to 
Lancelot’s story arc identify a sort of presumptuousness in despair itself, a distinct presumption 
in Lancelot’s understanding his falling back into habitual sin as something that necessarily 
makes him less than or other than he was made to be. The world of the Morte Darthur, like the 
world as St. Bernard describes it, is one in which a phrase from the contemporary theologian 
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Karl Barth might resonate: “Everyone who has to contend with unbelief should be advised that 
he ought not to take his unbelief too seriously. Only faith is to be taken seriously” (20-1). But it 
is perhaps harder than Bakhtin’s “miraculous” reading of romance might suggest to determine 
just what faith means in Malory, and how exactly one is to take it seriously. Some of the most 
essential moments in the Morte Darthur, from Lancelot’s adultery to Balin’s death at the hands 
of his own brother, depend on these questions. 
 
Taking the Wrong Adventure: Presumption and Despair in Malory’s “Book of Balin” 
 
 The Winchester Manuscript gives the first tale of the Morte Darthur, “The Tale of King 
Arthur,” two subtitles: “The Book of Balin” and “The Wedding of King Arthur.” The strange 
centrality of Balin’s story—strange considering how short-lived Balin’s knighthood is, and how 
relentlessly tragic—has made it a favorite for literary critics. Jill Mann’s seminal essay, “Taking 
the Adventure: Malory and the Suite du Merlin,” advanced a thought-provoking interpretation of 
the “Balin” story, arguing that understanding the meaning of “aventure” in Malory depends on 
recognizing that “The knight who undertakes an adventure submits to chance, in order to 
discover what chance has allotted him” (79). In the story itself, what Balin discovers is that, by 
taking a sword from a lady who says the sword can only be unsheathed by “a passynge good man 
of hys hondys and of hys dedis, and withoute velony other trechory and withoute treson” (61-2), 
he has in fact ensured that he will kill the man he loves most, and, as the lady herself puts it, “the 
swerde shall be youre destruccion” (64). For Mann, that Balin discovers particularly unfortunate 
things about his fate only makes him a better illustration of what she calls the “split between self 
and destiny” in the Morte (84)—the fact that adventures do not arrive as predetermined 
expressions of a knight’s underlying selfhood, but rather as contingent outside circumstances to 
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which the knight must adapt himself. Following Mann, J. Allan Mitchell sees in Balin Malory’s 
“most emphatic example of the one who is touched by events” (129)—again, a figure for the 
preeminence of contingency and of the split between the self and its fate in the world of the 
Morte Darthur. Somehow, finding Balin at the end of his tale sprawled out on his back next to 
the brother he has just slain, doomed to lie there alive till “the mydnyghte after” his brother has 
expired (91), we are meant in these readings to see him, as Mitchell puts it, “realizing the 
aspirations of all heroes of chivalric romance. . . .given over to temporality and exteriority . . . 
individuated by a strange adventure” (129).  
 To argue that Balin’s fate has anything to do with his or anyone’s “aspirations” requires a 
remarkable degree of abstraction from the story. This is an abstraction already inherent in 
Mann’s reading, and only slightly dramatized by Mitchell. Like Mann’s, Mitchell’s argument 
assumes a great deal about what he calls the “contingent and agonistic realm of romance” (129), 
the world of Balin’s relentlessly tragic downfall. This “realm” is in fact almost a parody, a kind 
of negative or mirror image, of the world of “miraculous chance” as it was described by 
Bakhtin—a world in which every “chance,” even the worst possible one, is experienced as the 
preservation of identity, and as the mysterious but sure providence of, and opportunity for, the 
operation of something like grace. And yet it is true that Balin finds his way into a “contingent 
and agonistic realm” of his own, and true also that his story represents, as Mann puts it, “a 
miniature version of the tragedy which is to engulf the whole Arthurian world” (“Taking the 
Adventure” 75). What Mann and Mitchell in fact offer up, by way of a total sympathy with 
Balin’s mistakes and with the fortune-ruled world in which he eventually finds himself—leaving 
an impressive body count in his wake—is a sort of negative theology of adventure, useful insofar 
as it calls attention to the real difficulties of what is sometimes called “taking the adventure” in 
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Malory in the right, ethical-religious way. Ultimately, it is neither in the world of “miraculous 
chance,” nor in the world of sheer “temporality and exteriority,” that Malory situates his heroes, 
but instead somewhere in the “eschatological tension” between them. As with Lancelot’s 
“adultery,” Balin’s tragedy, the tragedy of the seemingly good knight who nevertheless makes 
the very worst mistakes, is only where the thinking should begin. 
 Contingency has its place in that thinking, and in the Morte Darthur. Mann is not exactly 
wrong to say that “the pattern of destiny is formed (as Boethius tells us it is) by chance” (86), but 
she tellingly excludes Boethius’s conclusion—and this is arguably the problem to which the 
whole Consolation of Philosophy is addressed—that this must be, without an accompanying 
sense of a providence behind the “pattern,” an obvious cause for despair.26 Mann’s reading, like 
Mitchell’s, is strongly ideological, so determined to find a deep determinism in Malory that it 
will not settle for the real tragedy of the Balin story, and of the Arthur story as a whole, which in 
fact depends on a sense of free agents seeming to do their best but ending up, not entirely but still 
fatally, in the wrong.27 Mann and Mitchell’s reading, on the other hand, recalls the way one of 
Chaucer’s would-be alchemists insists that “Us moste putte oure good in aventure” (VIII.946), 
“construing time as modular . . . rather than gradual and causal” and “encoding the idea of 
futurity (“aventure,” from adventura, “about to happen”) in his very lexis of for-tune” (Johnson, 
 
26 This is implicit in Lady Philosophy’s reproach of the prisoner’s provisional embrace of Fortune, in Book II, pr.1, 
40: “But if [Fortune] cannot be held fast by your willing it, and makes those she flees from miserable, what is this 
fleeting goddess but a sure sign of misery to come?” (“Quos si nec ex arbitrio retineri potest et calamitosos fugiens 
facit, quid est aliud fugax quam futurae quoddam calamitatis indicium?”) (176-9). This text and translation are from 
the Loeb edition of De consolatione philosophiae, cited in my Works Cited below. 
27 For a strong argument for the role of the will’s evil inclinations in Malory, see Christopher Cannon’s “Malory’s 
Crime: Chivalric Identity and the Evil Will.” Cannon concludes that “it is not an arbitrary and random evil that 
destroys Arthur’s kingdom but an arbitrary good fortune that – at least for a time – kept lethal forces in check” 
(182). Though Cannon, somewhat like Mann, tends to overemphasize the role of arbitrary chance in the Morte, his 
stress on the way an evil will is at work even in Malory’s best knights represents a helpful corrective to her position. 
For a more direct refutation of Mann, see Marilyn Corrie, “Self Determination in the Post-Vulgate Suite Du Merlin 
and Malory’s Le Morte Darthur.”  
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Practicing Literary Theory 148), disavowing agency in the present. This is an idea of “aventure” 
that fetishizes fate and the futura, collapsing fate into chance, whatever the future may bring. 
Facing up to the worry of contingency—as a real worry, rather than as a cause for celebrating the 
being “touched by events” that is the death of Balin and his brother—means allowing for the 
possibilities of providence and of freedom, and so asking how it is that Balin gets himself into a 
“contingent and agonistic realm” all his own, far from Bakhtin’s world of “miraculous chance” 
and also from the more balanced Bernardine simplicity of the unburdened, un-presumptuous 
will. Mitchell asserts that “the sources of [Balin’s] corruption” are “diffuse in the narrative” 
(127), and leaves it at that; Malory relentlessly worries over, without ever simplifying, those 
sources. This, and not any split between self and destiny, is the real fascination of what Mann 
foregrounds in her treatment of Malory’s “Book of Balin”: Balin really is so good,28 and his fate 
really is so bad. But what if—Malory is always asking, in the tale of Balin and elsewhere—the 
two are not unrelated, but are in fact both necessary ways of describing, and of explaining, one 
and the same person? What if the essential split is not between Balin and his destiny, much less a 
supposedly contingent world and a miraculous one, but between Balin and himself? And what if 
Balin were really free? 
  When, at the start of the Balin story, King Arthur offers to try to unsheathe the 
miraculous sword that has been brought to his court, he is careful to qualify the grounds for his 
attempt: “I woll assay myselffe to draw oute the swede, nat presumynge myselff that I am the 
beste knyght; but . . . in gyvyng an insample to all the barownes, that they shall assay everych 
one” (62). Arthur explicitly disavows presumption—the result, for St. Bernard, of letting a 
 
28 Balin is described as a “good man named of his body,” and the damsel who brought the sword to the court says 
he’s the best knight she’s found on her long journeying (63). It is therefore too simple to suggest that Balin 
straightforwardly deserves his fate. 
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falsely autonomous self-image displace the soul’s natural, un-presumptuous state of simplicity. 
Simplicity is in fact a distinguishing mark of Arthur, the notably naive warrior-king who draws 
the sword from the stone only because he cannot bear to have his brother Kay without one; his 
activity as King is, in general, remarkably passive, as can be seen most clearly in his simply 
refusing to deal with the issue of the Queen and Lancelot’s increasingly public adultery. The 
question of how this simplicity is lost, and how it might be regained, hovers over the Morte, and 
especially over the way Malory makes use of the term “aventure” throughout. Mann describes 
“taking the adventure” in Malory as “a strange combination of activity and passivity” (“Taking 
the Adventure” 79). In her reading, when Balin draws the sword at court and so accepts the 
destiny that comes with it, he invites the “adventure” of contingency that is in any case his fate, 
embracing this mysterious combination. Although I strongly disagree with the idea that Balin’s 
particular way of “taking the adventure” should be understood as his getting the balance between 
activity and passivity right, these are nonetheless helpful terms—understood with reference to 
the dangers of Bernardine “presumption” and “despair,” but also with reference to Malory’s own 
key terms “worship” and “shame”—for interrogating the decisions made by the adventurous 
knights in Malory, and for understanding the way they relate to the Bernardine schema.29  
An interrogation of Balin’s actions in particular requires close analysis of how Malory 
uses that word “adventure” throughout the Morte Darthur, and so demands a less abstract look at 
the word’s use than that which was offered in the first section of this chapter. What I take to be 
the crucially chivalric, romance use of the word, a use consonant with the definitions offered by 
both Auerbach and Bakhtin, can be seen at work in the beginning of “A Noble Tale of Sir 
 
29 In his recent book-length study of the role of agency and intention in Chaucer, John Bugbee has argued that 
Bernard’s “mystical theory of action” involves an important balance of activity and passivity in the human will’s 
relation to God (137).  
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Launcelot du Lake,” the third tale of the Morte Darthur. By the time this tale begins, “arms and 
worship that passed all other of her fellowys in prouesse and noble dedys” have already been 
“proved on” Lancelot “in especiall”; but all this is described as only “play and game” next to 
Lancelot’s resolve “hymself to preve in straunge adventures.” Thinking to prove himself in this 
way, Lancelot “bade his nevew, sir Lyonell, for to make hym redy, ‘for we must go seke 
adventures.’ So they mounted on their horses, armed at all ryghtes, and rode into a depe foreste 
and so into a playne” (253). There is something about the real risks of adventure, the willed 
vulnerability and “active passivity” of riding into a “depe foreste,” that seems to the only way for 
a knight to really “preve” himself, to know himself and to show to others his own identity, no 
matter how much greatness is “proved on him” by way of his more actively demonstrated 
prowess at court. As Bakhtin observed, “by his very nature” the “hero of a chivalric romance . . . 
can live only in this world of miraculous chance”—this world of adventure—“for only it 
preserves his identity” (152). This tangle of activity and passivity in the person of Lancelot 
already suggests that “self and destiny” are much more intertwined in Malory than Mann tends to 
admit: Lancelot, at least, trusts that the adventure he takes will really “prove” himself, will make 
his essence known to himself and others. He trusts, in other words, that his destiny, however 
adventurously unpredictable, is genuinely self-disclosing and in no way arbitrary. 
 The word “aventure” in Malory in fact serves as a sort of battleground for meaning, a site 
where Malory works through his own ideas on contingency and providence, activity and 
passivity, rather than a mere fixed term that always refers to arbitrary “chance.” Though Mann 
seems drawn to the idea that knights may be defined by their adventures—she allows that the 
adventure of the sword alone really may say something about Balin’s most essential selfhood—
she glosses over the possibility that “adventure” might mean anything like a definitive, identity-
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conferring “miraculous chance,” preferring to de-theologize both “adventure” and “grace” at the 
outset of her study. She glosses these two words, respectively, as “fortune” and “good fortune,” 
as if there were no other nuances available; the fifth Middle English Dictionary entry for 
“aventure”—which, like the first, cites Malory for one of its references, and which reads, “A 
marvelous thing (action, occurrence), a wonder, a miracle”—is apparently forgotten (5). My 
purpose here is not so much to re-theologize the word, as to suggest that Malory uses the word 
“aventure” in several ways, some of them with an importantly theological dimension. The first 
MED entry for “aventure” in fact offers a choice between “fate,” “fortune,” and “chance,” 
presenting the interpreter with the difficulty of deciding whether or not to see the mechanism that 
sets events in motion as an active, intentional force in the adventuring process. The choice 
between these definitions is a choice not only of words but of entire world-views: Do we choose 
“fate,” with its implications of some guiding force, providential or not, behind the “aventure” the 
knight is presented with? Do we choose “fortune,” with its sense of a guiding force that is 
nonetheless somehow importantly arbitrary? Or do we choose “chance,” which would seem to 
deny any agency or even intelligible order to events?  
 Posing these questions makes it easier to spot subtleties in phrasing that seem native to 
Malory’s habitual way of thinking. Take Mann’s titular “taking the adventure” phrase, which is 
nearly unique to the Balin story and so which is, I believe, critical for understanding what makes 
him so important to the Morte Darthur as a whole. The phrase itself first occurs when the damsel 
who gives Balin his second sword, supposedly destined for the best knight in the world, asks for 
it back. Balin answers, “I shall take the aventure . . . that God woll ordayne for me. But the 
swerde ye shall nat have at thys tyme, by the feythe of my body!” (64). Against Mann’s more 
one-sided reading of the term, it is in my view important to read each use of the phrase “taking 
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the adventure” in relation to the different ways “adventure” is used throughout the whole Morte 
Darthur. Considered alongside more typical uses like Lancelot’s breezy “we must go seke 
adventures” (253), “taking the adventure” starts to look in fact like an especially active, assertive 
phrase; “seeking” and “taking” clearly signify two very different ways of disposing oneself 
toward the event in question. This more contextual reading of the term makes it clear that Balin 
is emphatically not submitting to sheer chance, but rather asserting that he will submit to any 
chance, any “aventure,” that means he gets to keep the sword—a sword that, we are told, 
“pleased hym muche” when he first drew it from its scabbard and eagerly “loked on” it (63). 
According to the MED, the specific phrase Balin uses means something like “to take (one’s) 
chances” (1b)—a phrase that in fact communicates, in modern English, a sense of presumptuous 
self-confidence. It is safe to assume that it communicates something of the same sense in 
Malory’s Middle English as well. 
 The second use in the tale of the phrase “taking the adventure” comes after Balin has 
witnessed the suicide of the lady Columbe, another test in activity and passivity that he seems 
once again to decisively fail. Having just dispatched Launceor, Columbe’s lover, Balin attempts 
to take Launceor’s sword out of Columbe’s would-be suicidal hand, but stops when he realizes 
that “he myght nat take hit oute of hir honde but yf he shold have hurt hir.” All of a sudden, as 
Balin looks on, Columbe sets the pommel on the ground and falls on her sword, leaving Balin 
“hevy” and “ashamed that so fayre a damesell had destroyed hirselff for the love of hys dethe” 
(69). Merlin, a generally reliable judge and prophet in the “Tale of King Arthur,” blames Balin at 
once—“thou haste done thyselff grete hurte that thou saved nat thys lady that slew herselff; for 
thou myghtyst have saved hir and thou hadist wold” (71)—and even credits this event with 
causing the later “Dolorous Stroke,” which will institute the Waste Land and hurry Balin on to 
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his eventual fate in double-fratricide. If Merlin is right, Balin’s problem in the particular case of 
Columbe’s suicide is something like a kind of practical determinism or over-passivity; he could 
have prevented the death if he “hadist wold,” but he acted as if he could not do so. At Arthur’s 
court he had pretended that taking the sword from the lady over her objections was a matter of 
providential necessity—“I shall take the aventure . . . that God woll ordayne”—but here he 
pretends, effectively if not explicitly, the reverse: that taking the sword from Columbe would be 
an impossibility, despite the immediately and obviously disproportional nature of the “hurt” to 
which this inactivity swiftly leads. As a Bernardine framework makes clear, the choices are not 
so different as they might seem: Balin chooses, again, to act as if he has no choice, and so draws 
tighter the knot of arrogant overactivity and ashamed inaction—of presumption and despair, in 
other words—around him. He then flees the scene, unable to bear the sight of the dead couple, 
and immediately meets with his brother Balan, previously unmentioned in the tale. When Balin 
informs Balan that he has beheaded the Lady of the Lake in Arthur’s court, killed the knight 
Launceor that was sent by Arthur to pursue him, and stood idly by at the lady Columbe’s suicide, 
Balan admits that these events grieve him, too, but there is nothing to be done; “ye must take the 
adventure that God woll ordayne you” (70). By now the dynamic of over-activity and -passivity 
has so solidified around Balin that this perhaps even rings true; in a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy, the knight now inhabits the deterministic world he first hypothesized for himself. 
There is nothing left to do but watch his own tragedy unravel.   
 The appearance of Balan at just this point in the story seems to mark the end of the period 
in which Balin has real agency; no longer will anyone suggest that he could have really done 
otherwise. Some readers have taken a psychoanalytical approach to the uncanny apparition of 
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this parroting brother;30 but if we examine it in terms of St. Bernard’s own psychologically acute 
theological framework, we can approach that doubling, and its attendant sense of strangeness, 
from a direction that is probably more germane to Malory’s own thought. In Bernard’s “realm of 
unlikeness” the naturally simple soul curves away from its simple identity in God, and so is 
inevitably split, or doubled; it is exiled from itself and from its deepest identity, which can only 
consist in willing nothing other than what God wills—and certainly not in willing to keep a self-
defining sword, and identifying that stubborn self-will itself with the will of God. In his forty-
second sermon De diversis Bernard writes, “The first realm is the realm of unlikeness. That 
noble creature, made in the realm of likeness, made in fact in the image of God, when he was in 
honor, did not understand this, and so descended from likeness into unlikeness. A great 
unlikeness indeed, from heaven to hell, from angel to beast, from God to the devil!” (“Prima 
regio est regio dissimilitudinis. Nobilis illa creatura in regione similitudinis fabricata, quia ad 
imaginem Dei facta, cum in honore esset, non intellexit et de similitudine ad dissimilitudinem 
descendit. Magna prorsus dissimilitudo, de paradiso ad infernum, de angelo ad iumentum, Deo 
ad diabolum!”) (42.2; VI:256). The split that sin engenders, then, is linked by Bernard not just to 
the diabolical, but also to the beastly, which man “when he was in honor” was so unlike as to be 
almost angelic; but it is above all a splitting, a ripping asunder of “likeness” into an unlikeness 
that is, like the relationship between Balin and Balan, defined by doubles: heaven and hell, angel 
and beast, God and the devil. 
 The one time Balin and Balan fight together alongside Arthur, we are told that the 
onlookers “seyde they were sente from hevyn as angels other devilles from helle” (76). The text 
itself therefore suggests that we should think of the introduction of Balan as the marker of an 
 
30 In her book The Genesis of Narrative, Elizabeth Edwards makes use of the Freudian uncanny and the “doubling” 
theory of René Girard to capture the sense of strangeness here (41-43). 
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emergent diabolic duplicity in Balin. Balin has reached, it seems, the point of no return, and is no 
longer self-possessed enough to act as a free moral agent. From here on out we will be dealing 
only with consequences, an ineluctable chain of tragedy that really does look something like fate, 
an “adventure” Balin has taken and cannot take back. Balin’s own original “I shall take the 
aventure” with the sword may be an instance of self-deception—he pretends he cannot do 
otherwise—but he seems at least to believe himself then. When Columbe dies, he says her death 
“grevith [him] sore” (70); cast down from selfish arrogance to helplessness, from presumption to 
despair, he begins to need a doubling brother, a Balan, to reassure him that things really could 
not have been otherwise. This suggests that even Balin no longer really believes this. The only 
way at this point in the story for Balin to continue acting as if he were an essentially volition-
less, passive agent, only “taking” a pre-determined adventure—and so not paralyzingly 
responsible for the exponentially fatal effects of his actions—is to summon up a second, 
supplemental self, which will reassure him that he never had a choice anyway. In short, Balan 
makes it possible for Balin to continue lying to himself—to become two knights in one, 
deceiving and self-deceived, diabolically self-justifying. 
 There can be no doubt, in any case, that Balin’s “taking the adventure” seems at once, 
like a kind of magnet, to draw all kinds of violence, and especially self-harm, to Balin’s person. 
When she sees Launceor dead, Columbe cries out, “A! Balyne, two bodyes thou haste slain in 
one herte, and two hertes in one body, and two soules thou hast loste” (69), and kills herself; 
when Merlin tells Balin that he will eventually strike the Dolorous Stroke because of Columbe’s 
death, Balin says this cannot be true, “for and I wyste thou seyde soth, I wolde do so perleous a 
dede that I wolde sle myself to make the a lyer” (71). Toward the end of his tale, when Balin 
brings the knight Garnysh to see that Garnysh’s lover has taken another lover for her own, 
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Garnysh kills his lover and her new paramour where they lie, then cries out, “now is my sorou 
doubel that I may not endure, now have I slayne that I moost loved in al my lyf!” and “sodenly” 
kills himself  (87). Garnysh, like Columbe, decides that he is not himself without his lover, much 
as Balin decides he is not himself without his sword; but Garnysh goes further than Columbe, 
deciding his lover cannot be herself without her love for him, and so makes himself a murderer 
as well as a suicide. There is an implicit meditation here on the self-destructive feedback loop of 
presumption and despair, and on the related way that a projected sense of incompletion can 
generate a latently violent misperceived need for another object or person to complete oneself. 
The tale is full of the disastrous doublings that this false neediness generates, each of which leads 
to violent and self-destructive action.31 This applies not just to Balin but to the world of romance 
itself; everything good in that world is turned inside-out, made unlike itself; “taken” up in acts of 
presumptuous self-will, at once self-asserting and denying entirely the reality of its own 
assertion, the miraculous “suddenly” of adventure becomes in the “Tale of Balin” the relentless 
“now,” and “now,” and “soddenly” of Garnysh’s murder-suicide. The tale might even be 
conceived, in the way of “imaginative theory,” as a deliberate representation and dramatization 
of the romance genre’s seamy underside, its latent inability to deal with complex ethical agency 
and the ramifying consequences of one’s own supposedly “miraculous,” in fact self-chosen 
adventures. 
 The third and final use of the phrase “taking the adventure” in the tale lacks the 
misplaced invocations of providence that are present in the first two, and is still more 
catastrophic. It comes just after Balin has exchanged his own shield for a larger one on a whim, 
 
31 Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death makes a similar point about the self’s being either in despair wanting to 
be itself, or in despair, wanting not to be itself. The former I would identify roughly with Bernardine presumption; 
the latter, with despair. 
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ensuring that he will not be recognized by his brother and so setting his own and his brother’s 
eventual deaths in motion. Balin is warned that he is in great danger, “for by [his] sheld [he] 
shold have ben knowen.” He replies, “Me repenteth . . . that ever I cam within this countrey; but 
I maye not torne now ageyne for shame, and what aventure shalle falle to me, be it lyf or dethe, I 
wille take the adventure that shalle come to me” (89). The invocation of God is missing here not 
necessarily because Balin’s misadventures have convinced him that everything is chance after 
all—he will ask for and receive last rites for himself and his brother as they die—but, more 
likely, because Balin himself can no longer pretend that providence is the only force at work, or 
use providence as a means of self-justification anymore; he is too utterly despairing now for that. 
It is no good pretending to be one of Mann’s de-psychologized knights now, unsullied by 
Bernardine duplicity; he can feel that he has lost the knack. Balin has begun to perceive that he 
has been caught, to use a metaphor written into the text, like a beast in a trap; but the trap is the 
same as it has been all along, and he is still walking into it. “Shame,” a negative manifestation of 
the same proud inflexibility that led Balin to “take the adventure” in the first place, prohibits him 
from taking any action to reverse the destructive direction of events. Here we see “shame” 
playing the merely negative role that St. Bernard warns against, a role it will assume with great 
force in the last books of the Morte Darthur, where nearly every one of the Round Table’s best 
knights is described as acting out of shame, and so ensuring their own destruction. This “shame” 
is, I propose, the shame of despair, the shame that is both unwilling to reconcile the precious 
self-image with the facts of the self’s situation, and unable to offer up a positive sense of self-
worth strong enough to override this paralyzing sense of its own inadequacy. It is not to be 
confused with the productive “shame” of contrition, which depends in the Bernardine scheme on 
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the just fear of God, and which might lead to repentance or even to something like conversion; it 
is precisely to “torne now ageyne” that has become, for Balin, unthinkable. 
 The “Book of Balin” plots the movement from presumption to despair, completing a 
narrative arc that runs, to use the terms of more contemporary theology, from voluntarism to 
determinism, over-activity to over-passivity. In the end Balin is, in Bernard’s terms, completely 
unaware of his own value; the question of “lyf or dethe” has become immaterial to him, and he is 
unable to perceive himself as having any choice between them. The self-assertiveness of “taking 
the aventure” is shown, step by inexorable step, to be the same as not wanting to be oneself at 
all: Balin’s previous assertion that he would “sle [himself] to make [Merlin] a liar”—would slay 
himself if he found out he was a certain kind of person with a certain kind of fate, in other words, 
rather than deal with the consequences—is brought to its logical conclusion in a complete 
devaluation of his own life, and in the strange claim, as he nears his death, that “my hert is not 
wery. I wold be fayne ther my deth shold be” (88). Here Balin cannot even see the heart-
weariness of wishing to die, and he can repent only “that ever I cam within this countrey.” His 
idea that the place itself is cursed represents, I would suggest, a faint romance echo of Bernard’s 
Augustinian “regio dissimilitudinis,” with its strong sense of fallen mankind as an exile in a 
realm that, through sin, comes to look increasingly alien and hostile. Completely dislocated, the 
person adrift in the Bernardine “realm of unlikeness” is as likely to kill his or her brother as to 
fight alongside him. When Balin comes to a sign of the cross set up in the road just before the 
place where he will die, he “herd an horne blowe as it had ben the dethe of a best” (88). The 
scene’s sense of unnatural solitude, and of a cursed country, gives way to Balin’s single glimmer 
of self-understanding in the tale: “‘That blast,’ said Balyn, ‘is blowen for me, for I am the pryse, 
and yet am I not dede’” (88). This is man in living death, the beast who cannot die, its natural 
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simplicity lost but its immortality nagging, the image of God defaced but still able to sense 
something of this defacement. As Bernard put it: 
Placed in honor, man did not understand that he was mud, being charmed by the height of 
that honor; and straightaway he experienced in himself what, some time later, a man from 
among the sons of captivity prudently observed, and truly propounded, saying: “Whoever 
thinks himself to be something, when he is nothing, deceives himself”. . . .Hence an 
extraordinary creature was mixed in with the herd, hence the likeness of God was 
changed into the likeness of a beast. 
(“Positus in honore, non intellexit quod limus esset, honoris fastigio delectatus; et 
continuo in se expertus est quod tanto post tempore homo de filiis captivitatis et 
prudenter advertit et veraciter protulit, dicens: Qui se putat aliquid esse, cum nihil sit, 
ipse se seducit. . . .Hinc egregia creatura gregi admixta est, hinc bestiali similitudine Dei 
similitudo mutata est.”) (35.6; I:253) 
Like the stations of the cross, Malory’s “Book of Balin” charts every stage on this despairing 
itinerary. 
 
“Making Good”: Lancelot ad imaginem Dei in “The Healing of Sir Urry” 
 Merlin comes into the “countrey” of Balin and Balan’s death the morning after their 
burial. There he makes his last active contribution to the fate of the Round Table: recasting 
Balin’s sword. Merlin fits the sword with a new pommel, asks a knight standing by to try and 
pick it up, then laughs when the knight cannot. He explains his laugh, declaring, “Thys ys the 
cause . . . there shall never man have thys swerde but the beste knyght of the worlde, and that 
shall be sir Launcelot other ellis Galahad, hys sonne. And Lancelot with thys swerde shall sle the 
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man in the worlde that he lovith beste: that shall be sir Gawayne” (58). Malory has significantly 
recast his source here. He adds “other ellis Galahad, hys sonne” to the prophecy from the Suite 
du Merlin, cementing the link between the end of the Balin story and the commencement of the 
Grail Quest. Still more significantly, he combines two swords into one. Where the Suite has 
Merlin take a second sword—Balin’s second sword, or perhaps Balan’s—and fix it in a floating 
stone meant expressly for Galahad, Malory collapses the two; it is now one and the same sword 
that is meant both to aid Galahad in initiating the Grail Quest, and to be used by Lancelot in the 
confrontation that will mark the final disintegration of the Round Table fellowship.  
 Vinaver reads this conflation as evidence that Malory did not understand the symbolism 
of the two swords in the first place. According to Vinaver, the Suite author meant them to 
represent, respectively, the “dark forces of destiny which cause the tragic deaths of Balin and 
Gawain” in the case of the sword meant for Lancelot, and the “light of salvation and redemption 
which is brought to the kingdom of Logres by Galahad and by Galahad alone” in the case of the 
sword meant for Lancelot’s perfectly pure son (“Introduction” xlvii). Vinaver does not even 
entertain the possibility that Malory’s combination may have been purposeful. Reacting against 
this reading, Robert L. Kelly has more recently argued that “Malory’s change was designed to 
shift the focus from Balin as a type of Lancelot (as slayer of one’s best friend) to Balin as a type 
of the redeemer figure, Galahad” (“Malory’s ‘Tale of Balin’” 98). But the principle effect of 
Malory’s making the two swords into one is one that Vinaver’s reading in fact brings out more 
clearly: Malory collapses two seemingly opposite symbolisms into one. Malory’s Merlin does 
not really give us a choice between “Balin as a type of Lancelot” and “Balin as a type of the 
redeemer figure”; both are kept in focus, carved into the pommel of the same sword. Neither 
does Malory give us Vinaver’s choice between the “dark forces of destiny” and the “light of 
218 
 
salvation”; both are in play, in some mysterious way, in the same material symbol that winds its 
way from the Morte Darthur’s beginning all the way to its end. 
Elsewhere Vinaver describes the importance of romance’s analogical method of 
“interlace,” the repetition and evolution of signs that gives the romance genre its sense of 
interconnectedness and inevitability. This is the method that makes a mysterious hand both give 
Excalibur to Arthur and take it back from him again; Vinaver describes it, following Dante, in 
terms of “melodies answering each other” (The Rise of Romance 122). The Queste del Saint 
Graal bends this figural texture in a more typological direction that makes it, if not an alternative 
to Scripture, at least an imitation of the way Scripture can insist both on the symbolic, irreducible 
importance of its literal events and historical characters and on the importance of the way those 
events and characters interlock with each other over time.32 This method allows the spiritualizing 
Queste author to supplant Lancelot without simply discarding him; Galahad is the melody that 
answers Lancelot, but Lancelot is the melody that calls forth Galahad’s answer: “In you is my 
beginning.” The son completes the father’s quest, but the father has brought forth the son. In the 
Queste, Galahad is the final fruit of the Round Table and also its end; but he is an end that gives 
new meaning to all that came before, an ending that does justice to the story in that it could not 
have come about without the story’s many imperfect particulars—Galahad is, after all, 
 
32 I am thinking here of Auerbach’s essay “Figura,” and of “the idea that earthly life is thoroughly real, with the 
reality of the flesh into which the Logos entered, but that with all its reality it is only umbra and figura of the 
authentic, future, ultimate truth, the real reality that will unveil and preserve the figura.” Auerbach calls this “the 
dominant view in the European Middle Ages.” This is perhaps true of works in a more monastic vein like the Queste 
del Saint Graal, but I am not sure it is true of Chaucer, Langland, or Malory. I am not even sure it is true of Bernard. 
The question of where different authors put the accent on “real reality” seems to me fraught and fascinating. 
Auerbach himself admits that this view was “in constant conflict with purely spiritualist and Neoplatonic 
tendencies” in the Middle Ages (72). He identifies these tendencies with “the so-called symbolical or mythical 
forms” whose “characteristic feature is that the thing represented must always be something very important and holy 
for those concerned, something affecting their whole life and thinking”; “this something is not only expressed or 
imitated in the sign or symbol, but considered to be itself present and contained in it” (56-7). Is Lancelot figural? Is 
the Host, or Nede? Is the eucharist? Chenu’s discussion of Pseudo-Dionysian symbolism, mentioned above, is a 




Lancelot’s illegitimate child. The meeting of Lancelot and Galahad is the closing of a circle, but 
it is also the beginning of an ascent upward and a movement forward in which Lancelot himself 
still participates.  
   Malory adopts and radicalizes the Queste author’s both symbolical and typological 
approach, insisting more strongly than the Queste author does on this element of participation 
and interdependence. The uniqueness of Malory’s symbolic imagination can be summarized 
neatly in the fact of Merlin’s stubbornly single sword—a resistance to easy demarcations and 
distinctions that would, to return to Helen Cooper’s phrase, put “an end to thought, just at the 
point where thinking ought to start.” This is why it is worth insisting on the relevance of 
Bernard’s emphasis on human duplicity and simplicity, and of Bernard’s further strong assertion 
that simplicity is native to the soul and can always be recovered. A simple split in the self—an 
insurmountable split between its Galahads and its Balins—would be too easy for Malory, just as 
it is too easy for the restlessness of Bernard, who wrote of God in the Sermones super cantica 
canticorum, “I expect that not even when He has been found will He cease having to be sought” 
(“Existimo quia, nec cum inventus fuerit, cessabitur a quaerendo”) (84.1; II:303). As Bernard 
writes in the eighty-second of the Sermones, “what Scripture says—“made of unlikeness”—it 
says not because the likeness is destroyed, but because another has been superadded. . . .That is: 
‘Their foolish heart has been darkened,’ says the Apostle; and the Prophet: ‘How has the gold 
been darkened, and the best color changed?’ He laments that the gold has been darkened, but it is 
gold nevertheless” (“quod Scriptura loquitur de dissimilitudine facta, non quia similitudo ista 
deleta sit loquitur, sed quia alia superducta. . . .Denique Obscuratum est insipiens cor illorum, 
Apostolus ait; et Propheta: Quomodo obscuratum est aurum, mutatus est color optimus? 
Obscuratum aurum plangit, sed aurum tamen”) (82.2; II:293). The “dissimilitudo” here is not the 
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sign of a natural split in the soul, but a “superadded” impurity. For Bernard, it is the “aurum” of 
simplicity that is natural; and this always must be affirmed, just as the obscuring work of 
duplicity must never be denied. Similarly, Merlin’s engraving on Balin’s sword does nothing to 
downplay the eruption of self-harm, the great “pité,” of Balin’s destructive “dissimilitudo.” 
Merlin’s actions mimic what Malory’s whole Morte Darthur tends to do: it yokes the worst, 
most apparently contingent moments together with the best and most obviously providential, and 
the best of humanity with the worst of it. Here and elsewhere, Malory balances his awareness of 
the “regio dissimilitudinis” and the duplicity of the soul with a re-affirmation of the soul’s 
essential simplicity, and so with what Mann herself describes as a “yearning for that which 
negates separation, for ‘wholeness’ – both the wholeness of the individual person, and the 
wholeness of the Round Table fellowship” (“Knightly Combat” 32). This is one of the deepest 
notes in Malory, and one that cannot be fully understood without something like the theological 
context of Bernardine “simplicity” and the danger of presumption. 
 The problem of the soul’s uneasy balance of simplicity and duplicity is played out most 
clearly in the person of Lancelot. Lancelot is too large a figure for any single reading or study, 
and I will discuss in detail only a small portion of his story: that portion in which he is most 
clearly a kind of foil for, and even a figure and fulfillment of, Balin. Kelly discusses Lancelot as 
a type of Balin in terms of Lancelot’s killing Gareth, a brother-figure for Lancelot and so himself 
a kind of Balan, doomed to demonstrate Lancelot’s duplicity and its fatal consequences. This 
overlap is important, but the carefulness with which Malory contrasts the two figures is largely 
ignored by Kelly, and has been less well described in the criticism. I should be clear at the outset 
that I do not mean by “contrast” simply to distance Lancelot from Balin, in hopes of clarifying 
that the latter is hopelessly sinful and the former really alright in the end; I am reading the tales a 
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more symbolical plane than that. I mean rather to contrast what Malory says about the soul by 
way of the two characters, and to suggest that the statements that are made in and through the 
stories of Balin and Lancelot are not exclusive but in fact co-dependent, a kind of typological 
call and response that together make up a rich, and richly Bernardine, vision of the soul as 
suspended between simplicity and duplicity, the image of God and its “superadded” sinfulness. 
This contrast is most evident in the scene called “The Healing of Sir Urry,” which is still 
believed to be Malory’s invention—at best “partial analogues” have been suggested (Norris 
136)—and which I believe to have been invented as an answer to questions raised by the stories 
of Balin and of Lancelot as Malory found them in his sources. 
 The beginning of “The Healing of Sir Urry” is remarkably similar to the beginning of 
Malory’s “Balin.” Sir Urry’s mother comes to Arthur’s court looking for help for her son, an 
“adventurys knight” who has slain the earl of Spain’s son Alpheus and so brought down the 
wrath of Alpheus’s mother, a sorceress, on his head. The sorceress has cursed Urry so that the 
seven wounds Alpheus gave him remain, and so that he “shulde never be hole untyll the beste 
knyght of the worlde had serched hys woundis” (1145). The lady who bore Balin’s sword had 
already been to the court of Arthur’s adversary King Royns, but Urry’s mother has been much 
farther; she has “passed all the londis crystynde thorow to have hym healed. . . .And that ys grete 
pité, for he was a good knyght of grete nobeles” (1146). Her description of her son directly 
recalls what Galahad says about Balin when he takes up Balin’s sword: “with thys swerde 
[Balin] slew hys brothir Balan, and that was great pité, for he was a good knight” (863). More 
striking still, Arthur’s response to this lady’s request echoes his response to the lady who bore 
Balin’s sword almost word-for-word. Beginning the test of Balin’s sword, Arthur offered to try 
to unsheathe the sword first, saying, “I woll assay myselffe to draw oute the swede, nat 
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presumynge myselff that I am the beste knyght; but . . . in gyvyng an insample to all the 
barownes, that they shall assay everych one” (62). Beginning the healing of Urry, Arthur says 
again, “I myselff woll asay to handyll your sonne . . . nat presumyng uppon me that I am so 
worthy to heale youre son be my dedis, but I woll corrayge othir men of worship to do as I woll 
do” (1146). Not only, then, does the challenge of healing Urry raise again the old fears of the fate 
of the supposedly “good knight” and of “holeness” that haunted the Balin story—Merlin finishes 
his prophecy of Balin’s Dolorous Stroke, “[Pelleas] shall nat be hole of that wounde many yerys” 
(72); it also raises these concerns once again under the shadow of presumption, which the above 
reading identified as the beginning of all Balin’s troubles. 
 Unlike Balin at the time of the test of the sword, Lancelot has dealt with presumption 
before. In a scene from Malory’s “Sankgreal” that I discussed briefly near the beginning of this 
chapter, Lancelot, “passyng hevy and dismayed” because he cannot find a way into an old chapel 
with a “fayre awter” inside (893), watches a sick man ride up to the chapel and sees the Holy 
Grail make the man “hole.” Lancelot cannot rise to go to the Grail himself because “he was 
overtakyn with synne,” half awake and half sleeping (894). It is just after this episode that he 
encounters a white-habited hermit who explains to him the nature of his fault: “And for youre 
presumpcion to take uppon you in dedely synne for to be in Hys presence, where Hys fleyssh and 
Hys blood was . . . ye myght nat se hyt” (896). This is one simple but important role that the 
“Urry” sequence plays in the Morte Darthur: it presents a good knight—and an inheritor of 
Balin’s sword—with the test of presumption, and this time he passes. It therefore responds 
creatively to its source, not disregarding the spiritual lessons of the Queste but instead re-
incorporating them into the larger Arthurian story around a more actionable ethical lesson. There 
is no question of Lancelot’s offering himself up as the “beste knyght of the world,” or arguing, as 
223 
 
Balin argued with the lady bearing the sword, that “manhode and worship ys hyd within a 
mannes person” (63), and so a knight may be better than he looks. Lancelot knows that part of 
what is hidden within his person is the potential for sinful presumption, and so he protests to 
Arthur, “I wolde nat take uppon me to towche that wounded knyght in that entent that I shulde 
passe all othir knyghtes. Jesu deffende me frome that shame!” It is not that Lancelot is 
necessarily a better knight than Balin; it is that he has failed before, and has learned from 
failure.33 Arthur must explicitly assure Lancelot that he will “nat do hit for no presumpcion, but 
for to beare us felyshyp” before Lancelot will assent (1151); he must refer Lancelot’s actions to a 
community-centered ethic of “felyshyp” that re-prioritizes the here-and-now over the Queste’s 
more purely spiritual emphasis. Otherwise he would be ashamed even to try. 
 Though Lancelot’s productive fear of the “shame” of being found presumptuous again 
seems to make the eventual healing possible, there are perhaps other, less strictly noble motives 
for his demurral. Just before he agrees to try and heal Urry, Lancelot says, “I shame sore with 
myselff . . . for never was I able in worthynes to do so hyghe a thynge” (1152). This may indicate 
that he is worried about failing for the simple embarrassment of it, or, worse—as R.M. 
Lumiansky has argued (229)—that he worries his failure will, in the eyes of the court, confirm 
the by now widespread rumors of his adultery. One of Malory’s most radical rearrangements of 
sources, his insertion of “The Knight of the Cart” episode just before the “Urry” sequence—
probably from the Vulgate Lancelot, following a series of episodes all taken from the Vulgate 
Mort Artu or its derivative, the stanzaic Morte Arthur (Norris 131)34—seems to have been 
 
33 In this point of emphasis Malory overlaps with, of all people, Langland, whose own stress on the didactic value of 
failure is almost comically relentless. In a sense “Urry” is Lancelot’s “Nede” moment; he has exhausted all his other 
options, and is finally ready to be “chasted.” 
34 Vinaver was so bothered by this re-arrangement that he placed the episode much earlier in the Morte, before even 
the Grail Quest, in his volume of selections from the Morte Darthur (McCarthy 88). 
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designed to remind the reader, and Lancelot himself, of Lancelot’s previous duplicity in 
concealing his relationship with the Queen, and of all the potential “shame” that comes with it. 
By this point in the story the Morte Darthur has demonstrated, and will continue to demonstrate, 
that shame can be destructively paralyzing; when Balin says he “maye not torne now ageyne for 
shame” (89) at the end of his story, he shows how the accumulative weight of his misdeeds has 
made him too “hevy” to move freely, like Lancelot weighed down by his sin as the Grail passes 
before his eyes. Similarly, in the last real misdeed of the Morte, Bedwere will think it “synne and 
shame to throw away” Excalibur (1239), and so lie repeatedly to Arthur about having thrown it 
back into the lake. 
  And yet, for all this, Lancelot’s “shame” is what saves him. In the context of the tale, this 
reflects a powerful sense that shame, much like “fear” in the Bernardine schema, can be 
harnessed as part of a chronology of lived ethical experience. Malory’s distinctive twist on the 
Queste’s figural patterning is to emphasize the freedom of Lancelot’s response to his experience 
in terms of the passing of time; Lancelot “is” his experience over time in much the same way that 
the Augustinian soul simply “is” its memory, but at the same time it is how he responds to that 
experience that defines who he is in the end.35 The passage of time is a major motif in “Lancelot 
and Guinevere,” from its unusually frequent identification of particular feast days—for instance, 
Urry arrives at Pentecost—to the outburst in favor of “stabylité” in love upon the arrival of the 
month of May, to Arthur’s assurance that Urry will be healed “in good tyme” (1146). There is a 
clear thematic logic to this: if “Lancelot and Guinevere” is about how Lancelot’s experience both 
 
35 As Rowan Williams puts it, “in a crucial sense (as Augustine says explicitly), memory is what I am. The puzzle is 
that so much of what I am is absent from conscious awareness. To acknowledge the role of memory is to recognize 
that ‘I’ am not a simple history to be unveiled and displayed for inspection, nor a self-transparent reasoning subject.” 
In the “Urry” sequence, Lancelot confronts the fact that he is “inescapably unfinished,” “never just ‘there’” (“A 
Question to Myself” 2-3).  
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reveals and informs his identity, then the experience of “shame” must do its productive work in 
the passage of time, in narrative. If the soul is naturally upright and simple, shame can make no 
claim on what is most native to the soul; but it takes time, and shame over time, to recover a 
simplicity that has been lost. Lancelot’s characteristic protest upon the death of Elayne, “I was 
never causar” (1097), is, in a sense, the excuse his ethical experience should teach him not to 
make,36 but in a deep sense he is right. In Bernardine terms, Lancelot does not lose all faith in his 
own inalienable “aurum”; he is never convinced that there is not something in him worth saving, 
and so he never quite despairs. And neither, as far as Malory is concerned, should he have: his 
presumption does prevent him from approaching the Grail as it heals a sick knight in the 
“Sankgreal,” but his recognition of and active disavowal of this presumption—thanks to his 
experience in time—will make him, in the “Urry” scene, a miraculous healer.37 
Before healing Urry, Lancelot prays “secretely unto himself” for the power to heal. He 
explicitly rejects the idea that this power could be, as Bernard put it, “innate in oneself”: “Now, 
Blyssed Fadir and Son and Holy Goste, I beseche The of Thy mercy that my symple worshyp 
and honesté be saved, and thou Blyssed Trynyté, Thou mayste yeff me power to hele thys syke 
knyght by the grete vertu and grace of The, but, Good Lorde, never of myself” (1152). Mirroring 
 
36 As Eleanor Johnson observes of Chaucer’s Canon’s Yeoman, “Time, like everything else in God’s universe, must 
be caused. . . .By hoping ever to race into the future, alchemists disavow the governing and comforting order of 
causality that time embodies,” rendering themselves “constitutionally unable to receive consolation” (Practicing 
Literary Theory 148). On one level—the sensus litteralis—Lancelot’s disavowal of causal agency at this point in the 
narrative does exactly this. If Lancelot has an “omitted victim” in Mann’s sense, it is clearly Elaine, whose only sin 
is to love Lancelot “oute of mesure”—a remark that, as P.J.C. Field notes, is deliberately ambiguous, as it could 
mean either “immeasurably” or “beyond what the virtue of mesure or moderation would allow” (“Time and Elaine” 
233). Lancelot’s one excuse for not marrying her is that he is not the marrying type, and his relationship with the 
Queen clearly informs his refusal. 
37 It is provocative, if only to me, that Malory is the first to give Elaine’s father the name “sir Barnarde” (Hares-
Stryker 216). It is also interesting, in this connection, that Barnarde has two sons, the healthy Lavayne he offers to 
help Lancelot in the Winchester Tournament and the unwell Tirry whose “straunge armys” almost get Lancelot 
killed in the joust. Barnarde also begins the pattern, before the later hermit, of asking for Lancelot’s name, which 
Lancelot refuses to give him. The encounter with Elaine and Barnarde’s two sons seems designed to capture 
something about Lancelot’s own sense of “radical doubleness,” and his duplicitous refusal of self-knowledge. 
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and reversing his earlier, Balin-esque attempt to disavow his agency, Lancelot enacts a kind of 
self-emptying here, a learned humility that involves shame of all kinds—fear of sin, fear of 
embarrassment, and the near-certainty he will fail—that should not be understated. His 
misgivings are deeply felt and well earned: “Never was I able in worthynes to do so hyghe a 
thynge” (1152) is not posturing, but the plain truth. He has never been a miracle-worker, and his 
experience in the Quest for the Grail has taught him that some things are indeed too high for 
even the best knight in the world. His reliance on grace here therefore comes about only by way 
of a painful realization that there is nothing else left to rely on, least of all himself. It is in this 
too, and not just as a healer of Sir Urry, that Lancelot becomes more of an imago Dei, emptying 
himself and taking on the form of a servant.38 It is this real suspension of certainty, the humbled 
step out into the unknown and into the uttermost reliance on a “miraculous suddenly” that may 
not even be miraculous, that gives Malory’s original “Healing of Sir Urry” scene its real 
dramatic force, and contrasts it so distinctly with Balin’s way of “taking the adventure.” “The 
Healing of Sir Urry” is an adventure that Lancelot does not even want to take. 
  It is my view that the whole of “Lancelot and Guinevere” builds carefully toward the 
drama of the “Urry” scene, which acts as a response to several calls, an answer once and for all 
about who Lancelot is and even what the Morte is, an assertion of providential grace and 
“miraculous chance” precisely in and through the apparently accidental particulars of Lancelot’s 
experience. Elizabeth Edwards has written that “The healing of Sir Urry does not come by 
chance, nor is it an accident. . . .Malory suggests an essentialist understanding of the world, 
 
38 Robert L. Kelly draws attention to the prominence of portrayals of Christ as humble physician in the late Middle 
Ages (“Wounds, Healing” 179). More attention might be given to the other Christ-like roles Lancelot acts out in the 
book of “Lancelot and Guinevere”: the saving knight in strange arms in “The Poisoned Apple,” and even a kind of 
harrower of hell in “The Knight of the Cart” scene. But the disclosure of Lancelot’s essence ad imaginem Dei comes 
about only by way of glancing recognitions of formal roles—most harrowers of hell do not sleep with the damned—
and so the question of who Lancelot really is is deferred, I believe, until the “Urry” sequence. 
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against the grain of story material that stresses the arbitrariness of conventional meanings and the 
accidental and non-essential relations of signifiers to signified” (Genesis 168). In Edwards’s 
view, Malory has inherited this essentialist “view of accident” from the monastic Grail Queste, 
where the wandering called for by romance adventure “may be a necessary delay . . . or it may be 
a mistake,” but contingency in itself can never spell doom for the knight who un-presumptuously 
“takes the adventure.” Edwards sees “Urry” as a counterpoint to the other tales of the book, 
which portray the encroachment of contingency into the Round Table’s world of “miraculous 
chance,” but which represent, for Malory’s purposes, little more than a “strategy for delaying the 
final hour” (173). Though I mostly agree with this, the meticulously crafted “Book of Sir 
Launcelot and Queen Guinevere,” Malory’s most deliberate conjunction of sources and original 
material, deserves close attention as more than a mere “strategy for delaying,” and “Urry” in 
particular demands to be seen as more than an interpolation of ad hoc essentialism.39 As a close 
reading of the book’s progression will show, it is ultimately a kind of essential accidental, and an 
ethically-inflected stress on the anagogical weight of experience, that the Morte Darthur’s 
penultimate book proposes. 
 At the beginning of “Lancelot and Guinevere,” Bors urges Lancelot not to flee the court 
because of a quarrel with the queen: “ye must remembir you what ye ar, and renomed the moste 
nobelyst knyght of the worlde” (1047). The question of what Lancelot is, in the wake of his half-
failure in the Grail Quest and in light of his fall back into mortal sin, is the question that drives 
“Lancelot and Guinevere,” and Malory’s sequencing of his sources creates a sense of progression 
toward an unveiling of Lancelot’s essential character. The book itself calls him “a knyght . . . 
with a straunge shylde, of straunge armys” in his initial encounter with Mador, Guinevere’s first 
 
39 Sue Ellen Holbrook points out that, unlike in some analogues, in the case of Lancelot’s healing of Urry “no 
outcome is predicted” (70). 
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accuser (1056); when they fight, Lancelot is a bare pronoun, his spear only “the othirs speare” 
(1057). Before his next adventure, when the Queen urges Lancelot not to disguise himself and 
joust against the Round Table at Winchester as he means to do, Lancelot answers, in the story’s 
one use of Balin’s trademark phrase, “I shall take the adventure that God woll gyff me” (1066). 
Lancelot presumes on providence in just the way that Balin does, taking only the adventure that 
allows him to do as he likes; he even asks his host for “a shylde that were nat opynly knowyn,” 
practically begging Balin’s fate (1067). And indeed, in the Winchester Tournament, Bors, 
Lancelot’s uncle, lodges his spearhead in Lancelot’s side and nearly kills him unwittingly; the 
threat of Balin’s fate for Lancelot hangs over the whole book, and is only narrowly avoided. 
Lancelot is healed of the wound from Winchester only when the hermit who asks Lavayne 
“What knyght ys he?” and asks Lancelot, “What knyght ar ye? . . . and where were ye borne?” 
(1075), recognizes him by a distinctive scar. Lancelot is made whole, then, at least in part 
because of an old wound; as with the healing that Lancelot himself works in “Urry,” it is perhaps 
not because of Lancelot’s sin that the healing is possible, but on a more figurative level the 
recognition and acknowledgement of a kind of un-wholeness is made a necessary condition of 
the healing.  
 With this movement toward answering the question of “what ye ar” in mind, Malory’s 
invention of “The Great Tournament” sequence, at which Lancelot fights wearing Guinevere’s 
sleeve and so is recognized this time by the court, makes good sense: the adulterous love for 
Guinevere comes closer to the surface, makes more of Lancelot known, just as the joust with 
Arthur’s knights becomes, in its second iteration, one in which Lancelot’s disguise is only for 
show. The decision to recapitulate the same tournament scenario shows Malory carefully 
emphasizing the progression of the book toward uncovering Lancelot’s identity: the repetition 
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throws the slightest differences—like the difference between wearing Elaine’s sleeve to remain 
unknown at Winchester, and wearing Guinevere’s sleeve to make himself known in the “Great 
Tournament” scene—into sharp relief. Lancelot’s answer to the healer-hermit’s question “What 
knyght are ye?” was, “I am a straungere and a knyght aventures that laboureth thorowoute many 
realmys for to wynne worship” (1075). But Lancelot is dissimulating here, pretending he is a 
“straungere” in order to hide his identity from the hermit, and the hermit’s own knee-jerk 
exclamation upon recognizing him is one the book is always driving toward: “ye ar the moste 
nobelyst knight of the worlde. . . .sir Launcelot” (1076). 
 This progression from “straungere” to “sir Launcelot” also casts light on Malory’s 
insertion of the “The Knight of the Cart” episode after the Great Tournament scene. The specter 
of Balin still hangs over some of its elements; Lancelot is specifically warned to “turne agayne” 
as he approaches the castle where Guinevere is lodged (1125). But Lancelot, unlike Balin, has a 
firm sense of purpose—as always, he needs to save Guinevere—and he affirms himself as “a 
knyght of the Rounde Table” with a “ryght way” (1125), exhibiting a positive sense of self to 
which Balin, once he has taken the sword, never again lays claim. Lancelot’s final unveiling 
upon entering the castle under cover of the cart falls little short of the “Sir Urry” sequence in its 
strong assertion of Lancelot’s identity. Lancelot leaps out of the cart and cries, “here I am, sir 
Launcelot du Lake, that shall fyght with you all!” (1127). That this declaration should be made 
within the same episode in which Lancelot’s adultery is, for the only time in the Morte Darthur, 
described openly, shows the book’s structuring schema at its highest pitch. The essential self 
comes to the surface only so far as the sin does; the uncovering of the wound is the condition of 
wholeness. Lancelot’s “aurum” is uncovered only when the extent to which that gold has been 
“obscured” is acknowledged head-on.  
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Somewhat like the chiastic effect achieved at the end of Piers Plowman, this narrative 
logic resonates with the structural idea behind Bernard’s De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae 
(“On the Steps of Humility and Pride”): “if you wish to return to the truth, it is not necessary to 
seek a new way that you do not know, but the known way by which you descended” (“si ad 
veritatem redire cupis, non necesse sit viam quaerere novam quam non nosti, sed notam qua 
descendisti”) (X.27; III:37). It is only by acknowledging the “known way by which he 
descended,” and so by retracing his way back through the traps into which he has already fallen, 
that Lancelot can be made whole again. That wholeness must consist in a full knowledge of the 
duplicity, the “Balin,” in him; and it is felt all the more deeply, when Lancelot finally feels it in 
“Urry,” because of the extreme poles of confident self-assertion and bloody deception that were 
involved in the “Knight of the Cart” episode that directly precedes it. Balin, Lancelot, and 
Galahad are, in Malory’s Morte Darthur, rightly engraved on the same sword: Lancelot works 
his agonizing way backwards through the “regio dissimilitudinis” of Balin, backwards up the 
steps of pride that are, going the other direction, the steps of humility. The result is a stunning 
reversal not so much of fortune, as of Lancelot’s understanding of himself and of the world he 
inhabits. He climbs a very different, much more experience and self-knowledge-oriented ladder 
of ascent than Galahad’s, but the destination—the salvation of Lancelot’s soul—is ultimately the 
same. 
Near the beginning of this chapter, I compared Galahad’s humbling before Lancelot in 
the Queste del Saint Graal to Father Zosima’s bow before Dmitri in The Brothers Karamazov. 
Discussing the similarly humbling kiss that Dostoevsky’s Alyosha offers his brother Ivan 
Karamazov, Rowan Williams writes, “This is simply the reaffirmation of the ultimate presence 
of creative love within the narrative” (Dostoevsky 234). The same might be said of Malory’s 
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“Healing of Sir Urry” sequence. Lancelot’s miracle does not cure him of duplicity for good; 
Malory’s final book involves him in all kinds of deception. Neither does the formal relationship 
between “Urry” and the “Book of Balin” cancel out Balin’s fate, which Merlin had carved in 
stone with gold letters. But Malory’s intention was not to cancel out anything; rather, the 
opposite. Just preceding Lancelot’s arrival at court and the actual healing scene, the long list of 
knights who try to heal Sir Urry affords a recapitulation of the whole story of Arthur. Some 
knights merely shuffle in and out of the frame. Some, including several not actually present, have 
their histories recapitulated in miniature. Each knight fails in his turn; they are there really only 
to anticipate Lancelot and, in doing so, to recast the whole Arthur story as a long, errant quest 
after wholeness. This vision of communal wholeness that overcomes despair in Malory is, like 
the Parson’s vision of “the body of man, that whilom was foul and derk” glorified in heaven, a 
vision of immanence lifted up into transcendence, only with the terms flipped around—an 
earthly goodness that, unlike Galahad’s, can be participated in now. 
 Edwards describes the importance of “recognition” over memory in Malory in a way that 
accurately describes the movement of the whole patterned penultimate book, with its reiterated 
emphasis on the passage of time. The Morte has a “spatial memory,” she says; “It is more 
accurate to say we recognize formal relations than that we remember them” (“Amnesia and 
remembrance” 141). Even and especially in the long list of knights in “Urry,” the effect is more a 
recognition of “formal relations” than of what we tend to think of as memory: many of the 
knights we have simply never heard of before, and several of the more important ones are passed 
over without comment, only conjuring up whatever faint impress they may have made on our 
minds before they give way to the names that come after them. Nevertheless we “recognize” 
even the knights we do not know; they fit into a pattern and suggest a new wholeness in stories 
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we do not know yet, in turn guaranteeing the real weight of the ones we do. With this weight in 
hand, what we cannot remember does not trouble us: “If memory is an ‘index of loss,’ with a 
correlation between the importance of the loss and the anxious urge to substitute memories, then 
these texts are not anxious about loss; they accommodate the simplest kind of loss, loss of 
memory, without apparent concern” (144). This emphasis on “recognition” reverses the tendency 
of popular Pseudo-Bernardine works like the Meditationes piissimae and the Prick of Conscience 
to displace Augustinian memory in favor of the rebarbative book of conscience, a simplified 
ledger of the sins that calls for interminable reflections on the judgment to come in the 
anagogical futura.40 Likewise, at just the moment in the Morte Darthur when the whole world of 
Arthurian romance is about to be lost, teetering on the edge of its tragic final book, the 
affirmation of the presence of creative love at work in the person of Lancelot, and the 
“recognition” of the imago Dei in Lancelot that this presence effects, ends the worry of loss and 
the danger of despair, the most distinctive late-stage symptom of Balin’s original, disastrous 
presumption. “The Tale of Sir Urry” puts all the worry of un-wholeness on Lancelot, and 
Lancelot puts all the burden of action on his Creator; and his Creator—his “Auctor,” as Bernard 
sometimes calls Him—acts. But the real moral of the story is that his Creator has already acted. 
Lancelot is shown to have been created as naturally simple,41 a child of grace in a metaphor that 
Malory obliquely gestures toward: after he works his miracle, “ever sir Launcelote wepte, as he 
 
40 Ivan Illich has argued that in the late Middle Ages “Conscience was conceived as an inner writing, or record, and 
this idea was reinforced by the appearance in churches of statues of writing devils who note people’s sins, and by the 
image of the Last Judgment as the reading of a book in which all sins are recorded. . . .the primary implication of the 
idea of a forum internum is that the law now governs what is good and bad, not what is legal and illegal. Church law 
became a norm, whose violation led to condemnation in hell—a fantastic achievement and, I would argue, one of the 
most interesting forms of perversion of that act of liberation from the law for which the gospel stands” (90). 
41 This is why Kelly’s insistence that for Malory “the real and essential Lancelot is the ideal one,” and therefore 
“The Urry episode cannot be understood as part of a pattern of cause-and-effect development,” misses the point 
(“Wounds, Healing” 191). “Urry” is a meditation on the relationship between nature and grace, human simplicity 
and duplicity, and the ultimate transcendence of these binaries. Kelly’s claim that “Malory leaves us with two 
Lancelots” is therefore too simple. 
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had bene a chylde that had bene beatyn!” (1152). As Edwards puts it, Lancelot and the court are 
proved not to have been “disinherited of marvels” (Genesis 168); Urry’s wounds “can reveal an 
essential value in the universe” (167). The romance “miraculous suddenly” is affirmed, but this 
time not as the negation of time and its vicissitudes; it appears to Malory, as it does to Lancelot, 
as time’s ground and guarantor, the very “ground of our beseeching.” 
 Lancelot’s reaction to that graceful intimation, his weeping “as he had bene a chylde that 
had bene beatyn,” is one of the most remarkable moments in the whole Morte Darthur. To close 
with a very old critical debate, and an old question about that weeping: Eugène Vinaver says 
Lancelot cries tears of joy, because he is grateful to have been permitted to work a miracle. C.S. 
Lewis says Lancelot cries tears of sadness, because he knows his sin will still bring about the end 
of the Round Table, no matter what miracles he works. It seems to me that it must be at least a 
little of both, and that the following passage from Bernard’s Sermones super cantica canticorum 
captures some of the humbled split, the vertiginous rush of groundlessness and grace “inter spem 
et desperationem” (“between hope and despair”), at the crux of it:  
For the first likeness remains: and that unlikeness offends all the more, because this 
likeness remains. O how good the one is, how evil the other! But because they are thrown 
together, each in its kind stands out more sharply. 
When, therefore, the single soul discerns such disparity in itself . . . it is poised 
between hope and despair. . . .It is dragged into despair by such evil; but it is recalled to 
hope by such good. Hence it is that, the more displeased it is with the evil it sees in itself, 
the more ardently it draws itself toward the good it perceives in itself as well, and longs 
to become again what it was made, simple and upright. . . .Which nevertheless . . . must 
be undertaken by grace, not by nature and not even by effort. . . .It does not lack grounds 
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for hope: its turning is to the Word. The dignified kinship of the soul with the Word, 
which we have been discussing for three days, is not in vain, and its persisting likeness is 
a witness of that kinship. The Spirit graciously admits into its fellowship whatever is like 
it by nature. And certainly, by reason of nature, like seeks like.  
(“Nam manet prima similitudo; et ideo illa [dissimilitudo] plus displicet, quod ista 
[similitudo] manet. O quantum bonum ista, quantumque malum illa! Ex mutua tamen 
collatione, utraque res in genere suo plus eminet. 
Cum ergo anima tantam in se una rerum distantiam cernit . . . inter spem et 
desperationem utique posita. . . .Trahitur in desperationem pro tanto malo; sed revocatur 
in spem a tanto bono. Inde est, ut quo sibi plus displicet in malo, quod in se videt, eo se 
ardentius ad bonum, quod aeque in se conspicit, trahat, cupiatque fieri ad quod facta est, 
simplex et recta. . . .Quod tamen . . . de gratia praesumendum, non de natura, sed ne de 
industria quidem. . . .Nec deest occasio praesumendi: ad Verbum est conversio eius. Non 
est apud Verbum otiosa animae generosa cognatio, de qua triduo iam tractavimus, et 
cognationis testis similitudo perseverans. Dignanter admittit in societatem Spiritus 
similem in natura. Et certe de ratione naturae, similis similem quaerit.”) (82.6-7; II:296-7) 
In this strange moment of ambiguous promise and inarticulate recognition, Lancelot becomes for 
a moment what he was made again, simple and upright like a child. Julian of Norwich captures 
another aspect of this moment even better: “For kindly,” she tells us, “the childe dispaireth not of 
the moders love, kindely the childe presumeth not of itselfe, kindely the childe loveth the moder, 
and eche one of them other” (321). This settled, childlike trust in God is not something Malory 
directly depicts in the Morte Darthur, but the elaborately patterned “Book of Sir Launcelot and 
Queen Guinevere” culminates in a moment that opens onto this possibility. In this one scene, if 
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only then, Malory shows himself to be more than a faithful translator of the Queste and ethically 
invested “fifteenth-century layman.” In this one scene, in which Lancelot becomes suddenly a 
child, “beatyn” by the unforeseeable grace of God, Malory is himself almost a mystic. 
In Malory’s source in the Queste del Saint Graal, before Lancelot comes to his vision of 
the Grail or Galahad comes to the Grail itself, we are told a story, the “legend of the tree of life,” 
in which the Queste author sketches out his whole work’s theme. It is, in essence, the scriptural 
story of Adam and Eve, but its author makes significant additions in line with his monastic 
preoccupations. There is particular emphasis placed on a branch Eve bears with her as she leaves 
Eden behind, a branch that is imagined as a sign of great significance: 
The branch that the first sinner brought with her out of Paradise was charged with 
meaning. In that she held it in her hand it betokened a great happiness, as though she 
were speaking to her heirs that were to follow her (for she was still a maid), and saying to 
them through the medium of this twig: “Be not dismayed if we are banished from our 
inheritance, for it is not lost to us eternally; see here a sign of our return hereafter.” (223)                                                                                                                                                      
(“Cil rains que la premiere pecheresse aporta de paradis fu pleins de mout grant 
senefiance. Car en ce que ele le portoit en sa main senefoit li une grant leesce, tot ausi 
come s’ele parlasta ses oirs qui aprés li estoient a venir, car ele ert encore pucele; et li 
rains senefoit ausi come se ele lor deist: ‘Ne vos esmaiez mie se nos somes gité de nostre 
heritage: car nos ne l’avons mie pedu a toz jorz maiz; veez en ci enseignes que encore i 
serons nos en aucune seson.’”) (212-3)                                                                                                 
The “sign” here is dead, cut off. It does not signify by corresponding with anything else. Its 
significance is itself, and where it comes from. The sign of the branch, somewhat like Lancelot’s 
mysterious weeping, does not directly connect its bearer to what it signifies; but it is a promise 
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that it signifies something, some original gift still attempting to make contact with us, and that it 
comes from somewhere to which a “return” might still be possible. As another white-habited 
hermit cautions the knight who finds it, and as Bernard might have cautioned him too, it is 
important not to be overwhelmed by the sense of absence that such signs can provoke: “Be not 
governed in your thinking by despair, but comfort one another, for the tree has more of life in it 
than death” (225) (“Ne destinex plus nule chose par desesperance, mes confortz li uns l’autre, car 
plus i a de la vie que de la mort” (214)). If Lancelot learns nothing else in his many adventures, 

















Chapter 5  
Memorare 
 
Take away Mary, this star of the sea, the sea truly great and wide: what is left but enveloping 
darkness and the shadow of death and deep shadows? 
 
(“Tolle Mariam, hanc maris stellam, maris utique magni et spatiosi: quid nisi caligo involvens, et 
umbra mortis, ac densissimae tenebrae relinquuntur?”) 
 
—Bernard of Clairvaux, On the Nativity of the Blessed Mary  
 
 For Chaucer’s Second Nun Bernard is the one who “list so wel to write” of Mary, “thow 
that flour of virgines art alle” (VIII.29-30), but this dissertation has had almost nothing at all to 
say about Mary. This aspect of Bernard’s work was clearly important for Chaucer, and a study of 
Bernard’s influence on Middle English imaginative literature would be incomplete without some 
treatment of it. If, as one critic has suggested, this line from the Second Nun’s Prologue indicates 
that Chaucer may have known of Marian writings attributed to Bernard at first hand (Lounsbury 
388), there is at least one likely place he might have found them: in the collection of four 
homilies called Missus est, also known as In Praise of the Blessed Virgin Mary. A copy of the 
Missus est sermons is preserved in Cambridge Peterhouse MS 219, which, as I indicated in 
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Chapter Three, has sometimes been associated with Chaucer (Delasanta and Rousseau 320). The 
sermons were widely circulated in medieval England, and appear to have been more popular 
there than any of Bernard’s homilies besides the Sermones super cantica canticorum, including 
twelve copies recorded in the late thirteenth century Franciscan Registrum Librorum Anglie 
alone (Holdsworth 172). They therefore serve as a good place to start for deciding what the 
Second Nun might have meant by saying specifically that Bernard wrote “wel” about Mary, and 
for outlining the significance of Bernardine Marianism in general.1 
Although, as some critics have pointed out, Bernard does not discuss Mary as frequently 
as his traditional association with her might suggest (Leclercq, “The School of Cîteaux” 199), 
even in his own lifetime this association was made by some of his closest friends. In his first 
book of the saint’s Vita Prima, Bernard’s friend William of St. Thierry tells the story of a young 
Bernard’s encountering Christ in a vision just before the Christmas Vigil, when the “child Jesus” 
appeared to him “before his very eyes as the wordless Word was being born from his mother’s 
womb,” “awakening in him the beginnings of divine contemplation and increasing his tender 
faith.” At this moment, William says, “Bernard was taken out of himself so that his childlike 
love was transformed.” This encounter inspires “a little book in praise of the Mother of God and 
her son and his Holy Nativity,” since “from then on, as he confesses, [Bernard] believed he was 
at the very moment of the Lord’s birth.” The account has the ring of authentic secondhand 
reporting, as William supplies the details of Bernard’s enthusiastic recollection: “From those 
who often listened to him it is obvious that the Lord showered him with blessings at that time, 
since he has spoken about this mystery more frequently and delved into its meaning more 
 
1 Bernard’s other Marian works include his letter to the Canons of Lyon (Ep. 174; 289-93), his sermon On the 




profoundly” (7). Marie-Bernard Saïd describes the collection of Missus est sermons—the “little 
book” that William mentions—as, “Almost alone of all [Bernard’s] works,” “written not for any 
practical purpose or to answer to a precise pastoral need, but simply to satisfy the exigencies of 
their author’s personal devotion” (xiii). The account of Bernard’s Christmas vision of the child 
Jesus speaks to the saint’s most formative experiences and intimate convictions, and the Missus 
est homilies to his response to them. 
There is good reason to believe that the style of the Missus est sermons models something 
important about what Chaucer was struck by in Bernard’s Marian writings. The sermons share 
distinctive stylistic features with the possibly Cistercian De Maria Magdalena homily that 
Chaucer must have admired in his youth, in turn offering us some window into Chaucer’s tastes 
in specifically devotional literature. In particular, the Missus est homilies crescendo in sermon 
four with Bernard’s imagining himself present at the scene of the Annunciation, collapsing time 
around himself as he felt time had collapsed around him when he was a boy on the night of the 
Christmas Vigil.2 Like the speaker in De Maria Magdalena who projects himself into the past to 
speak to Mary Magdalene—“So now hear my counsel. The consolation of the angels is enough 
for you” (“Nunc autem audi consilium meum. Sufficiat tibi angelorum consolacio”) (Delasanta 
and Rousseau 330)3—near the end of this final sermon Bernard abruptly enters a register of 
direct address: “Virgin, you have heard what will happen, you have heard how it will happen” 
(“Audisti, Virgo, factum, audisti et modum”) (4.8; IV:53). He re-stages the moment of 
 
2 As I noted in Chapter Three, there is in fact a tradition, reproduced in the Golden Legend, that identifies the date of 
the Annunciation with the dates of both the crucifixion and of the creation of the world: March 25, near the spring 
equinox (Vol. 3, 100). The Missus est homilies similarly situate the moment of Annunciation at the center of 
salvation history: the eternal Word will only be conceived in cooperation with Mary’s “fiat,” which in turn repeats 
and verifies the original “fiat lux” of God’s creative act.  
3 I have used the edition and translation provided by Rodney K. Delasanta and Constance M. Rousseau in their 
article “Chaucer’s “Orygenes upon the Maudeleyne,’” cited in my Works Cited below. This edition is based on 
Cambridge Corpus Christi MS 137. 
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Annunciation and decision, as if he and his listeners were really there and Mary were still 
deciding:  
The angel is waiting for your reply. . . .We, too, are waiting for this merciful word, my 
lady, we who are miserably weighed down under a sentence of condemnation. The price 
of our salvation is being offered to you. If you consent, we shall immediately be set free. 
We all have been made in the eternal Word of God, and look, we are dying. In your brief 
reply we shall be restored and so brought back to life.  
(“Exspectat Angelus responsum. . . .Exspectamus et nos verbum miserationis, o Domina, 
quos miserabiliter premit sententia damnationis. Et ecce offertur tibi pretium nostrae 
salutis: statim liberabimur, si consentis. In sempiterno Dei Verbo facti sumus omnes, et 
ecce morimur; in tuo brevi responso sumus reficiendi, ut ad vitam revocemur.”) (4.8; 
IV:53)  
This passage collapses salvation history down to a single moment of fragile human freedom, 
marking a present moment of deliberation where eternity and temporality meet: “Only say the 
word and receive the Word: give yours and conceive God’s. Breathe one fleeting word and 
embrace the everlasting word. . . .In this circumstance, alone, O prudent Virgin, do not fear 
presumptuousness, for if your reserve pleased by its silence, now much more must your 
goodness speak” (“Responde verbum et suscipe Verbum: profer tuum et concipe divinum; emitte 
transitorium et amplectere sempiternum. . . .In hac sola re ne timeas, prudens Virgo, 
preasumptionem, quia etsi grata in silentio vercundia, magis tamen nunc in verbo pietas 
necessaria”) (4.8; IV:54).4 At the moment of Mary’s “fiat” time and eternity are interwoven, and 
 
4 It is worth pointing out that another of Bernard’s most well-known Marian writings, his letter to the canons of 
Lyons, protests against the emerging doctrine of the Immaculate Conception on the grounds that it confuses the 
eternal state of blessedness, of “festivals beyond count,” with the current state of earthly “exiles,” where the idea of 
a “retrospective” effect of Mary’s purity on “the conception which preceded it” is misleading (Ep. 174.6; 292). 
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her own word is knit to the eternal Word that is her son. To not “presume” here would be to 
despair of God’s eternal presence. Bernard’s rhetoric foregrounds the eternal “presentness” of 
Mary’s decision, attempting to make it present again for his reader.  
 As the “mediatrix of salvation” between mankind and the man-God Christ (Ep. 174.2; 
290), Bernard’s Mary makes a renewal of the covenantal Christianity that William J. Courtenay 
saw as lost in Anselmian theology thinkable again—and in a less esoteric register than the one 
that was invoked by the fourteenth-century moderni. Mary herself will seal the covenant; the 
“price of salvation” has already been “offered” to her, and she has accepted, winning the Second 
Nun’s sons of Eve back from their exile (VIII.62). Mary has in a sense already “returned” what 
was “owed,” bypassing the anxieties that mark in their different ways Piers Plowman, the Prick 
of Conscience, and the Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae. This is spelled out more 
clearly in Bernard’s sermon On the Nativity of the Blessed Mary when he asks, “But perhaps you 
fear the divine majesty in him, because although he became man, yet he remained God. Do you 
wish to have an advocate with him? Have recourse to Mary” (“Sed forsitan et in ipso maiestatem 
vereare divinam, quod, licet factus sit homo, manserit tamen Deus. Advocatum habere vis et ad 
ipsum? Ad Mariam recurre”) (7; V:279). This recommendation is implicit already in Bernard’s 
prayer at the end of the Missus est homilies, where the saint ventriloquizes Mary in a way that 
both encapsulates some of the distinctive emphases of Bernardine theology and also prefigures 
some of its later literary incarnations: 
“Let it be to me according to your word.” Let it be to me concerning the Word according 
to your word. May the Word who in the beginning was with God, become flesh of my 
flesh, according to your word. I beg that the Word be to me, not [a word] that once 
 
Bernard dubs it a “dangerous presumption” to think in this way (Ep. 174.1; 290). His emphasis here is on 
maintaining the tension between the exiled, “pilgrim” present and the eternal, eschatological state of the futura. 
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pronounced fades away, but that conceived remains, clothed with flesh and not with air. 
Let it be to me, [a Word] not only audible to the ear, but visible to the eyes, one that 
hands can touch and arms carry. And let it not be to me a written and mute word, but one 
incarnate and living, that is to say, not [a word] scratched by dumb signs on dead skins, 
but one in human form, vividly impressed in my chaste womb, not by the tracings of a 
dead pen, but by the workings of the Holy Spirit. Let it be to me as it has never been to 
any person before me and will be to no one after me. . . .I do not want it to be a word 
proclaimed to me in discourse, symbolized in figures, or dreamed in the imagination, but 
one silently inspired, personally incarnate, corporally inviscerate. May the Word that 
could not, and had no need to, be made in himself, deign to be in me, deign to be to me 
according to your word. Let it be for the whole world, but let it be to me uniquely 
“according to your word.”  
(“Fiat, inquiens, Mihi secundum verbum tuum. Fiat mihi de Verbo secundum verbum 
tuum. Verbum, quod erat in principio apud Deum, fiat caro de carne mea secundum 
verbum tuum. Fiat, obsecro, mihi Verbum, non prolatum quod transeat, sed conceptum ut 
maneat, carne videlicet indutum, non aere. Fiat mihi non tantum audibile auribus, sed et 
visibile oculis, palpabile manibus, gestabile humeris. Nec fiat mihi verbum scriptum et 
mutum, sed incarnatum et vivum, hoc est non mutis figuris, mortuis in pellibus exaratum, 
sed in forma humana meis castis visceribus vivaciter impressum, et hoc non mortui 
calami depictione, sed Spiritus Sancti operatione. Eo vidilicet modo fiat mihi, quo nemini 
ante me factum est, nemini post me faciendum. . . .Nolo ut fiat mihi aut declamatorie 
praedicatum, aut figuraliter significatum, aut imaginatorie somniatum, sed silenter 
inspiratum, personaliter incarnatum, corporaliter invisceratum. Verbum igitur, quod in se 
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nec poterat fieri, nec indigebat, dignetur in me, dignetur et mihi fieri secundum verbum 
tuum. Fiat quidem generaliter omni mundo, sed specialiter Fiat mihi secundum verbum 
tuum.”) (4.11; IV:57) 
This striking “inculcation” of Bernard’s own words with Mary’s condenses many of the themes I 
have touched on in this study: the saint’s emphasis on the “incarnate and living” presence of 
God, “corporally invisicerate” or, as Julia Kristeva describes Bernard’s Christianity, “this 
passion of the body wrenching itself—which is called love” (166); what I might term Bernard’s 
anagogical “presentism,”5 where the eternal overlaps with time in the stance of prayerful 
longing, the noonday vision of Christ’s face shimmering into focus at moments of great 
rhetorical strain and sudden contemplative rapture; and, perhaps most strikingly, even something 
like a Bernardine “individualism,” since Mary asks that it be to her as it has “never been to any 
person before me and will be to no one after me,” “to me uniquely.” If this was written originally 
to emphasize Mary’s unique place in the history of salvation, it also opens up a window onto one 
of Bernard’s most innovative themes: the uniquely “personal experience” of each soul with the 
Word, and the “visible” word, “that hands can touch and arms can carry,” that emerges from this 
 
5 The third sermon on the Song of Songs begins, “Today we read in the book of experience” (“Hodie legimus in libro 
experientiae”) (1; I:14). Bernard’s first sermon for Advent, placed at the very beginning of his liturgical Sermones 
per annum, begins, “Today, brothers, we celebrate the beginning of advent” (“Hodie, fratres, adventus initium 
celebramus”) (1; IV:161). M.B. Pranger discusses Bernard’s “hodie” (“today”) in terms of the figure of the “verbum 
abbreviatum” (“abbreviated word”) that Bernard uses to capture the unfathomable smallness of God in the 
Incarnation, especially as he arrives on earth as a child. Pranger calls this Bernard’s “paradisiacal geometry” 
(Bernard of Clairvaux 272). The word is balanced in Bernard’s work by his use of the word “interim” to signal the 
provisionality of every possible “today.” 
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encounter.6 As I hope I have shown, this theme has a long history of flaring out in unpredictable 
ways in literary texts that engage with Bernard’s legacy.7 
  After this striking passage, Bernard makes some remarkable comments on the exegetical 
approach that has occasioned his remarks on Mary’s Nativity. They grant some unusually candid 
hints into the sources of Bernardine style: 
Those who reproach me with having done something otiose and unnecessary should 
realize, however, that I did not so much intend to comment on the Gospel as to seize from 
the Gospel an occasion for speaking about something that it always gives me joy to speak 
about. If I have really sinned by rousing my own devotion rather than seeking the 
common good, then the gracious Virgin can make excuses to her merciful Son for my sin. 
Whatever its worth, I dedicated this little work of mine most devotedly to her.  
(“Noverint tamen qui me tamquam de otiosa et non necessaria explanatione suggillant, 
non tam intendisse exponere Evangelium, quam ex Evangelio sumere occasionem 
loquendi quod loqui delectabat. Si vero peccavi, quod propriam magis ex hoc excitarim 
devotionem quam communem quaesierim utilitatem, potens erit pia Virgo apud suum 
misericordem Filium hoc meum excusare peccatum, cui hoc meum qualecumque 
opusculum devotissime destinavi.”) (4.11; IV:58) 
 
6 Caroline Walker Bynum cautions that, although “the twelfth century . . . did in some sense discover—or 
rediscover—the self, the inner mystery, the inner man, the inner landscape. . . .it also discovered the group. . . 
.Moreover, these two aspects of the twelfth century go hand in hand—inner with outer, motive with model, self with 
community. A new sense of self, of inner change and inner choice, is precipitated by the necessity to choose among 
roles, among groups” (“Did the Twelfth Century” 106-7). On the other hand, “Bernard of Clairvaux and other ‘new 
monks’ stress discovery of self—and of self-love—as the first step in a long process of returning to love of and 
likeness to God” (86).  
7 It seems possible that at least some of Bernard’s emphasis on experience comes from his engagement with the 
work of John Cassian. See, for example, Cassian’s warning that “it is proved by experience that the attack of acedia 
must not be eschewed by flight, but fought by resistance” (Institutes X.25). If Bernardine “experience” is in its 
original context importantly monastic and contemplative, it may also be importantly, at its roots, the experience of 
the desert fathers. 
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Not to “comment,” but to “seize”: this recalls Henri de Lubac’s remark that “by his whole 
manner” Bernard “treats Scripture with a new liberty; with an ‘audacious liberty’. . . .As Saint 
Augustine had done in a few pages of lyric exaltation, but more habitually, he composes centos. 
He pulls the texts from their context. He appropriates them” (152). As this passage shows, 
Bernard himself was clearly aware of this. Stylistically his work is at once an innovation and a 
return to tradition, an extension of a neglected mode beyond what even Augustine had done with 
it. If the Confessions are more personal in a sense than any single work of Bernard’s, Bernard’s 
approach as a homilist is nonetheless more habitually personalized and idiosyncratic. As M.-D. 
Chenu recognized, “imbued as he was with Augustinian thought,” Bernard “allowed its outlines 
and even its vocabulary to become blurred by his own personal experience” (61). What results is 
a theology defined as much by style as by substance, marked most of all by an insistence on the 
irreducible uniqueness of each person’s encounter with the divine Word. As Bernard says of 
Mary’s encounter with the Holy Spirit, “she alone was allowed to understand it because she 
alone was allowed to experience it” (“soli datum est nosse, cui soli datum est experiri”) (4.4; 
IV:50). For Bernard there is no theological formula, no comprehensive speculative theology, that 
could do full justice to this experience. 
More broadly, and also as these Marian texts help us to see, Bernard’s legacy reacts to a 
lacuna around something like Augustinian “memory” on two fronts: in the careful attention to 
the humanity of Jesus and the need for Christians to “remember” the details of his bodily life, 
and in the privileging of experiential knowledge that leads to his celebrating Mary as a mediator 
between man and God, guaranteeing the work of God’s mercy by going sometimes “biforn” the 
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prayer, “ful frely, er that men thyn help biseche” (VIII.55-6), as Chaucer translates Dante.8 These 
two aspects of Bernard’s genuine work are brought out very clearly in two of the most popular 
short works that were often misattributed to him in the late Middle Ages and after: the 
“Memorare” prayer to Mary and the hymn “Jesu dulcis memoria” (“sweet memory of Jesus”), 
which celebrates “eius dulcis praesentia” (“his sweet presence”) in juxtaposition with this “sweet 
memory.” The “Memorare” prayer is an especially good encapsulation of Bernardine Marianism, 
and beautifully models the way misattributed literary texts may themselves serve as insightful 
critical commentaries.9 Both prayer and hymn, although mistakenly attributed to Bernard, 
capture something vital in Bernard’s authentic thought: the importance of something like 
“memory” as the place where the divine and human are most deeply intertwined, and the stamp 
of the image of God remains latently accessible.  
As I have indicated, if Chaucer did not encounter Bernard’s rhetorical approach to 
experience and memory firsthand in the Missus est sermons, he nevertheless had a close 
analogue to it in the De Maria Magdalena sermon he claims to have translated in his youth. This 
sermon vividly imagines Mary Magdalene’s moments of grief between the crucifixion and the 
resurrection, directly addressing its subject several times: “You seek him who seems to disregard 
your sorrow, who seems not to acknowledge your tears. For you call him and he does not hear, 
you pray to him and he does not listen” (“Illum vero queris qui videtur dolorem tuum negligere 
qui lacrimas tuas non videtur respicere. Vocas enim illum et non audit, oras et non exaudit”) 
(327). This sermon writer goes even further than Bernard, addressing God himself as if he were 
 
8 Chaucer also translates this passage in the Prologue to the Prioress’s Tale, and touches on similar themes in his 
“ABC” to the Virgin: “Soth is that God ne granteth no pitee / Withoute thee; for God of his goodnesse / Foryiveth 
noon, but it like unto thee. / . . . and he represseth his justice / After thi wil” (137-43). 
9 The prayer begins: “Memorare, O piissima Virgo Maria, non esse auditum a saeculo, quemquam ad tua currentem 
praesidia, tua implorantem auxilia, tua petentem suffragia, esse derelictum” (“Remember, O most gracious Virgin 
Mary, that it is a thing unheard of, that anyone ever ran to you for protection, asked you for help, or begged for your 
intercession, and was left unaided”).  
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still in the process of deciding what to do with Mary Magdalene: “Sweet master, why do you 
unsettle the mind and spirit of this woman who totally depends upon you, who totally rests in 
you, who totally hopes in you, who totally despairs over you?” (“Dulcis magister ad quid 
provocas spiritum huius mulieris et animum eius {que} tota pendet in te, tota manet in te, tota 
sperat in te, tota desperat de se”) (334). Like Bernard, the author supplements the speaker’s voice 
with constant recourse to scripture, interweaving Mary Magdalene’s address with material from 
the Song of Songs: “Who will console me? Who will point out to me him whom my soul loves—
where he has been laid, where he rests, where he sleeps? I beseech you, tell him since I languish 
for love and am exhausted by sorrow; there is no grief like mine. Return to me, beloved, beloved 
of my desires. . . .O my hope, do not confound my expectations, show me your face and it will 
satisfy my soul” (“Quis me consolabitur? Quis indicabit michi quem diligit anima mea ubi 
positus sit, ubi quiescat, ubi cubat? Queso nunciate illi quia amore langueo et dolore deficio, nec 
est dolor sicut dolor meus. Revertere dilecte mihi, dilecte votorum meorum. . . .O spes mea non 
confundas me ab expectacione mea, demonstra faciem tuam michi et sufficit anime mee”) (333). 
The emphasis on the uniqueness of Mary Magdalene’s experience—“there is no grief like 
mine”—leads the author on to the provocative assertion that it is precisely Mary Magdalene’s 
state of near despairing hopelessness that explains her precedence in seeing the resurrected Jesus 
before the apostles: “Were you wiser than they, or rather did you love more than they since you 
were not afraid as they were? Certainly, Mary knew nothing more except how to love and how to 
grieve for the sake of love. She had forgotten to fear” (“Sapiebas plus illis an diligebas plus 
quam illi quia non metuebas ut illi. Certe modo nichil sapiebat Maria nisi diligere et pro 
dilectione dolere. Oblita erat timere”) (326). Mary is also said to achieve a state beyond the 
divide between contemplative and active lives, which readers are encouraged seek for 
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themselves: “And lest perhaps you repulse him with a proud manner, incline yourself humbly 
and look into the sepulcher of God which is in you, and even if you see angels there, one at the 
head and one at the foot, that is, if you recognize in your heart steadfast heavenly desires for both 
the contemplative and the active life, which nevertheless do not guarantee the vision and 
possession of Jesus, do not content yourself with this . . . but weep, and seek Jesus in yourself 
until you find him” (“Et ne forte erecta cervice repellas eum a te humiliando inclina te et ita 
prospice in monumento dei quod est in te, et si videris ibi angelos unum ad caput et unum ad 
pedes idest cognoveris in corde tuo quasi celestia desideria tam ad contemplativam vitam quam 
ad activam pertinencia per que tamen non possis videre et habere ihesum, noli hiis contentus esse 
. . . sed plora, quere ihesum in te donec invenias”) (340-1). Even if he was not conditioned 
firsthand by Bernard’s Marian writings, then, the likely Cistercian homily on Mary Magdalene 
conditions Chaucer with an emphasis on the precedence of experience and of humility, and with 
a stylistic presentism that stresses the irreducible uniqueness of each act of human freedom.10  
As I noted in Chapter Three, Lee Patterson has seen a prophetic dimension in Chaucer’s 
Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale: the servant who “blondren evere and pouren in the fir, / And for al that 
we faille of oure desir” (VIII.670-1), red-faced and breathless in his fascination with a quasi-
magical technology he neither quite believes in nor can quite give up, is an eerily prescient figure 
for a “subjectively centered modernity” marked by a “strangely unspecifiable guilt” (“Perpetual 
Motion” 57). Eleanor Johnson makes the further observation that this may have something to do 
with the Yeoman’s being drawn into an endless flux of futurity, a space of infinite desire and 
 
10 Nicholas Watson observes that “One result of the twelfth-century reform movement’s encounter with heroic 
asceticism was that the ascetic ideal began to change under the influence of an affective spirituality that was more 
inclusive,” re-casting “the role of spiritual love” as “the power to burn away a lover’s sin in a way self-discipline 
alone could never achieve.” This influenced Chaucer’s “incarnational aesthetic.” In addition, “Affectivity also 
focused attention on the spiritual importance of the laity by elevating feeling over knowledge” (“Christian 
Ideologies” 78-9). I have argued here that the Bernardine line of influence, including but not limited to the sermon 
De Maria Magdalena, is one crucially important piece of this puzzle. 
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impossible fulfillment marked by an “inability to grasp—let alone take comfort in—time’s linear 
progression as an epiphenomenal indication of divine providence and eternal love” (Practicing 
Literary Theory 147). The tale in this respect might be roughly aligned with Walter Benjamin’s 
unpublished fragment on “capitalism as religion,” which suggests that the economic engine of 
modernity, emerging first as a “parasite of Christianity in the West,” can be characterized by a 
pervasive immanentization of a newly inexpungeable guilt: “A vast sense guilt that is unable to 
find relief seizes on the cult, not to atone for this guilt but to make it universal, to hammer it into 
the conscious mind, so as once and for all to include God in the system of guilt” (288-91). In my 
view, this process is already underway in some very popular, putatively Bernardine medieval 
texts like the Meditationes piissimae and the Prick of Conscience. Of the Canterbury pilgrims, 
Chaucer’s Man of Law represents a particularly clear-eyed, diagnostic portrait of this process at 
work, as his Prologue twists some contemptus mundi material translated from Innocent’s De 
miseria humanae condicionis into a grotesque association of poverty with guilt, which in turn 
prefaces his own tale “taughte” of a “marchant” (II.132-3). It is no coincidence, I think, that this 
tale reduces its protagonist to a passive commodity that circulates the globe like a limitlessly 
exchangeable good, and that can be protected only by a miraculous intervention in the context of 
the officially sanctioned legal machinery.11 For this reason Harry Bailey is right to call the Man 
of Law’s performance, with characteristic good humor, a “thrifty tale” (II.1165): it is brutally 
economical in the way it bends theological material toward a recommendation of pure passivity 
in the face of evil and endless striving to expunge the perceived guilt of poverty. 
 
11 Eleanor Johnson describes the “normative legal fantasy” of Custance’s trial, where the real murderer is slain by 
divine fiat as soon as he perjures himself: “This particular instance, in which the guilty party is actually slain by 
God’s hand, offers a spectacularly extreme embodiment of the legal logic that underpins the trial by sacred oath, 
namely, that God will not permit a guilty party to commit perjury. It indicates, quite clearly, that God’s justice 
underpins the native law of England” (“English Law” 516).  
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But if the Canon’s Yeoman is a prophetic figure, and the Man of Law an importantly 
diagnostic one, then the Second Nun’s Cecilia must be understood as a prophetic character in her 
own right. Firmly linked to Bernardine Marianism by the Second Nun’s Prologue, Chaucer’s 
Cecilia embodies a mixture of the active and contemplative lives that is not so much a balance 
between them as simply both of them at the same time; her activity simply is her contemplation, 
and her “leveful bisynesse” (VIII.5) completely confounds several other traditional Christian 
binaries: she is married but chaste, a preacher but a woman, converting as much with her words 
as with the sweet savor of rose and lily crowns that are at once visible and invisible, anagogical 
signs of her eternal salvation and present sanctity.12 In her name itself “Is joyned, by a manere 
conjoynynge / Of ‘hevene’ and ‘Lia’; and here, in figurynge, / The ‘hevene’ is set for thoght of 
hoolynesse, / And ‘Lia’ for hire lastynge bisynesse” (VIII.95-8); “Men myghte hire wel ‘the 
hevene of peple’ calle,” (VIII.104), as she is “Ful swift and bisy evere in good werkynge” as 
“hevene” itself “is swift and round and eek brennynge” (VIII.114-6).13 Bearing the sign of the 
busy heavens in herself, Chaucer’s Cecilia is a kind of activist contemplative, or contemplative 
activist, in a way that looks as modern in its own right as the Yeoman’s alchemical toil. One 
recent critic has complained that Cecilia never prays, at least on camera, and that her very lack of 
passivity is a problem for the interpreter (Bugbee 208); but in fact, almost the Second Nun’s first 
comment about her, after the etymology of her name, is that she “nevere cessed . . . / Of hir 
 
12 Sherry L. Reames notes that Wyclif “cited Cecilia’s example as proof that the laity could perform minor 
sacraments like consecration,” but suggests that Chaucer is “very careful” not to enter into any controversy in his 
own retelling of her tale (344). I think the category of “prophecy” is helpful for framing the way Chaucer uses 
Cecilia not as a polemical tool but as an intimation of new possibilities, and of deeper resources within the Christian 
tradition. 
13 Similarly, in a passage from the end of his treatise De precepto et dispensatione (“On Precept and Dispensation”), 
Bernard says that the “kingdom of God” that is within us in “the subtler invisibility of its nature” (“subtiliori suae 
naturae invisibilitate”) is also present in the sun and moon and stars above us and outside of us, “in the immensity of 
[its] majesty” (“immensitate maiestatis”)—“But these are deep matters and would require more careful study, not to 
mention a more studious writer and a longer work” (“Sed altissima sunt haec, egentia utique et diligentiori 
disputatione, et doctori disputatore, et opere prolixiori”) (XX.61; III:293-4). 
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preyere and God to love and drede” (VIII.124-5). On the other side of this coin, Cecilia’s active 
mastery of a quasi-courtroom rhetoric also recalls Chaucer’s “ABC” of the Virgin Mary, his 
longest devotional poem in his own voice, which pushes its source toward a depiction of Mary as 
first of all our “advocat,” a kind of impassioned, resolutely active legal defense against the 
dangers of a creeping sense of unatonable guilt (102).14 Like the Host’s, Cecilia’s name perfectly 
designates her function, rendering her an anagogical figure in her own right, one who balances 
the capacity to “suffre” wrong “as a philosophre” with the refusal to “endure” “thilke wronges . . 
. / That thou spekest of oure goddes heere” (VIII.490-2). In the ancient figure of Cecilia, a 
modern way forward is charted for the Christian whose contemplation must be always active in 
the world.15 
 In view of Chaucer’s translation of the De Maria Magdalena early in his career, it is not 
surprising that he is still occupied, in his tale of Cecilia, with suggesting creative ways around 
the active/contemplative distinction. It is perhaps more surprising that he does so with a Marian 
and Bernardine preface from Dante that he also translates elsewhere. It has not been noticed, I 
think, that this preface recasts its source to potentially implicate the figure of Bernard even more 
in the course of the Second Nun’s narrative: the “oold man, clad in white clothes cleere” 
(VIII.201) who appears to read the creed to Cecilia’s converted husband Valerian from a book 
“with lettre of gold” (VIII.202)—identified by the Riverside Chaucer with St. Paul (945)—may 
in fact recall, in the context of Chaucer’s invocation of Dante, the “sene / vestito con le genti 
 
14 William E. Rogers points out that Chaucer “introduces a legal metaphor at least three times where there is no 
suggestion of it in his original,” the Cistercian Deguileville’s Le pèlerinage de la vie humaine, and links this to 
liturgical uses (Image and Abstraction 104). A passage from Bernard’s sermon On the Nativity of the Blessed Mary 
cited above also calls Mary our “advocatus.” 
15 John Bugbee notes the “explosion of Marian-miracle stories all over Europe in the high and late Middle Ages,” 
where “Mary is almost nothing but active” (185). Chaucer’s Marian Cecilia suggests that this hyper-activity can be 
laicized and applied beyond the exceptional figure of the Virgin Mary. After all, Cecilia is specifically called “the 
hevene of peple” (VIII.104).  
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gloriose” (“old man / dressed like the people in glory”) of Dante’s Paradiso, the at first 
mysterious replacement for Beatrice who of course turns out to be Dante’s final guide, St. 
Bernard, the most famous of the white-habited monks (31.59-60). “Affetto al suo piacer” 
(“Moved to his pleasure”) (32.1), St. Bernard speaks in Dante’s Paradiso “A terminar . . . lo tuo 
disiro” (“to finish . . . (Dante’s) desire”) (31.65). He brings the conclusion the Canon’s 
Yeoman’s proto-capitalist alchemy can never reach. This is because his end is already present in 
his beginning: like the Second Nun’s Cecilia, Bernard speaks from the heart, “moved” by his 
pleasure; as he says at the end of his Missus est sermons, he has seized “from the Gospel an 
occasion for speaking about something that it always give me joy to speak about.” Dante echoes 
this manner of speaking at the end of the Paradiso when he says, “La forma universal di questo 
nodo / credo ch’i’ vidi, perché più di largo, / dicendo questo, mi sento ch’i’ godo” (“I believe 
that I saw / the universal form of this knot / because, in saying this, / I feel that my joy expands 
more largely”) (33.91-3). This is an extraordinarily daring formulation, because it puts at the 
center of Christian experience and a theologically audacious poetry the barest justification of a 
feeling, a sense of joy, that can only be verified in the kind of open-ended exchange of affects 
and experiences that is modeled in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. It makes, in other words, an 
enormous wager on human feeling, and on that terminus of desire that Dante claims the soul will 
rest in when it reaches it, “come fera in lustra” (“like a beast in its lair”); “se non, ciascun disio 
sarebbe frustra” (“were it not so, then every desire would be in vain”) (4.127-9). If the Second 
Nun’s Tale is its own kind of prophecy, it is a prophecy of a world like this: one where the 
Gospel is first of all a matter of something like Bernardine “personal experience,” wrenched out 





In the Introduction to his study of Bernard’s thought and rhetoric, M.B. Pranger compares 
Bernard’s mix of affective engagement and rhetorical artfulness with the typical site of the 
medieval Cistercian monastery: “On the one hand, there is the austere but massive architectural 
form of the buildings making up the monastic complex, with their simple geometrical 
proportions. On the other hand, there is the extreme, untamed wildness of the surrounding 
landscape. Yet it is one single image which is conveyed to the eye of the beholder” (Bernard of 
Clairvaux 3-4). In the United Kingdom, of course, prominent Cistercian abbeys like Fountains 
and Rievaulx stand now as overgrown ruins, cultural tourist sites that nonetheless permit the 
“extreme, untamed wildness” of the original landscapes to grow back over the austere, 
geometrical architecture for which Bernard was, in some instances, directly responsible.16 
Preserved in some ways more carefully but in others still more given over to unpredictable 
alterations, un-ruined sites like Morimondo and Chiaravalle outside of Milan convey different 
lessons about the specific character of the Cistercian “stylists.” In particular, the monastery at 
Chiaravalle, a personal foundation of St. Bernard’s, represents an impressive organic accretion of 
the art of later eras in the life of the Order. Layer upon layer of artistic homage to Bernard’s 
foundation gathers against the backdrop of the abbey’s original design, just on the cusp of Gothic 
and Romanesque, with its distinctively flattened apse and bare mullioned windows: a rare 
frescoed dormition of the Virgin scene, attributed to Giotto’s school, with the traditional palm 
branch painted at the bottom of the lantern tower; an early Madonna della Buonanotte by 
Leonardo’s disciple Bernardino Luini in the southern transcript leading up to Bramante’s 
cloister; an intricately carved wooden choir, dating to the early seventeenth-century, representing 
 
16 Fontenay Abbey is one foundation of which Bernard is supposed to have been directly involved in the design. 
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a three-dimensional scene from the life of Bernard in every stall; and even an elaborate family 
tree of the Cistercian Order, featuring Bernard and William seated among the leaves, also in the 
southern transept, part of a later series of Baroque frescoes that were completed around the same 
time as the choir. The incongruity of this cento-esque collage of artworks belies its deep 
resonance with the spirit and style of Bernard: a return to simplicity that is at the same time “a 
sudden inflation of this language of ‘sweetness,’ tied to a more pronounced interiorization of the 
mystery” (de Lubac 173). The apparent austerity and formal rigor of the Cistercian movement 
has to be understood alongside the explosive inventiveness of its literary style, and of the new 
“spirit of freedom” that moved through it. If the interiors of Cistercian churches are most often 
bare and unadorned, it is at least in part because they are meant to be a blank canvas, an empty 
page on which to write something new. 
 The dormition of the Virgin scene is especially striking. Due to differences in Catholic 
and Orthodox thinking on the question of whether Mary died before she was taken up to heaven, 
it is rare to find it depicted in a western church. Depictions of Mary’s Assumption into heaven 
are far more common. But its presence in a church of Bernard’s founding captures something 
essential about Bernard’s theological emphases, and what I have described in Chapter Two as his 
peculiarly linguistic, capacious, sign-based view of sacramental theology. Even Mary, Bernard 
reminds his listener in the sermon for her Nativity, does not get exactly what she asked for: “She 
had asked that the full light of midday, where the bridegroom finds pasture, should be disclosed 
to her, but it was kept back, and instead of the full light she received the shadow, and instead of 
fullness the taste” (“Lucem quippe meridianam, ubi pascit sponsus, sibi petierat indicari; sed 
repressa est, et pro plenitudine luminis umbram, pro satietate interim gustum recepit”) (2; 
V:276). Yet for Bernard, Mary’s inhabiting this “eschatological tension” occasions, at least as 
255 
 
much as it does a sense of deprivation and rebuff, a delicate celebration of the in-betweenness of 
memory. In this state, “[the bride] knows that if she is faithful in the shadows of memory she will 
beyond doubt attain to the light of his presence” (“Novit enim quod si fidelis fuerit in umbra 
memoriae, lucem praesentiae sine dubio obtinebit”) (13; V:284); “Jesus always loves the middle 
place” (“Amat semper media Iesus”) (17; V:287). At the beginning of the sermon on Mary’s 
Nativity, the figure of Mary embodies for Bernard this state of in-betweenness: 
The heavens cherish the presence of the fruitful Virgin, and the earth venerates her 
memory. Thus all her goodness is shown there, and here is found its remembrance: there 
is fullness, here a poor offering of the first fruits; there is the substance, here only the 
name. . . .Would you know why her name and memory are among us and the reality in 
heaven? Thus shall you pray, he said: Our Father, who are in heaven, hallowed be your 
name. Faithful is the prayer whose very beginning reminds us both of our divine adoption 
and of our sojourning on earth. 
(“Fecundae Virginis amplectitur caelum praesentiam, terra memoriam veneratur. Sic 
nimirum totius boni illic exhibitio, hic recordatio invenitur: ibi satietas, hic tenuis 
quaedam libatio primitiarum; ibi res, et hic nomen. . . .Vis scire quia nomen et memoriale 
eius in nobis est, praesentia in excelso? Sic Orabitis, iniquit: Pater noster, qui es in caelis, 
sanctificetur nomen tuum. Fidelis oratio, cuius ipsa primordia et divinae adoptionis, et 
terrenae peregrinationis admoneant.”) (1; V:275) 
The figure of Mary is re-imagined here as the paradigmatic sign, a “memory” that reminds us of 
both our “divine adoption” and of our present incompleteness.17 On the theme of Mary Bernard’s 
 
17 M.B. Pranger claims that for Bernard Mary represents “a certain terrestrial purity which connects us with the 
divine,” the “link between the divine presence and the realm of shadows in which we live. However, her position . . . 
does more than mediate between light and darkness, reality and shadow. . . .she holds together the notions of desire 
and fulfilment, daylight turned into darkness, midday sleep into violence. . . .It is precisely within this context that 
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teaching on self-knowledge and conscience, harsh as it is in some places and harsher as it 
became in the history of his influence, softens and grow more confident, as if another Bernardine 
Christianity were hidden in the figure of Mary, the sleeping Mother of God whose memory fills 
the earth:  
What else do we want, brothers? Let us ask for grace, and let us ask through Mary, 
because she finds what she seeks, and she cannot be disappointed. Let us ask for grace, 
but grace from God. For from humans grace is a delusion. Let others ask for merit; let us 
eagerly seek to meet with grace. Why? Is it not because of grace that we are here? Surely 
it is of the mercy of God that we are not consumed. What are we? We are false, 
murderers, adulterers, thieves, the scum of the earth. Examine your consciences, brothers, 
and see that where sin abounds, there grace abounds all the more.  
(“Quid nos alia concupiscimus, fratres? Quaeramus gratiam, et per Mariam quaeramus, 
quia quod quaerit invenit, et frustrari non potest. Quaeramus gratiam, sed gratiam apud 
Deum; nam apud homines gratia fallax. Quaerant alii meritum, nos invenire gratiam 
studeamus. Quid enim? Non gratiae est quod hic sumus? Profecto Misericordiae Domini 
est, Quod non sumus consumpti nos. Qui nos? Nos periuri, nos homicidae, nos adulteri, 
nos raptores, purgamenta utique mundi huius. Consulite conscientias vestras, fratres, et 
videte, quia Ubi abundavit delictum, superabundat et gratia.”) (8; V:280) 
That the Christian tradition has maintained this association between Bernard and the figure of 
Mary, and gradually lost its interest in the mixed Bernardine and Pseudo-Bernardine figure of the 
 
Bernard’s concept of spiritual love can be seen as an oblique form of fulfilment. . . .not the same as languor 
hypostatized to which Gilson objected [in distinguishing between Bernard’s love of God and courtly love]. . . .It 
deserves rather to be called a new assessment of the whole process of love” (Bernard of Clairvaux 162). 
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“worm of conscience” that haunted the Meditationes piissimae and Prick of Conscience, is the 
last interpretive commentary that I will offer here. 
 
Conclusion 
Although it was not originally planned as such, this dissertation has had as much to say 
about Bernard of Clairvaux as it has about the Middle English writers examined in it. In the first 
chapter, I offered a re-reading of Piers Plowman’s Nede according to a Bernardine anagogical 
lens, arguing that the “eschatological tension” characteristic of anagogical thinking was 
responsible for the deep critical confusion around the character, and that this neglected 
dimension of medieval exegesis could help us to understand the apocalyptic ending of the poem 
better. This reading required a sympathetic interpretation of one of the sermons from Bernard’s 
masterwork, the Sermones super cantica canticorum, and an attempt to sketch a view of 
Bernardine anagogy and anagogical style.  
The second chapter tied this reading of Piers Plowman back into the context of 
fourteenth-century theology, especially the turn toward the priority of affect and experience for 
which Bernard was one of the great inspirations, and a lingering dissatisfaction with non-
covenantal modes of imagining God’s relationship with his creation. I offered a new reading of 
the figure of Conscience in Piers Plowman in terms of, and somewhat in opposition to, this 
theological background. I then turned to Bernard’s crusade preaching, and to its influence on the 
songs of Jaufre Rudel, to illustrate the influential Bernardine dualism that often existed uneasily 
alongside this more covenantal emphasis. This also helped me to ground my readings of 
Bernard’s presence in later texts in a case of significant, possibly direct influence. 
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As a hinge at the center of the dissertation, the Pseudo-Bernardine Meditationes piissimae 
opened up avenues to understanding what I have called the “figure of Bernard” in Middle 
English imaginative literature with a greater complexity and nuance. Between the end of Chapter 
Two and the beginning of Chapter Three, I demonstrated how this influential text helped inform 
the idea of Bernard as preaching constantly on the themes of contemptus mundi, chastened self-
understanding, and the terrors of judgment day. This forbidding figure appears in the widely 
circulated Prick of Conscience and in Piers Plowman, and acts as a useful foil for understanding 
Chaucer’s original theological contributions and the way they shape The Canterbury Tales. I 
argued that Chaucer should be understood as a “counter-theologian” with an ambitious, if 
playfully articulated, theological agenda, which his enigmatic figure of the Host in particular 
embodies, and which shares certain key sympathies with Bernard’s authentic work.   
In my fourth chapter, I returned to the method of Chapter One to apply another 
Bernardine interpretive “lens,” this time one having to do more with self-knowledge and with the 
specific problems of presumption and despair, as a way to understand what Malory was doing 
with some of his most original source adaptations and additions in the Morte Darthur. I agreed 
with previous critical judgments in seeing Malory as a somewhat typical fifteenth-century 
layman, but attempted to show how distinctively “lay” and nuanced theological preoccupations 
nonetheless fundamentally shaped his remarkably complex source use. Though I did not have the 
time to elaborate this at adequate length, I also suggested that Julian of Norwich could be 
understood as a particularly useful source for understanding the way Bernardine thought evolved 
and transformed in later vernacular literature.  
 Every step of the way, I have been surprised by Bernard. I have become convinced that 
both as a thinker and as a rhetorician, he is far more important for the late Middle Ages in 
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England than has been generally acknowledged, at least in my own field of literary criticism. His 
great advantage, in my view, was his intellectual and rhetorical flexibility—or, put more tritely, 
the fact that he doesn’t really make sense. Making not “sense” but “room,” in Rowan Williams’s 
phrase from my epigraph, Bernard’s writings are therefore not just influential but really 
generative, encouraging his literary heirs to go beyond him with the same “audacity” he modeled 
in his own work. Even the forbidding, quasi-dualistic Bernard that emerged in the shadow of the 
Meditationes piissimae was a challenge to its readers, a gauntlet thrown down that later authors 
had to either pick up or work around. 
The extent to which this has become a study of Bernard as much as a study of Langland, 
Chaucer, and Malory, is indicative of its methodological commitments. Combining Nicolette 
Zeeman’s idea of ‘imaginative theory” as embodied in literary texts with Barbara Newman’s 
suggestion that we must understand late medieval literature in terms of a culture of sacred and 
secular “crossover,” I have crossed over Bernardine theories with those of Middle English 
vernacular authors, noting points of possibly direct or indirect contact but also, especially in the 
case of Chaucer’s Host and of Malory, arguing for a deeper understanding of the way that late 
medieval imaginative texts can be theologically informed, even when they do not explicitly 
engage with theological sources. Whether the method works or not in my view depends almost 
entirely on whether it helps to make these vernacular authors not just more legible but more 
interesting, more striking, as if we were reading them for the first time.  
This dissertation has shown that crossing Bernard over with vernacular literature can 
make both the literature and the theology strange and new. I did not mean to treat the saint as a 
static theorist whose ideas could be simply “applied” to the literary texts I examined, but rather 
to capture the dynamism of Bernardine thought in action in its influence in later works of 
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imaginative literature, and to capture some of creativity of the responses his work directly or 
indirectly elicited. I have described a dialogue and a series of creative re-purposings, not a set of 
straightforward applications. If Bernard was widely considered, as Robert of Basevorn 
considered him, one of the three great preachers after Christ and St. Paul, it is no surprise that his 
literary presence in the late Middle Ages was as widespread and deeply “inculcated” as I have 
found it to be. It is a body of work that, like Julian of Norwich’s, asks to be “performed,” and 
that is perhaps still in a sense unfinished. The Cistercian turn inward, which Bernard himself 
explains in terms of the idea that the Kingdom of God is “already there within, but not yet 
appearing” (“intus iam manens, sed nondum apparens”) (XX.61; III:293-4),18 models an ethic of 
self-knowledge, simplicity, and humility that still has something to say to contemporary 
theology, ethics, and aesthetics. 
Each chapter of this dissertation has suggested avenues for inquiry that I have not been 
able to explore myself. The first chapter is perhaps the most self-contained, but its intervention in 
a long-standing critical controversy invites further reflection on anagogical thinking in the late 
Middle Ages, and the way our own exegetical horizons may still be conditioned by scholastic 
modes of reading that tend to collapse the “eschatological tension” embodied in apocalyptic 
figures like Langland’s Nede. My second chapter asks for a re-appraisal of the widely 
acknowledged turn to affect in fourteenth-century vernacular theology, suggesting that the 
Bernardine strain was more important than has been realized, and that this strain remains latent 
in important ways all the way up to the Reformation and beyond, not just in its well-known 
emphasis on the humanity of Christ but also in its balanced stress on interiority and on the 
covenantal nature of God’s commitment to his creation. This chapter, in conjunction with the 
 




beginning of the third, also suggests that a translation of the Meditationes piissimae de 
cognitione humanae conditionis—which would probably require a new edition of the text as 
well—might be very useful for making the landscape of fourteenth-century vernacular theology 
more intelligible, since it fundamentally shapes the Prick of Conscience and provides a pivotal 
moment for Piers Plowman. 
My third chapter serves almost as an Introduction to another work, a thorough reading of 
Chaucer’s theological sympathies and the way they inform his literary gambles. A longer 
treatment could deal with the influence of the work of the Cistercian Guillaume de Deguileville 
on Chaucer, which might also help to expand the scope of this study beyond Bernard to other 
influential Cistercian writers like Isaac of Stella and Aelred of Rievaulx. Significant theological 
aspects of Chaucer’s work, like his alleged translation of the sermon De Maria Magdalena, his 
“ABC” to the Virgin Mary and his Marian devotion in general, and his relationship with the anti-
Wycliffite philosopher Ralph Strode, remain somewhat sidelined topics in Chaucer studies, 
mostly confined to brief examinations in one-off articles separated by decades. If the “Host” is a 
eucharistic pun that Chaucer makes on purpose, then the theological horizons of his work are 
blown wide open, and further research is necessary. 
My fourth chapter is, like Chapter One, a bit more self-contained, but its occasional use 
of Julian of Norwich’s theology as a reference point suggests what is perhaps the most 
conspicuously omitted line of inquiry here: the question of Bernard’s influence on vernacular 
theological and devotional, as opposed to what I have called “imaginative,” literature, from 
Julian to Richard Rolle and Walter Hilton to the Ancrene Wisse, which is much more explicitly 
shaped by Bernard’s Sermones super cantica canticorum than anything I have examined here. 
This supplementary study could culminate with Nicholas Love’s Mirror of the Blessed Life of 
262 
 
Jesus Christ, a heavily Bernardine text that massively expands on the sense of Bernard’s 
devotion to the humanity of Jesus, a central facet of Bernard’s reputation in medieval Europe but 
not one that I explored at any length in this dissertation. This would involve it in more 
intellectual-historical questions about the pedagogical and ideological purposes of such writing, 
as Love’s text is well known for its anti-Lollard, hyper-orthodox agenda. It could also do more 
justice to the way theological and devotional texts can “cross over” with the imaginative works I 
have paid close attention to here, and to the way the line between Latin and vernacular tends to 
blur in works that so deeply inculcate Bernard’s and others’ voices as to confound linguistic 
boundaries.  
 My shorter, supplementary fifth chapter above examines Bernard’s work in terms of his 
later reputation for Marian devotion, especially as it manifests in Chaucer’s Second Nun’s Tale. 
In arguing that the “figure of Bernard” looms larger in this particular tale than has been noticed, 
and that the figure of Cecilia is intended to be in a sense prophetic, I raise larger theological 
questions, beyond the scope of this dissertation and of my field: why exactly is Bernardine 
Marianism, in a mix of authentic works and apocryphal texts like the “Memorare,” the strand of 
his work that survives the most strongly in Chaucer’s time and our own? What does Marianism, 
in the work of St. Bernard and elsewhere, really mean, and how was it related to Bernard’s 
innovations in literary style? And what—to risk a more than academic question—might other 
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